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
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
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
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THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

No. 1—January, 1906.

I.

TERTULLIAN AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY.

SECOND ARTICLE.

IN the last number of this REVIEW* it was pointed out that any approach which Tertullian may have made toward formulating a doctrine of a really immanent Trinity will be revealed by attending to the responses he makes to five questions. These questions are: (1) Whether he intends a real distinction of persons, in the philosophical sense of the term, by the distinction he makes between the divine "persons"; (2) Whether he supposes this distinction of persons to belong to the essential mode of the divine existence, or to have been constituted by those prolations of the Logos and Spirit which, according to his teaching, took place in order to the creation and government of the world; (3) Whether he preserves successfully the unity of God in the distinction of persons which he teaches; (4) Whether he conceives deity in Christ to be all that it is in the Father; and (5) Whether he accords to the Holy Spirit also both absolute deity and eternal distinctness of personality. We shall endeavor now to obtain Tertullian's responses to these questions.

(1) The interest with which we seek Tertullian's answer to the

* THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, October, 1905, pp. 529-557.

first of these questions, great enough in itself, has been largely increased by a suggestion made by Dr. Charles Bigg, which has been taken up and given additional significance by Prof. Adolf Harnack. Dr. Bigg suggested* that Tertullian may have borrowed the word "persona" which he applies to the distinctions in the deity, not from the schools, but from the law courts. Harnack added to this the further suggestion† that the term "substantia" in Tertullian may well have had a similar origin. On these suppositions it was thought possible that Tertullian by his formula of three persons in one substance may have meant very little more than the Monarchians themselves might supposedly be able to grant. In his *History of Dogma* Harnack returns to the matter‡ with some persistency and, we might almost say, dogmatism. Tertullian he asserts, (iv, 144),§ was not dealing with philosophical conceptions, but employing rather "the method of legal fictions." "It was easy for him," continues Harnack, "by the help of the distinction between 'substance' and 'person' current among the jurists, to explain and establish against the Monarchians, not alone the old, ecclesiastical, preëminently Western formula, 'Christus deus et homo,' but also the formula, 'pater, filius et spiritus sanctus—unus deus.' 'Substance' (Tertullian never says 'Nature') is, in the language of the jurists, nothing personal; it rather corresponds to 'property' in the sense of possession, or 'substance' in distinction from appearance or 'status'; 'Person,' again, is in itself nothing substantial, but rather a subject having legal standing and capable of holding property (*das rechts- und besitzfähige Subject*), who may as well as not possess various substances, as, on the other hand, it is possible that a single substance may be found in the possession of several persons." "Speaking juristically," he remarks again (iv, 122),|| "there is as little to object to the formula that several persons are holders of one and the same substance—property", as to the other that one person may possess unconfused several substances." That is to say, apparently, when Tertullian describes God as "one substance in three persons," we may doubt whether any other conception floated before his mind than that one piece of property may very well be held in undivided possession by three several individuals; and when he speaks of our Lord as one person with two substances, we may question whether

* *The Christian Philosophy of Alexandria*, p. 165.

† *Theology and Homonymy*, 1887, 3, 116.

‡ See especially E. T., Vol. II, p. 287 note; NC., Vol. IV, p. 37, 122 sq., 144 s.

§ German. ed. 1, 1887, Vol. II, p. 37. German. as above, p. 288.

he meant more than that the same individual may very well appear in court with two distinct "properties."

The theory certainly lacks somewhat in definiteness of statement,* and leaves us a little uncertain whether its application to Tertullian's teaching results in lowering the conception we suppose him to have attached to the term "person" or that we suppose him to have attached to the term "substance." The fact seems to be that Harnack, at least, himself vacillates in his application of it. Despite the passages already quoted, he sometimes speaks as if when Tertullian says that "Father, Son and Holy Ghost are three persons in the unity of the Godhead," we should raise the question whether by "persons" he means anything more than "capacities"—that is, whether the persons were conceived by him as much more than simply "nomina" (Harnack, iv, 57; *Adv. Prax.*, 30), and whether, therefore, his doctrine was not at least as nearly related to Monarchianism as to Nicene Trinitarianism (so Harnack, iv, 57, note). On the other hand, when he says that "God and man, two substances, are one Christ," we seem to be expected to raise the question whether by "substance" he means much more than "status, virtus, potestas"—that is, whether he really conceived the individual Jesus Christ as including in Himself two unconfused natures, or only two aspects of being. The sense of confusion produced by this attempt so to state the theory as to make it do double duty—and that, in each instance of its application—is already an indication that it is not easy to adjust it precisely to the facts it is called in to explain. What we are asked to do apparently is not merely to presume that Tertullian derived his nomenclature from the law courts; but to suppose that he was not quite sure in his own mind in what sense he was borrowing it. In other words, we are to suppose that he began by borrowing the terms, leaving the senses in which he should employ them to be fixed afterward; instead of beginning, as he must have done, with the conceptions to express which he borrowed or framed terms.

The real difficulty with the theory, however, is that it seems to be entirely without support in Tertullian's own usage of the words, and much more in his definitions and illustrations of their meaning. Harnack urges in its support little beyond the two somewhat irrelevant facts that Tertullian is known to have been a jurist,

* Mr. BETHUNE-BAKER, in his *The Meaning of Homoousios in the 'Constantinopolitan' Creed*, pp. 21 sq., and especially in his *Introduction to the Early History of Christian Doctrine*, pp. 138 sq., gives a lucid statement of the theory, and adopts it up to a certain point, but remarks that "it is going too far to describe Tertullian's conceptions as in any way controlled by juristic usage."

and so might well be familiar with juristic language, and that he used by predilection the term "substance" rather than "nature."* On the other hand, that Tertullian is here speaking as the heir of the Apologists and is dealing with conceptions not of his own framing, that, moreover, the whole drift of his discussion is philosophical, and that, above all, his own explanations of his meaning—as, for example, in the illustrations he makes use of—fix on the terms he employs a deeper sense, put this whole theory summarily out of court. It has accordingly made very few converts, and has

* The introduction of "substance" instead of "nature" appears to have been due to an attempt to attain greater precision of terminology. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, Book VII, chap. vi, §11 (*Post-Nicene Fathers*, I, iii, 112), explicitly testifies that this use of "substance" was of comparatively recent origin: "The ancients also who spoke Latin, before they had these terms, that is, 'essence' or 'substance,' which have not long come into use, used for them to say 'nature.'" In an earlier treatise, *De Moribus Manich.* (388), chap. ii, §2, Augustine had made the same remark (*Post-Nicene Fathers*, iv, 70): "Hence the new word which we now use, derived from the word for being—essence, namely, or, as we usually say, substance—while, before these words were in use, the word nature was used instead." The whole matter is exhibited again in *De Haer.*, xlix: "The Arians, from Arius, are best known for the error by which they deny that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are of one and the same nature and substance, or to speak more precisely, essence, called in Greek *οὐσία*"; and again, in the *Contra Sermon. Arian.* xxxvi, "The Arians and Eunomians dub us Homoeousiani, because against their error we defend the Father, Son and Holy Spirit by the Greek word *ὁμοούσιον*, that is, as of one and the same substance, or to speak more precisely, essence, which is called *οὐσία* in Greek; or, as it is more plainly (planius) expressed, of one and the same nature." That is Nature is the common word; Essence the exact one but stilted; Substance the nearest natural equivalent of Essence. The word "essentia" was as old as Cicero (*Sen.*, *ep.* 58 *ad init.*; cf. *Quint.*, 2. 14. 2; 3. 6. 23; 8. 3. 13), but never commended itself to the Roman ear, which esteemed it harsh and abstract: it was left, therefore, to an occasional philosopher to employ and then scarcely without apologies (*Sen.*, *ep.* 58. 6; *Quint.*, 2. 14. 1. 2). The more concrete "substantia" (apparently a post-Augustan word, cf. *Quint.*, 2. 15. 34) became, therefore, the usual term in careful writing. The two are constantly used as exact synonyms: e.g., Apuleius, *Dogm. Plat.*, I, vi, writes: "The *οὐσίαι* which we call *essentiæ*, [Plato] says are two, by which all things are produced, even the world itself. Of these one is conceived by thought only, the other may be attained by the senses. . . . And *primæ quidem substantiæ vel essentiæ*. . . ." Nature was simply the popular term and was held to be less exact, and was therefore avoided by careful writers. HARNACK's notion that Tertullian's preference of substantia has some deep theological significance seems, therefore, peculiarly unfortunate. For a refutation of it on its merits see STIER, *as cited*, pp. 76 *sq.* Mr. BETHUNE-BAKER (*The Meaning of Homoeousios*, etc., pp. 16 and 65; cf. also *Journal of Theological Studies*, IV, 440) also appears to overstrain the distinction between 'Substance' and 'Nature' in Tertullian and his successors. Their preference for 'substantia' is sufficiently accounted for by the greater precision of the word and its freedom from qualitative implications (cf. Quintilian's distinction of 'substantia' and 'qualitas' in 7. 3. 6) The 'natura' of a thing suggests implications of kind; 'substantia' raises no question of kind and asserts merely reality.

more than once been solidly refuted.* In the aspect of it in which it comes especially before us in our present discussion, it certainly seems impossible to give it a hospitable reception.

If there is anything, indeed, that seems clear in Tertullian's exposition it is that he deals seriously with the personality which he attributes to the three distinctions of the "economy."† This is indeed the very hinge on which the whole controversy which he was urging so sharply against the Monarchian conception turns. Whatever care he exhibits in guarding the unity of the divine substance, therefore, by denying that any *separatio*, or *divisio*, or *dispersio*‡ has taken place or could take place in it, is necessarily matched by the equal emphasis he places on the reality of the *distributio*, *distinctio*, *dispositio*§ that has place in it, and by virtue of which He who is eternally and unchangeably one (*unum*) is nevertheless not one (*unus*), but three,—not, indeed, in status, substance, power, but in grade, form, species, aspect.|| The point of importance to be noted here is not merely that Tertullian calls these distinctions "persons" (which he repeatedly does),¶ but that he makes

* *E.g.*, briefly, by SEEBERG, *Lehrbuch d. DG.*, 1895, I, 85–87; and very copiously by J. STIER, *Die Gottes- und Logos-Lehre Tertullians*, 1899, pp. 74–78. Even LOOPS says (*Leitfaden z. S. d. DG.*, Ed. 2, p. 87): "These formulas show that Tertullian learned something in the course of his polemics, but are so thoroughly explicable as formalistic reworking of the Apologetic and Asian Tradition, that there is no need to derive them artificially from the juristic usage (against HARNACK)."

† Cf. DORNER, *Person of Christ*, I, ii, 59: "As he gazed on the incarnate Logos, he felt certainly convinced of His personality. For it was not a mere impersonal power, but a divine subject that had become man in Christ," etc. Cf. also p. 24, note 2.

‡ Chaps. iii, viii, ix.

§ Chaps. ix, xiii.

|| Chap. ii: "*Custodiatur oikonomia* sacramentum, quæ unitatem in trinitatem disponit, tres dirigens, tres autem non statu sed gradu, nec substantia sed forma, nec potestate sed specie, unius autem substantiæ et unius status et potestatis."

¶ Mr. BETHUNE-BAKER, *Early History of Doctrine*, etc., p. 130, note² (cf. *Homoousios*, etc., pp. 17–18), remarks, to be sure: "Tertullian seems, however, to avoid the use of *personæ* in this connection"—that is to say, when "speaking as regards the being of God of one substance and three persons"—"using *tres* alone to express 'the three' without adding 'persons' in the case of the Trinity; just as later Augustine, while feeling compelled to speak of three 'persons,' apologized for the term and threw the responsibility for it upon the poverty of the language (*de Trinitate*, V, 10, vii, 7–10). Tertullian has the definite expression only when it cannot well be omitted—*e.g.*, when supporting the doctrine of the Trinity from the baptismal commission, he writes, 'nam nec semel, sed ter, ad singula nonima in personas singulas tinguimur' (*Ad. Prax.*, 26).'" There seems, however, to be as frequent use of the term as there would be any reason to expect, and Tertullian explains (ch. xii) that when he speaks of the distinction as "one" or "another" it is on the ground of "personality." See the long list of passages in HARNACK, IV, 123.

them persons by whatsoever designation he marks them. The whole of Scripture, he declares, demands this of its readers: it attests clearly the existence and distinction of the Trinity, and indeed establishes the Rule that He who speaks and He of whom He speaks and He to whom He speaks cannot possibly be the same; nor does it fail to place thus by the first and second the third person also.* Only on the basis of this tri-personality of God, he urges, can the plural forms in which God speaks of Himself in Scripture be explained:† and how can one issue what can justly be called a command except to another? "In what sense, however, you ought to understand Him to be another," he adds, "I have already explained—on the ground of personality, not of substance—in the way of distinction not of division."‡

In this whole discussion, Tertullian's watchword was necessarily *the economy*: and the economy was just the trinity in the unity. Had he not felt bound to assert the economy, there had been no quarrel between him and the Monarchians, whose watchword was the unity. As it was, he required to begin his polemic against them with the distinct positing of the question: and this involved the distinct enunciation of the doctrine of plural personality in the Godhead. We have always believed and do now still believe, he says,§ that there is One only God—but—and it is in this "but" that the whole case lies—but "under the following *οἰκονομία*, as it is called,—that this One God has also a Son, His Word, who proceeded from Himself . . . who also sent from heaven, from the Father, according to His own promise, the Holy Ghost, the Sanctifier of the faith of those who believe in the Father and in the Son and in the Holy Ghost." This is Tertullian's anti-Monarchian Confession of Faith. His complaint is that men behaved as if the unity of the Godhead could be preserved in no other way than by representing the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost as the very selfsame person, thus in their zeal for the unity neglecting the *sacramentum οἰκονομίας*,|| which distributes the unity into a Trinity. On the contrary, he insists,¶ although the true God is one only God, He must yet be believed in with His own *οἰκονομία*—which with its numerical order and distribution of the Trinity is a support to, not a breach of, the true unity; because, he explains,** such a Trinity, flowing down from the Father through intertwined and connected steps does not at all

* Chap. xi.

† Chap. xii, *ad initium*.

‡ Chap. xii, *ad finem*. Cf. xxi, near the beginning. Cf. DORNER, I. ii, 24 note 2.

§ Chap. ii.

|| Chap. ii.

¶ Chap. iii.

** Chap. viii, end.

disturb the monarchy, while it at the same time guards the state of the economy. Men must not be permitted to extol the monarchy at the expense of the economy, contending for the identity of the Father and Son, whereas the very names, Father and Son, plainly declaring their distinct personality, proclaim the economy*—lest under pretence of the monarchy men come to hold to neither Father nor Son, abolishing all distinctions in the interest of their monarchy.† Thus the discussion runs on, upholding the economy against the falsely conceived monarchy, to end in the same note,‡—in the declaration that the Son, the second name in the Godhead, and the second degree of the Divine Majesty, has shed forth on the Church in these latter days “the promised gift, even the Holy Spirit—the third name in the Godhead and the third degree of the Divine Majesty, the Declarer of the one Monarchy of God, but at the same time the Interpreter of the Economy to every one who hears and receives the words of the new prophecy; and the Leader into all truth such as is in the Father, and the Son and the Holy Ghost, according to the mystery of the doctrine of Christ.” To reject the economy is, in effect, he charges, to revert to Judaism,—for to Jews not to Christians it belongs “so to believe in one God as to refuse to reckon besides Him the Son, and after the Son the Spirit”§ The distinctive mark of Christianity to him, thus, is that the unity of God is so held that God is now openly known in His proper names and persons.||

Among the passages in which Tertullian exhibits with especial emphasis the distinction which he erects between the Father, Son and Spirit under the name of persons there is a striking one¶ in which he is replying to the Callistan formula which made the Father not indeed suffer in and of Himself, but participate in the suffering of the Son. He makes his primary appeal here to the impassibility of God as such, and then falls to magnifying the distinction between the Father and the Son. “The Father,” he asserts, “is separate from the Son, though not from God.” The meaning seems to be that the Son is the name specifically of the incarnated Logos, and the incarnated Logos—as God, indeed, one in substance with the Father—is, as incarnated, something more, viz., flesh as well; and on this side of His being, which is the only side in which He suffered (for the Son, under the conditions of His existence as God, Tertullian allows, is as incapable of suffering as the Father) is not one with God, but separate from

* Chap. ix.

§ Chap. xxxi.

† Chap. x.

|| Chap. xxxi.

‡ Chap. xxx.

¶ Chap. xxix.

Him. The Monarchian might certainly reply that on this showing the Father Himself, if conceived to be incarnate, might be as truly said to share in the sufferings of the Son, or the flesh, as the Son, incarnated, could be said to have suffered. If the sufferings of the flesh were not of the flesh alone, but the incarnated Deity stood in some relation to them, this would be, on Tertullian's own showing, as conceivable of the Father, deemed incarnate, as of the Son. Tertullian, therefore, attempts to help his answer out by means of a simile. If a river, he says, is soiled with mud, this miring of the stream does not affect the fountain, though the river flows from the fountain, is identical in substance with it, and is not separated from it: and although it is the water of the fountain which suffers in the stream, yet since it is affected only in the stream and not in the fountain, the fountain is not contaminated, but only the river that has issued from the fountain. We are not concerned now with the consistency of Tertullian: how he could say in one breath that the Son as God is as impassible, being God Himself, as the Father, and in the next that it is the very water from the fountain--the very substance of God in its second distinction--that is affected by the injury which has befallen it. What it concerns us to notice is, that in this illustration Tertullian very much magnifies the distinction between the persons of the Godhead. The Son is so far distinct from the Father that He may be involved in sufferings which do not reach back to or affect the Father. The stream may be the fountain flowing forth: but the stream is so far distinct from the fountain, that what affects it is no longer felt in the fountain. Here is the individualization of personal life in an intense form, and an indication of the length to which Tertullian's conception of the personal distinction went.

In another passage* Tertullian announces the same results without the aid of a figure. He is engaged in discriminating between mere effluxes of power or other qualities from God and the prolation of a real and substantial person: in doing this, he magnifies the distinction between the original source and the prolation. Nothing that belongs to another thing is precisely that thing: and nothing that proceeds from it can be simply identified with it. The Spirit is God, no doubt; and the Word is God; because they proceed from God, from His very substance. But they are not actually the very same as He from whom they proceed. Each is God of God: each is a *substantiva res*; but each is not *ipse Deus*; but only

* Chap. xxvi.

"so far God as He is of the same substance with God Himself, and as being an actually existing thing, and as a portion of the Whole."

In still another passage Tertullian is repelling the Monarchians' scoff that as a word is no substantial thing, but a mere voice and sound made by the mouth, merely so much concussed air, intelligible to the ear as a symbol of thought, but in itself nothing at all: therefore (so they argued) the Word of God—the Logos—is to be conceived not as a substantial thing distinguishable from the Father, but only as a symbol of intelligible meaning. Tertullian reproaches them for being unwilling to allow that the Word is a really substantive being, having a substance of its own,—an objective thing and a person,—who, by virtue of His constitution as a second to God, makes, with God, two, the Father and the Son, God and the Word. He argues on two grounds that the Logos must have this substantial existence. The one is that He came forth from so great a substance: God who is Himself the fullness of Being, cannot be presumed to prolate an empty thing. The other is that He is Himself the author of substantial things: how could He, who was Himself nothing, produce things which are realities, with substantial existence? Whatever else this argument proves, it certainly proves that Tertullian conceived of the distinction between God the Father and God the Son as attaining the dignity of distinct individuality. "Whatever, therefore,"—he closes the discussion with these words—"whatever, therefore, has the substance of the Word, that I designate a Person. I claim for it the name of Son, and, recognizing the Son, I assert His distinction as second to the Father."

(2) It may remain, no doubt, a question whether Tertullian did not conceive this distinction of persons to have been the result of those movements of the divine substance by which successively the Logos and the Spirit proceeded from the fountal source of deity, so that the economy was thought of as superinduced upon a previous monarchy. It is thus, indeed, that he has been commonly understood.* In this case, while certainly he would take the personal distinctions seriously, he might be supposed not to look upon them as rooted essentially in the very being of God. God in Himself would be conceived as a monad: God flowing out to create the world and to uphold and govern it, as becoming for these purposes a triad. The "invisible God" would be a monad; the "visible God"—the God of the world-process—would become a triad.

It may be that it was after a fashion somewhat similar to this

* So, *e.g.*, DORNER, HAGEMANN, HARNACK, STIER.

that Tertullian was naturally inclined to think of God and the distinctions he conceived to exist in His being; that is to say, his thought may have run most readily in the moulds of what has come to be called an economic as distinguished from what is known as an immanent Trinitarianism. It was along these lines that the Logos-speculation tended to carry him, and his hearty acceptance of that speculation as the instrument with which to interpret the deposit of Christian truth might well lead him to conceive and speak of the Trinitarian distinctions as if they were merely "economical." But the deposit of truth subjected to interpretation by the Logos-speculation was not quite tractable to it, and it is interesting to inquire whether Tertullian betrays any consciousness of this fact,—whether in his dealing with the data embedded in the Rule of Faith he exhibits any tendency to carry back the distinction of persons in the Godhead behind the prolations by which the Logos and Spirit proceeded from it for the purpose of producing the world of time and space. So loyal an adherent of the Rule of Faith might well be expected to deal faithfully with its data, and to seek to do something like justice to them even when they appeared to be intractable to his ordinary instrument of interpretation. And so bold a thinker might well be incited by the pressure of such data to ask himself if there were nothing in the *fons deitatis* itself which might be recognized as a kind of prophecy or even as a kind of predetermination of the prolations which ultimately proceeded from it—if the very issue of these prolations do not presuppose in the Godhead itself a certain structure, so to speak, which involved the promise and potency of the prolations to come,—if, in a word, the distinctions brought into manifestation by the prolations must not be presumed to have preëxisted in a latent or less manifest form in the eternal monad, out of which they ultimately proceeded.

That some indications exist of such a tendency on Tertullian's part to push the personal distinctions behind the prolations into the Godhead itself is perhaps universally recognized. It is frequently denied, to be sure, that this tendency goes very far. Harnack's form of statement is that it gives to Tertullian's teaching "a strong resemblance to the doctrine of an immanent Trinity, without being it."* Tertullian, he says, "knew as little of an immanent Trinity as the Apologists," and his Trinity "only *appears* such because the unity of the substance is very vigorously empha-

* *Op. cit.*, iv, 122.

sized.”* Johannes Stier holds essentially the same opinion. “Of an immanent Trinity in Tertullian,”† he argues, “there can be no talk, because he is absolutely explicit that a plural personality came into existence for the purpose of the world. Without the world, the primal unity would have abided. It is indeed true that the Logos and the Spirit were immanent in the unity of the divine original essence from the beginning, but nevertheless not—and this is the point—in a *personal* manner. From the beginning God, the divine original-essence, was alone; alone precisely as person (cf. *Adv. Prax.*, 5). From this (first) person, no doubt, absolutely immediately, the Logos (*ratio*, *sermo*) was distinguished as *subject*, but not yet as (second) person—he became person only pretemporally-temporally. And as for the Spirit, the matter is perfectly analogous in His case (cf. *Adv. Prax.*, 6). The Trinity of Tertullian is purely (against Schwane, p. 164, and others) economical, conceived solely with reference to the world; nothing is easier to see if we have the will to see it (cf. also Gieseler, p. 137; Harnack, I, 536; Huber, 117).” Nevertheless Harnack not only can speak of Tertullian as “creating the formulas of succeeding orthodoxy,” but can even declare that “the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity already announced its presence in him even in its details.”‡ And Stier is forced to acknowledge that Tertullian came within a single step of an immanent Trinity.§ “There needed, we must admit,” he remarks, “only a single step more to arrive at the eternal personal being of the *sermo* in God, to establish an eternal, immanent relation between the divine original-essence and His Logos as two divine personalities, to advance thence to the immanent Trinity. But Tertullian stopped with conceiving the *sermo* from eternity, it is true, along with the *ratio*,—and the discernment of this already itself means something,—but still only as the impersonal basis (*Anlage*) of a future personal *sermo*.” The reason of Tertullian’s failure to take the last step Stier, like Hagemann|| and others before

* *Op. cit.*, ii 261. Similarly LOOPS remarks: “These formulas anticipate the later orthodoxy: it is all the more necessary to emphasize how strongly subordinationist they are: the ‘economical’ trinity here is just as little an eternal one as in the case of the older theologians of Asia Minor” (*Leitfaden*, etc., 2d ed., p. 89)

† *Op. cit.*, p. 95, note.

‡ iv, 121.

§ P. S1.

|| *Die Römische Kirche*, etc., pp. 173 sq. On p. 175 HAGEMANN writes as follows: “With the last idea”—the idea namely that the *sermo* is inseparable from the *ratio*, and therefore even *before* creation God was not “alone,” but His “Word” included in his “reason” was with him—“Tertullian was advancing on the right road to the recognition of the eternal and personal existence of the Word in God. The Word has its ground in the Being of God, falls in the circle of His inner life, is

him, finds in the fact that Tertullian connected the personal *sermo* so intimately with the world that had he conceived the one as eternal, he must needs have conceived the other as eternal also: and as he was not prepared to think of the world as eternal, neither could he ascribe eternity to the personal Logos (cf. *Adv. Prax.*, 6 sq.).

Possibly there is a *petitio principii* embedded in the terms in which this reason is stated. Tertullian certainly connected the prolate Logos so closely with the world that we could scarcely expect him to separate the two. But whether that involves a similar inseparable connection between the personal Logos and the world is precisely the question at issue. The prolation and the personality of the Logos seem to be for the moment confused by our critics, doubtless because it is judged that the two went together in Tertullian's mind: but this judgment cannot be justified by merely repeating it. Meanwhile we note that it is allowed that Tertullian did conceive the *sermo* as eternally existent along with the *ratio*, and this is rightly regarded as a matter of some significance and as equivalent at least to the postulation of something in the eternal mode of existence of God which supplies the basis (*Anlage*) for a future personal Logos. What this something was Stier does not indeed tell us, contenting himself merely with denying that it amounted in Tertullian's thought to a *personal* distinction, prior to the prolation of the Logos. He uses a German term to designate it—*Anlage*—which might be fairly pressed to cover all that Tertullian expresses as to his personal Logos, when he speaks of it as a *distributio*, *distinctio*, *dispositio*, *dispensatio*: and Stier can scarcely mean less than that Tertullian recognized in the eternal mode of existence of the Godhead such a distinction, disposition, distribution, dispensation, as manifested itself in the outgoing from Him of a *portio* into a truly personal distinction when He was about to create the world. Less than this

inseparably given with Him. But he had shut himself off from the full and right understanding of the matter itself, by introducing into the investigation from the start the world-idea. He could not maintain, therefore, the full and eternal existence of the Word, without at the same time admitting the full and eternal existence of the world itself; and since this was to him an impossible idea, he could not carry through the former in its whole strictness. To him the Logos hung together with the world, and his conception of the latter was decisive for the conception of the former also. To be sure, he came near to the conviction of the eternity and the full divine nature of the Logos; but just as he was about to reach the goal, the world-idea hinderingly intruded in the way. No doubt it is to be said that his insight in this matter was injuriously affected by too great dependence on the Apologists." Again, on p. 177, summing up: "Enough: in order not to allow also the eternity of the world, he had sacrificed the eternity of the Son and taught, as a progressive realization of the world-idea, so also a progressive hypostatizing of the Logos."

would come perilously near to saying merely that the Son was potentially in the Father before He actually came into existence from the Father, which, as George Bull repeatedly points out, is no more than can be said of all created beings, all of which (according to Tertullian also), before they were produced actually, preëxisted in the thought and power of God.* By as much as Stier cannot mean that Tertullian recognized in the original mode of the divine existence no deeper basis for the personal prolation of the Word than there was for the production of the creature-world, by so much must he be supposed to mean that Tertullian recognized that the very structure, so to speak, of the Godhead, from all eternity, included in it some disposition by virtue of which the prolation of the Logos, and afterward that of the Spirit, were provided for as manifestations of an eternal distinction in the Godhead. This certainly leaves only a short step to the recognition of an immanent Trinity; so short a step, indeed, that it is doubtful whether it does not lead inevitably on to it. The question is narrowed down at any rate to whether distinctions eternally existent in the Godhead, and afterward manifested in the prolate Logos and the prolate Spirit as truly personal, were conceived as already personal in the eternal mode of existence of God or as made such only by the acts of prolation themselves. We imagine that the average reader of Tertullian, while he will not fail to note how much the prolations meant to Tertullian's thought, will not fail to note, on the other hand, that these prolations rested for Tertullian on distinctions existent in the Godhead prior to all prolation, as the appropriate foundations for the prolations; nor will he fail to note further that Tertullian sometimes speaks of these ante-prolation distinctions in a manner which suggests that he conceived them as already personal.

The whole matter has been solidly argued, once for all, in the

* *E.g., Defensio, etc.*, III, ix, 3 (E. T., p. 486). DORNER does not shrink from this assimilation of the preëxistence of the Logos and of the world: to Tertullian, he affirms explicitly, "the Son has in the first instance a mere ideal existence, like the world-idea itself" (I, ii, 64), and therefore "became a person for the first time at, and for the sake of, the world" (74). "There is no place," in Tertullian's view, he says, "for a real hypostatic sonship in the inner, eternal essence of God: all that he has tried to point out, is the existence in God of an eternally active potency of Sonship" (63), "a real potency of Sonship, . . . impersonal but already a personific principle" (69). It does not appear what purpose these latter phrases serve beyond exhibiting a possible doubt in DORNER's own mind whether it is quite adequate to Tertullian's thought to represent him as assigning no more real preëxistence to the Logos than to the world—whether, in other words, the Logos, in his view, did not exist in some more real form than mere potentiality.

tenth chapter of the third book of George Bull's *Defense of the Nicene Creed* (written in 1680, published in 1685). That this notable book is marred by special pleading, and that Bull shows a less keen historical conscience, as Baur puts it,* or as we should rather say, a less acute historical sense, than Petavius, his chief opponent in this famous debate, we suppose can scarcely be denied. In the main matter of dispute between these two great scholars, we can but think Petavius had the right of it. The position which Petavius takes up,† indeed, appears to involve little more than recognizing that the literary tradition of the Church, prior to the Council of Nice, was committed to the Logos Christology: while Bull undertakes the impossible task, as it seems to us, of explaining the whole body of ante-Nicene speculation in terms of Nicene orthodoxy. The proper response to Petavius would have been to point out that the literary tradition, running through "Athenagoras, Tatian, Theophilus, Tertullian, Lactantius," together with "certain others, such as Origen,"‡ is not to be identified at once with the traditionary teaching of the Church, but represents rather a literary movement or theological school of thought, which attempted with only partial success a specific philosophizing of the traditionary faith of the

* *Die christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit*, I, 110, where a sober estimate of the value of the work may be found. Cf. also SCHAFF, *Hist. of the Christian Church*, II, 544. MEIER (*Die Lehre von der Trinität*, etc., II, 76-77) looks upon BULL's effort to save the doctrine of the Trinity as a counsel of despair in the midst of a general decline of faith in this doctrine. Under the feeling that the doctrine could not be based on Scripture, since it is nowhere taught explicitly in Scripture, BULL undertook to show that it had for it at least the consistent testimony of antiquity. Even so, however, it was only a curtailed doctrine that he undertook the defense of. "BULL found himself also forced to make concessions; he perceived himself that he could maintain only the consubstantiality and the eternity of the Son, while allowing that differences existed as to special points—as e.g., whether the Son was begotten from the Father as respects substance: and he considers that the ground of the differences among the Fathers which PETAVIUS adduced was due to an attempt to find scholastic definitions among them. In his own faith he reverts to the pre-Augustinian period, . . . and sees himself driven back upon the Logos-idea, . . . and in this driftage we see the beginning of the destruction of the dogma even in the Church itself." It probably is a fact that every attempt to revert from the Augustinian to the Nicene construction of the Trinity marks a stage of weakening hold upon the doctrine itself. With all BULL's zeal for the doctrine, therefore, his mode of defending it is an indication of lack of full confidence in it, and in essence is an attempt to establish some compromise with the growing forces of unbelief. The same phenomenon is repeating itself in our own day: cf. Prof. L. L. PAINE's *The Evolution of Trinitarianism*, the assault of which on the Augustinian construction of the doctrine is a sequence of a lowered view of the person of Jesus gained from a critical reconstruction of the Bible.

† *De Trinitate*, I, 5, 7, quoted in BULL, *Introduct.*, 7 (E. T., p. 9).

‡ This is the enumeration given by PETAVIUS, *de Trinitate*, i, 5, 7.

Church. The measure of success which Bull achieved in explaining this literary tradition in harmony with the traditional faith of the Church—which was rather to be sought in the Rule of Faith and the naïve Christian consciousness of the times—is due to the constant reference which the writers with whom he deals made in their thinking to the Rule of Faith, of which they were always conscious as underlying their speculations and supplying the norm to which they strove to make their conclusions as far as possible conform; as well as to the survival in the final product which we know as Nicene theology of such elements of the Logos-speculation as could be assimilated by it. He was able, therefore, to show repeatedly that the very men whom Petavius adduced as teachers of the inadequate formula betrayed here and there consciousness of elements of truth for which this formula, strictly interpreted, left no place; and also that language much the same as theirs—and conceptions not far removed from theirs—might easily be turned up in writers of unimpeachable orthodoxy living after the Council of Nice. In both matters he has done good service. It is unfair not to remember that these earlier writers wished to be and made a constant effort to remain in harmony with the Rule of Faith; and that we do not obtain their whole thought, therefore, until we place by the side of their speculative elaborations the elements of truth which they also held, for which these speculations nevertheless made no place. They were in intention, at all events, orthodox; and the failure of their theory to embrace all that orthodoxy must needs confess was an indication rather of the inadequacy of the theory to which they had committed their formal thinking, than of any conscious willingness on their part to deny or neglect essential elements of the truth. And it is useful, on the other hand, to be reminded that their unwearying effort to do justice—as far as their insight carried them—to the whole deposit of the faith bore its appropriate fruit, first, in the gradual, almost unnoted passing of their theory itself into something better, as the Nicene orthodoxy supplanted because transcending it, and next in the projection into the Nicene orthodoxy itself of many of the characteristic modes of thought and forms of expression of the earlier theory—conditioning both the conceptions and the terms used to embody them which entered as constituent elements into the new and better construction. Meanwhile, to fail to appreciate this historic evolution, and to attempt to interpret the inadequate conceptions of the earlier thinkers as only somewhat clumsily expressed enunciations of Nicene orthodoxy, is a grave historical fault, and could not fail to fill Bull's book with expositions

which give it as a whole the appearance of an elaborate piece of special pleading. Only when the writer with whom he chances in any given passage to be dealing had become sharply aware—or at least uneasily conscious—of one or another of the elements of truth embodied in the Rule of Faith for which the speculation he had adopted as yet provided no place, and was really striving to take it up into his theory, make even by violence a place for it, and do justice to it, is Bishop Bull's exposition altogether admirable. This is the case with Tertullian in the matter of the eternal distinctions in the Godhead, and the result is that Bishop Bull, in the chapter in which he deals with this subject, has performed a delicate piece of expository work with a skill and a clearness which leave little to be desired.

He begins the discussion by adducing what is perhaps the most striking of the passages in which Tertullian appears explicitly to deny the eternity of the personal distinctions in the Godhead. It is to be found in the third chapter of his treatise against Hermogenes and runs as follows: "Because God is a Father and God is a Judge, it does not on that account follow that, because He was always God, He was always a Father and a Judge. For He could neither have been a Father before the Son, nor a Judge before transgression. But there was a time when there was no transgression, and no Son, the one to make the Lord a Judge, and the other a Father." Here certainly, apart from the context, and that wider context of the author's known point of view, there appears to be a direct assertion that there was a time before which the Son was not: and this falls in so patly with the Logos-speculation which assigns a definite beginning to the prolated Logos, that it is easy to jump to the conclusion that Tertullian means to date the origination of the Logos at this time. Such a conclusion would, however, be erroneous; and it is just in the doctrine of the prolation of the Logos at a definite time that the passage finds its juster explanation. It emerges that the term "Son" in Tertullian's nomenclature designates distinctively the prolate Logos. He therefore asserts nothing in the present passage concerning the eternity or non-eternity of personal distinctions in the Godhead. He affirms only that God became Father when the Logos was prolated, seeing that the Logos became Son only at his prolation. Bishop Bull animadvertes not unjustly on a tendency of Tertullian exhibited here to overacuteness in argument and to readiness to make a point at some cost: but he fairly makes out his case that in the present instance Tertullian is to be interpreted in this somewhat artificial sense—as if one should say there was a

time when God was not the Creator, because creation occurred at a definite point of time, before which therefore God was existent indeed, but not as Creator.* So God became Father, not when the Logos came into existence, but when He became a Son. By this neat piece of exposition Bishop Bull seeks to remove the antecedent presumption against Tertullian's admission of eternal distinctions in the Godhead, which would arise from an explicit assertion on his part that there was a time before which the Logos was not—that is to say, the prolate Logos. He shows that this is only Tertullian's way of saying that the Logos was not always prolate.

He then wisely proceeds at once to a discussion of the principal passage, wherein Tertullian seems to recognize personal distinctions in the Godhead prior to the prolations of Logos and Spirit. This is, of course, the very remarkable discussion in the fifth chapter of the tract *Against Praxeas*, in which Tertullian gives, as it were, a complete history of the Logos.† In this passage Tertullian begins by affirming that “before all things”—alike before the creation of the world and the generation of the Son, that is to say, the prolation of the Logos—God was alone (*solus*). He immediately corrects this, however, by saying that by “alone” he means only that there was nothing extrinsic to God by His side: for not even then was He really alone (*solus*), seeing that He had with Him that which He had within Himself, namely His Reason. This Reason, he continues, is what the Greeks call the Logos, and the Latins are accustomed to call Sermo—though Sermo is an inadequate translation, and it would be better to distinguish and say that Reason must antedate Speech, and that God rather had Reason with Him from the beginning, while He had Speech only after He had sent it forth by utterance—that is to say, at the prolation. This distinction, however, adds Tertullian immediately, is really a refinement of little practical importance. The main thing is that “although God had not yet sent His Word, He nevertheless already had Him within Himself, with and in Reason itself, as He silently considered and determined with Himself what He was afterward to speak through the Word.” Thus even in the silence of eternity, when God had not yet spoken, the Word in its form of Reason was with God, and God was therefore not alone. To illuminate his meaning, Tertullian now introduces an illustration drawn from human consciousness. He asks his readers

* See above, October, 1905, p. 551.

† This passage is discussed by BULL in Book III, chap. x, §§ 5–8. At an earlier point—III, v, 5—he had expounded the same passage more briefly, but not less effectively.

to observe the movements that go on within themselves when they hold silent converse with themselves; whenever they think, there is a word; whenever they conceive, there is reason. Speaking thus in the mind, the word stands forth as a "conlocutor," in which reason dwells.* "Thus," adds Tertullian, "the word is, in some sort, a second within you, by means of which you speak in thinking, and by means of which you think in speaking: this word is another."† Now, he reasons, all this is, of course, carried on in God on a higher plane (*plenius*), and it is not venturesome to affirm that "even before the creation of the universe‡ God was not alone, seeing that He had within Him both Reason and, intrinsic in Reason, His Word, which He made a second to Himself by agitating it within Himself." This Word, having within Himself Reason and Wisdom, His inseparables, He at length put forth (*protulit*) when it at length pleased Him to create the universe, that is, to draw out (*edere*) into their own substances and kinds the things He had determined on within Himself by means of this very Reason and Word.§

Nothing can be clearer than that in this passage Tertullian carries back the distinction manifested by the prolate Logos into the depths of eternity. It already existed, he says, within the silent God before the generation of the Word, that is, before the prolation of the Logos. He explicitly distinguishes its mode of preëxistence from that of things to be created, which "having been thought out and disposed," by means of that Word who was also the Reason of

* There may be a reminiscence here, and there certainly is a parallel, of the passage in PLATO'S *Sophist*, 263 E, where thought is called "the unuttered conversation of the soul with itself," and we are told that "the stream of thought flowing through the lips is called speech."

† Ita secundus quodammodo in te est sermo, per quem loqueris cogitando, et per quem cogitas loquendo; ipse sermo alius est."

‡ Ante universitatis constitutionem.

§ It is interesting to observe how closely Marcellus of Ancyra, in this portion of his system, reproduced the thought of Tertullian in this chapter. To Marcellus, says Loofs (*Sitzungsberichte d. k. p. Akad. d. Wissenschaften*, 1902, I, 768-9), "the Logos is eternal. . . . And this Logos of God is without any *γένεσις*. Before the time of the creation of the world, He was simply in God; the one God, along with whom was nothing, 'had not yet spoken' (*ἡσυχία τις ἦν*). When, however, God addressed Himself to create the world, τότε ὁ λόγος προελθὼν ἐγένετο τοῦ κόσμου ποιητής, ὁ καὶ πρότερον ἐνδοῦ νοητῶς ὀνομάζων αὐτόν. This προελθὼν in sequence to which came in the πρὸς τὸν θεὸν εἶναι of which John i. 1 speaks, did not, however, bring to a close the ἐν θεῷ εἶναι: the Logos remains δυνάμει ἐν τῷ θεῷ, and only ἐνεργείᾳ was He πρὸς τὸν θεόν; προῆλθεν δραστηρὴ ἐνεργείᾳ. How this is to be understood, Marcellus—with all sorts of cautions—has illustrated by the analogy of the human Logos: ἐν γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ ταῦτ' ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὁ λόγος καὶ οὐδενὶ χωριζόμενος ἐτέρῳ; ἡ μόνῃ τῇ τῆς πράξεως ἐνεργείᾳ." This reads (so far) almost like an exposition of the fifth chapter of the tract *Against Praxeas*.

God, existed "in Dei sensu," and only needed to be drawn out in their substances and kinds,—whereas He, the Word, from eternity coexisted with God as "a second," "another." All this Bishop Bull points out with great lucidity. He directs attention first to Tertullian's sharp discrimination at the outset between God's eternal existence "alone," so far as external accompaniment is concerned, and his inner companionship—so that He was never "alone," but ever had with Him, *i.e.*, within Him, His "fellow," the Logos. He next calls attention to the fact that by Reason in this context Tertullian does not mean God's faculty of ratiocination, by virtue of which He was rational, but a really subsisting *ἐννοια*—the *verbum mentis* of the schools. Still further, he animadverts on Tertullian's admission that the distinction he was drawing between the Reason and the Word was not drawn by Christians at large who, translating the Greek word "Logos" in John i. 1 by the Latin *Sermo*, were accustomed to say simply that "the Word was in the beginning," *i.e.*, eternally, and that "with God." In doing this he adverts to Tertullian's admission that he lays little stress on this distinction himself, and is fain himself to allow that the "Word" is coeternal with "Reason"—that is to say, of course, the "inner Word," not yet uttered for the purpose of creation: and further, that he allows that the Word consists of Reason, and existed in this His hypostasis or substance before He became the Word by utterance. Then, arriving at the apex of his argument, he points out that "Tertullian teaches that the Word, even anterior to His mission and going out from God the Father, existed with the Father as a Person distinct from Him." This, (1) because God is said not to be "alone"; but He only is not alone with whom is another person present. If through all eternity God was unipersonal, and there was not in the divine essence one and another, then God was alone. Hence God was not unipersonal, since He is affirmed not to have been alone. (2) Because in the illustration from human experience Tertullian distinguishes between the quasi-personality of the human inner word and the real personality of the divine inner Word. The whole drift of the illustration turns on the idea that "what occurs in man, God's image, is merely the shadow of what occurs really and in very fact in God." Finally, Bull argues that Tertullian clearly identifies the "Reason that coexisted with God from eternity with the Word prolated from Him at a definite point of time, and makes one as much personal as the other, conceiving nothing to have occurred at the prolation but the prolation itself,—the Word remaining all the while, because God, unchangeable. This argument is expanded in a supplement-

any reason which Bull gives for his conclusion by the help of a passage which occurs in the twenty-seventh chapter of the tract *Against Praxeas*. In this passage Tertullian argues that the Word, because God, is "immutabilis et informabilis"—unchangeable and untransformable: since God never either ceases to be what He was or begins to be what He was not. How, then, Bull asks, can Tertullian have believed that the Word, who is God, began to be a person only at His prolation, or, indeed, for that is what is really in question, began at that time only to be at all? From such passages, Bull justly suggests, we may learn that by all that Tertullian says of the prolations of the Logos and Spirit he does not mean to detract in any way from the unchangeableness of the divine persons concerned in these acts: nothing intrinsic was, in his view, either added to or taken from either of the two, seeing that each is the same God, eternal and unchangeable. "Tertullian does indeed teach"—thus Bull closes the discussion—"that the Son of God was made, and was called the Word (*Verbum* or *Sermo*) from some definite beginning; *i. e.*, at the time when He went out from God the Father, with the voice, 'Let there be light,' in order to arrange the universe. But yet that he believed that that very hypostasis, which is called the Word (*Sermo* or *Verbum*) and Son of God, is eternal, I have, I think, abundantly demonstrated."†

(3) There has been enough adduced incidentally in the course of the discussion so far, to make it clear that Tertullian in insisting on the distinction of persons in the Godhead—and in carrying this distinction back into eternity—had no intention of derogating in any way from the unity of God. If in his debate with the Monarchians his especial task was to vindicate the *οὐνομία*, the conditions of that debate required of him an equal emphasis on the "monarchy." And he is certainly careful to give it, insisting and insisting again on the unity of that One God whom alone Christians worship. This insistence on the unity of God has come, indeed, to be widely represented as precisely the peculiarity of Tertullian's doctrine of God. Says Loofs:‡ "Tertullian's Logos doctrine waxed into a

* In support of this take such a statement as the following from the thirteenth chapter: "You will find this," says Tertullian, "in the Gospel in so many words: 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God and the Word was God.' He who was is One; and He with whom He was is another." As it is probable that by the words "in the beginning" Tertullian understood eternity, here is an explicit assertion of a distinction of persons in eternity. Again, in chap viii, he says: "The Word, therefore, was both in the Father always, as He says, 'I am in the Father,' and with the Father always, as it is written, 'And the Word was with God.'"

† E. T., p. 545.

‡ *Leitfaden*, etc., p. 88.

doctrine of the Trinity (*trinitas* occurs first in him) because Tertullian sought to bring the Apologetic traditions into harmony with the stricter monotheism of the Asiatic theology." Similarly Harnack supposes that Monarchianism exercised a strong influence on Tertullian, "spite of the fact that he was opposing it," and remarks in proof that "no thought is so plainly expressed" by him in his tract against Praxeas "as this, that Father, Son and Spirit are *unius substantiæ*, that is *ὁμοούσιοι*";* and again, that he "expressed the *unity* of Father, Son and Spirit as strongly as possible."† We may attribute the influence which led Tertullian to lay the stress he did on the unity of God to whatever source we choose, but we must acknowledge that Tertullian himself did not trace it to the Monarchians. Though, no doubt, the necessity he felt upon him not to neglect this great truth was intensified by the fact that it was just with Monarchians that he was contending, yet Tertullian is not himself conscious of indebtedness to them for either his conception of it or his zeal in its behalf. To him it is the very principium of Christianity and the very starting-point of the Rule of Faith. Though he recognizes a monadistic monarchy as rather Jewish than Christian, therefore, and is prepared for a certain pluralism in his conception of God, all this is with him conditioned upon the preservation of the monarchy, and he has his own way of reconciling the monarchy, in which all his Christian thinking is rooted, on the one side, with the economy, which he is zealous to assert, on the other.

This way consists, briefly, in insistence not merely that the three persons, Father, Son and Spirit, are of one substance, but that they are of one undivided substance. Though there is a *dispositio, distinctio* between them, there is no *divisio, separatio*. It is not enough for him that the Three should be recognized as alike in substance, condition, power.‡ What he insists on is that the Father, Son and Spirit are inseparable from one another and share in a single undivided substance—that it is therefore "not by way of diversity that the Son differs from the Father, but by distribution; it is not by division that He is different, but by distinction."§ "I say," he reiterates, they are "distinct, not separate" (*distincte, non dirise*).|| They are distinguished "on the ground of personality, not of substance,—in the way of distinction, not of division,"¶ "by disposition, not by division." The ill-disposed and perverse may indeed

* Vol. IV, p. 57, note: cf. II, 257, note, p. 259.

† Chap. ii.

§ Chap. ix.

¶ Chap. xii; cf. xxi, xxi i.

† II, 257 note.

|| Chap. xi.

press the distinction into a separation, but the procession of the Son from the Father "is like the ray's procession from the sun, and the river's from the fountain, and the tree's from the seed"*—and thus the distinction between them may be maintained "without destroying their inseparable union,—as of the sun and the ray, and the fountain and the river."†

By the aid of such illustrations Tertullian endeavored to make clear that in distinguishing the persons he allowed no division of substance. His conception was that as the sun flows out into its beams while yet the beams remain connected inseparably with the sun, and the river flows out of the fountain but maintains an inseparable connection with it, so the Son and Spirit flow out from the Father while remaining inseparable from Him. There is, in a word, an unbroken continuity of substance, although the substance is drawn out into—if we may speak after the manner of men—a different mould. The conception is that the prolation of the Logos—and afterward of the Spirit proximately from the Logos—is rather of the nature of a protrusion than an extrusion: the Godhead is, now, of a new shape, so to speak, but remains the Godhead still in its undivided and indivisible unity. As Tertullian expresses it sharply in the twenty-fifth chapter of the *Apology*: "Just as when a ray is shot forth (*porrigitur*) from the sun, it is a portion of the whole, but the sun will be in the ray because it is a ray of the sun, and is not separated from the substance but is extended (*extenditur*), so from Spirit [is extended] Spirit, and from God, God, as light is kindled from light. The *materia matrix* remains *integra et indefecta*, although you draw out from it a plurality of *trades qualitates*; and thus what has come forth (*profectum*) out of God is God, and the Son of God, and the two are one. Similarly as He is Spirit from Spirit and God from God, he is made a second member in manner of existence, in grade not state, and has not receded from the matrix but exceeded beyond it (*et a matrice non recessit sed excessit*).” In a word, the mode of the prolation is a stretching out of the Godhead, not a partition of the Godhead: the unity of the Godhead remains *integra et indefecta*.

The unity of the Godhead is thus preserved through the prolations themselves, which are therefore one in a "numerical unity," as it afterward came to be spoken of—though in Tertullian's usage this language would not be employed, but he would rather say that the persons differ in number, as first, second and third, while the substance remains undivided. It is precisely on the ground that

* Chap. xxii.

† Chap. xxvii.

in their view the prolations involved a division and separation of substance that he separates himself from the Valentinians.* "Valentinus," says he, "divides and separates his prolations from their author. . . . But this is the prolation of the truth, the guardian of the unity, wherein we declare that the Son is a prolation of the Father without being separated from Him. For God sent forth the Word (as the Paraclete also declares†) just as the root puts forth the tree, and the fountain the river, and the sun the ray. For these are *προβολαι* of the substances from which they proceed. . . . But still the tree is not severed from the root, nor the river from the fountain, nor the ray from the sun; and neither is the Word separated from God. . . . In like manner the Trinity, flowing down from the Father, through intertwined and connected steps, does not at all disturb the monarchy, while it at the same time guards the state of the economy."‡

Harnack, therefore,§ does considerably less than justice to Tertullian's conception, when he represents it as substantially the same as that of Valentinus, differing only in the number of emanations acknowledged—because, as Hippolytus certifies, the Valentinians "acknowledge that the one is the originator of all" and "the whole goes back to one." Nor does he improve matters when he adds in a note that "according to these doctrines, the unity is sufficiently preserved, (1) if the several persons have one and the same substance, (2) if there is one possessor of the whole substance, *i.e.*, if everything proceeds from him." Tertullian, on the contrary, is never weary of asseverating that his doctrine of unity demands much more than this,—not merely that it is out of the one God that all proceeds—nor merely that what thus comes forth from God is of His substance, so that all of the emanations are of the substance of God,—but specifically that this going forth from God of His prolations is merely an *extension* of the Godhead, not a division from it. Thus the unity, he says, is preserved through the prolations; and no separation from God is instituted by the prolations. These abide unbrokenly "portions" of the deity, not fragments broken off from the deity. Nor is Harnack much happier when he goes on|| to say that Tertullian conceived God up to the prolation of the Logos "as yet the only *person*." According to his explicit exposition of the life of God in eternity, Tertullian held that there never was a time when God was alone, except in the sense that there

* Chap. viii.

† *I.e.*, this is a doctrine supported by the Montanistic prophecies.

‡ Chap. viii.

§ II, 258.

|| P. 259.

was no created universe about Him: in the beginning itself that Reason which the common people, simply translating the Greek of John's Gospel, call the Word, was with Him, though within Him, as Another. Thus in the unity of the Godhead there always was a distinction of persons, even before, by the prolations of Son and Spirit, this distinction was manifested *ad extra*.

The distinctions of persons in the Godhead, accordingly, as Tertullian conceived them, were not created by the prolations of Son and Spirit. These prolations merely brought into manifestation the distinctions of persons already existing in the Godhead. Neither did he suppose that these distinctions would cease on the recession of these prolations back into the Godhead,—as Tertullian anticipates will take place when their end is served. It is the prolations, not the personal distinctions, which in his thought have a beginning and ending; and when he teaches that these prolations come forth at the Father's will, fulfill their purpose and retire back into the Godhead, this cannot in any way affect his doctrine either of the unity of God or of the Trinity in the unity. In all this process, rather, he is tracing out only an incident in the life of God, a temporary outflowing of God to do a specific work. The whole exposition which Harnack gives of this transaction is colored by misapprehension of Tertullian's import. It is indeed more infelicitous than even this circumstance would indicate. No doubt Tertullian's subordinationism is very marked. Though he conceives the prolate Logos and the Spirit as truly God, they are, in his view, God at the periphery of His being, going forth, in a certain reduction of deity, for the world-work.* But to speak of even the prolate Logos as a "Being which must be a derived existence, which has already in some fashion a finite element in itself, because it is the hypostatized Word of creation, which has an origin"; and to add, "From the standpoint of humanity this deity is God Himself, *i.e.*, a God whom men can apprehend and who can apprehend them, but from God's standpoint, which speculation can fix but not fathom, this deity is a subordinate, nay, even a temporary one"—is to go beyond all warrant discoverable in Tertullian's exposition. It is of the very essence of Tertullian's thought that there was no "finite element" in the Logos, or in the Spirit

* Cf. DORNER, *Person of Christ*, I, ii, 460, 186, 108. DORNER somewhat misses the point by failing to see that Tertullian recognized the eternity of the personal distinction and so distinguished between the unproulated and the proulated Logos (see *below*, p. 26 *sq.*); but even Dorner perceives that there was some limit to Tertullian's subordinationism: "An Arian subordinationism was foreign to his mind" (p. 74; cf. p. 108).

which constitutes the third in the Godhead—"as the fruit of the tree is third from the root, or as the stream out of the river is third from the fountain, or as the apex of the ray is third from the sun";* that these prolations are, in a word, nothing but God Himself extended for the performance of a work—nothing, if the simile can be allowed, but the hand of God stretched out for the task of bringing a world into existence and guiding its course to its destined end. As such the Logos mediated between God and the world; but to make Tertullian teach, to use words of Bull's,† that "the very nature of the Son is itself a mean between God and the creatures," that is to say, is something distinguishable alike from the supreme nature of God on the one side, and from the rest of created beings on the other,—is to confound his whole conception. He not only did not teach that the Logos is a creature of nature different from that of God, of a derived existence, having an absolute origin, and destined to reach an end: but he explicitly teaches the contradictory of these things. The Logos existed eternally, he asseverates, in God: the prolation of the Logos, indeed, had a beginning and will have an end; but the Logos Himself who is prolated, is so far from being a derived existence, which has a finite element in it, and has an origin and is to make an end—that He is just God Himself prolated, that is, outstretched like a hand, to His work. And what is true of the Logos is true of the Spirit. He is not, as the Arians imagined, the creature of a creature, but just the still further prolated God—the tips of the fingers of the hand of God.‡

(4) With this conception of the relation of the prolations to the divine essence Tertullian was certainly in a position to do complete justice to the deity of our Lord. Had the prolate Logos been to him a "middle substance"—something between God and man in its very nature—then it no doubt would have been impossible for him to do full justice to our Lord's deity as the incarnation of this Logos. But seeing that the Logos was to him God Himself prolated, one in substance with the primal deity itself, no question of the complete deity of the incarnated Logos could arise in his

* Chap. viii, *ad fin.*

† III, ix, 11 (E. T., p. 503).

‡ Irenæus makes use of the simile of God's hands to explain his conception of the relation of the Son and Spirit to God. Cf. IV *praef.* § 4: "Man was moulded by God's hands, *i.e.*, by the Son and Spirit to whom He said, Let us make," etc. Cf. also IV, 20, 1; V, 1, 3; V, 5, 1; V, 28, 4. At a later date the Sabellians employed the figure of the alternately outstretched and withdrawn arm and hand as a figure of their notion of the successive movements of the divine revelation (DORNER, I, ii, 155, 159, 168). Augustine in *Joann.*, 53, 2-3, in criticising this Sabellian use of it, recognizes the propriety of the figure in itself.

mind. "We shall not approximate," he says,* "to the opinions of the Gentiles, who if at any time they be forced to confess God, yet will have other Gods below Him: the Godhead has, however, no gradation, for It is only one" and can, therefore, "in no case be less than Itself." Accordingly he is constant in declaring the Son, as He is God, to be "equal with" the Father.† All that is true of the Father, therefore, he would have us understand, is true also of the Son: they are not only of the same substance, but of the same power also; and all the attributes of the one belong also to the other. "The names of the Father," he says‡—"God Almighty, the Most High, the Lord of Hosts, the King of Israel, He that Is—inasmuch as the Scriptures so teach, these, we say, belonged also to the Son, and in these the Son has come, and in these has ever acted, and thus manifested them in Himself to men. . . . When, therefore, you read Almighty God, and Most High, and God of Hosts, and King of Israel, and He that Is, consider whether there be not indicated by these the Son also, who in His own right is God Almighty, in that He is the Word of God Almighty." Again,§ "'All things,' saith He, 'are delivered unto Me of the Father'. . . . The Creator hath delivered all things to Him who is not less than Himself,—to the Son: all things, to wit, which He created by Him, *i.e.*, by His own Word.'" Accordingly, Tertullian does not hesitate to speak of the Son as God or to attribute to Him all that is true of God. He does not scruple, for example, to apply Rom. ix. 5 to Him—affirming Him in the words of that text to be God over all, blessed for ever.||

If it be asked how Tertullian made this recognition of the full equality of the Son with the Father consistent with the subordinationism which he had taken over from the Apologists along with their Logos Christology, the answer appears to turn on the identification of the Son with the prolate Logos. The strong subordination of the Son belongs to Him as prolated, not specifically as second in the Godhead. "It will, therefore, follow," says Tertullian in an illuminating passage,¶ "that by Him who is invisible, we must understand the Father *in the fullness of His majesty*, while we recognize the Son as visible *by reason of the dispensation of His derived existence (pro modulo derivationis)*; even as it is not permitted us to contemplate the sun in the full amount of his substance which is in the heavens, but we can only endure with our eyes a ray by reason of

* *Adv. Hermog.*, VII (BULL, p. 580).

† *Adv. Praxeas*, VII, xxii; *De Resur. Carn.*, VI.

‡ *Adv. Prax.*, chap. xvii (BULL, p. 198).

§ *Adv. Marc.*, iv, 25 (BULL, *loc. cit.*).

|| *Adv. Prax.*, xiii, xv.

¶ xiv.

the tempered condition of this portion which is projected from him to the earth. . . . We declare, however, that the Son also, *considered in Himself*, is invisible, in that He is God, and the Word, and the Spirit of God." In this passage it is affirmed that in Himself, because He is God, the Son shares all the qualities of God, and becomes "reduced God," if we can be allowed such a phrase, only *pro modulo derivationis*, that is to say, as the result of the prolation by virtue of which He is extended outwards for the purpose of action in and on the world. This passage will aid us also in apprehending how we are to understand Tertullian when he speaks of the Son as a "portion" only of the Godhead. Again it is, of course, only as prolate Logos that He is so spoken of: and as prolate Logos He is conceived under the figure of the ray which as a "portion" of the sun is "tempered" to the eyes of men. Similarly the prolate Logos is a "portion" of the Godhead, that is to say, not a separated part or even a particular part of the Godhead, but the Godhead itself "tempered" for its mission relatively to the world. This "portion" is not to be conceived, then, as a fragment of Godhead; it is in and of itself all that God is. Tertullian not only distinctly affirms this on all occasions, but expressly explains that it is neither separated from the Godhead nor in anything less than it, but is "equal to the Father and possesses all that the Father has."* Nay, Tertullian

* We are here quoting BULL, II, vii, 5 (p. 200), where, as well as pp. 536 *sq.*, the meaning of "portio" is discussed. It is discussed also in HAGEMANN, pp. 182 *sq.*, cf. p. 283: who suggests, with a reference to *De virg. vel.*, c. 4, *ad fin.*, that it is a technical logical term, and imports the 'specific' as distinguished from the 'general,' in which case the Logos as a *portio* of the deity would rather be a "particularization" of deity than a "fragment" of deity. DORNER (I, ii, 78) thinks that the employment of such "inappropriate physical categories of the Son" is due to the "somewhat physical character of Tertullian's view of God," and "should be set to the account rather of his mode of expression than of his mode of thought": it "really disguised Tertullian's proper meaning" (cf. p. 121-2). From the manner in which Tertullian uses the term "portio" it would seem probably to be a technical term in the Logos Christology and that would imply its currency in the debates of the day. It is interesting to observe in a *Sermon of the Arians* which was in circulation in North Africa early in the fifth century what looks very much like a repudiation of the phraseology by the Arians—for Arianism was very much only the Logos Christology run to seed, the "left" side of the developing schemes of doctrine. In this document, at c. 23, it is said: "The Son is not a part or a portion of the Father, but His own and beloved, perfect and complete, only-begotten Son. The Spirit is not a part or a portion of the Son, but the first and highest work (*opus*) of the only-begotten Son of God, before the rest of the universe." Augustine (*Contra. Sermones Arianos*, XXVII, 23) answers only: "But what Catholic would say the Son is a part of the Father or the Holy Spirit part of the Son? A thing they [the Arians] think is to be so denied as if there were a question between us and them on it." It looks very much as if the whole past history of the use of this phraseology was out of memory in the opening fifth century.

tells us with crisp directness that this "*portio*" of the Godhead is Itself "consort in Its fullness" (*plenitudinis consors*). "If you do not deny," he argues with Marcion,* "that the Creator's Son and Spirit and Substance is also His Christ, you must needs allow that those who have not acknowledged the Father have likewise failed to acknowledge the Son, seeing that they share the same substance (*per ejusdem substantiæ conditionem*): for if It baffled men's understanding in Its Plenitude, much more has a portion of It, especially since It is consort in the Plenitude."†

It cannot surprise us, therefore, when we observe Tertullian representing a distinctive way of designating our Lord as in part due merely to a desire to be clear and to avoid confusion in language. He is speaking‡ of the habit of distinguishing between God the Father and the Son by calling the former God and the latter Lord. There is no foundation for the distinction, he tells us, in the nature of things. Any one of the persons of the Godhead may with equal propriety be called either God or Lord. He "definitely declares that *two* are God, the Father and the Son, and with the addition of the Holy Spirit, even *three*, according to the principle of the divine *οἰκονομία*, which introduces number." He will never say, however, that there are two Gods or two Lords, yet "not as if," he explains, "it were untrue that the Father is God, and the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God, and each is God." This apparently can only mean that the three are all together the one God,—and, indeed, one of his characteristic phrases is the famous *deus ambo* or even *tres*.§ But though Christ is thus rightly called God, it is best, he thinks, in order to avoid mistakes, to speak of Him as Lord when the Father is mentioned at the same time, and to call Him God only when He is mentioned alone. For there is no gradation in the Godhead, as Tertullian elsewhere remarks,|| although there are three "grades" in the Godhead: which is as much as to say that considered in themselves, those who are distinguished as first, second and third—that is to say, in the modes of their existence as source and prolations of the first and second order—are yet consorts in the plenitude of God.¶

* III, 6, near the end.

† Cf. BULL, II, vii, 6.

‡ *Adv. Prax.*, chap. xiii.

§ xiii, *med.*

|| *Adv. Hermog.*, 7 (quoted above).

¶ BULL, IV, ii, 5 (E. T., p. 581) treats with great care the apparent contradiction between Tertullian's assertion in *Adv. Hermog.*, 7, that "the Godhead has no gradations," and the assertion in *Adv. Prax.*, 2, that the persons of the Godhead are three "not in state but in gradation." Tertullian, BULL tells us, "means in the latter passage by 'gradation,' *order*, but not greater or less Godhead." "For," continues BULL, "whom he acknowledges to be three in gradation, them he denies to

On this basis Tertullian, in developing his doctrine of the person of Christ in the formula of "Deus homo, unus Christus," could strenuously insist on the complete deity as well as perfect humanity of this one divine-human person. And in this insistence we may find the culminating proof that he sought to do full justice to the true deity of Christ. He approaches this subject* in the course of a confutation of the Monarchian attempt to find a distinction between Father and Son by understanding the Father to be the divine Spirit incarnated and the Son to be the incarnating flesh. Thus, says Tertullian, while contending that the Father and Son are one and the same, they do, in fact, divide them and so fall into the hands of the Valentinians, making Jesus, the man, and Christ, the inhabiting Spirit, two. Proceeding to expound the true relation between the incarnated Spirit and the incarnating flesh, he next argues that the process of incarnation was not that of a transformation of the divine Spirit into flesh, because God neither ceases to be what He was nor can He be any other thing than what He is. Accordingly when the Word became flesh, this was accomplished not by His becoming transmuted into flesh but by His clothing Himself with flesh. No less is it insupposable, he argues, that the incarnation was accomplished by any mixture of the two substances, divine Spirit and flesh, forming a third substance intermediate between the two.† At that rate Jesus would have ceased to be God while not becoming man: whereas the Scriptures represent

be different in state. But with Tertullian, as we have seen, for a thing to be different from another in state, means not to be set under it, but to be on a par and equal to it. Hence in the same passage, presently after, he expressly says, that the three Persons of the Holy Trinity are all of *one power*; and consequently that no One of Them is more powerful or excellent than Another. Therefore the Godhead 'has no gradation,' that is, 'is in no case less than Itself,' as Tertullian distinctly explains himself: yet there are gradations in the Godhead, that is, a certain order of Persons, of whom One derives His origin from Another; in such wise that the Father is the first Person, existing from Himself; the Son second from the Father, while the Holy Ghost is third, who proceeds from the Father through the Son, or from the Father and the Son." This is a very favorable specimen of BULL's reasoning: and Tertullian's language may be made consistent with itself on this hypothesis. On the whole, however, it seems more likely that the real state of the case in Tertullian's thought was that indicated in the text. In the Godhead there are no gradations: but after prolations grades of being are instituted.

* Chap. xxvii.

† Accordingly we must not understand the phrase "Homo Deo mixtus," which occurs in the *Apol.*, c. 21, to imply that the two substances were "mixed," so as to make a *tertium quid*. What he means to say is only that Jesus Christ was neither man nor God alone, but the two together. Cf. BETHUNE-BAKER, *Homousios*, etc., p. 22, note.

Him to have been both God and man. Accordingly we must believe that there was no confusion of the two in the person of Jesus, but such a conjunction of God and man that, the property of each nature being wholly preserved, the divine nature continued to do all things suitable to itself, while the human nature, on the other hand, exhibited all the affections that belong to it. Jesus, thus, was in one these two—man of the flesh, God of the Spirit: and in Him coexist two substances, viz., the divine and the human,* the one of which is immortal and the other mortal. Throughout this whole discussion the integrity of the divine nature—immortal, impassible, unchangeable—is carefully preserved and its union in the one person Jesus Christ with a human nature, mortal, passible, capable of change, is so explained as to preserve it from all confusion, intermixture or interchange with it. We could not have a clearer exhibition of Tertullian's zeal to do full justice to the true deity of Christ.

(5) It scarcely seems necessary to add a separate detailed statement of how Tertullian conceived of the Holy Spirit. While we cannot say with Harnack† that Tertullian exhibits no trace of independent interest in the doctrine of the Spirit, it is yet true that he speaks much less fully and much less frequently of Him than of the Logos,‡ and that his doctrine of the Spirit runs quite parallel with that of the Logos. He has spoken of Him, moreover, ordinarily in connections where the doctrine of the Logos is also under discussion and therefore his modes of thought on this branch of the subject have already been perhaps sufficiently illustrated. The *distinct personality* of the Spirit is as clearly acknowledged as that of the Logos Himself. In the *oikonomia* the unity is distributed not into a duality, but into a trinity, providing a place not for two only but for three,—the Father, Son and Holy Ghost; who differ from one another not in condition, substance or power but in degree, form and aspect.§ And everywhere the third person is treated as just as distinct a personality as the second and first. There is no clear passage carrying this distinct personality back into *eternity*. That Tertullian thought of the personality of the Spirit precisely as he did of that of the Logos is here our only safe guide. On the other hand, there is no lack of passages in which the *unity of substance* is insisted upon relatively to the Spirit also.|| After explaining that

* Chap. xxix, *ad init.*

† II, 261, note.

‡ Cf. NÖSGEN, *Geschichte der Lehre vom heiligen Geiste*, p. 21.

§ ii *ad fin.*, cf. iii near end, viii, xi *ad fin.*, xiii, xxx. Cf. STIER, *op. cit.*, 92 note.

|| ii *fin.*, iii *fin.*, iv *init.*, viii, ix *init.*, etc.

the substance of the Son is just the substance of the Father, he adds: "The same remark is made by me with respect to the third degree, because I believe the Spirit to be from no other source than from the Father through the Son."* So again: "The Spirit is the third from God and the Son, as the fruit from the tree is the third from the root, and the stream from the river is third from the fountain, and the apex from the ray is third from the sun. Nothing, however, is separated from the matrix from which it draws its properties; and thus, the Trinity flows down from the Father through *consectos et connectos gradus* and in no respects injures the monarchy while protecting the economy."† On this view the *true deity* of the Spirit is emphasized as fully as that of the Logos, and Tertullian repeatedly speaks of Him likewise shortly as God,‡ as "the Third Name in the Godhead and the Third Degree of the Divine Majesty."§ Accordingly when he "definitely declares that two are God, the Father and the Son," he adds,|| "and with the addition of the Holy Ghost, even *three*, according to the principle of the divine economy, which introduces number, in order that the Father may not, as you perversely infer, be believed to have Himself been born, and to have suffered." To Tertullian, therefore, the alternative was not the complete deity of the Spirit or His creaturehood; but the unity of Monarchianism or the Trinity in the unity of the economy. He never thinks of meeting the Monarchian assault by denying the full deity of the Spirit, but only by providing a distinction of persons within the unity of the Godhead. The most instructive passages are naturally those in which all three persons are brought together, of which there are a considerable number.¶ To quote but one of these, he explains that "the connection of the Father in the Son, and of the Son in the Paraclete, produces three coherent Persons, [distinct, nevertheless] one from the other: these three are one [substance,—*unum*], not one [person,—*unus*], as it is said, 'I and my Father are one [*unum*],' in respect of unity of substance not singularity of number."** There can, in short, be no question that Tertullian had applied to the Spirit with full consciousness all that he had thought out concerning the Son, and that His doctrine of God was fully settled into a doctrine of Trinity. His mode of speak-

* iv *ind.*† viii *fin.*

‡ He seems to be the first in writings which have chanced to come down to us to apply the name "God" to the Spirit; but this is mere accident.

§ xxx *fin.*xiii *med.*¶ *E.g.*, ii *ind.* et *fin.*, iii *fin.*, viii *fin.*, ix *ind.*, xiii *med.*, xxv, xxx.** Chap. xxv *ind.*

ing of the Spirit introduces no new difficulty in construing his doctrine—which is something that cannot be said of all his predecessors.

By such expositions as these, Tertullian appears, in seeking to do justice to the elements of doctrine embalmed in the Rule of Faith, fairly to pass beyond the natural reach of the Logos-speculation and to open the way to a higher conception. A symbol of this advance may not unfairly be discovered in the frequent appearance in his pages of the new term "Trinity." The Greek equivalent of this term occurs in his contemporary Hippolytus,* but scarcely elsewhere, at this early date, to designate the distinctions in the Godhead,—unless indeed we account the single instance of its employment by Theophilus of Antioch a preparation for such an application of it.† In any event, there is a fine appropriateness in the sudden apparition of the term in easy and frequent use,‡ for the first time, in the pages of an author whose discussions make so decided an approximation toward the enunciation of that doctrine to denote which this term was so soon to become exclusively consecrated. The insistence of Tertullian upon the *οἰκονομία* in the monarchy—on unity of substance, with all that is implied in unity of substance, persisting in three distinct persons who coexist from eternity—certainly marks out the lines within which the developed doctrine of the Trinity moves, and deserves to be signalized by the emergence into literature of the term by which the developed doctrine of the Trinity should ever afterward be designated.

It is possible that something of the same symbolical significance may attach also to Tertullian's use of his favorite term *οἰκονομία*. Of course, *οἰκονομία* is not a new word; but it is used by Tertullian in an unwonted sense,—a sense scarcely found elsewhere except in his contemporary Hippolytus,§ and, perhaps as a kind of preparation for their use of it, in a single passage of Tatian.|| Tertullian constantly employs it, as we have seen, to designate, as over against the monarchy, the mystery of the Trinity in the unity. There can be no question of its general implication in his pages: but it is, no doubt, a little difficult to determine the precise

* *c. Noët.*, 14.

† *Ad Autol.*, II, 65. Here the term *τριάς* first occurs in connection with distinctions in the Godhead; and it is customary, therefore, to say that here first it is applied to express the Trinity. So *e.g.*, KAHNIS, HARNACK, LOOFS, SEEBERG. As NÜSGEN (pp. 13-14) points out, however, it is by no means certain that the word here has any technical import.

‡ *E.g.*, *Adv. Prax.*, 2, 3, 11, 12, etc.

§ *con. Noët.*, chaps. 8 and 14.

|| *Ad. Græc.*, 5.

significance of the term itself which he employs. The fundamental sense of the word is "disposition"; but in its application it receives its form either from the idea of "administration," or from that of "structure." If it is used by Tertullian in the former shade of meaning, its employment by him need not have great significance for his Trinitarian doctrine. He would, in that case, only say by it that the monarchy of God is administered by a disposition of the Godhead into three several personalities, Father, Son and Holy Ghost, through whom the single Lordship is carried on, as it were, by deputy; while the precise relation of these personalities to one another and to the Godhead itself would be left to the context to discover.

An argument which occurs in the third chapter of the tract against Praxeas seems to many to suggest that it was in this sense that the term was employed by Tertullian. Tertullian here explains that "monarchy has no other meaning than single and unique rule"; "but for all that," he adds, "this monarchy does not preclude him whose government it is . . . from administering his own monarchy by whatever agents he will": and much less can the integrity of a monarchy suffer by the association in it of a Son, since it is still held in common by two who are so really one (*tam unicis*)." Applying these general principles to the monarchy of God, he argues that this monarchy is therefore by no means set aside by the circumstance that it is administered by means of legions and hosts of angels"; and much less can it be thought to be injured by the participation in it of the Son and Holy Spirit, to whom the second and third places are assigned, but who are inseparably joined with the Father, in His substance. "Do you really suppose," he asks, "that those who are naturally members of the Father's own substance, His congeners,* instruments of His might, nay, His power itself, and the entire system of His monarchy, are the overthrow and destruction thereof?" It seems tolerably clear that Tertullian is not here comparing the economy with the administrative agents of a monarchy: with them he rather compares the hosts of angels through whom the divine monarchy is administered. The economy is rather compared to the sharing of the monarchy itself between father and son as co-regents on a single throne. In that case, so far is economy on his lips from bearing the sense of administration that it is expressly distinguished from it, and referred to something in the Godhead deeper than its administrative functions. The illustration, therefore, emphasizes, indeed, the

* *pignora* = pledges of his love, *i.e.*, his close relations.

personal distinctions of the economy—they are comparable to the distinction between father and son in a conjoint rule—but it suggests equally the penetration of this distinction behind all matters of administration into the Godhead, the Ruling Being, itself.

Nor is this impression set aside by the implication of the other figures employed by Tertullian to explain the relations of the persons in the Godhead. When he compares them to the root, the tree and the fruit, or to the fountain, the river and the stream, or to the sun, the ray and the apex, his mind seems undoubtedly to be upon the prolated Logos and Spirit; these figures indeed, so constantly upon his lips, seem inapplicable to eternal distinctions, lying behind the prolations. But it must be remembered, first, that these illustrations are not original with Tertullian, but are taken over by him from the Apologists along with their Logos-speculation—although they are doubtless developed and given new point by him; next, that the precise point which he adduces them to illustrate is not the whole import of the economy, but the preservation of the unity of substance within the economy of three persons; and finally, that the ordinary engagement of his mind with the Trinity of Persons, in what we may call its developed form—its mode of manifestation in God acting *ad extra*—need not by any means exclude from his thought a recognition of an ontological basis, in the structure of the Godhead itself, for this manifested Trinity. And if in one passage he presses his illustrations to the verge of suggesting a separation of the Son from the Father—intimating that the Son may be affected by the sufferings of the God-man while the Father remains in impassible blessedness;* in another, on the other hand, he seems expressly to carry back the distinction of persons into the eternal Godhead itself—affirming that God was never “alone” save in the sense of independence of all external existence, but there was always with Him, because in Him, that other self which afterward proceeded from Him for the making of the world.† The fullest recognition, therefore, that Tertullian habitually thought of the Trinity in, so to speak, its developed form—with the Logos and the Spirit prolate and working in the world—by no means precludes the possibility that the very term *οἰκονομία* connoted in his hands something more fundamental than a distinction in the Godhead constituted by these prolations.

And certainly the word was currently employed in senses that lent it a color which may very well have given it to Tertullian the deeper connotation of internal structure, when he applied it to the

* Chap. xxix.

† Chap. v.

Godhead. To perceive this, we have only to recall its application to express the proper adjustment of the parts of a building, as Vitruvius, for example, uses it,* or to express what we call the disposition, that is the plan or construction of a literary composition, as it is used, say, by Cicero, when he speaks of the *οἰκονομία perturbata* of his letter,† or by Quintilian,‡ when he ascribes to the old Latin comedies a better *οἰκονομία* than the new exhibited.§ A very interesting instance of the employment of the word in this sense of "structure" occurs in the *Letter of the Church of Smyrna*, giving an account of the martyrdom of Polycarp.|| The martyrs were so torn by the scourge, says this passage, that "the *οἰκονομία* of their flesh was visible even so far as the inward veins and arteries." Lightfoot translates here, "*the internal structure and mechanism*," and refers us to Eusebius' paraphrase, which tells us the martyrs were so lacerated that "the hidden inward parts of the body, both their bowels and their members, were exposed to view."¶ There can be no doubt that this very common usage of the term was well known to Tertullian the rhetorician, and it may very well be that when he adopted it to express the distribution of the Godhead into three persons it was because it suggested to him rather the inner structure, so to speak, of the Godhead itself, than merely an external arrangement for the administration of the divine dominion.

That Tertullian's usage of the term implies as much as this is recognized, indeed, by the most of those who have busied themselves with working out the interesting history of this word in the usage of the Fathers.** Dr. W. Gass, for example, after tracing the word

* i, 2.

† *ad Att.*, C. 1.

‡ *Inst.*, I, 8.

§ This sense is discussed by DANIEL, as below, note **, under his division 4, where a number of examples are given. See also LIGHTFOOT, on Eph. i: 10, and the Lexicons.

|| Chap. ii. See the note of Lightfoot on the passage in his great work on Ignatius (II, ii, 950).

¶ *Hist. Ecc.*, iv, 15; McGiffert's Translation, p. 189a.

** An account of the several attempts to trace the history of the word is given by GASS in the article referred to in the next note. The more important are: VON CÖLLN in Ersch and Gruber sub. voc. *Œconomia*; H. A. DANIEL in his *Tatian der Apologet.* p. 159 sq.; MÜNSCHER in his *Dogmengeschichte*, III, 137 sq.; GASS' own extended article; and LIGHTFOOT in his posthumously published volume entitled *Notes on Epistles of St. Paul*, p. 319 (on Eph. i. 10), with which should be compared his notes on Col. i. 25, Ign. *ad Eph.* xviii, (II, i. 78), and *Martyr. Polycarp.*, ii (II, ii, 950). The discussion of GASS is by far the fullest, but needs the preceding ones to supply the earlier philological development, and LIGHTFOOT's clear statement as a supplement. See also the Bishop of Lincoln's (KAYE's) *Justin Martyr*, 176, and BAUR's *Dreieinigkeit*, I, 178 note. HAGEMANN (*Röm. Kirche*, pp. 136, 150, 167, 175, etc., as per index) constantly represents the *οἰκονομία* as (even in Tertullian) merely "the sum of the divine acts which have reference

up to Tertullian and finding it employed up to that point to express "the outward-going revelatory activity of God, whether creative and organizing or redemptive,"* remarks upon the sudden change that meets us in Tertullian. "It has been justly thought remarkable," he continues, "that this same expression is applied by Tertullian to the inner relations of the Godhead itself. He employs 'economy' as an indispensable organon of the Christian knowledge of God, in his controversy with Praxeas." Then, after quoting the passages in the *Adv. Praxean*, chaps. 2 and 3, he proceeds: "Monarchy and economy are therefore the two interests on the combination and proper balancing of which the Trinitarian conception of God depends; by the former the unity of the divine rule, by the latter the right of an immanent distinction is established, and it is only necessary that the latter principle should not be pressed so far as to do violence to the former." Without laying too much stress on so nice a point, it would seem not unnatural therefore to look upon Tertullian's predilection for the term *οἰκονομία* as, like his usage of the term *Trinitas*, symptomatic of his tendency to take a deeper view of the Trinitarian relation than that which has in later times come to be spoken of as "merely economical."

We derive thus from our study of Tertullian's modes of statement a rather distinct impression that there is discoverable in them an advance toward the conception of an immanent Trinity. The question becomes at once in a new degree pressing how far this advance is to be credited to Tertullian himself, and how far it represents only modes of thought and even forms of statement current in the Christianity of his time, which push themselves to observation in his writings only because he chanced to be dealing with themes which invite a rather fuller expression than ordinary of this side of the faith of Christians. We shall hope to return to this question in the next number of this REVIEW.

to the government of the world," "the sum of the external revelations of God," "the internal distributions of the original unitary Godhead into a purely divine and a finite substance, and the division of the latter into a graded plurality of beings which make up the *pleroma*"—which last is the Gnostic way of expressing it.

* In an article on *Das patristische Wort οἰκονομία*, in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftl. Theologie*, xvii (1874), p. 478 sq.

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B. B. WARFIELD.

II.

THE NEW TESTAMENT ACCOUNT OF THE BIRTH OF JESUS.

SECOND ARTICLE.

HAVING discussed the hypothesis that the New Testament narratives of the birth of Jesus are to be explained as dependent upon facts, we turn now to the alternative hypothesis that the narratives arose in some other way.

Let us begin by mentioning two theories which may be distinguished from the others as being predominantly legendary rather than predominantly mythical.

Haeckel* has recently revived, with apparent seriousness, the second-century Jewish Pandera story as calling forth, in defense of the Christians, the story of the virgin birth. Haeckel's defense of his view is an even better refutation of it than the refutations by Loofs† and Hilgenfeld‡. We need pause only to observe that the universal rejection of the Pandera story in modern times is due not to its revolting nature, but to the overwhelming mass of historical evidence which is arrayed against it.

Beyschlag§ deserves somewhat more careful attention. According to him, at the time when Matthew wrote or Luke gathered his sources, any free invention of the birth story would, on Palestinian ground, have met with contradiction from the family of Jesus. Rather should we suppose that the idea, legend-like, wound itself around the fast-disappearing tradition, as an ivy about a crumbling wall, yet not so completely as to prevent our being able to discern here and there bits of the real facts. Such credible elements are the name Jesus, the stall, the census (as a cause for the crowded house, though not for the journey), the birth in Bethlehem, Symeon and Anna, the Davidic descent, the membership of Joseph and Mary in the circle of humble and pious Israelites. The course of events may have been somewhat as follows: Joseph, being a descendant of

* *Welträthsel*, neue Aufl., 375f.; E. T., 375ff.

† *Christliche Welt*, 1899, 1069f.

‡ *Zeitschrift f. wissenschaftliche Theologie*, 1900, 265f.

§ *Leben Jesu*, 3te Aufl., I, 159f.

David, and Mary, his bride, belonging also to those who were waiting quietly for the consolation of Israel, had high hopes that they themselves might be blessed with the son who should rule Israel. They therefore moved their home to Bethlehem in order that the prophecy of Micah might be literally fulfilled, but on account of some Jewish census could find no shelter except in the stable. The pious hopes for the expected child were not concealed from sympathetic pious Israelites; hence the shepherds at the manger, who had interpreted their inward joy as the song of a heavenly host. The joyful news spread to the pious in the neighboring capital; hence the greetings of Symeon and Anna. Indeed, even heathen astrologers at Herod's court heard of the child and the hopes clustering around him, and interpreted Kepler's constellation as announcing the coming of the expected Jewish world-ruler. Hence the rage of Herod and his command to kill the male infants in Bethlehem of David's race. The story of Elisabeth and John the Baptist grew up out of a carrying back of the later intimate relation between Jesus and His forerunner. The belief in the virgin birth arose solely on Jewish-Christian ground from the belief in Christ as a fresh start in humanity, determined as to form by the tradition of such children of promise as Isaac and John, and assisted by the Septuagint translation of Isaiah vii. 14.

This derivation of the doctrine of the miraculous conception is by no means peculiar to Beyschlag, and will be more conveniently considered further on; but Beyschlag's proposed account of the real events of the birth is all his own. It will hardly be necessary, I think, to refute the theory in detail, beyond merely calling attention to its artificiality—a defect which is concealed only by the ingenuity of the conception and the real beauty of the language in which it is clothed. To take only the most striking point of the whole account of Beyschlag—the reason for the journey to Bethlehem—we can at once point out its unnaturalness. For, if Joseph and Mary belonged to that circle of humble faithful folk which Beyschlag so charmingly describes, it would have been a psychological impossibility for them to hope that out of their lowly home was actually to spring the ruler of Israel. And if, as Beyschlag argues, a stable would never have been represented by the Church as the birthplace of Christ, still less would it have been the centre of Messianic hopes of Jews, whose ideas of the Messianic kingdom must, after all, have been far more external than those of Christians. Beyschlag has done a great service in pointing out the reasons why a number of the elements in the birth narratives can only be his-

torical, but he has not succeeded in showing how the other elements could have been evolved from these. Until at least some conceivable account of that evolution has been afforded us—Bey-schlag himself does not maintain that his account is in detail necessarily the correct one—we may well be skeptical as to the legendary explanation of the narratives.

Perhaps we shall find more satisfaction in a more thorough-going theory. Such a theory we certainly have in the work of Conrady.* According to him, the source of the infancy narratives of Matthew and Luke was the so-called *Protevangelium of James*, an heretical but important writing which was the first to enter the field of the early life of Jesus. Matthew performed the double function, on the one hand, of preserving and defending, and, on the other hand, of epitomizing and implicitly correcting this *Protevangelium*. Since this first attempt at using the source did not prove sufficient, Luke undertook by more radical measures so to work over the *Protevangelium* (especially in the interests of anti-docetism as against the docetism of the source), as to make subservient to the dogmatic interests of the Church a field previously fertile only for heresy. The *Protevangelium*, according to Conrady, was originally written in Hebrew, but breathes a heathen spirit, and is a poetical composition adapted from the Egyptian Osiris-Isis myth. These three writings—the *Protevangelium* and the two derivative narratives of Matthew and Luke—were the only sources current in the Church for the infancy of Jesus.

In this theory we have an extreme instance of the difficulty connected with all arguments from literary dependence. It is usually easy to discover that there is a connection between the works in question; but this connection almost always admits of reversal. It would seem, however, that in the present instance we have a case where the order is perfectly plain, though it is the reverse order from the one advocated by Conrady. No one who reads the *Protevangelium* can avoid the almost irresistible impression that the judgment of all scholars, except Conrady, is correct when they declare the *Protevangelium* to be based upon Matthew and Luke rather than *vice versa*. Everything points to a more advanced stage in the development, notably the carrying back of the miraculous element to the birth of Mary. Indeed, in the *Protevangelium* the miraculous begins to run riot, as in the later apocryphal gospels. Compare, for instance, the simple, grave account of the birth in Luke with the morbid and sensational details of the *Protevangelium*.

* *Die Quelle der kanonischen Kindheitsgeschichte Jesus*.

It would have required a wonderful genius to invent the account of Luke; it would have required absolutely superhuman genius to evolve it out of the *Protevangelium*. Nor is our impression of the matter much weakened by Conrady's argument* for the original character of the *Protevangelium*. The *Protevangelium* is thought to possess a marked unity, and yet to exhibit such a lordly disregard for little contradictions and difficulties as is quite in accord with the freshness and freedom of an original production. But those difficulties, notably the unexplained dumbness of the priest,† look too unmistakably like bits taken from Matthew or Luke. As for the derivation of the ideas of the *Protevangelium* from Egypt, we may well refrain from going so far afield until we have proved the simpler derivation through Matthew and Luke to be impossible. Conrady's whole complicated theory requires labored proof at every point (e.g., as to the possibility that a purely Gentile writing would be written in Hebrew), and practically every point depends upon Conrady's conclusion about what has gone before; so that the chances that the final result is correct are very slight. It is not likely that Conrady will ever change what he confesses is the universal opinion of scholars.‡

Somewhat related to the theory of Conrady is that of Reitzenstein,§ who, like Conrady, supposes that there was a common source at the basis of our two narratives and, like Conrady, looks to Egypt for important elements in his scheme. Reitzenstein's theory is founded largely upon a poorly preserved Egyptian fragment of about the sixth century, which contains in the first part the dialogue between the angel and Mary in a different form from the one given by Luke. The Egyptian fragment, Reitzenstein argues, cannot be derived from the narrative of Luke, for on that theory the differences cannot well be explained, whereas Luke's narrative is in itself incomprehensible and clearly secondary. Rather the fragment was derived from a gospel other than the one we now possess. A notable difference from Luke is the omission of *συνλήμψη ἐν γαστρὶ* in the promise of the angel. These words being omitted, Mary would naturally, in accordance with ancient usage, understand *χεχαριτωμένη, εὖρες χάριν παρὰ τῷ θεῷ*

* *Op. cit.*, 207f.

† See Hilgenfeld, *Zeitschrift f. wissenschaftliche Theologie*, 1901, 196.

‡ In criticism of Conrady, see Hilgenfeld, *op. cit.*, 186f. and elsewhere in the course of the article; T. Allan Hoben, *Am. J. Theol.*, VI, 476ff.; J. Weiss, *Theologische Rundschau*, 1898, 158, 159; cf. Holtzmann, *Theolog. Literaturzeitung*, 1901, 135f.

§ *Zwei religionsgeschichtliche Fragen nach ungedruckten griechischen Texten der Strassburger Bibliothek*, 112f.

and τέξῃ υἱόν to mean that she was already pregnant. Her question, therefore (appearing in the form πόθεν μοι τοῦτο γένησεται, ἐπεὶ ἄνδρα οὐ γινώσκω), becomes perfectly natural, whereas in the narrative of Luke, where the conception is put in the indefinite future, the question is meaningless.* This representation that the narrative of the annunciation is itself a narrative of the conception—a representation which appears in Origen, in those early Christian documents which speak of a conception from the Logos, and notably in a prayer discovered at Gizeh†—Reitzenstein brings into connection with that contemporary religious idea according to which one God produces another through his speech.‡ Starting with this religious idea, Reitzenstein says, the writer of the gospel from which the fragment is derived constructed the first account of the conception; his account, however, was often misunderstood, and two examples of such misunderstanding appear in our canonical narratives. In Matthew the miracle is announced only after it has happened, whereas in the original account it was in indissoluble connection with the annunciation itself. In Luke the miracle is announced beforehand, to bring it into parallel with the case of John the Baptist. In both cases the original significance of the annunciation is lost.

To this theory one obvious objection is the late date of Reitzenstein's fragment, as compared with our canonical Gospels. Even Reitzenstein himself seems to be unable to trace back the gospel upon which the fragment is based to a date earlier than the last part of the second century,§ and our canonical Gospels certainly cannot be put so late. Nor does the fragment, as interpreted by Reitzenstein, bear such indisputable internal evidence of its primary character as Reitzenstein seems to attribute to it. For example, Mary understands the words of the angel to mean that she is already pregnant, yet the angel takes care to inform her that the wonder is dependent upon her consent; in which rather intricate progress of the narrative the steps are by no means clearly marked.|| In general, we must say that entirely too much is built upon a meagre foundation for the theory ever to attain the solidity of proved fact. The fragment in question is itself very badly preserved, so that, even from the outset, much has to be left to conjecture. For example, the

* Cf. below, 57.

† Jacoby, *Ein neues Evangelienfragment*.

‡ Reitzenstein, *op. cit.*, 124, 83.

§ *Op. cit.*, 126.

|| See Anrich, *Theolog. Literaturzeitung*, 1902, 304, 305.

most fundamental thing of all is that the fragment does not contain the words *συνλημψη ἐν γαστρί*; yet there is a gap at the proper place. The gap is thought not to be large enough—very probably it is not large enough. But the fact remains that, even in such a fundamental point, we are not dealing with definite certainty. Or suppose (as indeed seems probable) that the words *συνλημψη*, etc., were omitted. Even then, it is by no means even certain that the author had any different view of the annunciation from that of Luke, for the omission might well have arisen merely from loose quoting. Indeed *συνλημψη* in connection with *τέξῃ* may have almost seemed like unnecessary fulness of expression, so that one of the phrases may easily have been omitted. If we find reasons for doubt at the very basis, how much more in the remoter conclusions—for example, that Matthew as well as Luke represents a weakening of the original account. However interesting Reitzenstein's fragment may be, it has accomplished nothing toward solving the vexed problem of the sources of our canonical infancy narratives. From this it follows that it has accomplished nothing toward explaining the origin of those narratives. For they in themselves contain no hint of that religious idea of creation by the Word; therefore we have no reason to regard them as attempts to embody that idea in narrative form.

We have mentioned first the theories of Beyschlag, Conrady, and Reitzenstein, because they are, after all, sporadic and peculiar, and may best be put aside before we begin to investigate more widely accepted theories which may be said to constitute the general trend of recent investigation. To this more serious task we now address ourselves.

We have attempted to show that the accounts whose mythical or legendary origin is to be explained are, so far as external evidence can show, parts of two very early Christian writings, the first and third Gospels. Now, since this fact, by making more probable an early date for the infancy narratives, greatly increases the difficulty of explaining the evolution of their ideas, it is natural to expect that recent criticism should here, as elsewhere, have recourse to divisive hypotheses, in order to weaken the force of the external evidence. Nor is the expectation without fulfilment. To the development of these divisive hypotheses several logical motives have contributed.

In the first place, as we have just hinted, if the virgin birth cannot be a fact, then the origin of a belief in it can be better explained if we put the first witness of such a belief at a late date. But against

such a late date is the external testimony to the Gospels. The mythical explanation is therefore much easier if it can be shown that the account of the virgin birth was no part of the original Gospels.

In the second place, as we have already seen, one of the chief arguments against the virgin birth is that it is contradicted by the rest of the New Testament, which traces the Davidic descent through Joseph. But the remarkable fact is that this supposed contradiction appears every whit as strong within the first and third Gospels themselves, as between those Gospels and the rest of the New Testament. So if those Gospels were each written throughout by the same men, then plainly these authors, at least, did not regard the thing as a contradiction at all; so that we cannot say that by emphasizing the Davidic sonship or calling Joseph the father of Jesus those other writers meant to exclude the virgin birth, any more than Matthew and Luke meant to exclude it by doing the selfsame thing. So if the "contradiction" is to be used as an argument against the virgin birth, it is very desirable to show that the writers of those portions of the first and third Gospels which recount the virgin birth were not the same as the writers who trace the Davidic descent through Joseph and call Joseph the father of Jesus.

In the third place, the task of those scholars who deny the fact of the virgin birth is not merely to show that the belief may have arisen somewhere or other in the world of those days, but specifically to show that it could have been accepted by the particular authors who actually record it, or by their sources. If, therefore, it is desired, for example, to regard the belief as of Gentile origin, though it is actually recorded in distinctly Jewish narratives, the easiest way out of the difficulty would be to show that the record of it is no original part of those narratives, but is an interpolation.

It is also very advantageous, in the fourth place, for those who deny the fact of the virgin birth to show that its attestation is not really twofold, as it seems to be. But in view of the manifest independence of the infancy narratives, this can be done only by showing that the notice about the virgin birth is, in at least one of the narratives, an interpolation.

These four considerations, we believe, represent the four chief logical motives for the rise of recent theories of interpolation with regard to the birth narratives. But we do not for a moment mean to imply that these are the chief or the only grounds by which those theories have been supported. True, some recent writers have taken liberties with the text merely on the ground of preconceived views about the whole course of mythical development. But

others, more cautious, have attempted to ground their theories in arguments which, while devoid of external support, are yet ostensibly, at least, definitely based upon a fair and minute examination of the text itself. It is this latter kind of argument which we should first examine.

In the Gospel of Luke, i. 5-ii. 52 seems to form a section in itself, and is prefixed to the account of Christ's public ministry, which begins in Luke as in the other Synoptists with the baptism. It is therefore not surprising that critics have seized upon this whole section as a later addition to the Gospel. In this case, however, no argument for regarding the section as an interpolation can be drawn from the account of the virgin birth in itself, as contradicting the rest of the Gospel, which traces the Davidic descent through Joseph. For that contradiction, if it be a contradiction, appears in some respects in an even more striking form within the birth narrative itself than between the birth narrative and the rest of the Gospel.* But certain other arguments have been offered:

1. Hilgenfeld argues that the prologue of the third Gospel, so far from pointing to the section i. 5-ii. 52 (*ἀνωθεν* ver. 3), actually excludes it, for the things "fulfilled among us" (*i.e.*, in Christianity), the things which had been related by eye-witnesses, could begin only with the baptism of Jesus, since before that time there was no Christianity nor was there any chance for eye-witnessing.

Hilgenfeld is right that *ἀνωθεν* does not strictly require that Luke should begin his narrative further back than at the point where the "many" others (ver. 1) had taken up the story, for the *ἀνωθεν* may simply be taken with *καθεξῆς* to express the one thought of orderliness or historical method. Yet it is too much to say that the birth narrative is excluded. For, in the first place, as Zimmermann has hinted,† it is altogether arbitrary to limit the *ἐν ἡμῖν* to things done after the baptism. *Τῶν πεπληροφορημένων ἐν ἡμῖν πραγμάτων* cannot be interpreted in a narrower sense than "Christian facts" (if even that much be admitted), and among "Christian facts" it is very natural to include everything that could possibly be learned about the life of the founder, to whose very person, and not merely to whose work, was attributed such supreme importance by the writer of the Gospel—especially if that writer was a Paulinist as Hilgenfeld so vigorously insists. Further, we cannot admit that *ἀνωθεν* is even merely neutral; for *ἀνωθεν* and *καθεξῆς* and the whole sense of the prologue indicate an historical purpose, a desire to

* See Luke i. 27, 32; ii. 4, 33, 41, 43.

† *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, 1903, 264.

search out all that could be learned; and such a spirit of investigation would never be satisfied with beginning the narrative abruptly at Jesus' thirtieth year, if there were any who could tell from personal experience or through eye-witnesses what had gone before. It seems to me that this is rather confirmed than otherwise by the words *οἱ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς αὐτόπται καὶ ὀπηρέται γενόμενοι τοῦ λόγου*. It seems to have been the author's fixed purpose to obtain his information not merely from eye-witnesses, but from eye-witnesses whose testimony extended as far back as possible.

2. Hilgenfeld's argument that the chronological data in i. 5, *ἐν ταῖς ἡμέραις Ἡρώδου βασιλέως*, and in iii. 1, 23 are contradictory shatters upon the little word *ὥσει* in iii. 23. If Jesus was *about* thirty years old, He may well have been a year or so older than that round number indicates.*

3. Hilgenfeld argues† that John the Baptist is introduced in Luke iii. 2 as if for the first time (cf. Luke v. 10), because he is defined by the name of his father. The reader of Luke i, says Hilgenfeld, would have no need to be told which John was meant.

If anything, the argument may be turned around, for it would be just the reader of Luke i, who would be interested in the name of the father, and to whom just that detail rather than the baptizing activity of John (Matthew, Mark) could be assumed as known; and it would be just the writer of Luke i, who would be able to supply the father's name. Furthermore, the fact that John was in the desert is introduced incidentally, in a way which seems to imply acquaintance with Luke i. 80.‡

4. According to Corssen,§ the Logos in Luke's prologue is the personal Logos, and his appearance upon the earth (the "beginning" of the Word) was the baptism, when God said to His Son, "This day have I begotten thee." With this agrees the absolute *ἀρχόμενος* in iii. 23 and Acts i. 21, 22. *ὥσει* (i. 23) is to be taken in a strictly comparative sense: the Logos appeared in the form of a man of thirty years.

The difficulties connected with this view are of course apparent. In the first place, it rests upon the more than doubtful reading of the Western text in iii. 22, "This day have I begotten thee." In the second place, to interpret *ὥσει* as comparative is here impossible, because it comes in close conjunction with a numeral, where no one would think of any other meaning than the common meaning,

* See Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, 264, 265.

† *Zeitschrift f. wiss. Theologie*, 1901, 466-468.

‡ Cf. Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, 265.

§ *Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen*, 1899, 310f.

"about." The ἀρχόμενος (iii. 23) indicates "the beginning of the Word" only if we allow Corssen's reading in iii. 22 and his interpretation of the baptism. If we interpret the baptism as the beginning of Jesus' Messianic work, rather than as the beginning of His divine Sonship, then the ἀρχόμενος evidently refers to the same thing. So ἀρχόμενος proves nothing in itself. Nor does Acts i. 21, 22, give it any added force, for there it is a question merely of the conditions necessary for apostleship. To be an apostle a man had to have been a disciple of Jesus only from the baptism, because before that Jesus had had no disciples.

Nor does the elaborate attempt (Luke iii. 1) to fix the date of the baptism necessarily prove (even in comparison with the method of Thucydides) that that was what Luke desired to fix as the "beginning" mentioned in the prologue. Perhaps the reason he did not so elaborately fix the date of what is recorded in i. 5ff. is that he did not there happen to possess such complete information. In any case, the baptism, even if not the beginning of the whole history, was surely an event important enough to lead a historian like Luke, writing for Gentiles and Romans, to give as complete chronological details as his sources would permit.

5. In Acts i. 1, the Gospel of Luke is described as a treatise concerning all that Jesus began to do and to teach until He was taken up. In this ποιεῖν τε καὶ διδάσκειν, says Hilgenfeld, the narrative of Luke i. 5-ii. 52 cannot be included; therefore those first two chapters were no part of the "former treatise."

But we must remember that Luke is at the beginning of Acts characterizing his former treatise as a whole and as contrasted (μὲν) with the history to follow. From such a point of view, it might well be described in general terms as an account of Jesus' earthly activity, even though it contained some introductory matter necessary to explain that earthly life. In a modern biography, we do not think it strange to find at the beginning a description of the state of affairs at the birth of its subject, or an account of family-relations for some generations back. Furthermore, as Zimmermann points out, we cannot, even on Hilgenfeld's theory, interpret the ποιεῖν τε καὶ διδάσκειν too strictly, for even the main part of the Gospel contains an account of events where Jesus was not the agent—e.g., the preaching of the Baptist. Finally, if Hilgenfeld's view is correct, it is rather remarkable that in Acts i. 1 we do not find the baptism mentioned as the *terminus a quo* as in Acts i. 22.*

* The foregoing enumeration of the objections to chaps. i, ii, is that of Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, 263f. I have also followed him to a great extent in the answers given.

Thus far we have not mentioned what at first sight seems to be the most striking indication that i. 5-ii. 52 was no part of the original Gospel—namely, the striking contrast in the style and diction of this section, both with the prologue on the one hand, and with what follows it on the other. It is one of the commonplaces of New Testament investigation that at Luke i. 4, 5, the most flowing Greek period and perhaps the most strongly Hebraistic section of the New Testament come together. Yet from this undoubted fact no conclusion can at once be drawn against the genuineness of the infancy section, for it is possible that in i. 5-ii. 52, Luke was so closely following a source that he refrained from changing its style and diction. This explanation is the more probable because the contrast between i. 5-ii. 52 and what follows is by no means so great as between that section and the prologue. It is an undoubted fact that in the admittedly original part of the Gospel, the author has allowed the style of the source to color the narrative. Therefore, he may well be carrying out the same method a little more fully in the infancy section. The difference would be one of degree, not of kind. But this is not all. Harnack* has argued that the Magnificat and the sections ii. 15-20, 41-52 (the latter two being chosen because of the difference of the subject-matter from the rest of the Gospel and Acts) exhibit specifically Lukan characteristics of style; and Harnack's investigation has been completed for the rest of the infancy section by Zimmermann,† with a similar result. Now with reference to the Magnificat, Spitta‡ has undoubtedly pointed out a serious defect in Harnack's method. Harnack has picked out the Old Testament passages upon which he supposes the Magnificat to rest, and has then extracted from the song the fourteen words which were not given by these passages. These words, he argues, are Lukan. Spitta's general criticism is that we cannot be certain enough that just Harnack's Old Testament passages and no others were consciously or unconsciously in the mind of the author of the song. So that if we find that Harnack's fourteen words are common in the Septuagint, we can scarcely draw any sure conclusion as to the Lukan authorship. But even if we allow to this objection its full weight, it does not vitiate the whole argument of Harnack and Zimmermann; for the method objected to is not carried through the other passages examined, or at any rate is not

* *Sitzungsberichte der königlich preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, 1900, 538-556.

† *Op. cit.*, 250f.

‡ *Theologische Abhandlungen für Holtzmann*, 78f.

fundamental there. Indeed, the cumulative evidence adduced for the linguistic affinity of the birth narrative with the other Lukan writings must, I think, be pronounced very convincing—far too convincing to allow us to stop short with the hypothesis of a common redactor merely. It seems highly probable that the writer of the Gospel and of Acts impressed his style upon the infancy narrative, although not so as to destroy the strongly Semitic character of the language of that section.

Of course there are several possible ways of explaining these facts. In the first place, we might say with Harnack that the Semitic coloring and Old Testament spirit of i. 5–ii. 52 are due largely to the conscious art of the writer, rather than to a close adherence to Semitic sources.* But I do not think we should by any means go so far as to suppose that Luke, in possession, on the one hand, of a certain unadorned tradition, and acquainted, on the other hand, in a general way with Jewish modes of expression, went deliberately to work artificially to mould that tradition into the language best suited to the time and place described. For example, it is highly improbable that Luke actually composed the Magnificat, as Harnack maintains. Rather should we say that in the first two chapters of the Gospel the author must be closely reproducing Palestinian tradition. It is not certain that that tradition was given to him in anything more than oral form; for it does not seem too much to expect that Luke should have had literary discernment enough to catch the charm of the beautiful Jewish stories and literary ability enough not to spoil that charm in the writing. But in view of the strongly Semitic character of the language, and the still more Semitic and strictly Jewish character of the thought, it is an impossibility to suppose that Luke was the actual composer of the stories, as Pfeiderer has contended. That would attribute to him too much historical sense and dramatic art for any historian of any time; much more for a historian possessing the characteristics of Luke and living at the time when he lived. Indeed, after all, the general effect of the section will probably always be such as to suggest to most minds that the author is using a written source, and a source which could have arisen only on Palestinian ground, and in circles where the ancient Jewish traditions and aspirations were preserved in their purest form. The linguistic data collected by Zimmermann point very strongly to the use of an Aramaic document, for how else but upon the theory of translation can we explain the distinctly Lukan character of the superficial coloring as against the yet more dis-

* Cf. Pfeiderer, *Urchristenthum*, 1te Aufl., 416f.

tinely Jewish character of the warp and woof? This, however, we must leave undecided. The special arguments for the theory of translation as given by Zimmermann* do not prove the matter, though they may show that that theory explains very satisfactorily at least some of the facts.† However, we may regard it as proved that Luke i. 5-ii. 52 follows closely a Jewish Christian source, which, if not written in Aramaic, was yet thoroughly Palestinian in character. But the linguistic characteristics of the section rather favor than oppose the view that the source was used by the author of the rest of the Gospel.

One other argument against the genuineness of our section remains to be considered—namely, the argument of Hilgenfeld that in the first two sections certain un-Pauline ideas are emphasized, such as the obligation of the law (ii. 22, 23, 39), righteousness of works (i. 6, 15, 75, ii. 25), the throne of David and the eternal kingdom over the house of Jacob (i. 32, 33); things which could never have been added to the Gospel by the Paulinist Luke. But, in the first place, Hilgenfeld's objection rules out of court on purely *à priori* grounds the view that the author in writing his narrative may have consulted the facts or the sources as well as his own dogmatic prepossessions. It is not impossible that a Paulinist should have written i. 5-ii. 52, unless it is impossible that a Paulinist should have desired to tell the truth—and the latter proposition is not so self-evident as Hilgenfeld and others of his school seem to suppose. In the second place, Hilgenfeld supposes that the redactor who added the two songs (with certain Pauline alterations, i. 55*b*, 73*a*, 76-79), and joined the whole narrative to the Gospel, was himself a Paulinist. It is not clear why, if the second Paulinist could do that, the first one, or the writer of the Gospel, could not have done it just as well. So Hilgenfeld's theory, aside from its other defects, is hardly consistent.

The first question, then, we may regard as settled. There are no good solid reasons for regarding i. 5-ii. 52 as an interpolation. Furthermore, in settling this question, we have incidentally established the fact that the narrative in i. 5-ii. 52 is of distinctly Jewish-Christian origin‡—a fact which we shall find to be of great importance.

The attempts to separate Luke i, from Luke ii, or to separate their sources,§ may be at once dismissed as devoid of evidence.

* *Op. cit.*, 268*f*.

† Against the theory of translation, see Wernle, *Synoptische Frage*, 102.

‡ Cf. Feine, *Eine vorkanonische Ueberlieferung des Lukas*, 13*f*.

§ *E.g.*, by Schmiedel, *Encyclopædia Biblica*, art. *Mary*, § 12.

Holtzmann* argues that Nazareth, Joseph and Mary are mentioned in ii. 4 ff. as though these names were not already known from i. 26, 27; but really the manner of repetition is perfectly natural as taking up the narrative where it had been dropped. So Luke ii. 4, 5, seems, if anything, rather to presuppose a previous mention of Joseph and Mary. Joseph's Davidic descent is introduced again in order to explain the journey. Moreover, the view in question is directly contradicted by ii. 21b ("which was so called by the angel before he was conceived in the womb"), where i. 31 is referred to. So Schmiedel is obliged to regard this clause (ii. 21b) as added when the two chapters were put together—a purely artificial expedient to bolster up a baseless theory. The two chapters are closely connected so far as style and diction are concerned, and have other things in common. For example, the same character is attributed in both chapters to Mary, and in both she is given a peculiarly prominent position in the narrative.

Far more serious is the attempt to exhibit i. 34, 35, as an interpolation; indeed it is against these two verses that the chief attack of all has been directed. Among those who have argued against the original presence of the two verses in the context where they now stand may be mentioned Hillmann,† Usener, J. Weiss (with a little hesitation), Harnack, Zimmermann, Schmiedel, Pfeiderer and Conybeare, to say nothing of others who less deserve mention, because they make little attempt to ground their objections to the verses upon anything more definite than their general theories of mythical or legendary development. The integrity of the passage has been defended by Hilgenfeld and Clemen,‡ as well as by "conservative" scholars.

First, we must remind ourselves that there is no external evidence whatever for regarding vers. 34, 35, as an interpolation. Conybeare, it is true, emphasizes the reading in MS. *b* which substitutes ver. 38 for ver. 34 and omits ver 38 (εἰπεν . . . τὸ ῥῆμα) from its proper place; but that may have been a mere blunder in transcription, especially as the two verses begin alike, "dixit autem Maria" (Headlam). Or perhaps the change might have been made by the scribe to save Mary from the appearance of unbelief. The testimony of John of Damascus to the omission of the phrase "seeing I know

* *Hand-Commentar*, on Luke ii. 5.

† Hillmann, *Jahrb. f. protest. Theol.*, 1891, 213f., first developed the argument for the interpolation theory, though Holtzmann (*Hand-Commentar*) seems to have made the first suggestion.

‡ Hilgenfeld, *Zeitschrift f. wiss. Theol.*, 1901, 199f., 313f.; Clemen, *Theolog. Literaturzeitung*, 1902, 299.

not a man" in some Greek codices is too late to be of great importance. Conybeare* claims the authority of Tischendorf (8th ed.) for the omission of vers. 34, 35, in the *Protevangelium of James*. But the facts are that the *Protevangelium*, though it omits ver. 34 in this context, substitutes what is rather an elaboration of that verse (*Εἰ ἐγὼ συλλήμψομαι ὡς πᾶσα γυνὴ γεννᾷ*), and actually contains the greater part of ver. 35.† That Conybeare can claim Tischendorf for his view about the *Protevangelium* seems to be due, as Headlam has pointed out, to a surprising misunderstanding of Tischendorf's notes, which arose from not looking under ver. 31 as well as under ver. 34.‡

The evidence for the interpolation theory must therefore be purely internal evidence.

In the first place, we must at once dismiss the argument§ that since the fatherhood of the Spirit of God[?] would suit very badly a purely Jewish Christian source (רוח being feminine, and the Jewish conception of God being transcendental), and since the basis of Luke i, ii, was such a source, therefore vers. 34, 35, could not have stood originally in their present place. This argument proves that a conception from the Holy Spirit, or a birth described in such terms as even to suggest the personal Holy Spirit as Father, would never have been invented on Jewish ground; but it does not prove that it may not have been recorded in a Jewish-Christian narrative if it were a fact. What we are just now trying to do is simply to lay the basis for future investigation by estimating the narrower and more solid grounds for supposing the whole or portions of the birth narratives to be interpolations—grounds which will hold firm upon any general theory of early Christian history. There are many who suppose the doctrine of the virgin birth, assuming it to be untrue, to have arisen on Jewish-Christian ground, and they may appeal, among other things, to the strongly Jewish character of the records. Against such scholars it is begging the question to say that since the doctrine of the virgin birth must be of Gentile origin, therefore it must be an interpolation where it finds a place in Jewish narratives.

It is further urged that i. 34, 35, is not merely without corroboration from the rest of the infancy narrative, but is even contradicted by it; for the whole of the first two chapters except our two verses

* *Guardian*, March 18, 1903.

† See Chap. xi.

‡ See Conybeare, *Guardian*, 1903, March 4, March 18, April 1, etc.; and against him, Headlam, *Guardian* of the same year, March 11, March 25, April 8.

§ Cf. Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, 274.

proceeds upon the supposition that Jesus was the son of Joseph and traces his Davidic descent through him. We freely admit (though in contradiction to B. Weiss) that in i. 27 ἐξ οἴκου Δαυιδ must almost certainly be taken with Ἰωσήφ rather than with παρθένον, for on any other interpretation the manner of addition of τῆς παρθένου is very hard to explain. So that when the angel (ver. 32) calls David father of the coming child, it seems most natural that his words should be understood of a descent through Joseph. The emphasis on Joseph's Davidic descent rather than on that of Mary in ii. 4, however, proves nothing, for it was the man only who would be considered as determining the place of enrolment. But if the Davidic descent of Mary is presupposed, surprisingly little emphasis is placed upon it, for, as has been observed, in the only place where anything is clearly said about her family relations (i. 36) she is called kinswoman of the Levite Elisabeth. The repeated occurrence of such words as γονεῖς, applied to Joseph and Mary; and πατήρ, applied to Joseph, has already been noticed; but these two terms do not necessarily imply anything more than that there was really an adoptive relation between Joseph and Jesus, and that Jesus before the world was regarded as an actual son. The failure to refer to i. 35 in ii. 21 proves absolutely nothing,* for any such reference would have made the sentence extremely clumsy. Nor is the phrase "their cleansing" in ii. 22 very convincing. It is quite in line with a good many things connected with the life of Christ, *e.g.*, the baptism of a sinless man. As to the failure of Mary to understand, or her astonishment at what was said about the child by Symeon and Anna and by the boy Jesus Himself, even Zimmermann admits that this has little bearing upon the question of the original presence of i. 34, 35, in the narrative. The astonishment of the parents was due to the fact that Symeon and Anna and the boy Jesus were found to be possessed of the secret of the Messiahship. Only thus, according to Zimmermann, can the passages be explained, whether the parents knew about the supernatural conception or only about the Messiahship of their son.

In general, we can say that it is unreasonable to expect that the account of the supernatural conception should be repeated again and again. In a narrative it is enough that it should be given once, whatever might be true of a dogmatic treatise. Yet, after all, we do not desire to depreciate the force of the argument against the two verses, derived from the silence or seeming contradiction of the rest of the story; for although that argument may not prove the

* Against Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, 280.

verses to be an interpolation, it will do much to render us hospitable to other proofs. If we really find that in the rest of the first two chapters there is not the slightest hint that might point to the virgin birth, or that there is a good deal that seems almost directly to deny it, we shall be very much disposed to look with suspicion upon the only two verses that tell of such a remarkable event. As a matter of fact, however, this is not the case.

In the first place, i. 27 deserves the most careful attention. We there read in the clearest terms that Mary was a virgin when the announcement was made to her by the angel. Now, since there is no subsequent mention of a marriage to Joseph, the natural conclusion is that in i. 27 we have a preparation for i. 34, 35.* To avoid this conclusion two expedients have been adopted. In the first place, Usener suggests that the redactor has left out a statement (which originally came after ver. 38) that Joseph took Mary to wife and that she conceived by him. But that is a mere supposition. In the second place, Harnack supposes that the word *παρθένος* in i. 27 is an interpolation made by the same redactor who added vers. 34, 35. For, he says, the word *ἐμνηστευμένη* in ii. 5 can only mean "wife," so that the same author could never have written a few verses back *παρθένον ἐμνηστευμένην*. One of the words must be removed, and the most natural one to remove is, of course, *παρθένον*. But this really begs the question. For *ἐμνηστευμένη* in ii. 5 means simply "wife" only on the supposition that i. 34, 35, are to be deleted—which is exactly the thing to be proved. Nor is the removal of the mention of the virginity of Mary from i. 27 at all an easy task, for the word *παρθένος* occurs twice (*παρθένον, παρθένου*), and is indissolubly connected with the very structure of the sentence.† Whatever may be said about the ease with which the two verses, i. 34, 35, taken by themselves, may be removed; if the removal of those verses necessarily requires another deletion, which, far from being equally easy, is so harsh as to be practically impossible, then the former deletion must be seriously reconsidered.

Harnack's argument has led us to the second chief reference to the two verses in question. In ii. 5 we find the phrase *τῇ ἐμνηστευμένῃ αὐτῇ οὖσα ἐν χόρῳ*—a phrase absolutely inexplicable unless i. 34, 35, is referred to. For, after all, if the author had meant "wife," he would certainly have said "wife"—at any rate, he certainly would

* See Hilgenfeld, *Zeitschrift f. wiss. Theol.*, 1901, 314, 315.

† Cf. Bardenhewer, *Biblische Zeitschrift*, 1905, 158, Anm. 3.

not have used ἐμνηστευμένη in conjunction with ἐνχύψ.* So evident is this that most of those scholars who regard i. 34, 35, as an interpolation can overcome the difficulty only by choosing the reading γυναιχι instead of ἐμνηστευμένη in ii. 5. The external testimony is briefly as follows: γυναιχι is omitted altogether by \aleph B C* D L Ξ , 1, 131, e, f, q**². sax. sah. copt. syr.^{sch} arm. γυναιχι is added after αὐτῶ by A C² F² Δ 1, q*, vg. goth. syr.^p aeth. γυναιχι is read without a preceding ἐμνηστευμένη or corresponding word by the Latin manuscripts a, b, c, ff², and by syr.^{sin}. The reading with both ἐμνηστευμένη and γυναιχι is evidently to be dismissed at once as a mixed reading. Now of course this leaves the overwhelming manuscript authority in favor of ἐμνηστ without γυναιχι, and this authority has been followed by Tischendorf (8th ed.), WH, Baljon, etc. Some scholars, however, have argued that γυναιχι represents the original reading, on the ground that γυναιχι might easily have been changed into ἐμνηστ for dogmatic reasons, whereas there would have been no ground for an Ebionitic alteration of ἐμνηστ.† But it is not necessary to think of an Ebionitic alteration, since ἐμνηστ might easily have given offense on account of the difficulty of conceiving of Mary as only betrothed when she made the journey with Joseph, as well as on account of Matt. i. 24, where it is said that Joseph took Mary to wife. Also Matt. i. 20 may have had an influence.‡ Therefore, in view of the preponderance of the external testimony for the omission of γυναιχι, it is almost as violent a change to insert it as it is to delete the words παρθένον and παρθένου in i. 27.

The important point to observe is that i. 27 and ii. 5 (to say nothing of passages which seem to attribute a peculiar importance to Mary rather than Joseph, and to say nothing of i. 41 where Elisabeth seems to greet Mary as already mother of the Lord) rest as dead weights upon any theory which separates i. 34, 35, from the context. The theory must have exceedingly strong independent support if it is not to break down under the strain. We now examine that independent support.

Harnack§ has enumerated as many as ten arguments for regard-

* Whether the writer actually had in mind exactly the relationship described in Matt. i. 24 remains uncertain. Here we are only interested in observing that whatever ἐμνηστευμένη meant to the author, it did not mean to him simply γυναιχι. To us it means naturally "wife," in the sense of Matt. i. 24. See Weiss, *Meyer*, 9te Aufl. on Luke ii. 5.

† See Hillmann, *op. cit.*, 216f.

‡ Cf. Hilgenfeld, *Zeitschrift f. wiss. Theol.*, 1901, 314; B. Weiss, *Meyer*, 9te Aufl. on Luke ii. 5.

§ *Zeitschrift f. d. neut. Wissenschaft*, 1901, 53-57.

ing i. 34, 35, as an interpolation. Let us briefly examine them to see whether they are as formidable in quality as they are in quantity.*

1. In vers. 34, 35, we find the particles *ἐπεὶ* and *διό*, one of which, *διό*, stands a number of times in Acts, but only once in the third Gospel, while *ἐπεὶ* (according to the best text of Luke vii. 1) occurs nowhere else in the Lukan writings. Harnack concludes that i. 34, 35, betrays a non-Lukan diction, and is therefore an interpolation.

To derive any argument from *διό* is plainly to rely too much upon "the constancy of the use of particles in the Gospel of Luke," especially since we have one other case where the word occurs. As to *ἐπεὶ*, it will be enough to remark that it is rash to attribute too much weight to one word in an argument from diction, especially in view of the Lukan expressions which Zimmermann has pointed out in the two verses.† Of course, too, Harnack's argument from the non-Lukan character of *ἐπεὶ* depends on the correctness of his opinion that Luke was the *author* (rather than merely the translator or redactor) of the first two chapters. And even if Luke was the author, yet it is not unlikely that his source may have here and there exerted an influence on his diction, in particulars such as these particles where he usually followed his own habits.

2. The conversation in i. 34, 35, unduly separates *καὶ ἰδοὺ συλλήμψῃ* in ver. 31 from the corresponding *καὶ ἰδοὺ Ἐλισάβετ ἡ συγγενὴς σου καὶ αὐτῇ συνειληφεν* (ver. 36).

An argument of this kind cannot have much independent weight, because prose style is seldom perfectly regular.

3. Ver. 35 is a doublet of vers. 31, 32, and is in part inconsistent with those verses. In vers. 31-33 Jesus is called son of David and son of the highest; in ver. 35 He is called son of God, because He is that through His birth. If the writer had had in his mind the "son of God" of ver. 35, he would have omitted the "son of the highest" and the "David his father" of vers. 31-33.

As Hilgenfeld has pointed out, though *υἱὸς ὑψίστου* does not require any such thing as is described in ver. 35, yet it by no means excludes it. And the mention of the "throne of his father David" simply indicates that the promise was put in Old Testament terms, though the promise of the everlasting reign perhaps points to an explanation to follow (Hilgenfeld). Even if the Davidic descent through Joseph is really incompatible with i. 34, 35, that does not prove that those two verses are an interpolation, for if the redactor

* For the criticism of Harnack's arguments, cf. Bardenhewer, *op. cit.*, 158f.

† Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, 256.

did not feel the contradiction, perhaps the original author did not. After all, the thing is largely a question of taste. Perhaps Hilgenfeld, who sees a well-conceived progress in the whole passage, is as well entitled to his opinion as is Harnack, who sees in it only a pair of clumsily joined doublets. Wernle* (with a different purpose) argues along the same lines as Hilgenfeld, pointing to Ignatius and to the readings of Syr^{sin} in Matt. i as showing that a part of the ancient Christians could think of "from the seed of David" and "from the Holy Ghost" together without offense. So perhaps the double interpretation of divine sonship would not be regarded as contradiction but as climax. It is therefore by no means necessary to follow B. Weiss in regarding ver. 35 (*διὸ καὶ . . . υἱὸς θεοῦ*) as supplied by the Evangelist. Probably the meaning of *υἱὸς θεοῦ* in connection with what precedes should not be pressed too far. On any view, however, ver. 35 would make Jesus *υἱὸς θεοῦ*, even though He might also have been called that on less definite grounds.

4. The words in vers. 36, 37 (pointing to the example of Elisabeth), obtain a good sense only if no mention of a conception by the working of the Holy Spirit has gone before; for if the most wonderful thing of all has already been promised, then it is weak and not convincing to point in support to Elisabeth's conception in her old age.

This, so far from being a support for Harnack's position, is really an argument against it. There could, in the nature of the case, be no parallel for the unique miracle. But what the angel could do was to point to a miracle which was at least sufficient to illustrate the general principle that *οὐκ ἄδυνατήσκει παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ πᾶν ῥήμα*.† And it is almost necessarily required for the logic of the passage that the greater event in which the belief was solicited, should be in the same sphere with the example used. If merely vers. 31-33 had gone before, then we should expect that the angel would point rather to the promised career of John than to something miraculous in his birth, to which miracle there was to be no counterpart in the case of Jesus. Zimmermann admits the weakness of the argument drawn from vers. 36, 37, against the integrity of the passage; but I must go still further. To me it will always be a mystery how the argument ever came to be formulated from vers. 36, 37, against the integrity of the passage rather than in favor of it.‡

* *Synoptische Frage*, 103-104.

† Bardenhewer, *op. cit.*, 161.

‡ Cf. Hilgenfeld, *Zeitschrift f. wiss. Theologie*, 1901, 202-203, 316-317, and especially E. P. Badham, *Academy*, January 26, 1895. B. Weiss, in *Meyer*, 9te Aufl., on ver. 35, calls attention to the *καὶ αὐτῆς* of ver. 36 as pointing in the direction we have indicated.

5. The question of Mary, *πῶς ἔσται τοῦτο, ἐπεὶ ἄνδρα οὐ γινώσκω*; is open to objection in two respects:

(a) Since Mary was betrothed to Joseph, and since he was of the house of David, it would have been perfectly natural for Mary to apply the promise of the angel to the fruit of the coming marriage (*σολλήμνη* future). So the question is a mere device of the redactor to introduce ver. 35.

Perhaps the difficulty arises in part from a too exact and mechanical interpretation of the question, for the question need be little more than the unthinking expression of the maidenly consciousness of Mary, startled as she was by the strange appearance of the angel. We may either think of the exact form of the question as due to the narrator, who, however, correctly represents the general sense of what Mary said to the angel or conveyed to him by look; or we may think of the present form of the question as given by Mary herself. In either case, there is no difficulty sufficient to justify the theory of interpolation. For the difficulty is as well explained by the natural confusion of Mary as by the clumsiness of the interpolator. An interpolator might even be expected to smooth things out. Or it is possible to take another view of the matter, and to suppose that there was something in the annunciation in its original form, or in the manner in which the words were spoken, to indicate that the conception was to be immediate or of a unique character.*

(b) This question of Mary expresses unbelief as much as does the question of Zacharias, *κατὰ τί γινώσκειται τοῦτο*; (ver. 18); yet Mary is praised as having believed (ver. 45), whereas Zacharias is punished with dumbness as having doubted.

The two questions are not quite equivalent, however sophisticated Harnack may pronounce the attempts to show a difference between them. The question of Mary may be simply the involuntary expression of surprise and perplexity; that of Zacharias must be a deliberate request for a sign. And even if we give the objection its full force, it does not prove much, for in any case the final answer of Mary was *Ἰδοὺ ἡ δούλη Κυρίου • γένοιτό μοι κατὰ τὸ ῥῆμά σου*.†

6. Mary is represented throughout the first two chapters as passive and silent—as keeping all these things and pondering them in her heart, as receiving blessing without reply. This picture is disturbed by the question of i. 34.

In the first place, this argument rests upon Harnack's doubtful view that the Magnificat is to be attributed to Elisabeth, and in the second place, it is merely subjective at the best.

* For a careful statement, see Allen, *Interpreter*, February, 1905, 121, 122.

† Cf. Hilgenfeld, *Zeitschrift f. wiss. Theologie*, 1901, 316.

7. After the necessary changes have been made in i. 27 and iii. 23, the Gospel of Luke knows nothing of the virgin birth, except in i. 34, 35. "After these few and easy deletions, which are *required*, as soon as we are convinced of the interpolation of vers. 34, 35, but which otherwise also obtrude themselves upon us, the narrative is smooth and nowhere presupposes the virgin birth."

As we have already shown, Harnack has no ground for saying that the removal of *παρθένος* in i. 27 has its own reasons, apart from the theory about i. 34, 35. Other objections also have already been noticed.

8. The composition of vers. 34, 35, is easily discerned. Ver. 34 prepares for ver. 35 (very clumsily it is true); ver. 35 is to be explained from Luke i. 31, 32, and Matt. i. 18-25.

It is rather suspicious that the redactor should be so clumsy in one point, and should yet exhibit positive genius in imitating (ver. 35) so admirably the style and spirit of the narratives.

9. So Matt. i. 18-25 becomes the starting-point for the representations of the virgin birth, which simplifies matters in the history of the legend.

In our judgment, however it may be in Harnack's, this is merely begging the question.

10. Whether Luke himself subsequently or an interpolator inserted the virgin birth in the Gospel cannot be decided, though the former alternative is less probable.

This does not seem to be intended as an argument at all, and so demands no answer.

Against all these minuter arguments may be balanced the important consideration of the parallelism with the annunciation to Zacharias. In vers. 11-20 we have (1) the appearance of the angel, (2) fear of Zacharias, (3) promise by the angel, (4) surprised question of Zacharias, (5) reiteration of the promise, with a sign. To these details we have in the full text of the annunciation to Mary striking parallels, and the details are there arranged in the same order. The general impression is very strong that this parallel was intended by the writer, so that it is very unlikely that vers. 34, 35, are to be removed; for without these verses the symmetry of the chapter is destroyed.*

Our conclusions may be formulated as follows:

(1) It is impossible that vers. 34, 35, should have been interpolated into the completed Gospel. That is excluded by the weight of external evidence. (Against Harnack.)

* Weinl, *Zeitschrift f. d. neut. Wissenschaft*, 1901, 37f.

(2) It is highly improbable that vers. 34, 35, are an addition made by the Evangelist to a Palestinian source that elsewhere he follows closely. On that view it is difficult to explain the peculiarly marked Semitic style and spirit which prevails in the two verses, so precisely in harmony with the rest of the narrative. (Against Zimmermann.)

(3) It is less improbable (but still far from likely) that in i. 34, 35, Luke is departing from a Palestinian source which he does not here follow closely but employs in so loose a way that we can seldom (as here) separate the source from the finished composition.* Against this view of the matter, Wernle himself notices the objection that it fails to account for the apparent contradictions and roughness caused by the insertion, but he supposes that that contradiction was not apparent to Luke in the same way as to us. So Wernle holds that the birth narrative is the work throughout (even through i. 31-35) of one author, and is as closely knit as we can expect in a time of lively productiveness and variegated religious syncretism. But how, then, can we be confident of separating between author and source in i. 31ff.? Wernle would perhaps be more consistent if he were more skeptical about this point. Perhaps, too, the same line of reasoning as that of Wernle will allow us to attribute the whole to some writer other and earlier than the writer of the Gospel. At any rate, grave objections may be raised, for example, from style and diction, against the large place which Wernle attributes to the Evangelist in the composition of chapters i, ii.†

Before passing on, we must notice a remarkable modification of the interpolation theory we have just been considering—a modification which has recently (1900) been suggested by Kattenbusch‡ and defended by Weinel.§ According to Kattenbusch, the birth from the Holy Ghost was originally thought of independently of the birth from a virgin, and it is to the former conception that Luke's narrative attaches the chief importance. Indeed, even i. 35, taken by itself, does not mean anything more than that the Spirit of God so overshadowed the mother that not merely was the child filled with the Spirit from the moment of birth, as in the case of John, but that which was begotten (*γεννημενον*) partook from the very first of the nature of the Spirit. That verse excludes the

* Wernle, *op. cit.*, 102f.

† In defense of the integrity of the passage, see especially E. P. Badham, *Academy*, January 26, 1895.

‡ *Verbreitung und Bedeutung des Taufsymbols*, 621-622, 666f. Anm. 300.

§ *Zeitschrift f. d. neut. Wissenschaft*, 1901, 37f.

human father only when it is taken in connection with the last clause of ver. 34 (ἐπεὶ ἄνδρα οὐ γινώσκω). So that in order to remove the virgin birth from Luke's narrative and thus secure unity of representation, it is not necessary to delete the whole of vers. 34, 35, with Hillmann, but merely to remove the four words ἐπεὶ ἄνδρα οὐ γινώσκω.

The special grounds that speak in favor of this new suggestion (as they are to be gleaned partly from Kattenbusch, but particularly from Weinell, who is more confident about the literary and critical question) seem to be derived largely from the comparison with the annunciation to Zacharias. As we there find no suggestion of the agency of Zacharias, because that was regarded as a matter of course, so the agency of Joseph is in this second annunciation similarly regarded as a matter of course. In the second place, the statement of ver. 35 about the πνεῦμα ἁγίον cannot exclude the coöperation of the human father, because it is expressly correlated with the conception by Elisabeth (ver. 36). In the third place, the very giving of a sign (ver. 36) requires that a surprised or doubting question should have preceded. But this requirement is not satisfied by Hillmann's theory. And in the fourth place, the parallelism of structure between the accounts of the two annunciations, which is destroyed by Hillmann, is preserved by this new suggestion.

As to this last argument, we observe that the parallelism is not preserved by Weinell's suggestion so well as by the maintenance of the integrity of the passage. For in ver. 18 Zacharias gives the reason for his doubt, to which reason there is nothing corresponding in the case of Mary unless the words ἐπεὶ ἄνδρα οὐ γινώσκω are retained. Therefore this very argument of Weinell speaks very strongly against his own theory, as it does against the theory of Hillmann. The most attractive thing about the new theory is that it removes one difficulty about Mary's question, in that it makes her surprise centre about the greatness of her son, rather than about a hitherto unmentioned peculiarity in the manner of His birth.* Furthermore, by retaining ver. 35, it procures the great advantage over the theory of Hillmann of not obliging us to attribute to a redactor such a marvelous genius in imitating the spirit and style of the original writing. Indeed, we are almost tempted to admit that the new theory is preferable to the old; at any rate, we gladly admit that the old has received a new wound from the fresh arguments of Weinell, especially the literary argument from the parallelism with i. 11ff. But these arguments oppose the older interpolation theory

* See Weinell, *op. cit.*, 38, 39.

as much in the interests of the integrity of the whole passage as in the interests of the new theory. On the other hand, many of the arguments of Harnack, and arguments upon which the champions of the old theory were accustomed to stake their cause to no mean extent, fall to the ground if ver. 35 is retained. Furthermore, although Kattenbusch is correct in saying that ver. 35 does not require the virgin birth, yet it naturally suggests something of the kind, so that it is better in place if the clause *ἐπεὶ ἄνδρα οὐ γινώσκω* has preceded. And then one great objection to the new theory (an objection which Weinel has not altogether ignored) is the extreme cleverness of the redactor. According to the new theory the redactor is too clever, as according to the old theory he displayed too much literary genius. On the whole, the two theories are about equally improbable; for, after all, the really fundamental objections apply to both alike, while the peculiar difficulties are about equally divided.

In Matthew, Hillmann supposes the first two chapters to have been no part of the original Gospel, while Hilgenfeld regards i. 18-ii. 23 as an interpolation. It is argued that the *ἐν ταύταις ταῖς ἡμέραις* of iii. 1 would not be natural if the third chapter was originally joined to what now goes before. According to Hillmann, probably some chronological note similar to that in Luke iii. 1 was left off by the redactor who added chaps. i, ii; for the redactor was so far from the time described that he would take no offense at applying the phrase *ἐν ταύταις ταῖς ἡμέραις* to what really happened after an interval of thirty years. But this is a mere supposition. Perhaps the author of the Gospel would himself have been looking back over a long enough interval not to have objected to the phrase, especially in view of the loose way in which the incidents are coupled all through the Gospel. Nowhere is the chronological succession very clear.

Hilgenfeld supposes that the *ἐν ταύταις ταῖς ἡμέραις* refers to the close of the genealogy, for it would be perfectly natural to mean by the phrase merely "in the time of Jesus," if it is taken in connection with the many generations indicated in i. 1-16. But this seems rather unlikely, for the genealogy is the expression of one idea, and has no chronological purpose. It would, therefore, be very unnatural to separate i. 16 from the rest by applying to it the phrase *ἐν ταύταις τ. ἡμ.* That phrase requires that something in the nature of narrative should have gone before, and this requirement is not satisfied by the genealogy. Meyer argues further that iv. 13 manifestly refers to ii. 23.

As to the content of the section, Hilgenfeld* enumerates as marks of the redactor (1) the Old Testament pragmatism, (2) the friendly attitude toward the heathen, (3) the view of Christ as born Son of God. But the Old Testament pragmatism is rather a mark of the author of the whole Gospel, who is interested throughout in showing the fulfilment of Old Testament prophecy. The friendly attitude toward the Gentiles proves nothing if the story of the Magi (Gentiles) is essentially true, for in the mere form of the story there is no evidence of a desire to magnify the Gentiles at the expense of the Jews. And it is not at all self-evident that the author of the rest of the Gospel should not himself have felt the contrast between the acceptance of the gospel by the Gentiles and its rejection by the Jews. Finally, why may not the idea that Christ was born Son of God have been the view of the author of the Gospel? Some one—i.e., the redactor at least—held to both the Davidic sonship and the virgin birth. Why may not the author have done so?

One piece of supposed external evidence must be mentioned, even though we consider it to be of little value. Conybeare† and Hilgenfeld attribute considerable weight to a Syriac tract, extant in a sixth-century manuscript (British Museum, Add. 17,142), and published, with a translation, by Wright in the *Journal of Sacred Literature*, 1866, Vols. IX and X. The tract is attributed to Eusebius and purports to be an account of the Star and the Magi, the history having been written down in 119 A.D. According to Conybeare, "the Syriac author of this tract . . . had in his hands a pre-canonical Greek source of 119 or 120," to which belonged the colophon that gives the date. Conybeare's conclusion is that the date 119 or 120 is the *terminus a quo* of the introduction of Matt. ii. 1-15 into the canonical text. The document is interesting, but the conclusions drawn from it seem to be best described as "problematical"—a word which J. Weiss aptly applies to Conybeare's Ephraem passage about Luke. And in view of the undisputed unity of style and diction between i. 18-ii. 23 and the rest of the Gospel—a unity far too perfect to be explained as due merely to a common redactor—we may safely agree finally with J. Weiss when he declares that there never were forms of the Gospels of Matthew and Luke without the infancy narratives.‡

As to the sources of the infancy section in Matthew, nothing very definite can be said. It is mere speculation, for example, when

* *Zeitschrift f. wiss. Theologie*, 1900, 269.

† See *Guardian*, April 29, 1903.

‡ *Theologische Rundschau*, 1903, 208.

Schmiedel makes i. 18-25 an addition later than chap. ii. Indeed, for all we can see, the two chapters might go back to the same source, for the failure to mention the place Bethlehem in i. 18 instead of in ii. 1 proves very little;* but, after all, the theory of merely oral sources can never be disproved. The ultimate home of the sources is far more likely to have been Palestinian than Gentile, for the section shows acquaintance with Jewish customs, and with the Hebrew text of the Old Testament; and perhaps is combatting Jewish slanders.† The story of the Magi does not oppose this view of the matter, for the Gentile coloring, so far as it exists, might be due to the Gentile subject;‡ and perhaps it is even a positive evidence for the Jewish character of the narrative, for it may represent the Jewish Messianic conception of a gathering of the heathen for worship to Mount Sion. If Matthew's Gospel is in general destined for Jews, then it is not necessary to suppose that i. 18-ii. 23 is a foreign element; or rather it is not necessary to do so until we have proved that the idea of the supernatural birth could not possibly have arisen on Jewish ground.§

As to the genealogy of Matthew, the attempt of Charles|| to prove that it is a later addition to the Gospel (about A.D. 170) is interesting only in showing how more usual critical theories can be reversed. Conybeare¶ has shown how impossible it would have been for the genealogy to have been added at that late date, when interests other than the interest in the Davidic descent were predominant; and Badham has argued with some weight against separating i. 1-17 and i. 18-ii at all. At any rate, there can be no doubt whatever that the genealogy was part of the original Gospel, or, to sum up our results, that the whole of chaps. i, ii, is genuine.

The discovery of Syr^{sin} in 1892 has made Matt. i. 16, from a textual point of view, one of the most extensively discussed verses in the New Testament, and has acted as a lively stimulus to the investigation of the genealogies in general. The bewildering mazes of the textual question** must here, for obvious reasons, remain

* See PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, October, 1905, 664ff.

† See W. Allen, *Interpreter*, February, 1905.

‡ Cf. *Church Quart. Rev.*, July, 1904, 389.

§ For the Jewish character of Matt. i, ii, see especially G. H. Box, *Zeitschrift f. d. neut. Wissenschaft*, 1905, 81f.

|| *Academy*, December 1, 1894.

¶ *Academy*, December 8, 1894.

** See a long controversy carried on by Conybeare, Badham, Charles, Allen, Rahlfs, Sanday, White, Skipwith, and a few others in the *Academy* from November 17, 1894, to February 23, 1895; Farrar in the *Expositor*, 1895 (Vol. I), 1ff.; J. R. Harris in *Contemp. Rev.*, LXVI, 656ff.; Conybeare in *Hibbert Journal*, I,

unexplored; nor do we need to explore them for our purpose. For after the first shock of discovery has passed away, the general consensus of scholarship seems to be leaning to the opinion that the readings of the new manuscript do not tell us as much as was at first supposed. As has been remarked, the reading at i. 16 merely intensifies difficulties already present; at any rate, it cannot prove that i. 18ff. was not a part of the original Gospel. Either one of two lines of solution seems to me to be possible. In the first place, we may say with J. Weiss* that the original form of the genealogy was "Joseph begat Jesus," though this was, of course, never the reading in the Gospel; the problem then being how to account for the variants after the change had once been made. This problem J. Weiss dismisses as insoluble. Wilkinson,† in one of the most convincing papers which I have seen upon the subject, attempts something of a solution. He decides (and correctly) that our present Greek text is the original text of the Gospel. For the narrator of i. 18ff. had two motives: (1) to assert the miraculous conception, (2) to assert that the birth took place while Mary was Joseph's wife. The latter was the narrator's way of effecting a "compromise"[?] between the virgin birth and the Davidic Messiahship. Now i. 16 in our critical text is in exact accord with this purpose, as the reading of Syr^{sin} is not, while Conybeare's reading from the *Dialogue of Timothy and Aquila* is manifestly conflate. The other readings, Wilkinson continues, were due to two causes: correction due to dogmatic sensitiveness, and corruption from the original sources (*i.e.*, from the reading of the original genealogy, "Joseph begat Jesus"). There are many attractive features about such a construction of the history of the variations, but I am not quite convinced that "Joseph begat Jesus" was the reading of the original genealogy—if there was a genealogy of this peculiar type—before the author of the Gospel made use of it. For, in the first place, the compiler who inserted the names of women throughout the genealogy would have been likely to mention the mother of Jesus; indeed, it is not impossible that he inserted the women expressly in view of the fact that there was something remarkable about Mary—*i.e.*, the virgin birth.‡ We must simply refrain from trying to make a decision.

In the case of Luke, perhaps there was an original genealogy

96ff.; J. R. Wilkinson in *Hibbert Journal*, I, 354ff.; Allen in *Interpreter*, February, 1905; Schmiedel, Art. *Mary* in *Enc. Biblica*, etc.

* *Theologische Rundschau*, 1901, 210.

† *Hibbert Journal*, I, 354ff.

‡ Cf. Allen, *Interpreter*, February, 1905, 112, 113; Box, *Zeitschrift f. d. neut. Wissenschaft*, 1905, 83f.

which made Joseph the father of Jesus without indication of anything peculiar in the relationship. At any rate, the *ὡς ἐνομιζετο* was added at least as early as the reception of the genealogy into the Gospel, and probably earlier. Indeed, I think we should not be too certain that the words of ver. 23 were ever without the *ὡς ἐνομιζετο*, for it is not even so evident as is sometimes supposed that no one would have gone to work to compile a genealogy who was expecting to remove (apparently, at least) the very point of it by these words. For, to emphasize what we have mentioned many times, we know that there were some who were interested to prove both Davidic descent and virgin birth. Why may not the compiler of the genealogy have been one of these? And suppose the genealogy was not first compiled at all in order to show the Davidic descent of Jesus, but was a long-prized family record which was continued from the generation to generation. If it was to be continued at all after Joseph, it could be continued only in the form in which we now have it—that is, in case the virgin birth was a fact. So there would be no question of going to work to construct a genealogy of Jesus; the genealogy already existed as a genealogy of Joseph.

It must be remembered that our discussion of divisive theories about the infancy narratives, long and tedious as it has been, is merely a means to an end. The great problem for those who deny the historicity of the birth stories is to show how the idea of the virgin birth could have arisen in such a way and at such a time and in such a place as to find a lodgment in those stories. This problem would be much simplified if certain things about the character and date of the account of the virgin birth could be established by clear internal evidence. Now the result of our examination of the supposed internal evidence, we believe, has been to show that the propositions—which we enumerated as the four logical motives for divisive theories—have not been established. In the first place, the infancy narratives are not interpolations in the Gospels; so all the evidence for the early date of the Gospels is also evidence for the early date of the infancy narratives. In the second place, those portions of the infancy narratives which tell of the virgin birth cannot so be separated from the rest as to allow us to suppose that the Davidic descent could not in the early days be maintained by the same writer that also believed in the virgin birth. So if the other New Testament writers emphasize the Davidic descent, it is no proof that they did not also believe in the virgin birth. In the third place, one of the narratives of the virgin birth—that of Luke—is pronouncedly Jewish-Christian and even Pales-

tinian in origin; while the narrative of Matthew also bears marks of Jewish-Christian origin, and at any rate is contained in a Gospel probably destined for Jews. Finally, since the account of the virgin birth is part of the fundamental structure of both narratives, and since the narratives are manifestly independent of each other, it follows that our two testimonies to the virgin birth cannot be reduced to one. The narratives being of such a character, the problem now is to show how the virgin birth, unless it were a fact, ever could have found a place in them. We must not merely show how the idea of the virgin birth might have been developed during the first century; we must further show—and this is often neglected—how this idea was ever taken up by just those narratives in which we now find it.*

Since the narratives of the virgin birth are Jewish in character, it is most natural to suppose that the basis of the idea is to be found on Jewish-Christian ground.† Within the limits of Judaism itself, two starting-points have been suggested for the development of the idea of the virgin birth. In the first place, certain great heroes of old—such as Isaac—being born by a peculiar exercise of the power of God, were regarded as begotten not *κατὰ σάρκα*, but *κατὰ πνεῦμα* (cf. Gal. iv. 29); and Luke even gives an account of such a birth in the case of John the Baptist. So since Jesus was considered greater than these spiritual children, it was only a short step to exclude the human factor altogether by making the Holy Spirit, in this case, not only an important factor, but the sole factor in His conception in His mother's womb (cf. the case of John, Luke i. 15). Not only was this "greater than the prophets" to be filled with the Spirit "from his mother's womb," but the Holy Spirit was to be the very constituting element of His personality. To this short step in advance the virgin prophecy of Isa. vii. 14 would afford the necessary impetus. Of course, as Beyschlag says, all this is merely the formal factor of the representation of the virgin birth; the material factor was the belief in Jesus Christ as a new beginning in humanity, as the one who came down from above. The course of development has been fully described by Lobstein:‡ The disciples began with a profound impression of the uniqueness of Jesus' personality. This impression they interpreted at first along merely Jewish lines—they interpreted the title "Son of God" as applied to Jesus merely in a

* For the question now about to be discussed, see especially Weiss, *Leben Jesu*, E. T., I, 221f.

† So Beyschlag, Harnack, Lobstein.

‡ *Die Lehre von der übernatürlichen Geburt Christi*, 2te Aufl., E. T., 1903.

Messianic or theocratic sense. But as Christian thought began to seek for the underlying causes of what it had at first accepted without deep reflection, the simple explanation of the unique personality of Christ as rooted in His Messiahship was no longer able to suffice. Thus arose the Pauline doctrine of preëxistence, and finally, under the influence of Alexandrian philosophy, the more highly developed Logos Christology of the fourth Gospel. To the theocratic sonship was added the metaphysical sonship. But parallel with this theological development, or preceding it, a more popular development had been going on. To the popular mind—assisted by the stories of spiritual children such as Isaac, and by the prophecy of Isa. vii. 14—the most natural explanation of the unique personality of Christ was that He was not born like other men, but begotten directly by God. So we have not only the theocratic and the metaphysical sonship, but also (inferior to the latter) the physical sonship.

Such a theory has an advantage over some that we shall presently consider, in that it does not call in elements which could not possibly have been included in Jewish-Christian narratives. Even here, however, we might with some reason object that the stage of mythical development required by Lobstein's theory is too advanced to be represented in a narrative reflecting so purely as that of Luke the spirit of the Old Testament and of Palestinian thought. But we waive this point, in order to emphasize even more serious objections. In the first place, Harnack is basing his theory upon a very unsteady foundation when he makes the passage Isa. vii. 14 not only a necessary element in the development, but apparently the only determining cause for the peculiar form which the myth has assumed.* For the word used in the Hebrew, *העלמה*, would give no impulse whatever to the idea of a virgin birth; while there is no evidence that the Septuagint translation (*παρθένος*) had ever as a matter of fact given rise to the inference that the Messiah was to be born of a virgin—certainly not within the limits of pure Judaism.† In general, modern criticism has learned to be much more skeptical than formerly about the omnipotence of Old Testament prophecy in creating stories simply in order to fit the predictions. There must be something to support before Old Testament prophecy can

* Harnack, *Dogmengeschichte*, E. T. from 3d ed., I, 100, note 1.

† Cheyne rejects Isa. vii. 14, LXX, as accounting for the narrative of Matt. i; but makes an interesting attempt to explain the origin of the mistranslation itself. He supposes that *παρθένος* was a title taken over from the goddesses of certain heathen religions, who were mothers but not originally wives. Box suggests Christian influence to account for the present form of the LXX passage.

be dragged in to support it, even though the form of the prophecy may have some effect in altering details.* Nor is it true that parthenogenesis was "in the air" at the time of Christ. It is not true that, as has been said, "To the narrator the miracle is simply a more impressive instance of what God wrought in the case of Elisabeth, Rebekah and Sarah, without affecting the paternity of John the Baptist, Jacob or Isaac."† It is not true that Jewish-Christians, on account of the examples of Isaac, Samson and Samuel, etc., would already be expecting something like a virgin birth, so that the Septuagint translation of Isaiah, even though not very convincing, would still be able to supply a strong enough impulse to lead to the definite formulation of the doctrine as we find it in Matt. i. and Luke i. For the step from a birth by promise, such as that of Isaac, to a birth without human father, such as that of Jesus, is by no means an "easy step," as is often asserted, but involves practically the whole of the mystery. The conception by means of an extraordinary power given to men is quite in accord with the workings of God in Providence—though it may exceed them in degree—whereas it is just the exclusion of the human agency that gives the miracle of the virgin birth that peculiar character which is so difficult to explain. Such cases as Isaac and Samson do not really go very far in explaining the origin of the unique idea as reflected in the narratives of Matthew and Luke. To bridge the gap is especially hard upon Jewish ground. For, in the first place, the noun קִרְיָה is feminine, so that it is hard to see how the idea could among Jews ever have found expression in just the form in which it appears in both our narratives (begotten "of the Holy Spirit"). Of course, it may be said that we should not take the phrase "Holy Spirit" as personal here, but merely as expressing the general idea of the power of God (cf. Luke's conjunction of *πνεῦμα* and *δύναμις*). Still the *form* of statement would naturally have been different—e.g., *ἐκ τοῦ λόγου σου*, a phrase which actually occurs in this connection in early Christian literature. That the representation of the present narratives of Luke and Matthew would hardly have originated on Jewish ground is shown by the *Gospel according to the Hebrews*, which made the Holy Spirit the mother of Jesus. Furthermore, attention has often been called to the fact that the idea of the direct action of God in the way described in Matthew and Luke is not at all in harmony with the strict Jewish monotheism of that day, with its sharp sepa-

* Nestle, *Jahrb. f. prot. Theologie*, 1892, 641, can at the very most show merely a verbal connection between Luke i. 35 and Gen. i. 2. Even that is more than doubtful.

† B. W. Bacon, *Independent*, LV, 3037.

ration of the Divine Being from the world of sense.* In order to avoid these difficulties, or rather in order to demonstrate the existence of a force capable of overcoming them, recourse has been had to that peculiar development of Judaism, the sect of the Essenes, or to the ascetic tendency prevalent in the Christian Church and observable in ascending degree in Paul and in the writer of the Apocalypse (so Hilgenfeld). But aside from all questions as to the date of our narratives, and as to the possible influence of the Essenes upon the writers of the narratives if those writers were ordinary Jews, this theory of an ascetic impulse to the doctrine of the virgin birth receives its deathblow from the entire absence of an ascetic tendency in the birth narratives themselves. (Cf. the expressions "father and mother" and "parents" in Luke.) In general, it may be mentioned as a remarkable fact—if the origin of the myth was Jewish—that it was just from Jewish-Christians (the Ebionites) that the conspicuous denial of the virgin birth in the early Church proceeded.†

It seems, therefore, reasonable to conclude that if the idea of the conception from the Holy Ghost in the womb of the virgin were to be received by the Jewish mind, there must have been some overpowering impulse to overcome the prepossessions of the current theology. The only such impulse that has been discovered is the impulse that would have been in evidence had the virgin birth been a fact; so if we are to deny the fact, we must go farther afield for the origin of the idea. It is not at all surprising, therefore, that very many recent scholars who deny the fact of the virgin birth are obliged to admit the inadequacy of the purely Jewish-Christian explanation of the origin of the myth.

The next step to take is that from primitive Jewish Christianity to Gentile Christianity, and this step was taken by Pfeleiderer.‡ He supposed that the ideas which lie at the basis of the birth narratives came specifically from the theology of Paul, and only the details from the Old Testament. The Pauline dogma of "Christ Jesus declared to be the Son of God according to the spirit of holiness" led to Luke's poetical narrative of the virgin birth, while the accompanying dogma "born of the seed of David according to the flesh" led to the narrative of the journey to Bethlehem. Against this derivation of the birth stories from Pauline ideas might be urged, in the first place, the absence of any trace in Pauline writings

* See Holtzmann, *Lehrbuch der neutestamentlichen Theologie*, I, 413.

† Weiss, *op. cit.*, I, 229.

‡ *Urchristenthum*, 1te Aufl., 417f.

of the beginnings of such a development of dogmatic interest in the mode of Christ's entrance into the world.* In the second place, as we have remarked in another connection, Pfeiderer's theory necessarily attributes to the Gentile Luke an historical imagination and a dramatic power—a power of making purely imaginary circumstances appear to be real—which is utterly foreign to the literary habits of those days (especially to dogmatically motivated narratives), and which would be worthy of a Defoe. Pfeiderer's theory therefore runs directly counter to what we have established as to the genuinely Jewish spirit of the narrative in the third Gospel.†

Being defeated on purely Jewish and Christian ground, those who deny the fact of the virgin birth betake themselves next to Alexandria, and seek to derive the idea from that mixture of Greek philosophy and Old Testament religion which we find best exemplified in the writings of Philo. So Conybeare and Völter.

The latter‡ develops his theory in connection with the narrative of Luke. He begins with the observation that it is remarkable that in a Christian writing so much space should be occupied with John, who was regarded as a mere forerunner. So the first chapter embodies a tradition about John which was not Christian, but purely Jewish, and regarded John as of independent importance. The Christian compiler was not able to do away with this tradition entirely, but used it by making John subordinate to Christ. This he did simply by inserting the middle portion (vers. 26–56) of the first chapter of Luke (in which middle portion, however, some elements of the original tradition can still be observed), without troubling the text of his Jewish source in the other portions. But this did not suffice for the second redactor, who transcended the narrow Jewish standpoint of his predecessor. So the second redactor interpreted i. 27 as referring to Mary rather than to Joseph, put Elisabeth's song into the mouth of Mary, inserted i. 34, 35, and made some changes in the song of Zacharias. The second chapter was written by Redactor I of the first chapter, and was altered at ii. 5

* Cf. Weiss, *op. cit.*, I, 230, 231.

† Pfeiderer has since 1887 radically modified his opinion, and now has recourse to pagan elements in accounting for the origin of the idea of the virgin birth. Thus he falls in line with a number of scholars whose opinion we shall discuss presently. He no longer regards the author of the third Gospel as the originator of the idea or the first to embody it in a canonical book, but accepts the common view that Luke i. 34, 35, is an interpolation. In general, his view loses its individuality. See *Urchristentum*, 2te Aufl., I, 406f., 692f. Cf. PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, October, 1905, 648, footnote.

‡ *Die Apocalypse des Zacharias im Evangelium Lucas*, Theologisch Tijdschrift, 1896, 244–269.

and ii. 32 by Redactor II, who was probably identical with the redactor of the third Gospel. Both the original writer of the first chapter and Redactor I were Jews pure and simple, and wrote in Aramaic (or Hebrew). Redactor II interpreted Isa. vii. 14 according to the Septuagint and in other ways transcended the narrow Jewish standpoint, and therefore was no Palestinian Jew; but, on the other hand, he must have understood Aramaic in order to translate the writings of his predecessors, and so could not have been a mere Gentile. So he must have been a Hellenist. This conclusion is confirmed by his dogmatic position. For on account of the gender of the word מָלַךְ, and the current Jewish conception of God, the belief in the virgin birth could scarcely have arisen on Jewish ground. But influenced by the heathen notions of "children of God," some such conception had entered into the thought of the Hellenistic Judaism of the Dispersion, as we can show from the writings of Philo.

Of course, Völter's elaborate theory of redactors is interesting only as a curious example to show how easily theories of interpolation may run mad. Every one of the main steps in the argument is based almost entirely upon subjective reasoning, and lacks even such show of support as is possessed by arguments such as that of Harnack for regarding i. 34, 35, as an interpolation. If we have refuted even these latter arguments, then it will hardly be worth while to mention the numberless difficulties that spring up on every hand against Völter.* One criticism only may be mentioned here as being particularly in point at the present stage of our discussion. Völter mentions two grounds for supposing that the narrator of the virgin birth in Luke was a Hellenist: (1) He transcends the narrow Jewish point of view and, for example, holds to the non-Jewish conception of the virgin birth; so he can be no Jew. This argument, at least so far as it refers to the virgin birth, we gladly allow (always supposing the virgin birth not to be a fact). (2) He was able to translate an Aramaic document, and was therefore no mere Gentile. But was the document really written in Aramaic? And if so, had it not already been translated? These are questions which need much more careful examination than Völter seems to have given them. We may safely conclude that, whether or no the original spring of the doctrine of the virgin birth was, as a matter of fact, Hellenistic Judaism, Völter's reasoning has not proved it. His attempt to show by literary criticism the actual course of development going on before our eyes in the

* For some of these, see Spitta, *op. cit.*, 6f.

text itself has after all been a failure. If we look to Alexandria we must be led to do so by more general considerations—for example, by some striking similarity of thought between Alexandrian philosophy and our canonical birth narratives.

Such an argument has been most fully developed by Conybeare.* According to Conybeare, such of the followers of Jesus as were Aramaic-speaking Jews recognized Jesus as the Messiah, while those followers who were Greek Jews and proselytes recognized in Him the Divine Logos. "But viewed as the Logos in human form, how should his birth be represented except as from a virgin?" For these followers among the Greek Jews lived in much the same intellectual atmosphere as Philo. And Philo regarded the Logos as born of Sophia, an "ever-virgin, gifted with an incontaminate and unstainable nature." In the second place, these same Hellenist disciples "believed that many of their holiest men had been born of the Holy Spirit, when God visited from on high their mothers in their solitude." "Thirdly, there was in that age a general belief that superhuman personages and great religious leaders were born of virgin mothers through divine agency."† "Fourthly, in Philo we have not a few indications of how those who held the belief that Jesus was the incarnate word would be likely to formulate the other belief which inevitably went therewith—namely, that he was born of a virgin."

As to the first of these points, Charles has shown how little weight can be attributed to it, for that Logos which was born of Sophia is not in Philo a personal conception. There are also insuperable objections of a literary and historical character against supposing that the account of the virgin birth came into the first and third Gospels only through the conception of Christ as the Logos. Conybeare's second point is not very clear, but seems to mean that, as he says in another place, "the Jews in the time of Christ deemed it possible for a child to be conceived of the Holy Spirit, and yet at the same time to be begotten in the ordinary way." "The one process gave his soul or reason, which was a gift of the Divine Spirit; the other process gave him flesh, blood and the faculties of sense." In Matthew, vers. 19, 20 of the first chapter represent a too literal in-

* *Academy* for 1894, November 17, December 8, December 22; for 1895, January 12, January 19, February 16. For criticisms, see Charles, *Academy* for 1894, December 29; for 1895, January 5, February 2. Cf. also a number of papers by Badham in the course of the same discussion.

† Here we pass over into the purely heathen sphere; so we shall defer this point till we come to speak of the next class of theories about the origin of the virgin birth. In Conybeare the point is not at all fundamental.

terpretation of such a philosophy. Afterward, Conybeare, corrected by Badham, seems to substitute for this argument the more positive one that an actual virgin birth is to be found spoken of in Philo, so that the writer in Matthew did not even have to remove the idea to a lower sphere. Conybeare's really important argument is under his fourth head. Here he brings forward Philo's treatment of Sarah, Rebeka, Leah, Zipporah. *E.g.*, Philo says—to quote Conybeare's reproduction of his words—"Moses having taken his wife findeth her with child of nothing mortal (= of the Divine Spirit)." Conybeare maintains—at any rate at first—that Philo's own idea of the marriage of virgin souls with God was wholly mystical and allegorical, but that he issued a warning against those who degraded his allegory "into the gross and fleshly meaning which it has assumed in Matt. i. 19." If this interpretation of Philo is right, then we have not found any direct parallel for Matthew. For there seems to be no evidence from the mere fact that he "warns the superstitious from the mystery he is propounding" that he is referring to those who held to a view like that of Matthew. And when Badham maintains that the correspondence between Philo's examples (Sarah, Zipporah, etc.) and Matthew's narrative is still closer than Conybeare at first believed, it is perhaps due to Badham's impossible exegesis of Matthew's account.*

Furthermore, against the whole argument may be opposed the great gulf fixed between the strict Palestinian Judaism and the Judaism of Alexandria†—a gulf which Conybeare has not really succeeded in bridging over. Again, we ought to consider the opposition of the whole spirit of the New Testament accounts to the speculations of Philo. It is impossible to see how the two things can have sprung up out of the same intellectual atmosphere, for the difference seems almost infinite; and Conybeare does not help his position by pointing out Alexandrian elements, like the conception through the ear and by rays of light, which *later* affected the form of the Christian narrative. The remarkable fact is that those elements do not appear in our canonical narratives, as we should expect they would if the Christian idea of the virgin birth arose out of Hellenistic ground. The sobriety of the canonical narratives, the absence of grotesque details, is a strong proof of their independence of Alexandrian speculations. If Luke i. 34, 35, is, as we think we have proved, no interpolation, so that Luke's narrative as well as that of Matthew comprises the virgin birth, then the argu-

* See PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, October, 1905, 669.

† See Charles, articles cited.

ment which we have just derived from the general spirit of our New Testament account becomes absolutely invincible. For Luke's narrative, at least, whatever may be said of Matthew, represents about as perfect an antithesis to Philo as could possibly be imagined.

The insufficiency of theories which would derive the idea of the virgin birth from Judaism is strikingly attested by the fact that so many recent critics feel obliged to have recourse to the heathen world.* But just at this point we must register a decided protest. In the first place, as Harnack has stoutly maintained against Usener, we cannot lightly break through the barrier that separates the early Church from the heathen world. "Over against all this [*i.e.*, the connections which Usener finds between heathen customs, etc., and Christian traditions]," says Harnack, "I remind the reader of the fact that the oldest Christianity strictly refrained from everything polytheistic and heathen, and that therefore every hypothesis that will explain from heathendom a piece of the original Church tradition is subject to the greatest difficulties, and demands the most careful examination. The unreasonable method of collecting from the mythology of all peoples parallels for original Church traditions, whether historical reports or legends, is valueless."† In another connection Harnack is even more explicit: "The Greek or Oriental mythology I should leave entirely out of account; for there is no occasion to suppose that the Gentile congregations in the time up to the middle of the second century adopted, in despite of their fixed principle, popular mythical representations." In the second place, if it is thus unlikely that heathen elements could up to 150 have been received even into the Gentile Church, it is even more unlikely that they could have been received into strongly Jewish Christian narratives, such as we have proved our canonical infancy narratives to be. It is therefore evident that every theory of the virgin birth which calls in heathen elements is absolutely dependent upon the doubtful view that Luke i. 34, 35 (or the essential part of those verses) is an interpolation.‡ And even if that should be granted, the weighty objection of Harnack must still be reckoned with. It is therefore not altogether unreasonable to say that when we consent to entertain any suggestion as to the heathen origin of elements in the myth of the virgin birth, we do so merely for the sake of the argument. However, since Harnack's view of the course of early Christian history and our view of the integrity of

* *E.g.*, Usener, Hillmann, Holtzmann, Soltau, Pfeiderer.

† *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, 1889, 205.

‡ Cf. Hillmann, *op. cit.*, 231.

Matthew and Luke have both been questioned (though, we think, altogether without good cause in the latter case), it will be well to examine as fairly as possible the supposed points of contact between heathen mythology and our birth narratives. Are these points of contact so evident and so important as to break down the objections that we have mentioned against any historical connection between the two fields of thought?

It will be well to outline briefly one or two of the main theories of development, in order that we may the better judge of the likelihood that in the matter of the virgin birth heathen ideas had their place.

One of the most thorough-going representations is that of Usener.* Usener supposes that when Jesus came to be regarded as the Messiah, it followed by logical necessity that all the Old Testament attributes of the Messiah should be applied to Him. In the first place, He had to be descended from David—hence the genealogies. In the second place, he had to be born in the city of David, Bethlehem (Micah v. 1. Cf. John vii. 40, Matt. ii. 6)—hence the infancy narratives transplant the parents thither, more or less at the risk of running counter to the firmly fixed Nazareth tradition. In the third place, Jesus, as the Messiah, and hence the chosen one of God, had to be brought into closer relations with God—hence the narrative of the great event at the baptism. This narrative appears in two forms: in Matthew, Jesus merely receives divine attestation; in Luke, He is divinely generated. (Usener retains the words, "This day have I begotten thee.") But as time went on, it was felt to be impossible to postpone this consecration or adoption to the thirtieth year. Rather He "must have been God's chosen instrument from his very birth." Hence the story of the nativity. This story appears in two forms, each carrying back one of the two forms of the baptism narrative. In Luke we have divine attestation (Usener regards i. 34, 35, as a later addition); in Matthew we have divine begetting. But we have also in Matthew something entirely new, the virgin birth. "Here we unquestionably enter the circle of pagan ideas," for "the idea is quite foreign to Judaism."† "The embroidery comes from the same source as the warp and woof," for the star is paralleled by the heathen ideas of the stars

* *Religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen*, I; *Enc. Biblica*, Art. Nativity (this article appeared later in its original German form, as prepared for the *Encyclopædia*, in *Zeitschrift f. d. neut. Wissenschaft*, 1903, 1-21).

† For the pagan analogies, see Usener, *Religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen*, I. 69f.

that appeared at the birth of heroes, while the story of the Magi perhaps originated "in the journey of homage made by the Parthian king Tiridates to Nero in Rome." Perhaps, also, Herod is a picture of Nero.

Soltau* gives the following account. If Jesus was to be the Messiah, the first conclusion would be that his real home must have been Bethlehem. Hence the original form of the special history of Jesus' childhood is given in Luke ii. 1-7, 21-40, where Joseph always appears as the father of Jesus, but where the place of birth is changed from Nazareth to Bethlehem. In Matthew we have "a further-developed Jewish-Christian version of the story," to the effect that Bethlehem was the real native place of Jesus, so that the difficulty is not to explain why His parents journeyed from Nazareth to Bethlehem, but why they journeyed from Bethlehem to Nazareth. Then this Jewish-Christian tradition was altered by three additions: (1) the generation of Jesus through the Holy Spirit (in Luke, and in Matthew in a different form from that in Luke), (2) the angels' song of praise (Luke), (3) the journey of the Magi (Matthew). These three ideas were probably of purely heathen origin, though the form they have taken may have been due to Jewish-Christians. The angels' song of praise is the adaptation of rejoicings at the birth of Augustus, who was hailed as the saviour of the whole human race. In the story of the Magi, perhaps the presentation of gifts may be traced back to the Old Testament. The other details are all based on heathen mythology—the star, upon the stars seen at the birth of great men; the journey of the Magi, upon the journey of the Parthian king Tiridates to pay homage to Nero. The Christians transferred spontaneously to their Prince of Peace the homage paid "to the earthly prince of peace, Augustus"; to their Messiah, the act of adoration paid to the Antichrist Nero. The story of the virgin birth may be viewed in three aspects: (1) "As regards form, the whole narrative is simply a *deliberate recast* of the older Jewish fable about Simon and John." (2) "As regards matter, on the other hand, it is to be explained as a *transformation* of Biblical conceptions *due to misconception*." In Paul and John we have the dualistic theory that Christ is not only born of the seed of David but also Son of God. When this dualism, "having been translated into popular language, penetrated to the lower classes of the people, it was almost bound to lead to the view becoming common among Christians untrained in philosophy that Christ, in calling God His

* *Die Geburtsgeschichte Jesu Christi*, E. T. For a criticism, see Lobstein, *Theolog. Literaturzeitung*, 1902, 521f.

Father, did not merely call Him so in the sense in which all are children of God, but that he was even bodily of higher derivation, of divine origin." (3) "At the same time, those elements *drawn from heathen mythology* can be detected, which promoted the transformation of Christian ideas and the development of a wrong conception." Especially Augustus himself was said to have been begotten of a serpent (representing Apollo). So all the three insertions into the original story—song of praise, virgin birth and journey of the Magi—"referred to what had been handed down and proclaimed in honour of the Roman Emperor, especially of Augustus, to the true Saviour of the world."

Usener and Soltau have thus made two attempts to trace more or less definitely the actual course of development through which our present narratives have been produced; but in this attempt, at any rate, they can hardly be said to have attained success. For they have been obliged to rely upon hypotheses to support hypotheses. To take merely one example, Usener can establish his parallelism between the two separate forms of the baptism story (divine attestation and divine generation) and the two forms of the birth narrative (Luke and Matthew) only by choosing a doubtful reading in Luke's account of the baptism in order to differentiate that account from Matthew, and by removing i. 34, 35, from Luke's account of the infancy so that it suits that representation.* Of course, these are merely details; but one problem for those who would see in our narratives the outcome of a course of mythical or legendary development is to show how that outcome came to be represented in just the way it is expressed in Matthew and Luke. Therefore, we have accomplished something when we have recognized that it is not possible to see the details of the course of development actually crystallized in our narratives.

Perhaps, however, we can yet discern the main outlines of such a course of development. In such a more cautious way the matter is discussed by Holtzmann.† He despises none of the supposed starting-points which have been suggested by various writers for the idea of the virgin birth. He even begins with ascetic tendencies in Judaism (*e.g.*, among the Essenes), and then uses all the other arguments for the Jewish origin of the idea, as well as for the origin

* The idea seems to be that the notion of the virgin birth, after it was introduced into the third Gospel, being inconsistent with the divine generation at the baptism, led to the corruption of the original form of Luke iii. 22 into our accepted text. See Pfeiderer, *Urchristentum*, 2te Aufl., I, 694. The whole course of reasoning can never rise above the level of supposition.

† *Lehrbuch der neutestamentlichen Theologie*, I, 409f.

from the dogmas of the Pauline theology. But, he continues, the idea could never on Jewish ground have ripened into its present form; for on Jewish ground the abstract-transcendent notion of God and the Jewish doctrine of the Spirit stood effectually in the way. But when the report of the "Son of God" was spread abroad in the Gentile world,* it found an atmosphere friendly in the highest degree to the development of such a story as we have in Matthew and Luke. For in the heathen world there were many "children of God," as Justin insists. Among them may be mentioned Hermes, Æsculapius, Dionysius, Hercules, etc., as well as Pythagoras, Plato, Alexander, Augustus.† These heathen representations "of the coming of the great from above needed only to strip off their coarsely sensuous forms in order to be transferred to the world-conquering Son of God from the East."

We answer that, after all, at least in the case of the mythological examples like Hercules, etc., when you have stripped off the coarsely sensuous form of the heathen representations you have changed their very essence. It is perfectly natural that the Greek gods should beget children, because they are simply enlarged men. It could not be said that the birth of demigods was regarded as a miracle; it was in the same sphere as an ordinary human birth. But there can be little doubt that in Matthew and Luke we have the narration of a miracle—and a miracle because the Hebrew notion of God is not lowered in the slightest degree. In the case of such heroes as Augustus and Alexander this objection is not quite so strong, because there it is hard to see how the human father could be definitely excluded. After all, however, the same merely anthropomorphic view of God prevails there too; so that the comparison with Matthew and Luke seems almost grotesque. At any rate, the parallel is certainly not so close as to overcome the grave objections which we mentioned against any theory of heathen influence.

We have thus far examined the theories that account for the origin of the idea of the virgin birth by means of Jewish, of Hellenistic, and of heathen elements. One possibility remains, namely, that the idea is Jewish, but that the Jews themselves received it from heathen nations. Such is the theory advocated recently by Cheyne.‡ Cheyne supposes that by means of his Babylonian, Egyptian and Persian parallels (cf. Rev. xii), he can show that "the

* Where, according to Pfeiderer (*Urchristentum*, 2te Aufl., I 695), the Jewish conception of sonship would not be readily understood.

† Cf. Usener, *Religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen*, I, 69f.

‡ *Bible Problems*, 1904.

passage in the prelude to the first gospel is a Jewish Christian transformation of a primitive story, derived ultimately, in all probability, from Babylonia, and analogous to the Jewish transformation of the Babylonian cosmogony in the opening section of Genesis." Rev. xii is derived ultimately from the same sources, and in Matthew we have certain parallels with that chapter (*e.g.*, Herod = the dragon; the flight to Egypt = the flight into the desert). Into Cheyne's learned discussions of Dusares, Tammuz, etc., we cannot now enter; but we can point out one general line of criticism. Cheyne apparently admits that by a study of the undoubtedly and narrowly Jewish writings approximately of the time of Christ, we can find no sufficient basis for the idea of the virgin birth. But there is a basis, says Cheyne, for that idea in the mythology of other Eastern peoples, and we know that the Old Testament has, as a matter of fact, been in various ways influenced by those mythologies. Therefore, concludes Cheyne, the influence may well have extended to the present case. But is not that argument rather indirect and unconvincing? Cheyne would probably not maintain that absolutely everything in the Babylonian mythology had an influence on Hebrew thought; for he recognizes the fact that the Hebrews gave a new meaning even to that which they did actually accept. So how can we be at all sure that the Babylonian *παρθένος* idea in particular had such an influence? We find no such proof of this idea in the Old Testament, as we find even of the other Babylonian ideas which Cheyne thinks were imported into Israel. It is therefore a rather doubtful proceeding to determine the content of Judaism by writings not of the Jews but of other nations.* Of course, if we do not share Cheyne's confidence that Babylonian ideas were in general easily carried into Hebrew thought, we shall be still less likely to accept his theory in the present case.

In concluding our discussion of mythical theories of the virgin birth, we call attention to the fact that such theories have by no means attained their end when they have shown that there was a logical motive leading the early Christians to look for something miraculous about Jesus' entrance into the world. If Jesus' was believed to be divine, then we freely admit that it was perfectly natural to conclude that He came into the world by a miracle. Furthermore, the conclusion is just as natural to-day as it was in A.D. 100, and it always will be natural, as long as sound reasoning

* The interpretation of Rev. xii is too problematical to be confidently adduced as an evidence that the heathen *παρθένος* idea had penetrated into Judaism. See *Expository Times*, February, 1905.

continues. So—to borrow the thought of a recent writer*—the heathen myths that we have been considering, so far from involving in suspicion anything at all similar to them, even illustrate a truth necessary to our argument. If Alexander was divine, then probably his birth was marvelous. The argument is sound, but the premise is false. If Jesus was divine, then probably His birth was marvelous. Here, too, the argument is sound, the only question being whether in this case the premise is true. Lobstein is correct in supposing that there might well have been a natural impulse in the early Church to invest Jesus' birth with the miraculous. But neither he nor any one else has shown how that impulse could have manifested itself in just the particular form in which it is now crystallized, unless in dependence upon fact. If Jesus was really divine, then we can say that probably there was something miraculous about His birth. Starting from that position, the most probable conclusion is that the canonical infancy narratives correctly inform us as to what that "something" was. For, otherwise, it is hard to see how they could have been evolved.

It is time to sum up our result. We examined, first, the hypothesis that the New Testament narratives of the birth of Jesus are to be explained as based upon facts. We showed that the narratives have very early attestation, and themselves give clear evidence that they are not pure inventions, but are based upon earlier sources. We then showed that the events narrated are not impossible unless all miracles are impossible; and that the supposed contradictions with the rest of the New Testament, and within the limits of the narratives themselves, have not been firmly established. We then examined the alternative hypothesis that the narratives are to be explained in other ways than as based upon facts. We showed that such an explanation cannot be assisted by any convincing independent proof that the narratives are composite in character; and that many theories about the origin of the idea of the virgin birth depend almost necessarily upon such unfounded interpolation theories. Finally we passed in review the various attempts to explain the origin of the account in Matt. i. 18ff., and Luke i. 34, 35, and found that the Jewish explanations fail on psychological grounds, whereas the heathen explanations must in addition face the gravest literary difficulties.

So we have found that there are grave objections both to the historical and to the mythical explanations of our narratives. What decision ought we to make? To this question we believe that

* G. A. Chadwick, *Expositor*, January, 1905, 54.

there is but one just answer, namely—that on the basis of a narrowly historical and critical examination of this one account, we can make no decision at all. The decision depends upon our point of view with regard to the miraculous in general. If, after an examination of all the other evidence, we are convinced that no miracle has occurred, then the New Testament account of the birth of Jesus can produce no sufficient reason for altering our opinion; but, if we believe that Jesus rose from the dead, then we shall avoid the greater difficulties if we accept the miracles in the first two chapters of Matthew and Luke. For there are two almost insurmountable difficulties connected with the mythical theory. In the first place, it is hard to see how the idea of the virgin birth arose unless based upon fact, and in the second place it is hard to see how the narratives could have attained such an appearance of trustworthiness unless substantially historical. The virgin birth is not one of the evidences of Christianity like the resurrection; but neither is it a stumbling-block. If Christ rose from the dead, then there is no reason to doubt that He was born of a virgin. Such, in brief, is the result of our examination. Ultimately, the decision lies in a field even more remote—namely, in the field of ethics. If we believe that there is nothing worse than imperfection in the world, then we shall be content with the ethical Christ of Lobstein or Harnack; but if we believe that there is such a thing as guilt, then we shall be predisposed to accept the miraculous Christ, who, among other things, was “conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary.”

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III.

THE DOCTRINE OF BAPTISM IN HOLY SCRIPTURE AND THE WESTMINSTER STANDARDS.

THIRD ARTICLE.

LET us turn now to the Standards of our Church and ascertain whether their teaching is in accordance with the doctrines we have deduced from Scripture. The two chapters of the Confession of Faith which bear upon the subject before us are the thirty-seventh and the thirty-eighth. For the sake of convenient reference we shall number the clauses commented upon.

1. In chap. 37, sec. 2, we read: "There is in every sacrament a spiritual relation, or sacramental union, between the sign and the thing signified." This doctrine is also taught in the Larger Catechism, Quest. 103, "What are the parts of a sacrament? A. The parts of a sacrament are two; the one an outward and sensible sign, used according to Christ's own appointment; the other an inward and spiritual grace thereby signified." This is the uniform teaching of the Church of Scotland and her daughters, in regard to the sacraments in general and baptism in particular. The old Scottish Confession of Faith, drawn up by John Knox in 1560, has these clear and vigorous words: "And thus we utterlie damne the vanitie of them that affirme the sacraments to be nothing but naked and bare signes. No; we assuredlie beleieve that by baptisme we are ingrafted in Christ Jesus, to be partakers of His justice, by which our sinnes are covered and remitted" (Calderwood, Vol. II, p. 31). In Calvin's Catechism, adopted by the Church of Scotland at the Reformation, and long in use, we read, Quest. 310, "What is a sacrament? A sacrament is an outward token of God's favor, which by a visible sign doth represent unto us spiritual things, to the end that God's promises might take the more deep root in our hearts, and that we might so much the more surely give credit to them. Quest. 311, What? Is this possible? that a visible and material sign should have such virtue to certifie our conscience?—No, not of itself, but God hath ordained it for such end. Quest. 312, Since it is the proper office of God's Holy Spirit to seal and print the promises of God in our hearts, how canst thou attribute or give this property unto the

sacraments?—There is a great difference between the one and the other. For God's Spirit is He alone who in very deed is able to touch and move our hearts, to illuminate our minds, and to assure our consciences, in such sorte that all these ought to be accounted His only works, so that the whole prayse and glory hereof ought to be given to Him onely; Notwithstanding, it hath pleased our Lord to use His sacraments as second instruments hereof according as it seemed good unto Him, without diminishing any point of the vertue of His Spirit. Quest. 313, Thou meanest, then, that the efficacie of the sacraments doeth not consiste in the visible sign, but wholly in the working of the Spirit of God?—I mean even so; according as it is God's pleasure to work by meanes by Him ordeined, without any derogation thereby to His glorious power." In his commentary on 1 Peter iii. 21, Calvin says, "When we speak of sacraments two things are to be considered, the sign and the thing itself. In baptism the sign is water, but the thing is the washing of the soul by the blood of Christ, and the mortifying of the flesh. The institution of Christ includes these two things. Now, that the sign appears often inefficacious and fruitless, this happens through the abuse of men, which does not take away the nature of the sacrament. Let us then learn not to tear away the thing signified from the sign." Craig's Catechism, published in 1581, connects the teaching of the Reformers with that of the Westminster divines. Under the title of "The Partes of the Sacraments" the following questions occur: "What are the principal partes of the Sacrament? The external action and the inward signification.—How are they joyned together? Even as the word and the signification."—A very striking, original and true comparison. A more intimate union could not be imagined. A little farther on, under the title "Of the Sacrament of Baptisme," we read, "What doth the laying on of the water signify? Our dying to sin and rising to righteousness.—Doth the externall washing make these things? No, it is the work of God's holie Spirit onlie.—Then the sacrament is a bare figure? No, but it hath the veritie joyned with it."

These several compendiums of doctrine sufficiently attest the historic teaching of the Church down to the period of the Westminster Assembly. By reference to Dr. Mitchell's *Catechisms of the Second Reformation* we shall see that the unquestioned belief of all who coöperated to produce the Westminster Standards was in entire accord with them. Dr. Mitchell has appended to each question and answer of the Shorter Catechism the corresponding statements of doctrinal manuals in use when it was compiled, revealing to us

in this way the actual sources of the answers so familiar to all Presbyterians. The following are appended to Questions 92, "What is a sacrament?" and 93, "Which are the sacraments of the New Testament?" "It is an holy ordinance of God, which He hath appointed to be used in His Church . . . whereby Christ and His benefits are, by such outward rites as He hath prescribed, signified, exhibited and sealed to them.—*Elton*. A sacrament is an holy action ordained by Christ in His Church, wherein under visible signs Christ, with all His benefits, is signed, sealed, and conveyed to the true believer.—*White's Short Catechisme*. Wherein by visible signs the promises of the covenant are represented, exhibited, sealed, and applied to us.—*Ames*. A visible sign ordained by Christ to signify, seal and exhibit the invisible graces promised to his elect in the Gospel.—*Baker's Catechism*. A signe to represent, a seale to confirm, and an instrument to convey Christ and all His benefits to them that do believe in Him.—*Perkins*. A sensible signe and seale of God's favor offered and given to us.—*Craig*." All of these assert the actual conveyance of the sacramental gift or grace conjointly with the worthy reception of the sacramental elements.

The Rev. John Ball was one of the Westminster divines and a minister of the Church of England at Whitmore. His *Shorte Catechisme* passed through thirty-four editions previous to 1653, and was translated into several foreign languages. It is therefore a good witness to the accepted doctrine among those who approved of the Westminster Standards. The question, "What is a Sacrament?" receives the reply, "A seale of the covenant of grace." The succeeding answers develop this statement more fully: "What are the parts of a sacrament? A. Two; an outward visible signe sanctified to represent and seal another thing to the minde and heart, and an inward grace which is the thing signified. . . . What is baptisme? A. A sacrament of our ingrafting into Christ, communion with Him, and entrance into the Church. Q. What is the outward signe? A. Water, wherewith the party baptized is washed by dipping or sprinkling in the name of the Father, Sonne, and Holy Ghost. Q. What is the inward grace or thing signified? A. Forgiveness of sinnes and sanctification. Q. To what conditions doth the party baptized binde himself? A. To believe in Christ and forsake his sinne. Q. How oft ought a man to be baptized? A. It is enough once to be baptized, for baptisme is a pledge of our new birth. Q. Who ought to be baptized? A. Infidels converted to the faith, and the infants of one or both Christian parents." The infants are thus recognized as partakers of the grace of the sac-

rament which consists in "forgiveness of sinnes and sanctification." Since the baptism of adults was at that time a rare occurrence, these answers must have had the case of children mainly in view.

Samuel Rutherford, "the saint of the covenant," was a commissioner to the Westminster Assembly. He will not be accused of superstition or sacramentarianism, yet we have his testimony emphatically on our side as opposed to cold, barren Zwinglianism. In his Catechism entitled *The Soume of the Christian Religion*, the question is asked, "Quhat is the end and fruite of ane sacrament?" A. It sealeth up our fellowship with Christ that He giveth Himself to us and that we promise to tak Christ to be our Redeemer, as he that receives charter and seall from the king receiveth landis and bindeth himself to be the king's vassald." This shows the sense in which "seal" is to be understood. It implies the legal conveyance "to the party of the second part" of the things mentioned in the deed. The next question guards against any mechanical, or "magical," interpretation. "Q. Is there any inward vertue in the sacramentis quhair [by], howbeit wee be sleeping, they give grace? A. No; the sacrament is bot the glasse of the physitian that carryeth the oyle, bot the oyle and not the glasse cureth the wound." The water, the bread, the wine, the outward action and elements are but as the glass of the vial; they contain and convey, but are not, in themselves, the healing and nourishing oil of divine grace. This teaching is applied to the sacrament of baptism. "Q. Quhat seeth your eye in baptism q'lk is the signe? A. Water sprinkled upon ane infant." So that we must take the next answer as applying to the case of an infant, for the adult is not contemplated at all in a normal baptism. "Quhat is sealed to us heer? A. Our new birth and washing from our sinnes; as the infant's face is under the water so ar our sinnes buried with Christ in baptisme, and we ar washed from our sinnes and put on Christ."

We have dwelt at some length upon the meaning of a sacrament as taught in the Confession of Faith and other acknowledged exponents of Presbyterianism, because we believe that it contains the kernel of the whole doctrine regarding baptism. The radical question is, Must we accord to baptism the full significance of a sacrament, or must we regard it as incomplete and only hypothetically efficacious? The teaching of our Church is clear and unfaltering. If the "things signified" are actually bestowed upon the worthy communicant in conjunction with his partaking of the sacramental bread and wine, so likewise, without any shadow of a doubt, "the things signified" are bestowed upon the child, warrantably pre-

sented in baptism, when the sacramental water is poured upon his brow. If baptism be a sacrament, then the spiritual realities signified must accompany the sign when the proper conditions for its administration exist. We have no scriptural ground for making any distinction between the two sacraments, such as that in the Lord's Supper the worthy receiver, then and there, partakes of the spiritual food proffered, but that in baptism there is no actual communication to the child of any divine gift, but only the promise of something when certain conditions are complied with, said conditions being impossible of realization until greater mental maturity is attained. All that baptism does for the child is accomplished when he is baptized, always remembering, as our Confession subsequently states, that the benefit of the ordinance is not restricted to the moment of time when it is administered.

2. Section 3 explicitly rejects the *ex opere operato* doctrine of Romanism. "The grace which is exhibited in or by the sacraments is not conferred by any power in them." Their efficacy depends solely upon the work of the Holy Spirit who honors the word of institution and the promise it contains. To call the doctrine we are maintaining "the magical theory" is grossly unfair, if not blasphemous. Not for a moment do we ascribe any potency to consecrated water. But the Holy Spirit has chosen this as the means and occasion of His own activity. His operation does not submit itself to any of the senses; it does not come within the sphere of consciousness at all. But we have the assurance of God's promise, which faith rests upon, that the two factors in the sacrament are inseparably joined together, so that the part we see is a testimony to the reality of the operation which we cannot perceive. The mystery cannot be eliminated without destroying the sacramental character of the ordinance.

3. In declaring that neither sacrament "may be dispensed by any but a minister of the Word, lawfully ordained," section 4 enunciates an important doctrine and one which has been allowed to almost disappear from Presbyterian teaching, namely, that a valid ministry is essential to a valid administration of the sacraments. A bald, rationalistic view of these ordinances and a weak, spurious liberalism have conspired to rob the sacred office of its divine authority and functions. What is here stated of the sacraments in general is repeated concerning baptism in particular in chap. 28, 2. The ordinance is to be administered "by a minister of the gospel, lawfully called thereunto." The Larger Catechism, Quest. 176, emphasizes this limitation, "The sacraments . . . are to be dis-

pensed by ministers of the Gospel, and by none other," giving among its proof-texts 1 Cor. iv. 1: "Let a man so account of us as ministers of Christ, and stewards of the mysteries of God," and Heb. v. 4: "And no man taketh this honor unto himself, but when he is called of God, even as was Aaron." These passages are given also in the Confession as warrants for the statement under consideration. In the Directory for the Public Worship of God, under "The Administration of Baptism," the first rubric is, "Baptism, as it is not unnecessarily to be delayed, so is it not to be administered in any case by a private person, but by a minister of Christ, called to be the steward of the mysteries of God." And in The Form of Presbyterian Church Government, under the heading "Of the Officers of the Church," among the specified duties of "the elder (that is, the pastor)" is the administration of the sacraments. Those who claim that the lay eldership have precisely the same ecclesiastical status as the minister, advocate a view emphatically contradicted by our Standards. In the document before us they come under the title of "Other Church Governors," and are spoken of as analogous to the Jewish "elders of the people" who were "joined with the priests and Levites in the government of the Church." They are said to be men "with gifts for government" and to have "commission to execute the same when called thereunto," and are joined "with the minister in the government of the Church. Which officers reformed churches commonly call elders"—implying that, strictly, the name is a misnomer if used as a synonym of "presbyter" or "minister." The Westminster Standards reserve as the functions of the ministry exclusively preaching, the administration of the sacraments and pronouncing the benediction, and they imply that the public reading of the Scriptures, prayer, and Biblical instruction have a special importance when performed by one who has been solemnly invested with the sacred office. The modern laxity which passes for freedom from ecclesiasticism, and which invites any one into the pulpit, has succeeded in abolishing "the sacred desk" altogether, substituting for it a sofa or easy chair behind a marble-topped "stand." It is not so very long since the entrance of a layman into the pulpit would have been severely rebuked. The views of Samuel Rutherford were not wholly antiquated. In his work already quoted he asks, "Then is it lawfull for privat Christians to expone Godis Word as pastors doe? A. It is not lawfull for them to teach publicklye as Godis mouth to the kirk, bot it is their duity upon all occasions in privat to expone and apply Godis Word both to themselves and to the conscience of others."

Those who dissent from these views, dissent from the standards which every minister of the Presbyterian Church in Canada has solemnly sworn to maintain and defend. Whatever authority the Directory and Form of Church Government may have in other Presbyterian Churches, they have been incorporated into the Basis of Union of 1875, and are part of its Constitution. Article 3 of that Basis reads, "The government and worship of this Church shall be in accordance with the recognized principles and practice of Presbyterian Churches as laid down generally in 'The Form of Presbyterian Church Government' and in 'The Directory for the Public Worship of God.'" In these documents only can we find the views of the Church regarding the functions of the Holy Ministry, and their statements have the authority of constitutional law. We may rightly object to the use of the word "priest" as applied to the New Testament ministry, but in doing so we must not repudiate the true doctrine of the sacred duties and authority of those who stand before the Lord and serve His flock. The teaching of our Standards is fully endorsed by contemporary and earlier authorities.

The Scottish Confession of 1560, in section 22, "Of the right administration of the Sacraments," says "That sacraments be rightly administered we judge two things requisite. The one, that they be ministered by lawful ministers, whom we affirme to be onlie these that are appointed to the preaching of the Word, into whose mouths God hath put some sermoun of exhortation, they being men lawfullie chosin thereto by some kirk. The other, that they be ministered in suche elements, and such sorte, as God hath appointed, elles we affirme that they cease to be right sacraments of Christ Jesus" (Calderwood, Vol. II, p. 33). At the time of the Reformation "some kirk" did not mean any kind of religious society or organization, but a national Church, a branch of the Church Catholic. It meant a Church with historical continuity from pre-Reformation times. The sturdy Churchmen of those days would have hesitated to recognize every schismatic movement for the purpose of "testifying" against some evil, or in behalf of a favorite dogma, as constituting a legitimate "Church." Only when our ecclesiastical mother fell upon degenerate days was such a falsely liberal doctrine advanced. As has recently been shown in a very interesting lecture by Dr. Sprott, of North Berwick, *schism was to them a heinous sin, and separation from the historic Church was not to be contem-

* *The Doctrine of Schism in the Church of Scotland*, Macleod Memorial Lecture, 1902.

plated as an honorable method of relief from conscientious difficulties. They would not have given the advice which comes so glibly now from would-be liberals: "If you're not satisfied where you are, join some other religious body where you will feel more at home." The Scottish Commissioners to the Westminster Assembly wrote: "To call us Calvinians, and the Reformed Churches, Calvinian Reformed Churches, is to symbolize with the papists who call themselves the Catholic Church. . . . They who apprehend danger in names (as there is a great deal of danger in them) ought not . . . to join with the papists in giving names of sects unto the Reformed Churches" (quoted by Dr. Sprott in his edition of *The Book of Common Order*, p. lxvii). From 1560 down to the time of the alliance with English Puritans the Church of our fathers claimed to be "The Catholic Church in Scotland Reformed." It ought to be a matter of profound thankfulness that the sad divisions of the past two hundred years have been so far healed that the Church of the Scottish Reformation is in Canada practically one Church as of old. We shall gain nothing, but on the contrary lose much that is conducive to our spiritual life, by forgetting the true dignity of those whom God has called to minister in the Pulpit, at the Font and at the Communion Table.

The authorities from which we have already quoted are equally emphatic on the subject of the invalidity of lay baptism. Calvin's Catechism says, Quest. 366, "To whom belongs the ministration of Baptism and of the Lordes Supper? A. Unto them who have the charge to preach openly in the Church; for the preaching of Gods worde and the ministration of the Sacramentes be things jointly belonging to one kind of office." Craig's Catechism answers with its usual brevity the question, "Who may administer the sacraments? A. Onely those that are lawfully called thereunto by the Church." These authorities advance no sacerdotal claims on behalf of the clergy. They base their views upon the covenant relationship in which believers stand. If the sacraments be seals and attestations of the covenant, both parties to that covenant must be represented when its terms are ratified and conveyance made of its blessings. The child is represented by his parents or sponsors and, with reverence and humility be it said, God is represented by His minister. Before him in his official capacity the parent declares his faith, claims for his child the grace he has himself received, and promises to bring up the child in accordance with its membership in the Church. Then the minister, speaking for God, certifies to the parent in this holy sacrament that the boon craved has been granted,

and that the child is received into the mystical unity of the Church, the Spirit-inhabited Body of Christ. We do not discuss the question of what constitutes a valid ministry, but our Standards are emphatic in declaring that certain sacred functions can be lawfully performed only by one who has been called and regularly ordained to the office of the Holy Ministry. It stands to reason that no one can act for God who has not been called of God, nor has anyone who intrudes himself into the sacred office a right to expect that his acts will be honored by the Holy Spirit as are those of a legitimate ministry. The King alone has a right to say who shall represent Him, and how he shall receive his commission as ambassador. The properly accredited ambassador alone has the right to attach the Royal Seal. Hence lay baptism is not recognized by the Presbyterian Church, nor that administered by Unitarians, Disciples (Campbellites), a suspended minister, or ruling elders (see Moore's *Digest*, pp. 659, 660, 663 and 677). Whether Romish baptism is valid or not is a moot question. John Knox stoutly maintained that it was, and advised those who could not procure the services of a Reformed pastor to bring their children to a Romish priest for baptism, lest they should appear to condemn Christianity itself. Calvin also held this view. (Sprott, *Doctrine of Schism*, p. 6), and it is assented to by all the branches of the Scottish Church, but American Presbyterians have taken a less liberal position, declaring that "as we do not recognize her (the papacy) to be a portion of the visible Church of Christ, we cannot consistently view her priesthood as other than usurpers of the sacred functions of the ministry, her ordinances as unscriptural, and her baptism as totally invalid" (Moore's *Digest*, p. 663. This was reaffirmed in 1879, but dissented from by several of the ablest theologians of the Church, including Drs. Charles Hodge and Philip Schaff). There was a strong feeling of disapproval in the Canadian Church when the late Father Chiniquy had himself rebaptized by a Methodist minister. The teaching of our Church is therefore clear on this point. The minister in baptizing acts for God, and is the human instrumental means of conveying the grace contained in the sacrament. If baptism be an empty sign, conveying nothing, then it matters not who administers it, or how often the edifying ceremony is performed.

4. Passing on to chapter 28, the first statement which claims our attention is that baptism is ordained "for the solemn admission of the party into the visible Church." It is a favorite doctrine with some that baptism does not admit a child into the Church, but only recognizes that he is by birth already a member. We submit, with

all respect to the brethren who advocate this view, that it rests on a confusion of ideas. By his birth of believing parents a child comes within the scope of the covenant promises on which God's people stand, and by baptism he is acknowledged to be "federally holy," or of the covenant seed. His right to membership is recognized and the membership itself is then and there conferred. We believe that the children of pious Baptist parents are equally with our own in this covenant relationship, but that they are unjustly denied the status in the Church which belongs to them. This cannot but be fraught with spiritual loss both to parents and children. The latter are denied a divinely appointed means of grace, and the former are guilty in withholding it from them.

The doctrine of the Confession is repeated in the Larger Catechism, Quest. 166, where it is said: "Infants descending from parents, either both, or but one of them, professing faith in Christ, and obedience to Him, are in that respect within the covenant, and to be baptized." They are to be baptized, not because they are members already, but they are to be received into the Church because they are within the covenant. To this agrees the statement of the Directory for Public Worship in the instruction to be given before the ordinance is administered: "That children, by baptism, are solemnly admitted into the bosom of the visible Church. . . . That they are Christians and federally holy before baptism and that therefore they are baptized." Calvin's Catechism, Quest. 323, says, "Baptisme is unto us an entry into the Church: for it witnesseth unto us, that whereas wee were before strangers from God, he doeth now receive us into his familie." Craig's Catechism states that baptism is to our children "An entrie into the Church of God, and to the holy supper," and explains that the ordinance can be administered to any person but once, "Because it is enough to be once received into God's familie." Ball's Short Catechism represents baptism to be "A sacrament of our engrafting into Christ, communion with Him and entrance into the Church"; and Rutherford declares "the end of baptisme" to be "That we may be received as burgesses in Christ's citie to be holie and without blame before Him." Finally, "A Brief Catechisme for Yong Children," "appointed by act of the Church and Councell of Scotland," and dated 1644, answers the question, "Why wes ye baptized being ane infant?" by saying, "That I might be ingraft in Christ, and enterit in His Church, which is His mystical body." We shall have occasion again to refer to this Catechism. The official *imprimatur* makes it a capital witness. Baptism is therefore taught in the

Scottish Standards to be the initiatory rite of the Church. All baptized persons are members of the Church, just as really members as they ever can be, and to speak of persons "joining the Church" when they make a public profession of their personal faith and partake of their first communion, is to ignore the initial sacrament and practically deny that there is any virtue in it. The next clause states what is involved in becoming a member of the Church by baptism.

5. We must first ascertain, however, the precise sense in which certain terms are employed. The sacraments are called "signs" and "seals" of the covenant of grace; they "exhibit" the benefits of Christ's mediation; they "represent" as well as seal and apply "Christ and the benefits of the new covenant." These are all technical terms of theology, and are used with scientific precision.

(1) When a sacrament is termed a "sign" we understand that it is authoritatively appointed as a token of the things signified, as, for example, the rainbow, Jacob's pillar, circumcision, the dew on Gideon's fleece, the shadow on the dial of King Ahaz. The validity of the sign does not rest on any suggestive similitude to that which it stands for, but solely on the fact that it has been arbitrarily designated by authority to fulfill its office. The figure 6 and the letters VI are equally appropriate signs for the number six; authority alone determines what they mean. Had the use of sand, instead of water, been commanded the sacrament would have been in every respect as complete and spiritually effective. Baptism by sand would have conveyed precisely the same grace as baptism by water now does. A "sign" is not necessarily a "symbol." We believe that the elements used in the sacraments are eloquently symbolical and typical, and that much may be learned from them regarding the significance of the ordinances, but our standards term them "signs" by way of expressing the fact that their validity lies in setting forth spiritual realities in accordance with the appointment of Christ. We can learn what specific grace is joined to the element and outward action only by inquiring what statements have been made on the subject by the Ordainer of the sacrament. The doctrines of our Standards must stand or fall by the pertinency or otherwise of the texts which can be adduced in support of them.

(2) The word "seal" is also used in a restricted sense. It is commonly understood to mean merely a stronger and more emphatic affirmation, as, for example, a wedding ring is a seal to nuptial vows. But we submit that this meaning is inadequate. The simile used by Rutherford shows that he regarded it as denoting

that which gave validity to a deed and put the receiver into possession of the property. This is also the view of Dr. A. A. Hodge in his *Classbook of the Confession of Faith*, where he says, "If they (*i.e.*, the sacraments) are 'seals' of the covenant, they must, of course, as a legal form of investiture, actually convey the grace represented to those to whom it belongs. Thus a deed conveys an estate, or a key, handed over in the presence of witnesses, the possession of a house from the owner to the renter" (p. 331. See also his *Outlines of Theology*, p. 597). Without the seal, the indenture is merely evidence of an intention. When it is "signed, sealed and delivered" the transfer is complete. In the eye of the law the property described in it has changed owners. When the sacraments are applied to those who are truly "parties of the second part" the supernatural and heavenly grace set forth in them is bestowed.

(3) The sacraments are also said to "exhibit" the grace signified and sealed. The word does not mean "to show forth" as a symbol, thereby quickening emotion and strengthening faith, but "to administer" or "bestow." This sense still survives in the medical profession. To "exhibit" a remedy is to administer it. Also in certain colleges an "exhibition" is a bounty bestowed upon scholars on certain conditions. Webster's Dictionary gives an illustration of this use of the verb: "He was a special friend of the university . . . exhibiting to the wants of certain scholars." It is the Latin *exhibere*. There is evidence from our Standards themselves that this is the sense in which it is used, when we compare the analogous statements of doctrine to those in which it occurs. In the Shorter Catechism (Quest. 92) we read: "A sacrament is a holy ordinance instituted by Christ, wherein by sensible signs Christ and the benefits of the new covenant are represented, sealed and *applied* to believers." This is expressed in the Larger Catechism (Quest. 162) by: "A sacrament is a holy ordinance instituted by Christ in His Church, to signify, seal, and *exhibit* unto those within the covenant of grace the benefits of His mediation." Here it occurs as the synonym of "apply." In the Confession of Faith (chap. 27, sec. 3) we read: "The grace which is *exhibited* in or by the sacraments, rightly used, is not *conferred* by any power in them," and in chap. 28, sec. 6, "The grace promised is not only offered, but really exhibited and conferred by the Holy Ghost." The realities "exhibited" in baptism are therefore handed over to or bestowed upon the recipient of the ordinance. There is an actual application of them to the spiritual nature contemporaneously with the application of the sign to the physical nature. When the water of the

sacrament rests upon the brow the operations of the Spirit set forth in the ordinance, and guaranteed by it, take place on the soul. It being understood, of course, that the necessary subjective conditions already mentioned have been complied with. The water does not act mechanically or "magically."

(4) One other important word is, we think, used in a sense other than the modern colloquial. The framers of our Standards were accustomed to the Latin language as the medium of theological discussion, consequently to find the precise meaning of the terms used by them we must turn up the Latin Dictionary rather than the English. Applying this rule to the word "represented," we see at once that it does not mean that the sacraments "stand for" the graces symbolized, as if these latter were absent and only their operation on some other occasion, under suitable conditions not at the time present (as conscious faith in infants), was guaranteed by the sensible "signs." Any good Latin Dictionary will show that "*representare*" means "to bring before one, to show, manifest," as actually present (*præsens*). When, therefore, the water, the bread, or the wine are said "to represent" things not cognizable by the senses, it means that they actually set these realities themselves before the recipient for his acceptance. They re-present them to him. So that the order of words in the admirable definition of a sacrament in our Shorter Catechism is seen to be adjusted with theological accuracy—they are first "represented," then "sealed," and finally "applied" or "exhibited." Seeing that the parent's faith is the ground of the child's reception of baptism, we perceive the teaching of our Catechism to be that baptismal grace is really offered, legally conveyed and personally bestowed in the administration of the ordinance.

The Confession of Faith next states that baptism is a sign and seal of the covenant of grace, and proceeds to specify the benefits received and the obligations incurred.

6. Baptism is a sign and seal of the child's "ingrafting into Christ." The proof-texts for this statement are Gal. iii. 27 and Rom. vi. 5, which have already been fully discussed. Exactly the same words are employed in the Larger Catechism (Quest. 165) and in the Directory, in which latter the explanatory clause is added, "and of our union with Him." Because of this union, consummated in the sacrament, the minister is directed to pray that God would make this baptism "to the infant a seal of adoption" and that He would receive him "into His fatherly tuition and defense." That the presence of a divine coöperation, effecting all that is signified and

sealed is recognized, is shown in the reverent manner in which the ordinance is to be observed. The prayer before the actual application of the water is preceded by the rubric: "This being done (*i.e.*, the parents suitably exhorted), prayer is also to be joined with the word of institution *for sanctifying the water to this spiritual use.*" The water is to be consecrated exactly as the bread and wine in the Lord's Supper, where it is said that "the minister is to begin the action (*i.e.*, *actio gratiarum*, or eucharist) with sanctifying and blessing the elements of bread and wine set before him . . . having first in a few words showed that these elements, otherwise common, are now set apart and sanctified to this holy use by the word of institution and prayer." Evidently the ingrafting or union referred to is a divine act effected by the Holy Spirit in connection with the use of sacramental water—not water *per se*, but water consecrated and set apart for the purpose of being the instrumental means of God's working, just as the bread and wine are consecrated and set apart to be the instrumental means of imparting the body and blood of Christ, real but supersensible things, to the worthy communicant. Our Standards, therefore, teach that by baptism the child becomes a member of Christ's mystical body. He is grafted into the true vine. The Scottish Confession of 1560 says, "We assuredlie beleieve that by baptisme we are ingrafted in Christ Jesus." Wyllie's Catechism, already quoted, states that a sacrament "is an eternall pledge of God's invisible grace sealing up our fellowship with Christ," and the Catechisme for Yong Children regards baptism as effecting for the child a union with Christ's mystical body. The Puritan Catechisms, quoted by Dr. Mitchell under the question, "What is baptism?" employ similar language, speaking of "our spiritual ingrafting into Christ." As we have already stated at length, the apostolic appeals to backsliding Christians are all based upon their assumed real spiritual union with Christ and membership in His Church. These appeals would have no force if there was not something in baptism which laid those whom they addressed under the most solemn obligations to manifest the life of Christ in their lives. The ingrafting is not formal or typical, but real.

7. The Confession further states that baptism is a sign and seal of "regeneration," and the proof-text cited is Titus iii. 5. Calvin's comment upon this passage is as follows: "God doth not mock us with empty signs, but by His power invariably makes good what He demonstrates by the outward sign. Wherefore baptism is congruously and truly called 'the laver of regeneration.' We must connect

the sign and the thing signified, so as not to make the sign empty and ineffectual; yet not so honor the sign as to detract from the Holy Spirit what is peculiarly His." Regeneration is connected with the sacrament of baptism, but it must be followed by the continued use of the grace bestowed to the mortifying of sin and growth in holiness. To this end the Holy Spirit will be "poured out upon us richly." This doctrine the apostle declares to be a current commonplace of primitive theology, "a saying" which he heartily endorses as "faithful," and exhorts Titus to preach it as a matter not to be doubted, so that all who believe may realize the obligation resting upon them to "maintain good works." The other Standards reiterate the statement of the Confession. The Larger Catechism says that baptism is "a sign and seal of regeneration by the Spirit," evidently to guard against a purely figurative interpretation of the word which would not imply the exercise of the specific functions of the Holy Spirit, "the Lord and Giver of life." A second proof-text is here added, Eph. v. 26, which we have already discussed. The Directory also states that baptism is "a seal of regeneration," and in the prayer before the administration the minister is directed to ask that God would make the baptism to the infant "a seal of regeneration." The same doctrine is affirmed in Calvin's, Craig's and Rutherford's Catechisms, and in the Book of Common Order. The Heidelberg Catechism was in use for a time in Scotland, and is still used by both the German and Dutch Reformed Churches in Europe and in the United States. Question 73 is, "Why then doth the Holy Ghost call Baptism the washing of regeneration and the washing away of sins? A. God speaks thus, not without great cause: namely, not only that He will teach us thereby that like as the filthiness of the body is taken away by water, so our sins are taken away by the blood and Spirit of Christ; but much more that by this divine pledge and token He wishes to assure us that we are as really washed from our sins spiritually as we are washed with water bodily." Ezekiel Rogers, of Puritan fame both in Old and New England, and a member of the Westminster Assembly, in his *Chiefe Grounds of Christian Religion*, calls baptism "A sacrament of our new birth and entrance into the state of grace." Ball's Catechism, already referred to, states that the inward grace or thing signified in baptism is "Forgiveness of sinnes and sanctification," giving as proof-text for the latter Titus iii. 5. Wyllie's Catechism defines baptism as "A sacrament of our entering into the kirk, quherin by the externall signe of water sprinkled is sealed up to us our new birth, and the washing away of our sinnes in the blood of Christ"; and the

Catechisme for Yong Children answers the question, "What profit have ye by baptisme now?" by putting into the "yong childe's" mouth, "It seals up the remissione of my sinnes in Christ's blood; and advances the renovation of my heart in His Spirit: which ar my spirituall washing." The doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration is distinctly the teaching of the Reformed Church of Scotland in all its symbolic documents and representative theologians down to and including the period of the Westminster Assembly. That regeneration takes place in baptism has been the belief of the Church from the earliest times. The quotation which has been given from Justin Martyr shows that the word "regenerated" is with him a synonym of "baptized." With all their dread of superstition the Reformers did not discard the term nor the doctrine it stands for. The fathers of the Westminster Assembly still held the same views. Only when Zwinglianism and Puritanism, with their shallow doctrine of the Sacraments, became dominant do we find evasive explanations of our Standards. The regeneration effected in baptism cannot, however, be the permanent subjective change usually termed "conversion" and described in our Catechism as "effectual calling," for the Apostle Paul often warns Christians against the danger of losing the grace that had been bestowed upon them and becoming reprobate. The salt may lose its savor. The unfruitful branch may be cut off and burned. Just precisely what baptismal regeneration amounts to we are not prepared to say. Yet it clearly means a real, not hypothetical, bestowment of spiritual life by the Holy Spirit. By nature scions of the first Adam and inheritors of the estate of sin and misery into which we are brought by the Fall, we are by baptism engrafted into the second Adam, put in possession of the life which He imparts, and invested with all the privileges of children of God. But this status can be realized and maintained only by the use of proper means. Faith must grasp the hand held forth in baptism to uplift, the heart must respond to the "kindness of God our Saviour, and His love toward man"; obedience must exercise, develop and confirm the faculties of the new-born; and the means of grace must replenish the divine life in the soul, if children are to be "nurtured in the chastening and admonition of the Lord." What this implies on the part of the parent is well expressed by Dr. Blaikie in the *Pulpit Commentary*: "Instilling sound principles of life, training to good habits, cautioning and protecting against moral dangers, encouraging prayer, Bible reading, church going, Sabbath keeping; taking pains to let them have good associates, and especially dealing with them prayerfully and earnestly, in order

that they may accept Christ as their Saviour and follow Him." If as parents we are faithful and have holy confidence to grasp and hold fast the promise given to our "seed" in connection with baptism, we may be sure that the election of God will not nullify this promise, God's sovereignty will not cancel the gift which in this sacrament His grace has bestowed. As we have trusted Him for our own salvation, we may trust Him for that of our children.

8. Baptism is also stated to be a sign and seal of "remission of sins." The Larger Catechism has "of remission of sins by His blood" (Quest. 165). The Directory states that baptism is a seal "of the remission of sins," and further explains that "the water in baptism representeth and signifieth . . . the blood of Christ, which taketh away all guilt of sin, original and actual . . . that baptizing signifieth the cleansing from sin by the blood and for the merit of Christ." The minister is instructed to pray that the Lord would "make this baptism to the infant a seal of . . . remission of sin," and after the ordinance he is to give thanks that God "is true and faithful in keeping covenant and mercy," and as an evidence of this faithfulness brings "some into the bosom of the Church to be partakers of His inestimable benefits purchased by the blood of His dear Son," which, in such a context, must mean that by baptism the child has become a partaker of the benefits purchased by the death of Christ. This is thoroughly in accord with the definition of a sacrament in the Shorter Catechism. Calvin's, Craig's and Rutherford's Catechisms all teach that baptism is a seal of the remission of sin. The sixty-ninth question of the Heidelberg Catechism is as follows: "How is it signified and sealed unto thee in Holy Baptism that thou hast part in the one sacrifice of Christ on the Cross? Thus: that Christ has appointed this outward washing with water, and has joined therewith this promise, that I am as certainly washed with His blood and Spirit from the pollution of my soul, that is, from all my sins, as I am certainly washed outwardly with water whereby commonly the filthiness of the body is taken away." The testimony of Ball's and Wyllie's Catechisms and that for Yong Children has already been given. The proof-texts appended in the Confession and Larger Catechism are, it appears to us, scarcely pertinent. They seem indeed to be singularly unfortunate. One has reference to John's baptism (Mark i. 4), which was not a Christian sacrament, and therefore throws no light upon our subject; and the other (Rev. i. 5) reiterates the great truth that the washing away of sin is effected by the blood of Christ, but has not the remotest reference to any sacrament. The statements of our

Standards are, however, amply sustained by other passages already discussed. For example, Acts ii. 38, Peter's answer to the penitent inquirers on the day of Pentecost; Acts xxii. 16, the statement of Ananias to Saul of Tarsus; also Titus iii. 5, Eph. v. 26 and 1 Peter iii. 21. The teaching of Scripture and our Standards is, therefore, that in baptism all sin is forgiven through the atonement made by Christ Jesus, for then the benefits of that atonement are "represented," "sealed" and "applied" or "exhibited" to the child. In the case of an infant this can mean only the guilt of original sin. The case of an adult would be analogous to that of the apostle Paul.

The obligations resting upon the baptized will be dwelt upon later, and also the last clause of section 2. We pass on to section 5.

9. The fifth section of chapter 28 reads as follows: "Although it be a great sin to contemn or neglect this ordinance, yet grace and salvation are not so inseparably annexed to it as that no person can be regenerated or saved without it, or that all that are baptized are undoubtedly regenerated." Craig's Catechism asks, "What if our children die without baptisme?" and answers, "Yet they are saved by the promise." The covenant relation will be honored in their case. We cannot find any statement, in any of the works referred to in this discussion, of the teaching of the Church regarding the destiny of children of unbelievers or of the heathen who die in infancy. The Church has never formulated any doctrine on the general subject of infant salvation. But in the National Covenant, drawn up in 1580 by John Craig, the author of the Catechism which bears his name, and which was subscribed to on many historic occasions, among the doctrines of the Romish Antichrist held up to detestation and abhorrence are "his cruel judgment against infants departing without sacrament" and "his absolute necessity of baptism." In Rutherford's Catechism we are startled to read the blunt question, "Ar infantis all damned that dieth without the sacrament of baptism?" and the answer, by implication, emphasizes the necessity of the ordinance as one of the appointed means of salvation: "Thair is no warrand in Godis word to bind Godis hands so as he could not save without outward means." That seems to have been the only ground on which the gentle pastor of Anwoth could hope for the salvation of the unbaptized.

The last clause of the section simply means that baptism cannot effect its end unless the person baptized has a right to the ordinance through being within the covenant, either in virtue of his own faith or that of his parents. The proof-text given is Acts viii. 13, 23. The request of Simon showed that he had failed altogether to appre-

hend the true character of the Holy Spirit; he was destitute of true faith. His profession of it at his baptism was hypocrisy. In such a case his baptism would be no baptism, lacking the necessary subjective conditions. The reference does not prove, nor is it intended to prove, that the children of believing parents may fail to receive the grace of baptism, namely, regeneration. If, however, we understand regeneration to be such an introduction into the sphere of action of the spiritual powers as may issue, if duly improved, in a state of confirmed allegiance to Him to whom he has been solemnly dedicated, we have a meaning which satisfies the requirements of the sacramental theory and is supported by the whole tenor of apostolic teaching. We have already enlarged upon this point and will return to it again.

10. Section 6 of this chapter is quite misunderstood when it is quoted as asserting that the grace of baptism may be conferred at some later period and not at the time of administration of the ordinance, and further that it is a matter determined by the secret election of God whether baptism is of any effect at all. Two assertions are made: (1) That the efficacy of baptism is not restricted to the moment of time wherein it is administered, but is a continuous operation of divine grace lasting through life; and (2) that this grace is not only offered but really exhibited and conferred by the Holy Ghost upon those who are receptive of it, as it may be required in their spiritual discipline and development. Hence it is our duty to "improve" our baptism. What this implies forms the substance of one of the finest passages in all symbolic literature, the answer to the 167th question of the Larger Catechism. It is given in full below.* Of this answer the late Dr. John Macleod says, "It is indeed a matter of deep thankfulness that so remarkable a declaration of duty remains to us as is here embodied in one of the Standards of the Church, showing us how far we have in these latter days

* Q. 167. *How is our baptism to be improved by us?*

A. The needful but much neglected duty of improving our baptism is to be performed by us all our life long, especially in the time of temptation, and when we are present at the administration of it to others; by serious and thankful consideration of the nature of it, and of the ends for which Christ instituted it, the privileges and benefits conferred thereby, and our solemn vow made therein; by being humbled for our sinful defilement, our falling short of and walking contrary to the grace of baptism, and our engagements; by growing up to assurance of pardon of sin, and of all other blessings sealed to us in that sacrament; by drawing strength from the death and resurrection of Christ, into whom we are baptized, for the mortifying of sin and the quickening of grace; and by endeavoring to live by faith, to have our conversation in holiness and righteousness, as those that have therein given up their names to Christ; and to walk in brotherly love, as being baptized by the same Spirit into one body.

fallen from the faith, and also pointing out to us the way of recovery" (*The Holy Sacrament of Baptism*, p. 124). This answer asserts the reality of a grace of baptism which we may fall short of or walk contrary to—a grace which is to be an efficient force in our spiritual life and which ought to be improved all our life long; which, moreover, implies such a union with Christ as enables us to draw strength from Him for the mortifying of sin, the quickening of grace, and the maintenance of a consistent walk and conversation. A host of proof-texts are given, and they are all among those which we have commented upon in the former part of this discussion, showing the uniform character of the apostles' appeals to backsliders and slothful Christians. In spite of these noble words, which ought to be familiar to every Presbyterian minister, how seldom are baptized Christians nowadays urged to improve their baptism. Exhortations to spiritual growth are, in a most unscriptural manner, entirely dis severed from the starting-point of spiritual life. Whenever do we hear a congregation reminded that their baptism meant "their giving up to God, through Jesus Christ, to walk in newness of life," and that they then entered "into an open and professed engagement to be wholly and only the Lord's?" (Larger Catechism, Quest. 165). The order of baptism in the Directory is saturated with the views above enunciated. In his exposition of the "institution, nature, use and ends" of the sacrament the minister is required to show "that the inward grace and virtue of baptism is not tied to the very moment of time wherein it is administered, and that the fruit and power thereof reacheth to the whole course of our life." "He is also to admonish all that are present to look back to their own baptism; to repent of their sins against their covenant with God; to stir up their faith; to improve and make a right use of their baptism and of the covenant sealed thereby betwixt God and their souls." In the prayer following the ordinance he is required to ask "that the Lord would teach him by His word and Spirit, and make his baptism effectual to him, and so uphold him by His divine power and grace, that by faith he may prevail against the devil, the world and the flesh, till in the end he obtain a full and final victory, and so be kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation, through Jesus Christ our Lord." Such teaching as this is never heard from those who regard baptism as "a mere outward ordinance." They seldom impress upon parents the necessity of seeking it for their children; never present it from the pulpit as furnishing a motive and aid to a holy life, and practically treat it as an ordinance infinitely inferior to the Lord's Supper, because no divine agency is recognized as specially present in it.

Dr. A. A. Hodge infers from the words "to such (whether of age or infants) as that grace belongeth unto, according to the counsel of God's own will, in His appointed time," that "baptism conveys grace to the elect only." Such an interpretation is not supported by any other statement in any of our Standards. They represent the grace of baptism as belonging to all who come within the covenant, and therefore without doubt to the children of believing parents, one and all. It lies in the very nature of a sacrament that the reality signified is bound up with and invariably accompanies the sign. Our Standards regard the grace conveyed by baptism as a continuous operation of the Holy Spirit lasting throughout life. It is liable to prove ineffectual if, through ignorance of its nature, it remains unimproved, or if, being perversely resisted, the Spirit is quenched. It cannot be the same as the grace of perseverance, to which Hodge refers, for that could stand in no such jeopardy (*ex vi termini*). Who of the baptized will persevere to the end is known only to God, but every child who is warrantably presented for baptism is in that sacrament supplied with needful grace, and will be finally saved if the ordinary means to that end are faithfully used. This is the guarantee which the ordinance presents to believing parents. It says to them, "The grace which saved you will save your child also." But this end will not be attained without their being "nurtured in the chastening and admonition of the Lord." It is not necessary, in discussing baptism, to take the doctrine of election into consideration. A child may fall away from the grace of baptism, but the elect will not.

11. The last statement of the Confession in regard to baptism is that it is but "once to be administered to any person." The reasons for this, according to Dr. A. A. Hodge, are: (1) "From the spiritual significance of the rite. It signifies a spiritual regeneration—the inauguration of the divine life." We fail to see the force of this reason. If it is only a symbol, why should it not be repeated if it is deemed manifest that the divine life did not begin when it was previously administered? Certainly it ought not to be repeated in the case of one who is in possession of what it conveys; but ought not one like Simon Magus, who has never been spiritually regenerated, assuming that the apostle's words mean so much, to be baptized when he gives evidence of a real change of heart? If the sacrament is only a symbol, it ought to be repeated until it means something to the person baptized. But the Confession does not say that it merely symbolizes regeneration—it certainly does that—but that it "signifies," "seals," "exhibits," "confers" and "applies" regeneration. Dr.

Hodge seems to be conscious of a double sense in the word, for he guards his meaning by prefixing the adjective "spiritual," which evidently signifies a subjective change in the soul. But this neither the Confession nor the New Testament ever asserts to be the effect of baptism. Such a change can only come with the dawn of rational and ethical consciousness. Under our present erroneous or inadequate teaching regarding the grace conferred in baptism, and the conditions of entrance into personal relations to the Saviour, it does not take place, in the great majority of cases, until adult life is reached. But the regeneration which is connected in Scripture with baptism, and is referred to in the doctrinal statements of all the great historic Churches of the Reformation, is an objective bestowal of spiritual help and a placing of the child under God's "fatherly tuition and defense." He then receives "the promise" which the apostle declared to be the heritage of God's people "and their children." Henceforth he is "holy." Dr. Hodge's second reason is, "It is the rite of initiation into the Christian Church, and as there is no provision made for getting out of the Church when once in, so there is no provision made for coming in more than once." But why is there no provision for getting out of the Church? Is it not because it is impossible to undo what has been accomplished in baptism and make it as if the consecrated water had never washed the brow? The responsibility consequent upon having been baptized can never be thrown off. Would this be true of a mere symbol? The third reason is, "The apostles baptized each individual but once." Still we want to know a reason for this, and the further fact that universal Christendom has forbidden rebaptism. The doctrine of sacramental grace taught in the New Testament and embodied in our Standards supplies this reason.

The teaching of the Confession is fully endorsed by the Larger Catechism, Quest. 177, "Baptism is to be administered but once; with water, to be a sign and seal of our regeneration and ingrafting into Christ, and that even to infants." Ball's Catechism asks, "How often ought a man to be baptized?" and answers, "It is enough once to be baptized, for baptism is a pledge," not a symbol only, as Hodge has it, "of our new birth." All our authorities, as already shown, make baptism the rite of entrance into the Christian Church. We would press home the significance of this Catholic doctrine of a *unica baptisma*. According to the unanimous teaching of the Reformed Churches, baptism cannot be repeated. A lifetime of sinful conduct may intervene between the font and "the penitent bench," yet the significance of the initial rite remains unimpaired.

We never rebaptize the hoary-headed convert who has been the recipient of baptismal grace, it may be, fourscore years previously. Once baptized, a man must either go forward in the way of life or fall away to perdition—the second death is the doom of the apostate twice-born. There is an indelible and irrevocable character in baptism. It can never be to any one the same as if he had not been baptized. In baptism the soul is brought into contact with the powers of the world to come. In the passive nature of the child there is no resistance to their entry. We have a right to believe that the ordinance has effected its purpose. Whose fault is it if the child does not know what the sacrament means and is not responsive to the holy influences which draw him Godward? If the doctrine of our Church on this point were heartily believed and acted upon it ought to be the rule for our young people to grow up never knowing the time when they did not love God and try to keep His commandments. We would have the joy of admitting them to the sacramental Feast of Love when the dew and freshness of youth was upon them, and the Church would flourish under a perpetual Pentecostal blessing.

We need not discuss further the teaching of our Standards. The same views are embodied in the confessions of other Reformed Churches—namely, the Helvetic, the Belgic, and the French Confessions—and the Heidelberg and Anglican Catechisms. It is the universal doctrine of the Protestant Reformed Churches of the sixteenth century. We owe our loss of it to the influence of a shallow Zwinglianism which has usurped the place of authority and denounces the sacramental teaching of our fathers as heresy and incipient Romanism. A revived study of our incomparable Standards, viewed in their historical setting, would reinvigorate the intellectual and spiritual life of the Church and prove the true antidote to the vagaries of modern neology.

St. John, N. B.

T. F. FOTHERINGHAM.

V.

REVIEWS OF
RECENT LITERATURE.

I.—APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY.

LIFE'S DARK PROBLEMS; OR, IS THIS A GOOD WORLD? By MINOT J. SAVAGE, D.D., Author of *Life Beyond Death*, *The Passing and Permanent in Religion*, etc. 8vo, pp. 219. G. P. Putnam's Sons; New York and London: The Knickerbocker Press. 1905.

This is a theodicy. The writer would "justify the ways of God to men." In view of such "dark problems" as are presented by "Pain," by "Life's Incompleteness," by "Moral Evil," by "Death," by "Accidents and Calamities," by "Mental Disease and Decay," the author would prove this world to be "the best conceivable" and God to be "our Father." His attempt is both noteworthy and instructive, but not because of its elaborateness. On the contrary, its style is simplicity itself. While always clear, often strong, and sometimes eloquent, it is unfinished. These chapters were evidently given first as pulpit discourses, and it is as evident that they have been published as spoken. Neither are these discussions remarkable because of their thoroughness. They do not aim to go to the bottom of things. In the words of one of the most favorable reviews of this volume, the writer "wants neither to be popular nor profound." His clearness, we cannot help thinking, is often secured at the expense of depth.

Nor are his statements characterized by soberness and accuracy. The reverse is the case. Words are used inexactly, as when, for example, on page 59, the truth of evolution is said to have been "*demonstrated*" (italics ours): whereas the link is still missing without which it could not be even proved to be a fact; and though facts can be *proved* to be such, they never can be so *demonstrated*. Again, exaggeration is frequent, as when, on page 33, we read, "All educated people to-day know that there never was any fall of man or any Eden": whereas multitudes of people to-day who sustain every test of education except this unique one of our author firmly believe, on what they regard as divine testimony, that there were a fall of man and an Eden; and while there may be many who do not believe that there ever were a fall of man and an Eden, in the nature of the case, how can any even of these *know* that there were not? So, too, positive misstatements are not wanting, as when, on page 146, we are told that Calvinism has "so dominated the world as to hinder its advance for generations"; whereas history teaches nothing more clearly than that Calvinism has led the conflict for civil as well as for religious liberty.

Dr. Savage's theodicy is, however, both noteworthy and instructive because it is written from the standpoint of theism pure and simple. He rejects supernatural revelation. He denies the historicity of much of the Bible. He repudiates the deity and also the perfect humanity of Christ. He would seem not to regard him even as the best of earthly teachers. We have been taught, and we

have been accustomed to feel, that the justice and goodness of God can be vindicated only in the light of the divine sacrifice on Calvary. Dr. Savage scorns all such aid. Indeed, he rarely takes counsel with any except himself; and when he does, it is to secular rather than to theological literature that he turns. He confesses his faith in "God the Father Almighty"; he looks out on the dark problems of life; and then by his own unaided understanding he tries to show that these, dark though they appear, really illustrate and prove the righteousness and love of our heavenly Father. Does he succeed?

1. We must admit, and we are glad to admit, that he says much that is true, and that much of this he says admirably. Dr. Savage is no materialist, and he knows and can show why he is not. He handles Haeckel and Moleschott without gloves, and he disposes of them effectively. We have seldom read anything better than his exposure of their assumptions. He is a theist, and he gives grounds for his theism. He presents several of the theistic arguments with uncommon simplicity and force. The last chapter, that on "Is God a Father?" is in the main a strong chapter. He writes often sanely and helpfully with regard to the dark problems which he considers. Undoubtedly, there is not nearly so much pain as we suppose; most pain, especially in the case of the lower animals, appears far more intense than it is; susceptibility to pain is needed to keep us from running into danger; because life is incomplete it does not follow that it is not good; much of its incompleteness is our own fault; if we are immortal souls, life must be incomplete here; the horrors of death are greatly aggravated by our own sins (we would go further and say that death itself, at least in the case of man, is the consequence and punishment of sin); eternal life in this world would be neither possible nor desirable; accidents and calamities are largely the result of our own carelessness and wrongdoing,—all this, and much else, is true and important. It throws light on life's dark problems: but it throws no new light, no light that has not been streaming all the while, at any rate by implication, from that supernatural revelation which Dr. Savage would despise, no light, we venture to suggest, which has not come to him from that revelation, though he himself has now forgotten that such is the case.

2. The negative part of Dr. Savage's discussion is unsatisfactory and unfair. His polemic against Calvinism and even against Christianity is unsatisfactory because it is superficial. It does not see beneath the surface, much less go beneath it. For example, because Job does not allude to the fall of man and the resulting introduction of evil, it is argued that he could not have known of these, and that, therefore, the history of them which we find in Genesis must be a late addition. The writer, however, fails to perceive, that it is not the origin of evil, but the reason for evil, which exercises Job; that these are distinct inquiries; that, consequently, a knowledge of both would not necessarily imply a reference to both; that, on the contrary, it might naturally lead to the assumption that as the origin was known, there was no need, when discussing the reason of evil, even to allude to its origin. Because a writer presented the reason for our Civil War without referring to the attack on Fort Sumter, it might not be concluded that he was ignorant of the event. The conclusion would rather be that he took the knowledge of it for granted.

But this polemic of Dr. Savage is not only unsatisfactory. It is grievously unfair, in that it ignores the truths which are essential to the Christian positions. Thus on p. 33 Calvinism is declared to be immoral because it holds that Adam was responsible for his fall inasmuch as God did not "in some outright fashion make him fall." This, however, is not the ground assigned by Calvinism for Adam's responsibility. The fact is ignored that Adam fell by his own free act. And this is the essential, the crucial, fact as regards his responsibility. That the government, in some particular case, does not prevent treason and even so orders that it can work itself out does not destroy or lessen the guilt of the traitor.

Again, on the same page, Dr. Savage declaims against the immorality of the imputation of the guilt of Adam's sin to new-born babes. They are so self-evidently innocent that to regard them guilty is monstrous. And so it would be, were the judgment based on appearances. But it is not. All men are born into the world "children of wrath," and consequently evince invariably as they develop an evil disposition, because they were all "in Adam." Hence, his punishment becomes their punishment; and so young children, though they look innocent, are guilty and grow up sinners. That this is so may logically be questioned. Whether it is just that it should be so may be disputed. To ignore, however, when criticising this doctrine of universal guilt, this explanation which Calvinism makes of it is worse than illogical; it is grievously unfair. A man must always be judged in the light of his own reasons. To judge otherwise is to subject oneself to severer condemnation. Once more, it is unfair to imply that Calvinism denies that "everything is under laws of cause and effect" (*vid.*, p. 47), because it believes in miracles and special providences and punishments. A miracle involves no violation and no suspension of any law of cause and effect. A miracle presupposes the introduction of a new and supernatural cause, and it is precisely because the law of cause and effect holds in this case as really as in any other that a new and supernatural effect follows. A special providence is in no wise against the laws of cause and effect; it is on account of them and through them that its special end is realized. When the horticulturist produces a new and particular variety of apple, he does what "the laws of cause and effect" could not do by themselves, yet he does it wholly by means of them. Shall the Maker of "the laws of cause and effect" not have equal power over them? A punishment is not less a punishment because it is a "result," and a "result" is not less a "result" because it is a punishment. To hold that God punishes sin "in the ordinary sense" is not to deny "the laws of cause and effect"; it is to hold that those laws were constituted with a view to the punishment of foreseen sins, and that God can and will combine and control these laws to this end at least as effectually as men can. Now all this ought to be reckoned with; it ought, at any rate, to be recognized; to ignore it, as Dr. Savage does, is indefensible. It is the suppression of the particular truth which is presupposed by the discussion. So, too, in his consideration of prayer on pp. 54 and 55, it is most unfair to imply that to believe that God will answer the prayers of the farmer is to believe "that God will change His universal and eternal laws as to the farm because some one prays." On the contrary, in so far as the pious farmer is intelligent, he believes, that God will answer his prayers through these universal and eternal laws; that He can answer them thus because these laws do not limit but express His power; and that, consequently, he who prays without trying to observe these laws is both foolish and sacrilegious. In a word, to believe in prayer is not to deny the efficacy of means. One reason why we are encouraged to pray is that we behold in the universal and eternal laws of God the means by which He can and will answer. Of course, it may be objected that this involves a false philosophy. But this objection ought to be made. Christianity ought to be given the credit of at least having a philosophy. Her antagonists are welcome to prove her mistaken if they can, but when they simply assume that she is a fool we must call on the world to witness the outrage.

3. Setting all this aside, however, it remains that in the last analysis, Dr. Savage's solution of "life's dark problems" is no solution. What he says comes down to this, that evil is not really evil, because it is necessary as the background which brings out the good; and that the naturalistic interpretation of the world, when understood, is more comforting as well as more rational than the old worn-out supernaturalistic view. But is it true that pain is the condition of consciousness and of happiness (p. 88) and evil of goodness (p. 127)? If so, then pain and evil must be eternal, or God becomes impossible. If, however, pain and evil are eternal, we are forced back into either dualism or atheism, and neither of these is

any more acceptable to Dr. Savage than to ourselves. The fact is, that he has put the cart before the horse. It is evil that needs the background, not good. Goodness is positive, self-conscious, self-satisfying, self-revealing. Sin does not make the law, but "by the law is the knowledge of sin." Goodness is fundamental, eternal, absolute. Dr. Savage would comfort us by implying that it is secondary, temporal, relative.

Again, is it true that the naturalistic interpretation of the world is more comforting as well as more rational than the traditional supernaturalistic view? On the contrary, it is neither. It is not more rational; for it is quite irrational. What could be so irrational as that the Infinite Person should constitute laws which would be inconsistent with all directly personal action on His part? Verily this would be infinite self-stultification. Nor is it an answer to say, as Dr. Savage does, p. 50, that because God is perfectly wise, he must act always in the wisest way. This is true, but it proves nothing to the point. Must the wisest way always be the same way? Because the wisdom of God manifests itself ordinarily in the uniformity of nature, does it follow that it will never be wiser that he should interpose with his own hand in the course of nature? A person will invent a machine and run a machine and carry out his purposes in the main by means of a machine; but, just because he is a person, he will never, he can never, shut himself up to a machine and so degrade himself to a machine. The personality of God and naturalism are mutually exclusive.

Nor is the naturalistic view of the divine government any more comforting than it is rational. This is because we, too, are persons. As such, it can never satisfy us to feel that we are simply in the grasp of a machine. It will make no difference how wonderful and beneficent is its construction, or how wise and kind is he who operates it. We can get peace only in the consciousness that we are in the hands of One who, though infinite, is a person like ourselves, and who, because an infinite person, can never be hindered by the laws which he has constituted from coming into directly personal relations with even the smallest of his children. "The reign of law" is a grand conception and, if rightly regarded, a true one; but it is inadequate. As Augustine said, "Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our souls are restless till they rest themselves in Thee."

4. Probably the most unsatisfactory part of this whole volume is the discussion in the otherwise excellent closing chapter of special and supernatural revelation. This Dr. Savage declares to be neither necessary nor possible. It is not necessary because we have already an infallible revelation in nature. That this revelation in nature, though trustworthy so far as it goes, has no message of grace and thus leaves man's deepest need as a sinner unmet, he does not seem to observe. This, however, is not strange; for from his position even the sinner can have no need of grace. What is strange is that he fails to see that the objection which he brings against special and supernatural revelation applies much more to the revelation in nature. If people have differed as to the meaning of Scripture, to a far greater degree have they done so as to the meaning of nature. In the former case the sects of what, in spite of them, is still one religion have resulted; in the latter case, the not seldom contradictory religions of the world. Indeed, whence came the theism which Dr. Savage himself defends so earnestly? While its grounds are independent of Christianity, no fact of history is more evident than that, as Prof. Flint has observed, "Theism has come to us mainly through Christianity." Apart from its special revelation, the revelation in nature has profited little. Even Plato said, in substance, in the *Timæus*, "How hard is it to find the Father and Maker of all this universe, and when He is found to describe Him to man-kind!"

No stronger is Dr. Savage's position that supernatural revelation, if necessary, would be impossible. His argument is, that such revelation would have to be special; that it could not be special and God not be partial; and that if God were

partial, He would cease to be God (p. 209). It must be remembered that partiality may be charged only when those passed by have a claim on the benefactor. A debtor is partial if he does not pay his creditors *pro rata*; for they all have a claim on him. Other things being equal, a father is partial if he leaves property to one child and not to the others; for they all have a claim on him. The government, however, would not be partial if it pardoned one criminal and not all; for no criminal has any claim on the government for pardon, but only for the just punishment of his crime. In a word, grace cannot be partial. If it could be, it would cease to be grace. Now the supernatural revelation of the Gospel is purely gracious. No one can claim it: for the light of nature ought to be sufficient, as our author admits; and the only reason why it is not sufficient is the blinding effect of our own sin.

Be this as it may, however, Dr. Savage himself takes our position. The most significant admission in his whole discussion is that on pp. 61 and 62, after referring to the differences between men in respect of "qualities of character, goodness and badness, capacity for happiness, the ordinary means and conditions for enjoyment," he says: "Ultimately,—we might as well face the matter frankly,—ultimately, the Author of this universe is responsible for all these human differences." Could there be a more unqualified abandonment of his whole contention? Could he allow more unreservedly that God does not distribute to all alike, but to every man severally, according as, in his love and wisdom, He wills? Perhaps the most instructive lesson of this entire volume is that the absolute sovereignty of God is not a truth of revelation only. It is a necessary consequence of theism as well. One cannot be a theist, as Dr. Savage is, and not admit, as he does, that in the last analysis the reason for all differences is to be found in God. If He is *God*, He *must* do "according to His will in the army of heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth."

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WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

II.—EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY.

The Bross Lectures, 1904. THE BIBLE, ITS ORIGIN AND NATURE. Seven Lectures delivered before Lake Forest College on the Foundation of the late William Bross. By the Reverend MARCUS DODS, D.D., Professor of Exegetical Theology in the New College, Edinburgh. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905. 12mo; pp. xi, 245.

By the munificence of the late William Bross, a considerable sum of money has been placed in the hands of the "Trustees of Lake Forest University," the proceeds of which they are charged to use to create a literature of exposition and defense of the Christian religion. It is specified, among other particular objects that should be sought under this general commission, that an effort is to be made "to demonstrate the divine origin and authority of the Christian Scriptures." It was quite natural, therefore, that among the earlier works called out under the stimulation of this bequest, there should be one on the origin and nature of the Bible. It may be doubted, however, whether Dr. Dods' lectures are calculated to meet perfectly the expectation aroused by language which speaks of a demonstration of the divine origin and authority of the Christian Scriptures. Dr. Dods, of course, believes that the Scriptures are a product of a movement of life and thought which originated in a divine impulse, and that there is much that is divine, and therefore authoritative, in them—that their main burden and central message, in fact, is divine. But around this central core, he believes that much that is human in origin and far from authoritative in effect has been

woven like a widely extended web, or shall we say like the coma of a comet that surrounds, partly transmitting, partly obscuring, the light of the nucleus.

In this Dr. Dods is but a representative of a general tendency which is at the moment very active in Christendom. Men everywhere, deeply affected by the assault which has been made in our day, perhaps with unexampled vigor and subtlety, upon the Christian system as a divine revelation, and especially upon the Christian Scriptures as the vehicle of that revelation, have sought to ease the situation by casting away what they have deemed the husk in the hope of saving what appears to them the kernel. They have commended to us, therefore, a new and reduced Christianity, documented in a new and reduced body of Scriptures. Dr. Dods is by no means an extreme representative of this tendency. But *gradus non mutant speciem*. In this book also he appears before us as the "concessive" apologist, the "mediating" theologian, and begs to put in our hands a Bible, which, in his view, is much more rationally conceived in its origin and nature than the old Bible was, and therefore, in his opinion, may be much more successfully defended. We certainly shall not deny that a certain measure of ease may be purchased for the defender by simply declining to defend; although it is not always certain that, so long as what we consider the citadel is to be defended, its defense is made really easier by the surrender of what we may deem outposts but which may prove to be approaches. We gladly recognize that Dr. Dods would fain defend what both he and we look upon as the citadel. But we find it impossible to admit that what he would yield as indefensible outposts are either indefensible or can be yielded safely or loyally. We rejoice that we have a fuller and richer Christianity than Dr. Dods feels bound to proclaim, and Scriptures far more divine in their origin and nature than he is inclined to admit. We believe that the defense of this richer Christianity and these more completely divine Scriptures is not only possible but imperative, if we would preserve Christianity in the world. And we believe their defense to be logically easier than that of the lowered views which Dr. Dods would commend to us. We do not believe that half-truths are more easily defended than whole ones; and we look upon the "concessive apologetics" which Dr. Dods represents as inimical to Christianity, and all the more to be firmly resisted because its assault is more insidious and therefore more dangerous than open attack.

Ask Dr. Dods what the Scriptures are and he will tell you, A body of books which we set apart from all others and assign a place of supremacy because they "are all in direct connection with God's historical revelation which culminated in Christ." Like all Dr. Dods' definitions (it is inherent in the position he occupies) this is—inadequate. If we should say the Bible is the documentation of God's self-revelation for the purpose of human salvation, that would be a more adequate description of the internal characteristic of the Scriptures,—expressing, indeed, their unifying principle. But the plain fact is, to put it in briefest terms, that the Scriptures are the *corpus juris* of Christians imposed on them as such by competent authority. This competent authority is proximately the Apostles, acting as Christ's authoritative agents in founding His Church. Thus apostolicity (in the sense of apostolic imposition, not authorship) is and always has been the principle of canonicity. There is no gain in blinking this plain fact, and seeking to transmute it into some more immanent principle. The Christian Church is a manufactured article; it was founded; and its character was impressed on it and its law imposed on it by its founders. Of course we may ask why the Apostles imposed just this particular body of books on the Churches which they established as Christ's authorized agents in founding His Church. And doubtless, in pursuing this inquiry, we shall ultimately reach the principle that these books stand together as constituting the "canon" which the Apostles gave the Church, because they constitute as a whole the documentation of God's revelation of Himself for salvation. But nothing could be more confusing than to confound this

internal principle of unity with the external principle of canonicity, though good men, as, for example, Luther, have in every age been guilty of the confusion, —with the most unfortunate results. Throughout its whole history authentication as God's law for His Church has been the proximate ground of the reception of the canon, although, of course, throughout the whole history of its formation organic participation in the revelatory process has been the principle of the constitution of the canon. And it is on the same ground that the canon must continue to be received if received at all. It is a grave error to represent this rational procedure as a desertion of the principle which governed the fathers of the Reformed Churches. They, as little as we, sought to determine the "canon"—which is a matter of history—on the basis of the *Testimonium Spiritus sancti*—which is a matter of experience: on that basis is determined not the "canon" but "the Word of God." From his standpoint Dr. Dods very naturally finds the method of the Reformed doctors a little confusing: but the confusion is his not theirs. They treated the Scriptures as a unit because the Scriptures are a unitary apostolic book; and they then asked if this book "found them." Discovering that it did, they recognized it as the "Word of God." Of course, Dr. Dods may say that apostolicity cannot justly be claimed for all these books. That is a matter of opinion, concerning which we differ with him and concerning which the fathers of the Reformed Churches differed with him. That the body of the Apostles imposed a Bible on the Church is not disputable; that this Bible contained all the books, and no others, which our present Bible contains we consider historically substantiated: that this collection as a whole is "the Word of God" is experimentally verifiable. This strikes us as a much more reasonable method of dealing with the matter than Dr. Dods' fluctuating way, which involves a confusion between the historical question of what constitutes the canon and the vital one of what is the Word of God to me,—analogous to the common confusion of the Scriptures as the *principium cognoscendi* and the Scriptures as the means of grace.

Let us, however, revert to the primary definition which Dr. Dods gives of the Bible as constituted of books which we set apart from all others and give a place of supremacy because "they are all in direct connection with God's historical revelation which culminated in Christ." What is to be observed here is that all that Dr. Dods can say of Scripture is that it is "in direct connection with" revelation: and that the adjective "historical" which he attached to "revelation" is not to be read as distinctive, but as descriptive. That is to say, Dr. Dods believes in no other than an "historical" revelation; what he teaches is that God reveals Himself only in the sequence of historical events, while Scripture is only the product of this revelation, working through human minds. The theory, as will at once be perceived, is that which was given great vogue in the middle of the last century by the attractive presentation of it by Richard Rothe, and which has been more recently commended, with some caution but much earnestness, to English readers by the late Prof. A. B. Bruce. As commonly presented, its essence is that it confines Revelation to the series of Divine acts in history, while it treats Inspiration as the correlate of Revelation, or, as Dr. Dods prefers to phrase it, its "complement" (p. 97),—the action of the Divine Spirit on the human spirit by virtue of which the latter "perceives, appreciates, accepts and in certain cases records the Revelation of God." In this view the Bible is no part of the Revelation (though why the production of the Scriptures may not be conceived as an element in the series of the Redemptive acts of God it is hard to perceive), but is simply its record; and its record, so far as appears, in purely human strength—apart, that is, from the effects of that so-called Inspiration by which in Dr. Dods' view men are enabled sympathetically to receive and possibly to record Revelation. "The essential elements in revelation," explains Dr. Dods, "have been understood and interpreted by men." "In the Bible we have that

selected revelation which inspired men have accepted and seen fit to record." "God has revealed Himself, and the leading facts of this revelation are recorded for us in the Bible, and from these facts we can gather what God wishes us to know about Him and how He wishes us to think of Him" (pp. 96, 97). In other words, all that we commonly know as "direct revelation" is denied or retired to the background: revelation is made to consist in an immanent action of God through man by virtue of which a series of events are produced which are then perceived and interpreted by human spirits prepared for their task by a corresponding action of God upon them enabling them to see and appreciate these events aright. The latter Divine activity is then called Inspiration. Inspiration has therefore, no direct concern with the record; it is distinctly not graphical but personal.

We shall not pause to point out how little support this construction has in the letter of Scripture itself. Scripture represents revelation, normative revelation, as through the medium of speech, or at least in a mode best represented by speech. "Thus saith the Lord" is its typical expression. And Scripture assigns Inspiration not to the person but to the written product: to it, it is "every Scripture"—or, as it is probable we should translate it, "the entire Scripture"—that is given by inspiration of God. Let us pause only to call attention to the lowered supernaturalism of the theory; and also to the inconsequence of the reasoning by which it is supported. "What has been the method of revelation?" asks Dr. Dods. "Our answer to this question," he replies, "depends upon our idea of God." "If we believe in God as immanent in the world and man, then we shall necessarily believe that God reveals Himself through human sensitiveness to the Spiritual, and inquiry after Him. If we believe in God as merely transcendent, we shall think of Him as moving man from without" (pp. 78-9). Now, why has Dr. Dods—shall we say subintroduced?—the little word "merely" into the last clause, by the introduction of which the exact parallelism of this clause with the preceding one is broken? In point of fact, "merely" must stand in both clauses if they are to be taken, as they are treated here, as true disjunctives. And, in point of fact, Dr. Dods actually reasons throughout the volume on a presupposition which tends to treat God as "merely" immanent and as operating in the world solely "through human sensitiveness to the spiritual"—though we thankfully recognize that in dealing with the miraculous element in the Gospels a higher note is struck. Indeed, he at once goes on to say in our present passage: "In the one case revelation will be internal and natural; in the other it will be external and supernatural,"—and proceeds to point out that "belief in the immanence of God tends to abolish the distinction between the natural and the supernatural." It is this tendency, showing itself everywhere, which leads Dr. Dods to pare down the supernatural character of the Bible; it is it which lies at the root of his denial of the infallibility of the Bible—or of its "literal infallibility" as he elects to call it, in the effort to save for the Bible, even on his theory of its origin and nature, a sort of infallibility in a single sphere.

How inadequately Dr. Dods thinks of the supernatural element in the Bible may be observed as well as elsewhere at the point where, in an attempt to break the force of the Bible doctrine of inspiration, he cries out with emphasis (in opposition to the direct testimony of Scripture) that it is not the Book but "the man who is inspired" (p. 117). But where does Dr. Dods suppose that this man that is inspired came from? He apparently imagines that he is given by the world—or by himself—and that God comes to him, finds him as he is, and does the best He can with so poor and inadequate an instrument. It is "with all his natural powers and idiosyncrasies" that "he becomes the organ of the Spirit,"—as if, therefore, the product would necessarily be different from what the Spirit might have made it if only He had had a better instrument! "Inspiration does not lift the inspired person out of all his limitations, but uses him as he is, and all his

faculties as they are," he asserts, with no pause to consider, that all these natural powers and idiosyncrasies, all these faculties and capacities, that make the man, are themselves, down to the last one of them, of God; that the man himself is what God made him and what God made him precisely for this end, that through him He might give this precise word to men; that God the almighty ruler of the world does not have to put up with the best man He can find and agree to abide the result, but first forms the man to suit His purpose, and then uses him to accomplish His purpose, and so produces through him precisely what He wills. It is, ultimately, this defective sense of the Divine, even in its immanent working, which lies at the root of our modern tendency to depress the supernatural; and the evidences of it face us everywhere. Thus, for example, we find Dr. Dods using such language as this: "God was compelled" (p. 85), "It was useless for Christ to die, until . . ." (p. 86),—as if God were under the domination of men and needed to wait on man and walk warily lest He should get beyond His tether. It is amazing that any thinking man could imagine that by such shallow expedients as this language embodies, the great problem may be solved of why God Almighty operates in this world by process. The current employment of such language is the saddest indication of how far the men of our day have lost the vision of God, and of how prone they are to operate in their thinking with the will of man as really the prime factor of importance in the world's history. It surely is no wonder, therefore, that, even though but a little under the influence of this modern blight, Dr. Dods should show himself throughout these lectures working under the fatal confusion of man's thought of God with God's revelation of Himself, and that he should accordingly be continually treating the record as the record of how man (under whatever Divine impulses) had come to conceive of God rather than of how God from time to time revealed Himself to man.

We have written somewhat desultorily, but we hope we have made it clear that the fountain of Dr. Dods' inadequate conception of Scripture as the documentation of God's revelation of Himself for salvation, lies in his inadequate conception of the modes of the Divine operation in the world—in a word, in his chariness with regard to the supernatural. He wishes apparently as little supernatural a book as he can, as a Christian man, manage to get along with. The writers of Scripture, it is undeniable held the diametrically opposite view. There was no antecedent opposition to the supernatural in their minds. They lived in a supernaturalistic atmosphere. They saw God in everything and above and over everything. And they give us a frankly supernatural book. Dr. Dods says that it is not the book but the man that is inspired: Paul says that every, or all, Scripture is God-breathed. Dr. Dods says that much of Scripture is of little or no spiritual value; Paul says it all is profitable to make the man of God perfect. Dr. Dods says that whole stretches of it are untrustworthy for historical or other not directly spiritual purposes, and no part of it is untouched by human fallibility; the writers of the New Testament say as the end of all strife, "It is written!" and Jesus Himself says, that when we adduce Scripture we adduce what cannot "be broken." It is possible that in a matter of fact like the infallibility of Scripture, however, Scripture will not, on Dr. Dods' view, be implicitly trusted. We must at least ask, however, how he will practically get along with his fallible Scriptures? He gives his strength to proving that, fallible as they are, they yet preserve a true picture of Christ, and that Christ, once given us, becomes the criterion of Scripture. Now, of course, this is the main thing. The Scriptures exist to give us Christ; and when they have brought us to Christ they have performed their fundamental function. No human being who knows the Scriptures and has by them come to Christ will deny that. But what Christ is this that we shall get from our fallible Scriptures? We know the Christ which the infallible Scriptures give us: and every lineament of that Divine-human form is precious to us. Shall we be able to retain this form in all its lineaments on the basis of a fallible Scripture?

How much of it goes, with the infallibility of Scripture? Nothing essential, says Dr. Dods: and we might conceivably be willing to content ourselves with the Christ he preserves for us. But what about the Christ that Wernle gives us? or Wrede? or Oscar Holtzmann? or Auguste Sabatier? or Réville? or Brandt? or Harnack? Which Christ of the fallible Scriptures shall we be ultimately forced to put up with? Will He become to us at length only a vague figure who lived in Galilee nineteen centuries ago and made a religious impression on His followers of such depth that it has propagated itself down to our day? And when we have got our Christ from Scripture, what Scripture will that Christ in turn give us? The Christ the Scriptures as they stand give us, is the Christ that said of Scripture "It cannot be broken." Everywhere throughout the whole extent of the Scriptural representation, it is this attitude that He holds to Scripture. It seems quite clear that this is not the Christ that Dr. Dods would have us receive from Scripture; or at least, if we receive Him, it is clear that he would not have us accept His Scriptures at His estimate. It appears that we are to estimate Scripture not by His teaching, then, but by His "standard." That He was conscious of no incongruity of Scripture with His standard,—even that is not to weigh decisively with us. We are to do our own judging: we are easily to reject all that does not approve itself to our estimate as measuring up to Him. It may seem to some of us, indeed, that we thus come into grave danger of discrediting the very Christ we have received. But as we have received Him only from a fallible Scripture, perhaps we may be justified in adjusting Him when received to our own ideals. Many pursue this method. But in that case what warrant, other than our own subjective conception, have we for the Christ we finally adopt and make the criterion of Scripture? And if we are to make the Scriptures that give us the Christ and then make the Christ which gives us back the Scriptures—it will be hard if we do not ultimately find ourselves arrived at the goal for which we set out.

Subjectivism is, in truth, the gulf into which all our modern theorizers inevitably fall. Dr. Dods no more escapes it than the others. What he really gives us is therefore an ideal sketch—a "program," is it not, that they call it?—of what he would like to be the principle of the canon, the nature of revelation, the function of inspiration, the extent of infallibility, and the like; of what he would find it commodious, in accordance with his preconceived opinions as to God and the world, to hold and teach and defend on these matters. For what is really the principle of the canon, the nature and method of revelation, the effect of inspiration, the infallibility of Scripture,—for the facts, hard or comforting as we may esteem them—we must go elsewhere. That what Dr. Dods could wish were the facts approaches much nearer to what they are than what they are represented as being by many others, sharers with him in the modern prepossessions against the supernatural—though adopting them more exclusively or developing them more consequently than he—we very gladly recognize. Dr. Dods still believes in the general historical trustworthiness of the Gospels; and, although unwarrantably assailing their trustworthiness in many details (on, let us say it frankly, very frivolous grounds), yet sturdily and successfully defends the essential historical soundness of their narrative, and especially the trustworthiness of the portraiture of our Lord which they present. Dr. Dods even believes in and defends the reality of the miraculous element in the life of Christ as it is depicted by the Evangelists. These are great things to say of one who is so much affected by the modern spirit which, as he himself tells us, is swayed by nothing more profoundly than "the presupposition of the incredibility of miracles" (p. 134), and to which the presence of a supernatural element in a narrative is enough to condemn it at once as unhistorical. We rejoice that Dr. Dods would preserve to us at least a supernatural Redeemer, even if he draws back before too supernatural a Bible. We could wish, of course, that he had gone on and done as much justice to the supernaturalism of revelation and inspiration and the resultant Scriptures as

he has to the supernaturalism of the person and work of our Lord. As it is, he inevitably seems to us to have handled these matters far too lightly and to have presented only, as he himself remarks of Prof. Huxley in a similar case, "another demonstration that the ablest man may sometimes be satisfied with touching but the surface of a subject."

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

THE PRIESTLY ELEMENT IN THE OLD TESTAMENT. An Aid to Historical Study for Use in Advanced Bible Classes. By WILLIAM RAINEY HARPER, Professor of Semitic Languages and Literatures in the University of Chicago. Revised and Enlarged Edition. Constructive Bible Studies: College Series. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1905. Pp. viii, 292. Postpaid, price \$1.00.

Dr. Harper's great gift of teaching comes to fine manifestation in this manual. The book makes an impact. Its power is felt at once; the power that comes from mastery of the material, clear analysis, logical arrangement, incisive style, steady and easy advance step by step from the simple to the complex. The book has, too, the ring of certainty. The author states the conclusions of the school of Biblical criticism to which he belongs in the same concise and positive manner that one would record a geographical discovery, and he sets forth the doctrines of his school as though they had been ascertained by the same rigid scientific method as are the facts of chemistry. Indeed, the earlier part of the book reads like a school text-book of which the sole purpose is to impart knowledge.

Nevertheless, to mention but one matter, in the judgment of the present reviewer, the esteemed author has overlooked a historical fact that is fundamental to the whole discussion. He fails to remember that Israel did not enter upon its national existence as savage tribes untouched by civilization, but was envired by highly developed life. A large part, if not the whole body, of the people had lived in Egypt, and during a period of Egypt's greatest splendor. Moses, moreover, whom Dr. Harper recognizes as an important factor in the early life of the nation, appeared at a time when literature flourished and had already assumed recognized forms and was serving manifold purposes. He lived in an age of codified civil law, of ethical precepts, pomp of worship, elaborate ritual, graded priesthood, and imposing sanctuary. His work should reflect the times; and as outlined in the Old Testament it does reflect them. The people began their national existence with the dominant ideas of the age as a part of their equipment, and naturally gave evidence of their appreciation for these conceptions and achievements in their institutions. This historical fact, left out of consideration by the author, vitally affects the presuppositions of his argument and places his rich material in a different light.

These "constructive Bible studies" are intended to be, and assuredly are, a tool for the worker, a ready instrument at hand to aid him in the study of any point connected with "the priestly element in the Old Testament," a map of the ground to be traversed, an index to the relevant Scripture passages and the critical literature. It is an admirable "preparation" of material for the man with a broad outlook, who can bring to the investigation additional facts from a larger realm of knowledge and is able to survey the subject in its ecumenical relations.

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

THE THEOLOGY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. By the late A. B. DAVIDSON, D.D., LL.D., Litt.D., Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament Exegesis, New College, Edinburgh. Edited from the Author's Manuscripts by G. D. F. SALMOND, D.D., F.E.I.S., Principal of the United Free Church College, Aberdeen. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1904 (International Theological Library).

It is with a double sense of loss and sadness that we come to the reading of this

book. As the title and preface tell us, the author passed away before he could put the material of his lecture-manuscripts on Old Testament theology into the beautiful, well-ordered form which it would undoubtedly have received from his hand, had he been spared to complete this task. And since the date of publication, Principal Salmond, who undertook the task of editing the posthumous volume, has also gone to his reward, so that in the book before us we have the last contribution to Biblical science of two of the most eminent Scottish theologians of our day. Both have labored so long and so usefully, each in his own sphere, that we cannot refrain from paying on this occasion our tribute of admiration and thankfulness to their memory.

Our gratitude would have been still greater, if the work under review did not so painfully disclose the extent to which the author in his later days gave countenance to the current critical views regarding the Old Testament. Not as if Dr. Davidson went the whole length in adopting the evolutionary, subjectivizing interpretation of the Old Testament history of religion or in advocating the literary conclusions of the modern school. In point of fact, he occupies an intermediate position, which, in our opinion, does justice to neither the old nor the modern view and is, on account of its continual oscillation between the two, weaker than either of them. Biblical theology is defined as "the knowledge of God's great operation in introducing His kingdom among men." One might object to the use of the idea of the kingdom in such a general definition, on the ground that this idea did not become the central organizing idea in the Old Testament consciousness, or did even emerge until a comparatively late period. It would have been vastly better to substitute for this the idea of revelation, for the latter is actually coextensive with the whole course of sacred history, if only revelation be taken not in the abstract theological sense of a communication of truth, but in the practical sense of a self-manifestation of God for the purpose of establishing and cultivating the true religion. But, apart from this infelicity, the definition given has at least the merit that it safeguards the objective character of the theme of Biblical theology. The moderns simply say that Biblical theology deals with the religion of Israel in its phenomenological sense. Dr. Davidson is conscious of tracing an operation of God, not an evolution in man. And yet, strange to say, at subsequent points in the book this consciousness appears too weak and too little assured of itself to repudiate or even criticise the opposite, the subjectivizing point of view. The author simply proceeds as if the two were identical or the difference immaterial. On page 13 occurs the following characteristic sentence: "New thoughts of Jehovah or revelations regarding Him,—for the two things are the same, seeing that a revelation is no revelation until it takes the shape of human thought—etc." It will be noticed that Dr. Davidson does not say "until it is received," but "until it takes the shape of human thought"; evidently he means to place the revealing-process itself in the subjective emergence of thoughts in the human consciousness. The statement that a revelation is no revelation until received into human thought is a curious instance of pitting the strict etymological sense of the word against its common usage. The divine part of the transaction has always been called "revelation" quite apart from its effect or reproduction in the consciousness of man. But Dr. Davidson seems to deny the objectivity of this divine factor, at least in the sense in which it could properly be called a revelation in itself. "Revelation of truth," we learn on page 8, "was not, so to speak, communicated from without; but the organs of revelation rose within the people in the persons of its highest representatives, men in whom its life beat fullest and its aspirations were most perfectly embodied." "The prophetic thoughts were . . . profoundly subjective to the prophets themselves, that is, rose up out of their own hearts with the greatest intensity and fire of conviction" (p 14). And most explicitly on p. 36: "On man's side this revelation was an operation of Jehovah in the mind. Revelation

was the arising in the mind of man of thoughts or impulses accompanied by the conviction that the thoughts and impulses were from God. In such thoughts the mind of man and God coalesced and the man was conscious of meeting God." The reader will not fail to notice, how here the meeting of man with God, in which the two subjects are distinguished, is identified with the coalescing of the divine and human mind, in which the distinction is entirely lost. Now we do not mean to assert that revelation through inspiration of the subjective mind of man is nowhere found in the Old Testament. To the Psalmists it was frequent, perhaps the ordinary experience. But we protest against the setting up of this partial method as the exclusive method of divine procedure in revelation, and protest especially against the indiscriminate extension of it to the sphere of prophecy. König may have gone too far in claiming for all prophetic revelation the external objectivity, which admits of being defined in terms of space, but certainly his main contention, that the prophets were conscious of having the truth addressed to their subjective personality *ab extra*, is fully borne out by the testimony of the prophets themselves. It has never been refuted and cannot be refuted, least of all by the quibble that revelation is not revelation, until it takes the shape of human thought. Dr. Davidson, and all who take the same view, must go back of the prophetic testimony and the prophetic consciousness, and construe on some other basis their theory of revelation. That in this other basis there is frequently a considerable element of antisupernaturalism it would be difficult to deny.

Not merely, however, in the question of the form of revelation, in other respects also, the author does not always speak in such terms as to us would seem to be demanded by an unqualified endorsement of the supernaturalism of the Old Testament. In his capacity of a Biblical theologian, Dr. Davidson professes not to go to the Old Testament with any general conception that it is the Word of God spoken to us, but only to rise from it with this conception. This would seem to imply that the Biblico-theological treatment of the truth itself is not affected by its supernatural origin and character. The organic character of the progressive unfolding of truth is described as something that results from its dependence on the organic character of the historical development of Israel, which shares this peculiarity with all historic life. Must we infer from this that the organism of the Old Testament truth is not determined by its supernatural origin? Is there not a development here generically distinct from the natural evolution of the national life? On p. 12 the following statement is quoted, with apparent approval, from Wildeboer's *Canon*: "From an evolutionistic point of view, men speak of the development of the religion of Israel. From a different point of view, the history of Israel's religion is called a progressive revelation. We must remember that a progressive revelation from the divine side must exhibit itself among men as a persistent struggle to realize new truths. . . . This conflict appears to one man as a progressive development; to another, who by experience has learned to know the gulf between God and the human heart as a terrible reality, it appears as a progressive revelation. But, however it be regarded, all are agreed that from the Tora and Neb'im we can understand how the precious treasure of Israel's religion came more and more fully to light, and maintained itself ever more firmly." This is the kind of attenuated supernaturalism which seems to be able to make itself believe that the interpretation of the historical phenomena can be the same from the supernatural standpoint as from the evolutionistic, and that yet the cause of supernaturalism can be fully safeguarded by merely positing behind the phenomena a divine causation which is denominated "supernatural." But is it not reasonable to say that supernaturalism in order to be real at all must be such as to make itself a potent factor in the shaping of the phenomena? Can we continue to believe in it, when it is assumed so to work, that its effects are capable of a naturalistic and supernaturalistic appreciation alike? Is our consciousness of "the gulf between God and the human heart as a terrible

reality" the only or the main reason for putting a supernatural causation back of the process of history? Can anybody find comfort in being reduced to the position, where supernaturalism is an unverifiable possibility, or do we not rather feel that, in order to be at all, it must obtrude itself, in the field of history, a triumphant reality? How is this so-called supernatural activity of God, which lies back of the phenomena, to be distinguished from His mere providential immanence in the world? Is there anything to differentiate the one from the other, if the former does not affect the complexion of history? These and other like questions are inevitably suggested and not answered by Dr. Davidson's statements.

The extent to which the author adopts and lays at the basis of his work the current critical views is not quite easy to determine. This is owing to the fact that he does not follow any chronological method in discussing the contents of the Old Testament religion, but, topically dividing it into the doctrine of God, the doctrine of man, the doctrine of redemption, treats within the compass of each of these the whole material that lies scattered in the Old Testament writings, and that frequently, though not always, without regard to distinction of periods. Even the New Testament is occasionally drawn upon to contribute elements of argument and illustration. In this method of topical treatment the book resembles Dillmann's work, with this difference, that the latter gives a far lengthier discussion in a separate section to the course of historical development, whilst Dr. Davidson disposes of this matter in a few pages. The chronology of criticism, however, is constantly used. We are told that the Old Testament religion hardly begins till the exodus (p. 16). The adjective "prehistoric" occurs repeatedly. The origin of the idea of God lies beyond the horizon of history (p. 31). This would seem to imply that there is an evolutionary origin, but elsewhere the view seems to be retained that man has an innate conception of God in virtue of creation, and on p. 96 the matter is left in doubt. What we have of the patriarchal period is not a contemporaneous historical record, but the *traditional or legendary* view taken by the ninth or the eighth centuries (p. 28). Still the patriarchs are treated as historical persons (p. 97 and elsewhere). Even to the account of the exodus this applies. The Book of the Covenant is placed between the exodus and 800 B.C. Deuteronomy was "made public" in 621, apart from any theory of its origin or even its date of composition (p. 17). It at least did not influence Israel until Josiah's time (p. 360). The denial of the early existence of the Levitical law, not merely in codified form, but even as oral priestly tradition, is implied (p. 308), where it is held that to sacrifice was the privilege of every Israelite. The ritual law for the first time was brought together and codified in the post-exilic period, and did not become until then an element in the national life (p. 19). Only the Decalogue is positively and consistently treated as Mosaic, and that particularly as regards the two great principles of practical monotheism and the prohibition of images. On the other hand, not only are the single critical conclusions as to the date of the several documents adopted, also the incisive critical principle that in the post-exilic period a new way of reading the past history of the nation arose, and that the scheme of Israel's religious history, as it now lies before us in the Old Testament (in other words, the Old Testament itself), is the product of this rewriting, is espoused (p. 18). The newest critical hypothesis about the origin of the present prophetic writings receives assent. The collectors made insertions in order to render the prophecies applicable to the thoughts and religious needs of their own times. Still this is not meant in any extreme sense, for the genuineness of the promissory element in Hosea and Amos, of the great Messianic prophecies in Isa. ix and xi, of the latter part of the Book of Micah is recognized (pp. 369-372), although in the same connection there is again a hint at the post-exilic expansion of ancient prophecy. And on the whole, while those critical opinions are introduced at certain points, they do not shape or eve

appreciably affect the treatment of the material. The conclusions are not drawn from them which are usually considered their correlates. Dr. Davidson continues to believe that the conceptions of God in the patriarchal age did not differ greatly from those which we now have (p. 48). The unity, if not the spirituality of God was known to Abraham (p. 98). The Hebrew idea of God is ethical, not physical, he affirms without qualification (p. 36). Prophetism was a development of Mosaism on one side (p. 20). On the other hand, it must be confessed that the author has done next to nothing to show how, with his critical premises, the history of revelation can be made intelligible. The old view with its continuity of revelation from the beginning, whatever in the opinion of our modern critics may be its historical difficulties or impossibilities in the concrete, yields at least a reasonable philosophy of the process of revelation. The new view, with its great prehistoric blank at the beginning, leaves us to a large extent face to face with the blind, unilluminated facts. What brings the light into it is the subjectivizing, evolutionary, naturalistic interpretation of the facts. Where the critical theories and any solid form of supernaturalism are combined, as is the case in Dr. Davidson's book, they eventually obscure and confuse each other. We are confident in affirming that, notwithstanding the unusual lucidity and orderliness with which Dr. Davidson's mind naturally operated in his material, no student will get from this book a clear and distinct idea as to what the course of the development of Israel's religion actually was, not to speak of the reasons why it was shaped thus and not otherwise. To mention only one instance: the juxtaposition of the ethical and ritual elements in the Old Testament is affirmed on p. 14 and elsewhere after a purely mechanical fashion. The critical hypothesis has its answer ready to the question, why these two elements exist thus mechanically together or even lie in conflict in the religion of Israel. From Dr. Davidson, at least in this book, we look for an answer to this and similar questions in vain. Perhaps this unfortunate circumstance is in part due to the peculiar origin of the volume. One gains the impression that Dr. Davidson's views in regard to the content of truth of the Old Testament were substantially worked out in a period previous to his aligning himself with the modern hypothesis. Afterward the critical conclusions were superimposed, but they did not have time materially to reshape the body of doctrinal convictions.

As a so-called Biblical Dogmatic the book has great merit, and still more, if considered as a series of essays on the important topics of Old Testament teaching. A wealth of sound generalizing is to be found here, which in most cases admirably reproduces the large content and bearing of the Scriptural facts. On the other hand, a close scrutiny of the data in detail and a delicate attention to the finer nuances of teaching are lacking, not because the writer was incapable of giving this, but evidently because the primary intent of the work for classroom teaching did not permit of this. The same circumstance will explain the not infrequent repetition not only of isolated statements, but of whole trains of reasoning on important conceptions. We are not sure but the editor could have excluded some of these to advantage. Evidently, however, Dr. Davidson was a thorough believer in the pedagogic efficacy of repetition, and in so far even this feature of the book helps to increase its individual character. It is difficult, where so much is excellent, to single out sections for special praise. An exception may be made for the extended section on eschatology, and its lucid discussion of the development of the Old Testament doctrine of immortality. Here the author lays bare to our view more than elsewhere the basis of his induction and gives most admirable *resumés* of the important passages bearing on the problem. It must have been an especially congenial and delightful task to Principal Salmond to edit this portion of the book.

At the close, besides an Index of Scripture Passages, extended Notes of Literature, topically arranged, are given. The latter, however, need supplementing.

E.g., under the topic "Lord of Hosts" the important article of Borchert in *Studien und Kritiken* is overlooked. Under the head of "Typology, Prophecy and the Prophets" we miss Giesebrecht's *Berufsbegabung der Alttestamentlichen Propheten*; under the head of "Angels," Everling's *Paulinische Angelologie und Dämonologie*, which is evidently not excluded on account of its dealing with a New Testament subject, because an article of Hackspill on *Jewish Angelology* in the New Testament period is mentioned.

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

JESUS AND THE PROPHETS. An Historical, Exegetical and Interpretative Discussion of the Use of Old Testament Prophecy by Jesus and of His Attitude toward It. By CHARLES S. MACFARLAND, Ph.D. (Yale), Minister of the Maplewood Congregational Church of Malden, Massachusetts. With an Introduction by FRANK K. SANDERS, Ph.D., D.D., Dean of the Divinity School of Yale University. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1905. 8vo; pp. xvi, 249.

We may at once say frankly that this is a very crude and undigested book from which little useful is to be learned—except, indeed, the extent to which the unbelieving attitude toward the Scripture-record which characterizes modern research is invading the ranks of our ministry. This attitude is very clearly set forth by Prof. Sanders in his Introduction to the volume. "In place of an acceptance based upon its definite, unchanged transmission of the formulated declarations of God, there tends to grow up a reliance upon the Bible because it is a faithful transcript of the most pertinent human religious experience, reflecting all phases of the normal growth of a real consciousness of relationship with God and formulating successive approximations to eternal truth." The Bible, in other words, ceases to be a manual in theology, and becomes a textbook in psychology. It is a "human document," or, as Prof. Sanders calls it, "a manual of life." From it we may learn not what God is and how He would have us think of Him and serve Him; but what man is in his religious experiences, and the phases through which a normal growth of religious consciousness is apt to pass. To thinkers of this cast, the Bible naturally loses all authority properly so called. As it records only the varieties of religious experience, it is inevitable that the only normative element in it should be discovered in the best religious experience it records. That is still happily supposed to be found in the religious consciousness of Jesus Christ. Accordingly, writers of this type continually speak of Jesus as the end-term of the religious development recorded in the Bible, and as therefore also "the standard by which it may at all stages be estimated." Only—how can we know that this normative religious experience is accurately represented to us in these Scriptures? Well, shortly, we cannot. Consequently, Prof. Sanders tells us, there has grown up "a great desire to know Jesus at first hand." And then Prof. Sanders proceeds with a most instructive disjunctive, which perhaps he scarcely intended to frame just as he has framed it, but which may stand to us as an instance of the heart speaking out of the mouth. "There is a great desire to know Him at first hand," he says, and continues explanatorily (the elucidating italics are, of course, ours), "*not* merely through the loving vision of His earliest interpreters, *but* as He looked and spake and worked and thought." The evangelists are "His earliest interpreters": what they give us, therefore, is not the real Jesus, "as He looked and spake and worked and thought," but a vision of Him distorted by their love. Men nowadays do not wish a "loving vision." They wish the bald truth. The contrast is ominous. There are some of us who may wonder whether what men nowadays actually wish is not to substitute an "unloving vision" for that perfect truth which can be seen only by the eye of love.

In his view of Jesus and his view of the Scriptural record by which a loving

but manifoldly deflected vision of Jesus has been transmitted to us, Mr. Macfarland is a faithful follower of his teachers at Yale. And he has set himself in this volume to get behind "the loving vision," and to determine the bald truth at least as to Jesus' attitude to the Old Testament and especially its prophetic element. The keynote of his endeavor is revealed by such phrases as, "We must not interpret Jesus by the Evangelists"; "we have here an evident attempt to ground the later exegesis and interpretation in the example of Jesus Himself." Mr. Macfarland will, we hope, excuse us if, for our part, we find such words more applicable to his own book. It seems to us simply a sustained attempt to ground the new view of Scripture in the example of Jesus; to reject every utterance reported of Him which is manifestly inconsistent with the new view; and to explain all that remains *vi et armis* in accordance with it. And, for our part, we find it impossible to interpret Jesus by *this* evangelist. The representation of Jesus' view of the Bible and attitude toward prophecy given by the earlier evangelists is at least self-consistent, harmonious with the portrait of Jesus they draw, and not marred by unsupported *obiter dicta* and elaborate pieces of special pleading. It is at least credible. And this, we think, cannot be said of Mr. Macfarland's representation.

We have already remarked that Mr. Macfarland's presentation of his material lacks something in point of form. The core of the book consists of what looks like his detailed notes on the several passages in which Jesus quotes from the prophetic books, apparently printed directly from his notebook. To these are prefixed a few introductory pages, and adjoined certain short summarizing chapters. Even in these, however, there are presented no thoughtful and well-considered generalizations. The very language is uncouth, and the construction of the sentences un-English. We should have imagined the writer a foreigner unwonted to English idiom, did not the Scotch name stare out of the title-page upon us. We open the book at random as we write these words, and our eye catches on one side of the opened page this sentence: "As to the Second Gospel, it seems probable that it did not originally consist as we have it"; and on the other side this one: "They [the evangelists] do not always interpret or present in entire agreement." These are typical sentences: their like or their superiors in point of license in the use of English construction may be found at every opening. Mr. Macfarland is evidently a thoroughly emancipated man. He deals as freely with the English language as he does with the Gospel narrative or the teaching of Jesus.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

THE EARLY CHRISTIAN CONCEPTION OF CHRIST. Its Significance and Value in the History of Religion. Expanded from a Lecture delivered before the International Theological Congress at Amsterdam, September, 1903. By OTTO PFLEIDERER, Professor of Theology in the University of Berlin. London: Williams & Norgate; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1905. Crown 8vo; pp. 170.

The value of this little book lies in the revelation which it brings us of what Pfeiderer thinks of Christ, not of what the early Christians thought of Him. It presents itself, in its title, to be sure, as an exposition of the early Christian conception of Christ. In its discussions it is rather, however, an attempt to show how the early Christians came to think as they did of Christ and how they were led to set forth their conception of Him in the forms they employed. The underlying purpose is to assure the reader that he ought to have nothing but a historical interest in the "early christian conception of Christ," seeing that it is only one of the many conceptions of Christ which have been held during the progress of the ages, with just as little claim as the last to represent truly what Christ really was. No doubt a bold and laborious attempt has been made in these latter days "to distin-

guish between the Christ of Faith and the man Jesus of History." But the effort has been in vain. Strive as we may, we can get back, not to the real Jesus, but only to the Jesus that was believed in by our first informants—the writers of the New Testament, upon whose palette had already been mingled colors derived from Jewish prophecy, Rabbinic teaching, Oriental gnosis and Christian philosophy. "All that can be determined with certainty from these writings is only that conception of Christ which was the object of the faith of the early Christian communities and their teachers." The real Jesus is hopelessly lost to us; and the separation of His actual figure from the imaginative incrustations which envelop it "is a problem which can never be solved with absolute certainty." This is Pfleiderer's contention.

We observe, however, that nevertheless: (1) Pfleiderer seems to be absolutely certain that the actual Jesus did not correspond with the portrait of Him which is drawn by the New Testament writers; and the origin of this portrait and the process of its formation out of the "religious ideas of various origins" current at the time, he apparently knows a good deal about. (2) He appears to have formed a quite clear and definite and quite strongly entrenched view of what manner of being the undiscernible actual Jesus really was. (3) He expresses himself as considering it, nevertheless, a matter of no very great importance what was the manner of being of the actual Jesus. Christianity, being grounded on something more intimate to man than any objective figure, is, in his view, independent of our conception of that figure, and persists through the most varied conceptions of it. "It makes no difference," he remarks, "whether historical tradition concerning Jesus of Nazareth has contributed more or less to this belief, or whether this contribution has been direct or indirect, or even—which is, of course, most improbable—if it has contributed nothing at all; the content of that belief, and consequently the essential character of Christianity, abide the same."

The body of the book is given to a study of the "early Christian conception of Christ"; or rather of the sources of "the early Christian conception of Christ." This study is prosecuted under the heads of "Christ as Son of God," "Christ as Conqueror of Satan," "Christ as a Wonder-Worker," "Christ as the Conqueror of Death and the Life-Giver," "Christ as the King of Kings and Lord of Lords." These, it seems, are the chief elements in the early Christian conception of Christ. An effort is made to suggest natural sources from which each of these elements may have been derived by the early Christians; and natural processes of mental action by which each of them may have been applied by the early Christians to the figure of Jesus. It is a study, we perceive, in early Christian mythology. As such, it is written with Pfleiderer's wonted skill, but possesses no outstanding features to distinguish it from the ordinary performances of the kind with which the world is now flooded under the influence of the "Comparative-Religion School." Pfleiderer wrote this treatise before the vogue of the new Pan-Babylonian School, and his sketch of the religious origin of Christianity suffers in consequence from the diffusiveness which reigned before that school, with its "general Oriental tradition," gave unity and definiteness to the presumed natural basis of Christianity. He gathers illustrative material, therefore, from the most varied and widely separated sources, going by predilection as far afield as Buddhism for his specially emphasized sources. A much more plausible case might be made out for his thesis, therefore, than he makes out; though a more thorough application of the mythological principle than he makes could scarcely be made. In his view the ascription of a supernatural origin to Christ is but another application of the general judgment of men that "a man endowed with wisdom and power beyond the measure of ordinary men must also have derived the principle of bodily existence from a higher and diviner seed" (p. 34). The invention of "the God-man of dogma" he thinks but the resultant of two tendencies native to man, producing this product "like the diagonal or the parallelo-

gram of forces"—the tendency to identify "the limited human personality" of a historical Saviour with "the eternal spiritual principle" and the tendency to "draw a clear and sharp line of division between the two" (p. 140). All the articles of belief which compose the substance of "Catholic Christianity," he thinks, "were to be found in the religious cults of the expiring world of antiquity, here and there, in the manifold forms of Jewish Apocalypse, of Oriental mysticism and gnosis, of Greek speculation and Roman Cæsar-worship." What was wanting was only "the single subject for the synthesis of these predicates, the nucleus around which this chaotic seething mass of religious ideas could crystallize into a new world of faith and hope for the present life and that to come." And "that point of unity was given in the person of Jesus, the Galilean Saviour" (p. 151). Accordingly, by a "creative synthesis" of the elements provided in them, Christianity developed from the earlier religions "as their higher unity and purer truth" (p. 160).

This is what Pfeiderer thinks of the originating factors of Christianity. What he thinks of Christ is, no doubt, already apparent. When His figure is "stripped of all mythical accessories," Pfeiderer appears to have no doubt that it will stand before us "as the ideal of a lofty and noble religious hero worthy of the veneration of the mind and heart of the modern world" (p. 8). But just as much does it seem to him beyond question that its appearance will be in a "simple human grandeur." What is more than this in the figure that has been transmitted to us is only a transformation of the Jesus of history by the objectivation ("after the manner of ancient animism") of an impression received into the bosom of primitive Christianity from the greatness of this simple man (p. 160). We may still talk of "the incarnation of the divine Logos" if we will; but the only incarnation of the divine Logos which a modern man can believe in is "love," and this has been "consummated not once only, but ever comes to pass when love unites the hearts of men and consecrates society so that it becomes the kingdom of God" (p. 165). Jesus was, indeed, "the first to be strongly inspired by the new spirit of divine Sonship and love"; and this being so, He may be said to have "given the mightiest impulse to its awakening and its sovereignty in the hearts of men." On this ground we may look to Him as our Master, Guide and (if we choose so to speak of it) our Saviour. But we must not imagine that "the real principle of Redemption" finds in Him a unique embodiment. He was a man of His times and of His own people, sharing the limitations that belonged to men of His times—or of any times; His mental horizon was bounded by His inheritance and His opportunities. And His moral development was conditioned by the circumstances that surrounded Him. "Under the influence of the apocalyptic tendencies of His day, His spirit took on an ascetic tendency which it would be unfortunate to imitate. It was not in Him alone that God is incarnate, but in the hearts of all good men; the incarnation is, in a word, continuous and we are to behold the living Christ-Spirit, this ever-indwelling divine principle of mankind, everywhere where the souls of men open themselves to the knowledge of every truth, where hearts glow with enthusiasm for all that is good, where love fulfills its daily sacrifice for the good of the community" (p. 170), . . . and the like. For, after all, it is love which conquers the demon of selfishness, and which therefore may be "rightly conceived as a supernatural power revealing itself as a divine all-attractive force in the souls of men, like the force of gravitation in the material world" (p. 104). "And since love in its highest manifestation in self-sacrifice for the common good is sure that it never loses, but only then truly finds itself (Mark vii. 35), so in very deed that divinely human act of loving self-sacrifice in service of the brethren is the way to eternal life, and that drama of Redemption with its *Leitmotiv*, 'Through death to life; die and you shall live,' brings to typical expression an eternal truth in the moral government of the world" (p. 165). Such an ideal is naturally "above the limitations of time and coincides

with no one of its historical manifestations" (p. 164); and consequently, as we have seen, "it makes no difference whether historical tradition concerning Jesus of Nazareth has contributed more or less"—or even nothing at all—to the conception of Him we have found: the content of our Christianity abides the same in any case, and is independent of any view we may take of Christ.

Thus, we perceive, Pfeiderer, as he reduces Christianity to mere altruism, has no need of any Jesus at all in this impersonal Christianity. He can get along with any conception of Christ men choose to form for themselves. It is indifferent to him what we think of Christ, in a word, simply because the Christianity he offers us is a Christless Christianity. Whatever conception of Christ at any time seems to play in best with the altruistic temper and helps men most in each age to attain and retain that temper, is a good enough conception of Christ for that age. The idea of Christ in any case is merely an aid to the altruistic temper, and may be readily dispensed with when altruism is attainable without it. There is nothing remarkable in this teaching: it is the common goal of the "liberal" tendencies of our time, and may be found in greater or less purity of expression in much of the religious teaching about us which still, strangely enough, elects to call itself Christian. There is not even anything of distinction in the manner in which Pfeiderer expresses or defends this teaching. It is worth observing afresh in his book only that we may note afresh the vigor and the variety of modes of presentation in which there is being now offered to the world in the sacred name of Christ a religion to which Christ is a matter of indifference, in the sacred name of religion a scheme of life to which all specifically religious motives are alien. Christless Christianity and atheistic religion—this is the gulf to which much of what arrogates to itself the name of the deeper religious thinking of recent times is converging; and very many of our most honored Christian teachers who have not yet opened their eyes to the direction in which their thinking is running are contributing to the current flowing to this dreary debouchment. The choice lies, and will ultimately be seen by all to lie, between the complete Christianity which is commended to us by the Scriptural revelation in its entirety, and no Christianity at all. No middle ground is possible as a permanent resting-place for the inquiring spirit. The sooner this is universally perceived, the better it will be for all parties: and the value of a book like this of Pfeiderer's is that it will help to this perception. Pfeiderer adopts the alternative of no Christianity at all; but just altruism in its stead. The question which each of his readers will be forced to face is whether he is prepared to go with Pfeiderer to this extreme. If not, he will find the only logical alternative is the other extreme—the complete Christianity which is taught by the New Testament records.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

THE ESCHATOLOGY OF JESUS; OR, THE KINGDOM COME AND COMING. A Brief Study of Our Lord's Apocalyptic Language in the Synoptic Gospels. Delivered under the Constitution of the A. B. Bruce Lectureship in the United Free Church College, Glasgow, by Rev. LEWIS A. MUIRHEAD, B.D., Minister of St. Luke's Church. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 1904. 8vo; pp. xxvii, 224.

The four lectures contained in this book largely deal with the issue raised in recent times by the hyper-eschatological interpretation of our Lord's kingdom-preaching, of His Messianic consciousness, in fact of His whole mind and message. This interpretation tends to shift the centre of gravity in our Lord's gospel from the ethical to the eschatological, in the sense that the latter might almost seem to have possessed for Jesus' mind a supreme interest for its own sake apart from its religious and ethical implications. So far as the writer disputes the correctness of this position, we find ourselves in hearty agreement with the central thesis of his book, and believe it will render most timely service. He very skillfully

points out the main fallacy of this modern view. It lies in the tacit assumption that ethical and eschatological form a logical antithesis. But in reality there is nothing to prove that in what Jesus taught concerning the eschatological coming of the kingdom and the acts or events associated with it, He was inspired by any other than the purest and deepest religious and ethical motives. The kingdom of the end is still the kingdom in which communion with God and righteousness are central and supreme. Undoubtedly the eschatological crisis contains much that cannot be resolved into purely religious and ethical processes, it contains physical and cosmical elements, and in so far it may be said to go beyond the sphere of the present kingdom which our Lord declares to have been realized in the spiritual sphere even at the time of his earthly ministry. But what there is more in the conception of the eschatological kingdom, materially considered, does not for this reason become extra-ethical or extra-religious, formally considered. It is further plain, and this we wish the author might have emphasized more than he does, that by reason of its ethical and religious significance the eschatological aspect of the kingdom possesses for Jesus supreme, absolute interest and is not a mere fringe, as it were, of His consciousness, nor a mere accidental form for expressing the truth that the religious and ethical forces must revolutionize the world. Jesus believed that nothing short of a cosmical regeneration could bring about the normal religious and ethical state in which the centre of the kingdom consists. If the Weiss-Bousset-Wernle hyper-eschatological view endangers the supremacy of the ethical factor in Jesus' teaching, it must not be forgotten that the opposite extreme, that of undue depreciation of the eschatological element, may easily lead to a similar result. We do not believe that Jesus could have dropped his eschatological expectations without thereby essentially modifying the centre of his ethical and religious consciousness. The absolutism of the latter stands or falls with His eschatology. This the author has not sufficiently taken into account. Another criticism we feel bound to offer concerns the author's inclination to resolve the eschatological utterances of our Lord as much as possible into mere figurative language. It is true his position where he formally puts the question, what Jesus meant by his apocalyptic language leaves the point at issue undecided: "It is obvious that some of the secondary ideas of apocalyptic are represented in the language of our Lord, and it is tempting to ask how far these secondary ideas, viewed apart from the situations that called for their use and gave them their power of appeal to receptive hearers, represented to our Lord an independent system of reality. Did He really believe in a personal Power of evil that had sway in this world, and wrought ill in the bodies and souls of men apart from their own will? Did He conceive heaven as a place above the earth . . . ? Had He distinct ideas of an intermediate state of bliss and woe for disembodied spirits, and did He conceive the final state as accompanied by a bodily resurrection of all dead and a summons of all, yet alive in the flesh, to judgment executed by the Messianic Son of man coming with the clouds? Did He know of a fiery abyss, to which, in the end, Satan and his angels, and all whose names were not written in the Book of Life, should be consigned?" The answer given to these questions is the agnostic one: "We have no means of knowing what Jesus thought about this or that element of what He always presented, and probably in His own mind always conceived, as a whole—the kingdom of God" (pp. 63, 64). It seems to us that, on this point, the author has yielded too much to the influence of Haupt, to whom all the eschatological statements of Jesus become mere imagery. In point of fact, he occasionally reveals an inclination to pass over from the agnostic position above defined to this latter view, *e.g.*, on page 139, where, speaking of our Lord's prophecy of the fall of the Jewish nation and of the end of the world, he remarks: "Only here (*i.e.*, with reference to the cosmical catastrophe), it seems to me, we have the right to say that to His own consciousness the words had no relation to literal fact, or,

at any rate, no such relation to it as the imagery in which He depicted the destruction of Jerusalem." To us it seems extremely hazardous to posit even the possibility that Jesus may have consciously used as mere figurative language what by all others was understood literally and realistically. Of course, no one denies that there are figurative elements in His eschatological sayings as well as in other parts of His teaching. But we see no reason why they should not be recognized here by the same criteria that are usually applied to distinguish figurative from literal language. To put on a line, as possibly equally figurative, the words about entering through the straight gate and the prediction of His own coming with the clouds of heaven, as is done on p. 52, seems to us altogether unwarranted.

We have the highest respect for the motive which probably underlies this shrinking on the author's part from a positive committal to the literalness of our Lord's eschatological speech. This motive appears to be, in part at least, the desire to vindicate the infallibility of our Lord's teaching, which a too strenuous insistence upon the realistic interpretation might seem to put in danger with the modern mind. The author reveals a commendable and most refreshing reverence here, and even outside of the eschatological sphere, in regard to such matters as history and criticism, openly confesses that he is not ready to affirm in the easy-going manner of the day that Jesus must have thought, on such questions lying within the scientific sphere, as his contemporaries did, and where they were wrong have erred with them. But, while respecting the motive, we are afraid that the hesitation to accept our Lord's eschatological teaching at its full literal value is not as innocent a matter as it might superficially appear. After all, is not the shrinking on this point a symptom of the general modern recoil from the supernatural as such? The eschatological element in our Lord's teaching is but another name for the supernatural, and to spiritualize the former may easily become equivalent to the elimination of the latter. We do not mean to say that the author contemplates this in any sense, but that the position he occupies may be abused for such a purpose admits, in our opinion, of no doubt. Besides this, while upholding the infallibility of the Lord, the writer is able to do so at the expense only of that of the Evangelists. It is true, here also, he proceeds with considerable moderation. "There are probably no ancient reports in the world so manifestly objective and veracious as the Synoptic Gospels." "Perhaps they (the Evangelists) never really misreported a sentence taken by itself." But "it is, to me, as certain as any fact in history, that the Evangelists sometimes and inevitably misunderstood Jesus." And "I would stake the entire worth of this investigation upon the assertion that they did not understand fully, and therefore partially misunderstood the mind of Jesus, in reference to the kingdom of God. They misunderstood in particular His way of thinking and speaking about its consummation" (pp. 35, 36). Here again the influence of Haupt's treatise is very perceptible. How the principle works out may be best observed in the author's discussion of the great eschatological discourse, which seems to join together the fall of the Jewish state and the end of the world. Instead of explaining this from Jesus' participation in the well-known peculiar prophetic perspective, which overleaps intervals and marks only the outstanding crises, he attributes it to the misunderstanding of the Evangelists, who felt at the time of writing that the world was coming to an end. Still, even here we are told that there was a certain basis for the juxtaposition of the two events in the mind of Jesus Himself. During the last days of His life His conflict with the Jewish authorities developed to a point of intensity which made Him feel that on the issue depended the course of the history of the world. And this He naturally and inevitably expressed in eschatological language. Only, as stated above, the eschatological language remained to Him conscious imagery, whereas to the later writers it assumed the character of literal prediction.

The center of gravity of the book lies in the third and fourth chapters. The

former deals with the consummation of the kingdom and contains much that is valuable in correction or refutation of the extreme eschatologism of Johannes Weiss and others. The fourth chapter gives an admirably lucid and succinct survey of the Son-of-man problem, in its most recent linguistic phase, and argues with great cogency in favor of the historic character of this self-designation in the mouth of Jesus. As to the sense, the author assumes that Jesus on purpose chose it, because, while to Himself it had Messianic associations from the beginning, it needed not suggest such to His hearers. The peculiarity of the usage, that our Lord always speaks of the Son of man in the third person, is explained, in partial dependence on Johannes Weiss, from the fact that the Messiahship was to Jesus objective, the gift of revelation, something that He hardly dared to identify with His own subjective personality. In Weiss this hypothesis has the form that Jesus conceived of the Messiahship as something future, in other words, that the distinction between Himself and the Son of man was a distinction in the category of time.

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

THE PHILIPPIAN GOSPEL OR PAULINE IDEALS. A Series of Practical Meditations based upon Paul's Letter to the Church of Philippi. By W. G. JORDAN, B.A., D.D., Author of *Prophetic Ideas and Ideals*, Professor of the Old Testament Exegesis in Queen's University, Kingston, Canada. New York, Chicago, Toronto: Fleming H. Revell-Company; London and Edinburgh.

The Fleming Company is indefatigable in its efforts to spread Christian literature, and the presswork of nearly all its publications is excellent. This book is no exception to the rule. The men associated with one another in this important business deserve the thanks of the Churches.

The title of this book reminds one of olden times. It is so full, and is in itself a study. The author intends to describe the "Philippian Gospel," in which he finds "Pauline Ideals." I confess that I do not like this part of the title. It may be very modern and pleasing to the general public, but is there a *Philippian Gospel* which consists of *Pauline Ideals*? There is only *one Gospel*, the Gospel of Jesus Christ, which does not consist of ideas and ideals of man, but of revelations of God's power, wisdom and love in the Saviour. And what is Paul? A servant of Jesus Christ, the Saviour's messenger and interpreter, infallibly guided by the Holy Spirit. He does not deal in ideals, but in realities. His several epistles are special messages and interpretations of the same Gospel, and even in his descriptions of its transcendent glories he is conscious of speaking not of human ideals but of divine realities.

The subtitle of the book is better to the point. The author gives us "a series of practical meditations." The title of his book may sound a little pompous, but the author himself is very modest. In his Preface he says: "The series of simple expository sketches contained in this small volume are sent forth in the hope that thoughtful readers will find in them something of real suggestion and helpful stimulus." He writes for thoughtful readers in general and does not confine himself to scholars. "They cannot take the place of critical commentaries or elaborate theological essays, but as a modest attempt to represent in modern words some of Paul's great thoughts they may perhaps have a province of their own." Certainly they have. My soul longs for "practical meditations" which lead me into the presence of the King. And if I read the signs of the times, correctly there are multitudes of hungry and thirsty souls who long for spiritual nourishment. Whether the words used are archaic or modern is of minor importance, if only the old but never antiquated Gospel is set before us as the heavenly manna. But if God reveals Himself in His Word, let us then no longer speak of Pauline ideas or prophetic ideals, but of God's revelation coming down to us from on high.

I wish the author would have consistently carried out his plan to give simple expository sketches, but it is a fact that he *bases* his meditations upon Paul's letter to the Church of Philippi. His modern position is often noticed; his subjectivity predominates too much.

He belongs to the Ethical school. His exposition of Christ's humiliation and exaltation is rather disappointing. He emphasizes the ethical application of the great mystery of the person of Christ. Of course Paul speaks of this grand subject with a practical end in view, but this end will be the better attained the deeper our dogmatical insight in this mystery is. In the interest of Christian Ethics I plead for a rehabilitation of Dogmatics to its proper sphere.

The Ethical sections of the book are excellently treated, but the same cannot be said of those portions where Dogmatics prevails. It is painfully evident that the writer is, to a certain extent, in the coils of the modern trend of religious thought. Where the author, *e.g.*, speaks of the risen Lord and the risen Life, the risen Lord is put in the background, whilst the accent is put upon the risen Life. "The Resurrection of Jesus is a matter of immense importance for the faith of the first disciples, and it becomes at once a central theme of their preaching. To Paul it was a fact of history, and a force of the spiritual life; it is in the latter sense that it is set forth here. . . . Even when he deals with the doctrine of the resurrection, in his most argumentative manner, his great aim is not so much to prove that Jesus rose as that His disciples will rise from the dead." And later on, "The life and death of Jesus is not finished in the sense that it is a mere external substitution. We may make fine distinctions in our schemes of thought, but Christian experience means living over again the life of Christ." I might add many quotations, but *sapienti sat*. The writer exalts Christian experience above the great facts of salvation, which we endeavor to interpret in our theological system. And is it not true that our Christian experiences are castles in the air, if they are not based upon the rock of God's redeeming work?

How thoroughly "Ethical" our author is becomes evident from what he calls "a noble creed." This noble creed he finds in Phil. ix. 8, 9: "Finally, brethren, whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honorable, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report, if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things. The things which ye have learned and received and heard and saw in me, these things do: and the God of peace shall be with you." These words are grand and we do well to heed them, but to call them a noble creed is entirely out of place. It is a specimen of what the Germans call *die Umwertung der Begriffe*.

I am sorry that I have to emphasize my dissent from the author in his Ethical position. Ethics severed from Dogmatics is a menace to the true progress of Christianity and Theology. To place Christian experience upon the pinnacle of the temple leads to skepticism. If Critical theologians were to succeed in robbing us of our faith in the Bible as the Word of God, and Ethical theologians were successful in making the Bible a record of past experiences, what would remain?

I say again, I am sorry that I have to emphasize my dissent from the author in his Ethical position, for I am willing to state, that he has written a book full of important matter well expressed. Its Ethical expositions, where he is not influenced by his modern position, are very good, and the choice of his headlines is very happy indeed.

Holland, Mich.

N. M. STEFFENS.

III.—HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.

THE RELIGIOUS CONTROVERSIES OF SCOTLAND. By the Rev. HENRY F. HENDERSON, M.A., Author of *Erskine of Linlathen*. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1905. New York: Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons. 8vo; pp. ii, 274. Price, \$1.75 net.

Mr. Henderson's entertaining volume on *The Religious Controversies of Scotland* seems to be issued as one number of a series which is to treat in general of "Religion in Literature and Life." The expectation raised by this fact that its subject will be dealt with from the literary rather than the theological point of sight and with some of the adornments that belong to a literary treatment is not disappointed. The book is good reading. There is a deftness of touch in its style which is altogether charming; and a lightness of tone in its entire manner which prevents it from ever becoming dull, but which approaches sometimes, though perhaps it never overpasses, the limits of good taste in dealing with matters so serious. There is not absent even that sympathy with the heretic by which all literary treatment of religious controversy is apt to be colored, and which perhaps at bottom is only a genial recognition of the touch of nature that makes the whole world kin. To Mr. Henderson, too, the catalogue of Scotland's heretics appears to seem something very like the bede-roll of Scotland's religious heroes, who have turned single-handedly against an oppressive system and by their noble struggles won for Scotland the larger outlook and the wider sympathies which she now enjoys.

It is a singular illusion by which, in the popular imagination, high independence of thought and illustrious mental achievement are credited to those who are unable to stem the drift of popular feeling, or to retain their hold on the great fundamental truths of the Christian religion, which have also been the formative principles at once of the religious and even the national life of a country like Scotland. For this is, after all, the real state of the case, as ordinarily, so also in the particular instances brought before us in the present volume. These heroic heretics, who in Mr. Henderson's opinion have by their efforts and sufferings conquered for Scotland relief from the incubus of the high and dry Calvinism that used to sit between her shoulders, prove, after all, to be but the exponents of the popular thought of the day, impinging against the barriers erected against the disintegration of the religious principles that have created Scotland. To this Mr. Henderson himself bears witness as he explains, from time to time, that the new movements against which the Church was called upon to protest were but the embodiments of the currents of sentiment at the moment flowing up and down the world. Thus, for example, in describing the origin of Morisonianism he writes as follows: "Of the movement now to engage our attention, nothing is truer than that it was the genuine offspring of its age. During the thirties of last century the Legislatures of our country were made to recognize the rights of man as they had never done before. . . . Brotherhood, equality and fair play were clamoring loudly at every closed door, and refusing to be turned away. A corresponding clamor, quite independent of politics, was being made in the name of Christian theology. . . . Freedom for all, food for all, education for all, and salvation for all, were now coming to be the national watchword." Similarly elsewhere. What heroism is required to turn, with the whole world at your back, to scout the fundamental principles of the religion of revelation, upheld in the face of these mighty odds by a faithful few? Mr. Henderson, alike with others who write in this vein, has neglected to tell us; as they have neglected to point out to us the warrant for finding the seat of authority in religion in the current thought of the world. What if the whole world is clamoring for "salvation for all"—"fair play," as they call it, in the matter of salvation, for men indiscriminately? Is the de-

mand of the crowd for "equal" distribution of the goods of the other life as of this, after all, a sufficient warrant for a revision of religious teaching? Are we to base our doctrine on a "Thus saith the mob," or on a "Thus saith the Lord"?

Enough has already been said to indicate that Mr. Henderson has written his survey of the religious controversies of Scotland from a point of view which is not in full sympathy with the religious system which has constituted for so many years the backbone of Scottish character. He makes no secret of this, but at numerous points takes pains to express his distaste for what he thinks the morbidity of the Calvinism inherited from the seventeenth century. In this he goes indeed even beyond the "heroes" he has commended to our admiration as the instruments by which relief has been brought. McLeod Campbell could see that the reaction against Calvinism was already "tending to an opposite error" (p. 159); while Mr. Henderson is scarcely awake to this error when it is already attained. David Hume could write (p. 52): "The doctrine of absolute decrees has ever been intimately connected with the enthusiastic spirit; as it affords the highest subject of joy, triumph and security to the supposed elect, and exalts them by infinite degrees above the rest of mankind." But Mr. Henderson prefers to say: "Seventeenth century Calvinism had laid an arrest on Christian joy. It had been fatalistic, and had robbed life of love, liberty, and gladness." One regrets that Mr. Henderson's historical researches have not carried him far enough back to lead him to look into, say, Rutherford's *Letters*. The actual point of sight of Mr. Henderson is more positively revealed, however, not merely by his enthusiastic approval of "the three universals" of Morisonianism,—of God's love, of Christ's sacrifice, of the Spirit's application of grace,—the mild judgment which he passes on the crass rationalism of *Scotch Sermons*, the strenuous defense which he puts in of all the destructive "results" of the modern "critical" assault on the Bible; but also and even more sharply in hints scattered here and there through the volume of a quite remarkable manner of looking at religious problems. Take, for an example, an anecdote of the late Dr. Bruce's college days, told on p. 251. A body of students were discussing "the fate of the heathen, and whether noble heathen like Socrates could be denied salvation. "'Omnipotence can do anything,' said one. 'Omnipotence can surely do nothing unjust,' interposed another. 'Omnipotence could not,' said a third, 'condemn a man of lofty character.' 'He might do so,' said the first speaker, 'if He did not approve of his goodness.' Bruce, coming forward with clenched fist, closed the debate by an oracular deliverance most characteristic of the man. 'I say, Daniel, God *couldn't* damn Socrates!'" It is an idle story of Dr. Bruce's callow youth. It may very well not be thoroughly authentic. If authentic it means no more than that when Dr. Bruce was at college he still had a good deal to learn—which, probably, was the reason he attended the college classes in those days. But what are we to say of Mr. Henderson's repeating it with an air of admiring approval of the sentiment expressed—that sentiment being the baldest Pelagianism, with the implication that man, by his own goodness, earns acceptance at God's hands and wrings the gift of bliss from Him as of debt not of grace?

Well, it would of course be far too much to say that such a passage shows that Mr. Henderson stands upon a definitely reasoned-out Pelagian platform. There surprise the reader, whose attention has been attracted to such passages, scattered through the volume, side by side with these, other passages of widely different import, in which Mr. Henderson shows a clear insight into points of doctrinal importance and a considerable skill in doctrinal statement. We may instance his remarks on the gravity of the issues at stake in Prof. Simson's second trial, and some remarks in the discussion of Edward Irving's and even of McLeod Campbell's teachings. But it is scarcely possible not to say that such passages as we have referred are a reflection of the general tone of thought, characteristic of the modern literary, or popular, if you choose, attitude toward the Christian sys-

tem, playing upon Mr. Henderson's mind as he surveys the religious controversies of Scotland. This tone of thought is distinctly anti-supernaturalistic, anti-Biblical and anti-evangelical: and as it reflects itself upon the polished surface of Mr. Henderson's mind it betrays him occasionally into expressions which seem now to challenge the power of God to work miracles ("If the Holy Ghost can still give me the gift of tongues," p. 127), now to underestimate the trustworthiness of the Bible record, now to suggest that man is, after all, his own saviour. These cross-lights befecking the surface of his mind mar greatly—we cannot deny it—Mr. Henderson's discussion of the religious controversies of Scotland. That they do not destroy its value altogether is due partly, doubtless, to the general objectivity of the discussion, in conjunction with the literary skill and clearness with which it is carried through; and most, doubtless, to the simple fact that they are cross-lights befecking the surface of his mind. It was necessary to point them out, because they impart a tone to the volume which the reader will not fail to feel and for which he must allow. Having pointed them out, however, it is equally necessary to say with emphasis that despite them the volume is not only an interesting but an instructive one and supplies a very informing discussion of its subject.

The scope of the volume is the last two centuries. The breadth of the title, which says nothing about limitations of time, is defended on the ground that there were no "religious controversies" in Post-Reformation Scotland prior to the last two centuries: that the controversies of the preceding two centuries had been "ecclesiastical" rather than "theological" or "religious." We may pass over the manifest artificiality of this discrimination without remark: the crown rights of the Lord Jesus seem to involve something of both religion and theology. The religious controversies which are described in the volume are twelve in number, and range in their substance all the way from the authority of Scripture or the constitution of our Lord's Person, or the very nature of salvation, to the lawfulness of stage-plays. In their actual sequence they concern (in the nomenclature of the author): "Professor Simson's Affair"; "The Marrow Men"; "Hume's *Essay on Miracles*"; "The Playhouse Battle"; "An Ayrshire 'New Light'" (W. McGill); "The Apocrypha Controversy"; "Edward Irving"; "The Row Heresy"; "The Rise of Morisonianism"; "The Scotch Sermons"; "Robertson Smith and the Higher Critics" (especially George Adam Smith); and "The Dods-Bruce Case." These all are treated with a grace and geniality which bring the personalities of the exciting causes of the several disputes somewhat vividly before the reader, and at least outline to him the course of the controversy. The list is not exhaustive,—even an outsider like the present reviewer may think of additional "cases" which might have supplied matter of interest on which to comment: nor is any of the "cases" exhaustively treated. But certainly there is provided an adequate survey for the general reader of the most celebrated causes which have engaged the attention of the Church courts of Scotland through the past two centuries. As he reads through the pleasantly written narrative, the interested reader is apt to make two reflections, the one reassuring, and the other scarcely so. The former is, How little Scotland has been really vexed by serious religious error during the past two centuries, and how faithfully the Church for the major portion of the time has dealt with serious error when it appeared in its midst. The latter is, What a change has come over Scotland in both respects during the last quarter of a century. Can anybody believe that the Scotland of half a century ago would have received with the measure of indifference with which modern Scotland has endured them the teachings of *Scotch Sermons* or those of the fomenters of the new Biblical criticism? Mr. Henderson is quite right when he contends that the theological and religious temper of modern Scotland is vastly different not merely from that of the Scotland of the generation which compacted the Reformed religion into its most systematic form, but also from that of the

Scotland which still drew through so many generations its vitality from the work of that great creative period. Whether he is right in his view that the change is a blessing and a harbinger of still greater blessings to come may admit of debate. There are some who will not be able to read his last three chapters without many misgivings. The trouble with modern Scotland seems to be that under the assault of recent scientific and critical unbelief she seems in danger of losing her clear sense of the Supernatural, which is only another way of saying she is in danger of losing the vision of God. And when that is lost, everything is lost.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH—NEW SCHOOL—1837-1869. An Historical Review.

By EDWARD D. MORRIS, D.D., LL.D. Columbus, Ohio. 1905.

Dr. Morris has written an interesting and valuable book from the point of view of one who, as one of its distinguished ministers, knows well the life of the New School branch of the Presbyterian Church. His affection for the Church, in which the whole of his life as a pastor, before he became professor in Lane Theological Seminary, was spent, has not abated, and he defends its distinctive traits and policy with the warmth of a son defending a parent; not formally, of course, for the book is a historical review; and without bitterness, for Dr. Morris is even more strongly attached to the reunited Church than to his memories of his Church before the union.

One who was born and reared in the Old School Church would probably challenge his emphasis here and there and, indeed, some of his statements, as, for example, the statement that the abrogation of the Plan of Union and the enactment of the Excising Act were legislation "for which no provision existed in the Constitution of the Church." The present writer's father and uncle—both honored ministers of the New School branch of the Church—took the same view. But the court of last resort took the opposite view, and relegated the contention of these gentlemen to the realm of private opinion, by deciding the critical case in favor of the Old School Trustees of the General Assembly.

Dr. Morris has told the story of the separate career of the New School Church, 1838-1869, admirably. The limitation in space he put on himself has forbidden details and compelled him to generalize; but he has succeeded in giving to his readers a distinct and attractive picture of a noble communion of Christians. The account of the reunion is written sympathetically, and the closing chapters of the book express the writer's fervid love for the reunited Church, for which he has labored so long and faithfully and by which he has been so justly honored.

Princeton.

JOHN DE WITT.

BIBLIOTHECA REFORMATORIA NEERLANDICA. Geschriften uit den tyd der Hervorming in de Nederlanden. Op nieuw uitgegeven en van inleidingen en aantekeningen voorzien door Dr. S. CRAMER en Dr. F. PYPER. Tweede Deel: HET OFFER DES HEEREN. (De oudste verzameling Martelaarsbrieven en Offerliederen.) Bewerkt door Dr. S. CRAMER. s'Gravenhage: Martinus Nyhoff, 1904.

Before me lies the second volume of the *Bibliotheca Reformatoria Neerlandica*. The same monumental and painstaking care, which characterized the first part of the work, is evidenced in this volume also. It is edited by Dr. Cramer, professor in the City University of Amsterdam and in the Baptist-Seminary of the same place.

No wonder that the work has been deemed worthy of a place on the shelves of the libraries of the great universities of Europe and of some of the leading institutions of America, as is evidenced by the list of preliminary subscribers.

It is a large octavo volume of 683 pages, beautifully printed, as we expect from

that prince of publishers, Nyhoff of the Hague, and from title-page to index it is as nearly perfect as the printer's art can make anything.

A halo of martyrdom surrounds this book, for is it not the unprinted martyr, ology of the Dutch Anabaptists? Unprinted, I said; no, not quite, but printed so long ago and for a circle so small, that the very existence of this choice collection was well-nigh forgotten.

Its title—"Het Offer des Heeren"—"The Sacrifice of the Lord," indicates the contents. Here lie before us a collection of martyrological writings, hoary with age and full of thrilling interest.

The Anabaptists of Holland originally had been animated with the wild and fanatic spirit of their continental brethren; in fact, excesses committed by them synchronize with some of these earlier documents. But the mass of them had been reorganized by that chaste spirit, Menno Simons, and they had become steeped in a piety so deep and unaffected, so simple and childlike, that even their bitterest enemies have again and again borne witness to the purity and grandeur of their Christian life. The period of their activity and influence on the Dutch Reformation precedes the entrance of Calvinism into Holland, which, in its earliest stages, saw the Anabaptist movement crushed by bitterest persecution. Their one great desire seems to have been *implicit and literal obedience to the Scriptures*—and thus the reprint of these old documents seems like a veritable mirror, which reflects their sturdy faith, their absolute loyalty, their Quaker-like principles of non-resistance, their love toward God and the brethren, and the depth of their Christian emotions. To me, at least, the perusal of these pages has been a quiet inspiration, a review of that grand army of the martyrs, who by their death gave testimony that they pleased God. So rare has this volume become that Prof. D. Gerdes, of Groningen, in his *Catalogus librorum rariorum*, called it "Martyrologium rarissimum." In the second half of the nineteenth century, however, several copies were discovered, so that the author of the present work could avail himself of eleven editions, which run from 1562 to 1599. The fourth edition, that of 1570, is the one selected as the best text. It is compared with all the rest and noteworthy variations in the text are indicated by marginal references.

This collection, of course, does not contain the accounts of *all* the Anabaptist martyrdoms; what we here have are simply samples, collected by a loving, now unknown, hand for the support and comfort of those who endured like persecution. In all we have here sixty-five distinct writings, accompanied in each case by a simple metrical rendering of the subject.

To this collection is added another old document entitled *Een Liederboekken, tracterende van het Offer des Heeren*.

These poetic effusions were written by eye-witnesses of the martyrdom of the saints mentioned above. In some cases they are extremely realistic and their tone and contents prove that they were written by brethren of the same faith.

They appeal from the earthly judge to the heavenly, and again and again admonish the former to suspend his bitter persecution. Apparently these songs were used in the worship of the Anabaptists, or at least in their social gatherings, for they are all set to well-known popular tunes.

They do not give a hint of the momentous national occurrences which changed the world around them; for these Anabaptists believed, as was said above, in the principle of non-resistance—they refused to bear the sword, to swear an oath or to own a country, in the physical sense. They were of the earth, yet not earthy. Their faith had a large element of mysticism.

What especially attracted my attention, in the examination of this volume, was a matter, which corroborates the views of a prominent Baptist professor in this country, who was virtually driven from his post because he had dared to publish the result of an investigation, which had convinced him that the early English Baptists *did not baptize by immersion*.

It is well known that the English Baptists derived their views and practices from Holland, but the Dutch Anabaptists were not immersionists. This practice originated with the "Rhynsburgers" or "Collegiants," during the Arminian controversy, and was transplanted to England from Holland.

In the *Offer des Heeren* twelve cases are mentioned, where the inquisitorial investigation touches the subject of baptism. In not a single one is immersion so much as mentioned, either by the inquisitor or by the arraigned martyr. One and all they insist on a baptism *which follows faith*, but of *its mode* they have nothing to say. Had they believed in or practiced immersion, so flagrant a divergence from common ecclesiastical usage must, as a matter of course, have attracted the attention of the judge and its explanation must have been demanded in the trial.

As neither is the case, this omission seems to prove conclusively that the early Dutch Anabaptists were wholly unacquainted with the view of Baptism, which their English successors magnified into an article of faith. Theirs is sufficiently expressed by the name they bear in Dutch history—"Wederdoopers," "Rebaptizers."

All in all this second volume of the *Bibliotheca Reformatoria Neerlandica* is a priceless treasure, in no way inferior in interest and value to its important predecessor. We look forward with great interest to the next volume of this monumental work.

Louisville.

HENRY E. DOSKER.

DR. B. J. ESSER ZENDING EN POLYGAMIE DE GEDRAGSLIJN DER CHRISTELIJKE ZENDING TEN OPZICHTE DER VEELWIJVERIJ HISTORISCH TOEGELICHT, BAARN HOLLANDIA—DRUKKERIJ. 1905.

This instructive and well written treatise is an Academical dissertation, which earned for its author the title of Doctor of Theology. The subject is timely and its careful consideration of the utmost importance. "Missions and Polygamy" have been a veritable *crux* for Missionaries and Missionary Boards. Not so much this question in the abstract, for all Churches are agreed that polygamy has no place in the *ecclesia constituta*. Mohamedans and Mormons may look with favor on polygamous marriages, but they are outside the Church of Christ. Dr. Esser's object is not to defend the Christian monogamy against its assailants, but to give his readers a complete survey of the attitude of the Churches from the earliest times to the beginning of the 20th century towards polygamists who desire to be received into the Church of Christ. There is a perfect agreement between the title of his book and its contents. The character of his treatise is exclusively historical. He does not give a theory of his own, but confines himself strictly to a narration of former and present positions, taken by the different denominations and missionary societies. If the reader looks for more he looks in vain. He may regret that the author has limited himself to the historical aspect of the subject, but he will have to admit that the writer has carried out his purpose in a most excellent manner.

The "litteratuur opgave," i.e., the bibliography, requires about five pages, and the careful reader will have to acknowledge that the author has used all the sources mentioned in this list, with the utmost care. He has investigated books and pamphlets, encyclical letters and official reports; church fathers, scholastic theologians of the Middle Ages; the Reformers, Old-Protestant and modern writers about the subject have been investigated. Dr. Esser is a well read man. And what he could not find in print he successfully tried to get by means of private information. He truly deserves the thanks of all who are interested in the subject, for the exhaustive manner of his treatment. No writer, who desires to give a comprehensive view of the subject of "Missions and Polygamy" in all its aspects, can ignore Dr. Esser's historical treatment.

After a brief and crisp introduction he first speaks of the *Old Church*. The sources for this period are few, and they give only scanty information. The *Middle Ages and the Roman Catholic Church* contribute considerably more, but the method of dealing with the question is biased by the view of marriage as a sacrament. Unity of treatment is thereby assured, but it is a unity which does not solve but covers all difficulties. Diversity of opinion and hence of method begins with the *Old Protestant Theology*. Individualism begins to assert itself and the different types of the Reformation take different views also with regard to the treatment of polygamous marriages.

The Modern Protestant Missions, however, take the lion's share of the subject. The introduction and the first three chapters require 82 pages, while the last chapter alone consumes 89 pages. Missionary activity, the independent attitude of the several Churches and Missionary Societies are the causes of such a variety of attitude. General Conferences have done a great deal in later years in bringing different views in contact, the one influencing and modifying the other, but much remains still to be done to bring about a closer harmony. A careful study of Dr. Esser's treatise will be very helpful in forming an estimate of the difficulties which are in the way of harmonious action. It will also convince us of the necessity of building up a theory on the basis of the Holy Scriptures and in harmony with the principles of the Reformation. The question whether the method of nullification (of polygamous marriages), of legitimation or of a continued catechumenate of polygamists is the correct attitude cannot be solved historically. Dr. Esser does not attempt it; but it certainly ought to be tried in harmony with the Holy Scriptures, the principles of the Reformation and the historical development of the Churches.

Holland, Michigan.

N. M. STEFFENS, D.D.

A HISTORY OF PREACHING: FROM THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS TO THE GREAT REFORMERS, A.D. 70-1572. By EDWIN CHARLES DARGAN, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Homiletics in the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, Louisville, Kentucky. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son., 1905. Svo, pp. 577.

This portly volume is the beginning of an altogether worthy and really notable enterprise. Dr. Dargan, after eleven years of service as professor of homiletics, essays to give English readers their first thoroughly comprehensive *History of Preaching*. Some idea of the size of this undertaking may be formed from the fact that the present treatise, which brings the history down to the death of John Knox, in 1572, is to be followed by two more volumes dealing, respectively, with *The History of Modern European Preaching* and *The History of Preaching in the United States*.

The peculiar difficulties involved in a task of this kind are obvious enough: here a superabundance of material that does not readily yield to brief but accurate characterization, and there an utter lack of data by which to estimate the sermonic influence even of some of the most celebrated preachers; here a long array of fourth-rate pulpiteers who, though having little enough claim upon the minister of to-day, must yet for completeness' sake be discussed, and there a galaxy of the brightest stars whose surpassing beauties, however, we scarcely have leisure to analyze or even fully to behold. To be sure, Dr. Dargan's labor is not exactly that of a pioneer. He freely acknowledges his indebtedness to the many special monographs on the great preachers, the histories of homiletics, the excellent treatises on the pulpit of certain eras and countries, and the compendious manuals that try in some fashion to cover the whole period. But the very scope of his undertaking has rendered his problem more difficult, a fact that ought to make us think the more highly of the merits of this volume and at the same time to pass a more lenient judgment upon what we must regard as its undoubted defects.

We consider the general arrangement of the material most admirable. The chronological and topical divisions of the work are natural and eminently proper. The first of the four periods here treated embraces the patristic preaching and culminates in Chrysostom and Augustine. The second or early mediæval period, extending from 430 to 1095 (this last date is misprinted in the heading on p. 105), presents the "decline of preaching in the fifth to the eighth centuries" and "the voices in the night," Photius, Ansgar, Rabanus, Anselm, etc., who labored in the ninth, tenth, and eleventh centuries to restore the power of the pulpit. The third period, extending to the death of Tauler and the ordination of Wiclif, 1361, focuses attention upon the greatest of the schoolmen and the most important of the monastic leaders. The preacher of to-day will here find much to amuse as well as instruct him. The last period, covering the Renaissance and the Reformation, occupies, properly enough, fully one-half of the book. We are likewise favorably impressed with the comprehensive character of the work. No important name is omitted, and though it sometimes happens that our reading does not greatly enrich our information, we are often surprised to see how much can be said for the pulpit fame of some of our less familiar acquaintances. Furthermore, we cannot but acknowledge our pleasure in reading so many excellent summaries concerning the relation of the preacher's work to the religious, intellectual, moral, and social life of the periods under review. The signs of the times are accurately read and clearly reproduced. These admirable discussions, placed as a rule just before the accounts of the leading preachers, do much to relieve the otherwise monotonous character of some of the chapters and to add to the value of others. Such matters as the length, structure, and style of sermons, the character of the audiences, and the rhetorical devices sometimes employed to secure and sustain interest afford a frequent theme for humorous comment. It is another genuine merit in a work of this kind that the conclusions are to so large an extent based upon an independent study of the sources. Often enough, to be sure, the final verdict is found in quotation marks, the chief authorities cited being Schaff, Broadus, Nebe, Paniel, Rothe, Ker, Christlieb, and Van Oosterzee. But the reader is made to feel that the author has done all that can reasonably be expected in a work of such scope to verify his statements by independent research. Attention ought also to be called to the carefully arranged index and to the bibliographical helps. The latest and best monographs on some of the subjects are nowhere referred to, but on the whole ample aid is given for the detailed study of individual preachers. Lastly, the style is for the most part simple and straightforward, generally interesting in spite of some of the dull preachers here discussed, and occasionally quite eloquent.

But these excellencies are offset by a number of grave defects. There is a lack, more noticeable in some parts than in others, of critical insight, of judicial balance, of literary perspective. Much of what we have found so delightful and instructive is after all only loosely connected with the subject. This *History of Preaching* does not always avoid the danger which the Abbé Boucher predicted would assail every work of this kind, namely, the tendency to identify this theme with the larger subject of the progress of Christianity in the world. We think that much valuable space might have been saved and the usefulness of the book enhanced by devoting relatively less attention to the secondary matters and more to the great personalities. Especially in the first half of the work we find scores of pages, in the aggregate, given to Fathers whom it never occurs to us to regard as preachers, and about whose homiletic achievements Dr. Dargan can give us only a shrewd guess. Of course, to be thoroughly just, we must say that our author has apparently tried to apportion his space according to some scale of values. Thus Origen and Gregory Nazianzen receive four pages apiece, while Justin Martyr and Irenæus are properly disposed of in one. Again, Chrysostom and Augustine are duly labeled as the greatest

preachers of their age and given a correspondingly generous treatment. Bernard of Clairvaux and Francis of Assisi are likewise seen to be more important than their numerous but less known contemporaries. Indeed, considering the brevity of these last two accounts, we cannot but regard them as most felicitous characterizations. So, too, among the Reformers, there is careful discrimination between stars of the first and those of lesser magnitudes. But we must regret, and we think that most readers will regret, that the greatest preachers in all these epochs have not been far more extensively dealt with both as to their lives and, in particular, as to their influence in the pulpit and their homiletic remains. Not one of the ten most celebrated preachers of these sixteen centuries receives a sufficiently life-like portrait. It is decidedly disappointing in a work planned on so large a scale to find but three scant pages on the distinctive features of Chrysostom's preaching, while Luther, Zwingli, Calvin, and Knox—the last, indeed, with some show of reason in view of the fewness of his extant sermons—must be content with even briefer accounts of their work as preachers. The author's style, it must be confessed, ought to be richer in the suggestiveness and pictorial power necessary for vivid characterization. But this defect could be in part overcome by the application of a different method, by the elimination of some of those elements which, while interesting and instructive, are only remotely connected with the life and work of the great preachers, and which, let it be repeated, may be more advantageously studied in the larger works on Church History. The book does not, after all, fulfill our hopes for a masterful portrayal of the persons whose achievements afford the only reason for undertaking a work like this, the really great preachers of the Church. Much of the book, then, is not *history* at all, and from the very nature of the case cannot be: the sources can produce only a narrow and shallow stream of chronicles. And on the other hand, some parts of the book are not concerned with the history of *preaching*: they deal with facts that have no sufficiently obvious bearing upon the subject under discussion.

We hope, indeed, that Dr. Dargan will in due time redeem his promise for the completion of what to every student of Church History appears as a most noble enterprise. But we must also express the hope that the later volumes may, even at the risk of omitting much valuable information of a general nature, give greater space and a more intensely personal interest to the greatest names in the history of the Christian pulpit.

Princeton.

F. W. LOETSCHER.

THE CHURCH'S TASK UNDER THE EMPIRE. Four Lectures, with Preface, Notes, and an Excursion. By CHARLES BIGG, D.D.,[†] Canon of Christ Church and Regius Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the University of Oxford. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1905. 8vo; pp. xv, 136. Price, \$1.75 net.

"These four lectures, delivered in the Oxford Schools in the Michaelmas term of 1904, are an attempt," the author informs us, "to sketch in broad outlines the nature of the task which lay before the Church when she set out in obedience to the divine call to evangelize the Graeco-Roman world, and the degree in which she was enabled to fulfill the task within the compass of the first five centuries."

The theme is, of course, a thoroughly familiar one. But this has not prevented Dr. Bigg from making a valuable contribution to our knowledge of the early history of the Church along those specific lines which he here specially emphasizes. It may be admitted, therefore, that these four lectures—one on the Education, two on the Religion, and another on the Moral and Social Condition of the Empire in the period under consideration—reveal a certain one-sidedness of interest, and that this impression is only heightened by the narrow limits to which the discussion has been confined. But from another point of view this method of treatment is amply justified. Presupposing a general knowledge of

his subject, the author brings into clearer relief the important results that he has obtained from the latest works in epigraphy, archæology, and palæography. Prof. Bigg combines in a charming way exact scholarship with broad culture, a thorough appreciation of the distinctive features of Christianity as a historical force with a charitable but just estimate of the merits and defects of the decadent religions and ethical systems of the doomed Empire. The discussion at no point becomes exhaustive, but the notes and often the text itself are crowded with facts taken from new and hitherto inaccessible sources. The standard English, German, and French works on this subject—Seeck, Schiller, Friedländer, Dill, Clover, Duchesne, Coulanges, Cumont—here receive many interesting confirmations as well as a few critical readjustments. Many questions are left open and many more are raised in the hope of inciting others to help solve them. We venture to think, indeed, that this clear positing of some of the problems suggested by the latest epigraphical and archæological researches here referred to is one of the best services that English patristic scholarship has rendered in recent years. It would be easy, but, in view of the author's plea for indulgence on this very point, quite uncalled for, to allude to some of the more important omissions in the discussion. We shall only quote with approval his own statement that the "task" here undertaken "is far too large a subject for so small a volume." For the rest, we prefer with all frankness to acknowledge our indebtedness to the author for so much additional light on this familiar theme.

Princeton.

F. W. LOETSCHER.

THE CHURCH COVENANT IDEA: ITS ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT. By CHAMPLIN BURRAGE. Philadelphia: American Baptist Society. 1904. 16mo; pp. xi, 230. Price, \$1.00 net.

In spite of its limited compass this book may be considered a fairly exhaustive treatment of its somewhat neglected yet most worthy and interesting theme. There is a large array of historical evidence, adduced chiefly by way of generous citations from the documentary sources, the reader being invited to form his own conclusions upon the basis of this testimony. The development of the "Church Covenant Idea" is traced from the days of the Anabaptists and the Brownists to the present time.

Here and there the evidence will, doubtless, be capable of enrichment, but for the present we may regard Mr. Burrage's investigations in the chief libraries of America and Europe as furnishing us with the maximum of available knowledge upon this subject. The last of the twelve chapters shows the different ways in which the Covenants have been formed, adopted, and renewed in the various periods of modern history. We gladly give expression to our appreciation of the interest and value of this monograph on "The Church Covenant Idea."

Princeton.

F. W. LOETSCHER.

HISTORY OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCHES OF THE WORLD. Adapted for Use in the Classroom. By R. C. REED, D.D., Professor of Church History in the Presbyterian Theological Seminary at Columbia, South Carolina; Author of *The Gospel as Taught by Calvin*. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1905. 12mo; pp. 408.

The title accurately designates the contents of this volume. In simple, straightforward, and unpretentious style, with excellent judgment in the selection of the things to be emphasized and with an admirable sense of perspective, Dr. Reed traces the historical development of Presbyterian Churches throughout the world. The introductory chapter sketches the growth of ecclesiastical organizations from the Apostolic Church to the Reformation. Then the reappearance of Presbyterianism in Switzerland under Zwingli and Calvin is made the starting-point for the spread of this polity into Continental Europe and Great Britain, and thence into the United States and the present missionary stations

of our Church. The spirit of the book is judicious and moderate. The topical method employed throughout will add to the value of the compend as a textbook. The Index could with advantage have been considerably enlarged. The Appendix reprints the valuable "Statistical Returns from the Reformed and Presbyterian Churches of the World," published by "The Eighth Council of the Alliance of the Reformed and Presbyterian Churches which met in Liverpool, July, 1904." We recommend the volume as an excellent popular history of Presbyterianism.

Princeton.

F. W. LOETSCHER.

ENGLISH CHURCH HISTORY, FROM THE DEATH OF ARCHBISHOP PARKER TO THE DEATH OF KING CHARLES I. Four Lectures by the Rev. ALFRED PLUMMER, M.A., D.D., Formerly Fellow and Tutor of Trinity College, Oxford, and Master of University College, Durham. Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons. 12mo; pp. x, 179. Price, \$1.00 net.

It is well that Dr. Plummer consented after much hesitation to permit these lectures, after they had been repeatedly delivered in England, to reach that larger circle of readers of which such an author's works are worthy. The lectures present the politico-ecclesiastical history of England during the years 1575 to 1649 under the following captions: (I) Counter-Reformation and Ultra-Reformation; (II) The Wise Fool in Church and State; (III) Development of Despotism in Church and State, and (IV) Downfall of Episcopacy and Monarchy.

Dr. Plummer's claim that these discourses offer little that is original must be allowed. "In the main," he says, "these lectures are based upon, and in some particulars are directly derived from, modern works which are accessible to every one." It must be confessed, moreover, that the author has not always succeeded in his sincere and everywhere noticeable desire to be fair. In more than one place his Anglican sympathies lead him to do injustice to the Dissenters. Not that Elizabeth's shortcomings are overlooked, nor that James and Charles are raised above their proper level, but rather that the conceded limitations of a Calvin or a Cartwright or a Cromwell are viewed from a distorting angle of vision. But this partiality is for the most part bravely overcome, and it by no means blinds us to the many admirable qualities of this work. The lectures are able and instructive, affording opportunity for judicious revision of some widespread but inaccurate opinions concerning the leading personalities of this period. There is a tendency to express judgments *ex cathedra*, which makes one challenge some of the statements, but before the paragraph is finished the author has managed to justify his views, save when he deals with some of the less commendable features of the Puritan movement. But even here he is uniformly interesting and suggestive and we can readily understand the many importunities made for the publication of the lectures by those who heard them delivered.

Princeton.

F. W. LOETSCHER.

IV.—SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE. By PROFESSOR W. BRENTON GREENE, Jr., D.D. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. 1905. Svo, pp. 55.

This little volume has been prepared primarily for the use of students in "The Westminster Teacher-Training Course" who may wish to pursue their study of Christian doctrine further than could be done with the aid of the regular Manual. The bare outline, which is all that the limits of the latter permit, is in the book under review extended and illustrated, though still of necessity very briefly. With each chapter references are given to "The Confession of Faith," and also to "Popular Lectures on Theological Themes" by Dr. A. A. Hodge. The subjects discussed are "The Bible," "The Nature of God," "God's Works of Creation

and Providence," "The Nature and Original State of Man," "Sin," "Redemption," "The Christian Life," "The Means of Grace," "The Last Things." Though many and important topics have had to be omitted, the writer has aimed to be full enough to be helpful to laymen generally who would study the great doctrines of that "faith which was once for all delivered unto the saints."

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

✓ LA THÉOLOGIE DE RITSCHL DANS SES RAPPORTS AVEC LA DOCTRINE DU PÉCHÉ.
Par EMMANUEL CHRISTEN. Genève. 1903. 137 pages.

This is a brochure on Ritschlianism especially in relation to sin. He first contrasts the traditional doctrine of sin with that of Ritschl. Then he discusses at length (1) Ritschl's Christology; (2) his soteriology; (3) his eschatology. He then gives his conclusions. He makes Ritschl's fundamental error to be sin. Sin, according to Scripture, is rebellion against God; but Ritschl makes it the opposite of sovereign good; that from a religious view sin is indifference and defiance of God, and from a moral view sin is a manifestation of selfishness in regard to one's neighbor. He then contrasts the views of Ritschl with Scripture on original sin, pre-existence of Christ, reconciliation and justification. Ritschl bases justification on the love of God in Christ and not on Christ's expiation of sin. He notes the effacement of the Holy Spirit and the absence of all mysticism in Ritschl, who makes redemption mainly of this life with little or no eschatology. This starting-point in viewing Ritschl is new to English readers, who have been accustomed to begin with his philosophical principles and then proceed to his dogmatics. But there is no doubt that Ritschl's wrong view of reconciliation is due in part at least to his wrong teaching about sin.

Philadelphia.

J. I. Good.

V.—PRACTICAL THEOLOGY.

THE PASTOR AND MODERN MISSIONS. A Plea for Leadership in World Evangelization. By JOHN R. MOTT, M.A., F.R.G.S. New York: Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions. 12mo, pp. 250. \$1.00 net.

There are two needs in the mission problem: The non-Christian world needs Christ and the Christian world needs to be aroused to interest and effort in carrying Christ to this non-Christian world. Many agencies exist to-day for the solution of this problem. Mr. Mott, as an expert director of missionary effort, seizes upon the pastor as the key to the second phase of the problem, which is the primary need. If the Christian world can be aroused, the mission problem, humanly speaking, is settled. With this end in view, the lecturer presents the condition of the non-Christian world in the first lecture and devotes the four other lectures to showing ways in which the pastor may aid in evangelizing this great world, now outside of Christ.

Mr. Mott speaks as a specialist in missions and so views matters from a little different angle than that of the pastor. Leaders in any great movement can neglect factors with which the worker who handles details must reckon. Foreign missions ought to lead in interest and effort, but all other good movements must have a place in the pastor's interest. Then one questions whether "the imperative need of the present missionary crisis" is not overworked. The chief apologetic for missions must be the command: "Go ye into all the world, and preach the Gospel to the whole creation." No argument based upon present necessities or future dangers can compare with this call of the Captain of Christendom. This is not to deny the worth of the first lecture; it is rather to supplement it. No one questions the high value of the material there presented. Every pastor ought to have it. But to make it effective, he and his Church need the authority of the Great Commission.

The second lecture takes up the problem of imparting information. Here Mr. Mott is preëminently a master. While urging the importance of the pulpit as a means of education in missionary lines, he shows also the great value of various Church organizations in the development of missionary knowledge and enthusiasm. Very valuable is the section upon ways by which the pastor shall keep himself fitted for all this varied work. It is to be regretted that Mr. Mott should repeat the charge so often heard about "the unscriptural and unreasonable attitude of the members who say they believe in home but not in foreign missions." It is the foreign missionaries and their friends who force this distinction so sharply upon our notice. In an experience of fifteen years as pastor and mission worker, the reviewer has never heard this division talked about by any one but foreign workers. Certainly the consecrated workers and contributors in the domestic field are not shutting up either hearts or purses to the great non-Christian world just beyond. In all fairness, one is compelled to criticize the whole book in this particular. The arguments and illustrations are drawn almost exclusively from the foreign field. When one comes to the bibliography, rich, suggestive, valuable as it is, he is compelled to admit that the only phase of "Modern Missions" about which the pastor is not supposed to need any information is that of our home work. No doubt the lecturer never intended to put such a slight on the great home field, for he distinctly provides for home mission sermons and so on, but yet one would never dream from the book lists that there were any important phases of mission work other than those found in the foreign field.

The fourth and fifth lectures consider the pastor as a financial and recruiting force in the world's evangelization. Here Mr. Mott shows the genius of a great organizer. After a striking introduction showing the power of money, he proceeds to put forth methods of securing increased gifts. But he always insists that the increase of gifts will come only through increase of spirituality. In our money-getting age men are apt to be only money-givers. Most valuable and unique is the table of large gifts to missions. In the following pages the great *crux* of the mission problem is handled, the recruiting of the force. Here the lecturer is fearless and insistent. Alas, that it should be true that pastors dare not urge others to consecrate themselves to missions lest the pastors' consciences should be stirred to reproach! But it is the churches which must furnish the men as well as the money. The Student Volunteer Movement and all kindred forces that touch the young people only occasionally or in the days of college life cannot be the greatest recruiting agencies. If men go to college thinking little of the ministry, they are not likely to find the way to the theological seminary; if they know little about missions, they are not likely to knock at the doors of the Mission Boards. The only way to get a crop of missionaries is for the pastors to grow them. Close upon this thought comes the final lecture dealing with the theme of the pastor as a spiritual force in the world's evangelization. Even more important than the problem of getting workers is the question of their spiritual fitness; and most men get their fundamental ideas of spiritual life from their home church. The spirituality of the home church is apt to be measure of the spirituality on the mission field. It is a fitting climax to have Mr. Mott tell us that the chief need of missions is more prayer by the pastors and people. After all the world is to be brought to Christ by bringing its needs to the foot of His throne.

Taking the book as a whole with its finely chosen and well-presented material, its fertility of methods and its wealth of reference to sources in the notes and bibliography, one cannot but feel that the pastor and mission worker have here a manual calculated to meet many needs. Of course, no one can adopt all the schemes presented, but every one will rejoice to find so many suggestions which shall aid in evangelizing the world and in promoting the spirituality of the whole Church.

Princeton.

W. B. SHEDDAN.

SERMONS ADDRESSED TO INDIVIDUALS. By REGINALD J. CAMPBELL, Minister of the City Temple, London. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 1905. Pp. viii, 328.

It is another thoroughly characteristic collection of sermons that the distinguished minister of the City Temple of London here offers to the public. Whoever has heard Mr. Campbell has been impressed by the same qualities that give these printed discourses their subtle charm—the winning sincerity and frankness of the preacher, his sympathetic identification of himself with the peculiar needs of those who consult him as their spiritual adviser, his ability to illuminate these concrete problems by the application of fundamental religious and moral principles, his marvelous versatility in illustration, and, in admirable keeping with these gifts and traits, his utter simplicity and directness of speech, his bright, earnest, and often striking way of putting commonplace truth. There is an unescapable reality about these discourses which, regardless of the author's theological vagaries, makes the reader feel himself in the presence of a messenger of God who has a clear vision of things spiritual, a large knowledge of the human heart, a profound insight into the mystery of Calvary, and a noble passion to help men by making them see their need of redemption from sin by the cross of Christ. The notes prefixed to the text show how "every one of these sermons came into existence because some one asked for it or some life story suggested it." It is the high degree of success realized in making these ministrations practical that will, we are confident, give the book the large and useful life it deserves.

We cannot, however, regard any of these discourses as great sermons. Indeed the author himself modestly says they "are not literature, they are extempore speech, they are face-to-face teaching and exhortation addressed to an audience which, at the time, and to the preacher, consisted as it were of but one individual." This fact accounts for the colloquial tone of many paragraphs and perhaps also for the fragmentary character of the discussion of some of the topics. It is, however, chiefly because of this lack of system in the presentation of his truth that these sermons, in our judgment, fall short of the highest historic ideals. Mr. Campbell has penetrating vision and fine feeling, as well as an unusually generous culture, but we look in vain for anything in the nature of a sustained and well-articulated discussion. Not infrequently the sermon amounts to little more than a frank statement of the problem under consideration, and the argument, instead of gaining the maximum of force that the sacred text would warrant, terminates with a mere diagnosis of the speaker's own religious consciousness. There is, in fact, an ultra-personal quality which, charming as it is, none the less occasionally betrays Mr. Campbell into altogether unwarranted, not to say absurd statements. Here, for example, is a deliverance in regard to the historicity of Abraham's offering of his son Isaac: "This was a moral crisis, and a terrible crisis, too, for Abraham; and it is because of the vividness with which it is pictured here that I venture to think, critic or no critic, it took place." The sermons on "Eternal Punishment and Eternal Life," "The Agnosticism of Jesus," and "A Sinful God" abound in assertions that have little more to commend them than the popular virtue of not being orthodox. But we are quite sure that the most helpful paragraphs in this book are not those in which with such ill grace Mr. Campbell presumes to stand upon so much higher a vantage-ground than "the theologians."

Princeton.

F. W. LOETSCHER.

THE DIVINE OPPORTUNITY. Sermons preached by F. B. STOCKDALE. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1905. Svo; pp. 136. 50 cents.

Though the author does not give us on the title-page any clue to his identity we gather from the sermons that he is a New York Methodist pastor. The qual-

ity of the sermons quickens the desire to know and hear him. For the sermons, marked by largeness of vision, dignity, elevation of thought and freshness of treatment, are much above the ordinary. Familiar texts are illuminated; old themes become new; great truths, without much specific application, are so presented as to make their own impression. There is a certain likeness to F. W. Robertson in the preacher's spirit and attitude of mind toward the truth and his hearer, but he is in no sense an imitator.

Princeton.

PAUL MARTIN.

BURDEN BEARING, AND OTHER SERMONS. By JOHN RHEY THOMPSON. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1905. 8vo; pp. 261. 75 cents.

The sermons contained in the volume were preached extemporaneously in Grace Methodist Episcopal Church, Brooklyn, in 1883-84. They are good sermons, spoken by one who loves men and knows them and sympathizes with them. He is eager to bring home spiritual truth to them, so that they will listen and understand its application to their own lives and circumstances. There is success in the difficult art of concrete illustration from the realm of actual business and social life without falling into cheapness of style. The method of the sermons is the elucidation and application of a single well-defined theme. The sermon on "The Theistic Basis of Immortality" is an especially good example of a difficult subject made intelligible, interesting and helpful to an ordinary congregation. In his preparation the preacher has not only mastered the subject for himself, but with the instinct of a true teacher has mastered it for his hearers also.

Princeton.

PAUL MARTIN.

THE SOUL-WINNING CHURCH. By Rev. LEN G. BROUGHTON, D.D. London, Chicago, Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1905. 8vo; pp. 126.

The Georgia evangelist publishes under this title a series of addresses upon the Church which he has delivered at revival services. The only controversial points touched upon in the book are the "Baptism for Service" and the "Premillennial Coming," both of which the author warmly advocates. The style is very popular and some of the numerous illustrative stories, however well they may have answered for the easy discourse of an evangelist, are hardly worthy of print. The purpose of the addresses is to impress the true dignity of the Church as being the Church of the living God, its supreme end to save sinners, and its power for accomplishment the Spirit of God. The criticisms of the existing Church are for the most part well taken and the counsels for its betterment wholesome.

Princeton.

PAUL MARTIN.

THE USEFUL LIFE, A CROWN TO THE SIMPLE LIFE, AS TAUGHT BY EMANUEL SWEDENBORG. With an Introduction by JOHN BIGELOW. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905. 8vo; pp. xxxii+71. 75 cents.

The volume is made up of an extended Introduction and a body of quotations from Swedenborg. The Introduction makes clear that the much heralded "simple life" is only one of the processes, not the consummation, of the Creator's purpose in man. If sought for itself it has little worth, as the extremely simple life of the early hermit monks, as by a final experiment, once for all demonstrated. The true end of life is not simplicity but usefulness. The life is to be freed from complications that it may devote itself to worthy work, and in accomplishing this work it becomes simple. This is certainly in accord with Scripture, and the author of the Introduction finds it especially well set forth in the teaching of his master, Swedenborg, in his "Doctrine of Uses." Swedenborg has been too long before the world to call for review. If having failed to understand Swedenborg's system as a whole, we turn to this volume of extracts in hope that upon a single practical theme he may seem more simple, the expectation is doomed to disappointment, for here are the same combinations of beautiful and suggestive

expressions of truth with sentences and clauses that may mean many things or nothing, and we are left still wondering whether the fault is with Swedenborg or the reader.

Princeton.

PAUL MARTIN.

VI.—GENERAL LITERATURE.

THE NAPOLEON MYTH. By HENRY RIDGELY EVANS. Containing a Reprint of *The Grand Erratum*, by JEAN BAPTISTE PÉRÈS, and an Introduction by Dr. PAUL CARUS. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1905 8vo; pp. 65.

The purpose of this booklet is clearly set forth in the Introduction by Dr. Carus. The reader is to learn "how rapidly folklore tales attach themselves to a dramatic figure of history; and Napoleon's case is perhaps the better for a student, because his personality is still within clear remembrance of the last but one generation and the legends have developed under the very eyes of a civilized world, whose historians were in the habit of recording facts with accuracy and whose writings are still within reach." But this statement does not tell the whole truth. There is an ulterior motive revealed in the following characteristic utterances (p. 5): "The Christian Gospels are not simply narratives of the life of Jesus, but they are the story of Jesus as the Christ, embodying ancient traditions not only of the Jewish notion of a Messiah but many other kindred hopes . . . The Jewish Messiah conception had been modified and deepened by the Persian doctrine of Mithra, the virgin-born viceroy of God's kingdom on earth; the Babylonian Marduk, the Conqueror of Death and mediator between God the Father and men, and also the world-resigning Buddha of India. The picture of Jesus in the New Testament is not strictly historical, but it contains historical facts. It is the story of Jesus, the Nazarene, as interpreted by those who believed that he was the Christ."

Pages 11 to 21 are devoted to a republication of Jean Baptiste Pérés' *Grand Erratum: the Non-existence of Napoleon Proved*. This celebrated pamphlet, written in 1827 and translated into most of the languages of Europe, but of late quite rare, was an attempt, in the interest of conservative theology, to reduce to an absurdity the purely negative tendencies of the rationalistic criticism of the Scriptures then in vogue. In order to travesty the arguments of these critics, Pérés reviews the leading facts of Napoleon's life, and shows that after all "the supposed hero of our century is nothing more than an allegorical personage, deriving his attributes from the sun." No attempt on our part to characterize the author's "demonstration" of his propositions could do justice to his exceedingly clever satire. The debate, to be appreciated, must be followed in its details. Every reader at all conversant with the extravagant claims of the higher critics will realize the appropriateness of republishing this celebrated burlesque at this time, and will feel duly grateful to Mr. Evans for having prefixed it, in this little book, to his own "occult" study of the "mythical Napoleon."

Indeed, if we may be forgiven for indulging in so odious a comparison, we have found Pérés far more interesting than Evans. The author has, it must be admitted, made a careful study of the mythopoetic elements in Napoleon's life. But his account lacks definiteness of purpose, so that the reader is more mystified than instructed or pleased. We are tempted to be ungracious enough to say that the many illustrations of the book—reproductions of celebrated paintings of Napoleon—charmed us more than the author's story of the "mythical Napoleon."

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

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The Princeton Theological Review.

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THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

No. 2—April, 1906.

I.

TERTULLIAN AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY.

THIRD ARTICLE.

IN a discussion printed in the two immediately preceding numbers of this REVIEW * it has been pointed out that there is discoverable in Tertullian's modes of statement a rather distinct advance towards the conception of an immanent Trinity. We wish now to inquire how far this advance is to be credited to Tertullian himself, and how far it represents modes of thought and forms of statement current in his time, and particularly observable in Tertullian only because he chanced to be dealing with themes which invited a fuller expression than ordinary of this side of the faith of Christians.

We have already seen that there is a large traditional element in Tertullian's teaching; that even the terms, "Trinity" and "Economy," in which his doctrine of the distinctions within the Godhead is enshrined, are obviously used by him as old and well-known terms; and that he betrays no consciousness of enunciating new conceptions in his development of his doctrine, but rather writes like a man who is opposing old truth to new error.

* THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, October, 1905, pp. 529-557; January, 1906, pp. 1-36.

Indeed he openly asserts that this is the case. If we are to take his own point of view in the matter, we cannot hesitate to assert, then, that he has himself made no advance, but is simply enforcing the common Christian faith against the innovations of destructive heresy. Of course this common Christian faith, which he is zealous thus to enforce, is fundamentally the Rule of Faith. But it can scarcely be denied that it is more than this; Tertullian's own view clearly is that his expositions embody also the common understanding of the Rule of Faith. He is not consciously offering any novel constructions of it, or building up on his own account a higher structure upon it. No doubt he is doing his best to state the common faith clearly and forcibly, and to apply its elements tellingly in the controversy in which he was engaged; and he may certainly in so doing have clarified it, and even filled it with new significance, not to say developed from it hitherto unsuspected implications. How far, however, this can be affirmed of him can be determined only by some survey of the modes of thought and statement of his predecessors and contemporaries who have dealt with the same doctrines.

What first strikes us when we turn to the Apologists with this end in view is that most of Tertullian's modes of statement can be turned up, in one place or another, in the Apologetic literature. We say "in one place or another" advisedly, for the peculiarity of the case is that they do not all appear in the pages of a single writer, but scattered through the writings of all. Thus if the term *τρίας* appears in Theophilus, it is in Tatian that the term *οἰκονομία* meets us in a sense similar to that in which Tertullian uses it. If Athanasius seems to struggle to carry back the divine relationships into eternity,* and Theophilus by the use of the distinction between the *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος* and the *λόγος προφορικὸς* at least seeks a basis for the distinction of God and His Logos prior to the prolation of the Logos, Justin leaves us uncertain whether he thought of the Logos as having any sort of being before the moment of His begetting. The simile by which the relation of the Logos to God is compared to the relation of the light to the sun is already found in Justin: but it is to Tatian that we must go to discover such a careful exposition of the relation of the Logos to God as the following: "He came into being by way of impartation (*κατὰ μερισμόν*) not of abscission (*κατὰ ἀποκοπήν*); for what is cut off is separated from the primitive (*τοῦ πρώτου*), but what is imparted, receiving its

* Cf. BETHUNE-BAKER, *Early History of Doctrine*, etc., p. 129.

share of the Economy,* does not make him from whom it is taken deficient." The result is that while we could from fragments, derived this from one and that from another of the Apologists, piece together a statement of doctrine which would assimilate itself to Tertullian's, we could verify this statement from no one of the Apologists, but, on the contrary, elements of it would be more or less sharply contradicted by one or another of them. There are, in other words, hints scattered through the Apologists that men were already reaching out toward the forms of statement that meet us in Tertullian, but only in him are these hints brought together. We assent, therefore, when Harnack† says: "We cannot at bottom say that the Apologists possessed a doctrine of the Trinity." Only we must in this statement emphasize both the terms "at bottom" and "doctrine." There are everywhere discoverable in the Apologists suggestions of a trinitarian mode of thought: but these are not brought together into a formulated doctrine which governed their thinking of the being of God.

The phenomena are such, in one word, as to force us to perceive in the writings of the Apologists—as has been widely recognized by students of their works—a double deposit of conceptions relative to the mode of the divine existence. There is their own philosophical construction, which is, briefly, the Logos-speculation. And underlying that, there is the Christian tradition,—to which they desired to be faithful and which was ever intruding into their consciousness and forcing from them acknowledgment of elements of truth which formed no part of their philosophical confession of faith. This divided character of the Apologetic mind is by no one more clearly expounded than by the late Dr. Purves in his lectures on *The Testimony of Justin Martyr to Early Christianity*. Justin was, as Harnack remarks,‡ "the most Christian among the Apologists," and this feature in his dealing with doctrine is perhaps especially marked in him: but it is shared also by all his congeners. Dr. Pur-

* This is a very obscure phrase: *οικονομίας τὴν αἰρεσιν προσλαβόν*. CLERICUS declared that in his day it had never been successfully explained. DANIEL (p. 164) explains: "What has arisen through participation, as one light is kindled from another, has of course part in the nature of the thing from which it is derived, and is of the same nature with it; but does not make the thing from which it is taken any poorer in this nature." BAUR translates the whole passage thus: "What is cut off is separated from the substance, but what is distinguished as a portion, what by free self-determination receives the œconomy, the plurality in the unity, causes no loss to that from which it comes." BETHUNE-BAKER (p. 126) renders: "Receiving as its function one of administration," and explains: "The part of *οικονομία*, administration of the world, revelation."

† II, 289, note¹ at the end.

‡ II, 203 note².

ves fully recognizes that Justin was, in his thinking about God, first of all the philosopher: and that his "own thought strongly tended away from the doctrine of a Trinity"*—toward a sort of ditheism which embraced a doctrine of "the consubstantiality of the Logos and the Father of all." And yet there crops up repeatedly in his writings testimony to the worship by the Christians of three divine persons. This testimony is particularly remarkable with reference to the Spirit. For "Justin's own theology had really no place for the Spirit," and yet "Justin speaks of the Spirit as not only an object of worship but as the power of the Christian life." "Thus Justin," concludes Dr. Purves,† "in spite of himself, testifies to the threefold object of Christian worship. He even finds in Plato an adumbration of the first, second and third powers in the universe, though in doing so he misunderstands and misinterprets that philosopher. Justin's own conception is vague, or, when not vague, unscriptural in certain important points. . . . But . . . he . . . effectively testifies to the traditional faith of the Church in the Father, Son and Spirit as the threefold object of Christian worship, and the threefold source of Christian life." What was true of Justin was true, each in his measure, of the other Apologists. "Two conceptions of deity were struggling with each other"‡ in their minds. Dominated by their philosophical inheritance, they could only imperfectly assimilate the Christian revelation, which therefore made itself felt only in spots and patches in their teaching. What was needed that the Christian doctrine of God should come to its rights was some change in the conditions governing the conceptions of the leaders of Christian thinking by which they might measurably be freed from the philosophical bondage in which they were holden.

The appearance of juster views precisely in the expositions of Tertullian would seem thus to be connected ultimately with a certain shifting of interest manifested in Tertullian as compared with the Apologists. The Apologists were absorbed largely in the cosmological aspects of Christian doctrine.§ In Tertullian these retire into the background and the soteriological interest comes markedly forward. In their cosmological speculations, the Apologists, for example, scarcely felt the need of a Holy Spirit; all that they had clamantly in mind to provide for, they conceived of as the natural function of the Logos. Their recognition of the Holy Spirit was therefore

* *Op. cit.*, p. 275.

† P. 279.

‡ P. 145.

§ General discriminations like this must, of course, not be pressed to extremes. See e.g., Purves, *The Teaching of Justin Martyr*, p. 277. Cf. BETHUNE-BAKER, *Early Christian Doctrine*, 125.

largely conventional and due to allegiance to the Christian tradition. A new point of view has been attained when Tertullian, out of his soteriological interest, thinks of the Spirit profoundly as the sanctifier of men, the "vicarious power" of the Logos for applying His redemptive work. This shifting of interest inevitably led to a new emphasis on the distinctive personalities of the three persons of the deity, and to their separation from the world-process that justice might be done to their perfect deity as the authors—each in his appropriate sphere—of salvation.* It is instructive that in his *Apology*, addressed like the chief works of the Apologists to the heathen, Tertullian still moves, like them, largely within the cosmological sphere: whereas in his tract *Against Praxeas*, addressed to fellow-Christians, the soteriological point of view comes more to its rights. And it is equally instructive that among preceding writers it is in Irenæus who, with emphasis, eschewed philosophy and sought to build up a specifically Biblical doctrine, that we find forms of statement concerning the three persons whom Christians worshiped as the one God most nearly approaching the construction adumbrated by Tertullian. Perhaps it is not too much to say that the supplanting among Christian thinkers of the Logos-speculation by a doctrine of immanent Trinity was largely mediated by the shifting of interest from the cosmological to the soteriological aspect of Christian truth, and that in Tertullian we see for the first time clearly marked the beginning of the process by which this change was wrought.

This suggestion receives notable support from a comparison of Tertullian's modes of statements with those of his contemporary Hippolytus, in his treatise against Noëtus—a treatise which, as it arose out of conditions remarkably like those which called out Tertullian's tract against Praxeas, contains so much that is similar to what we find in that tract that it is hard to shake ourselves entirely free from the illusion that one borrows from the other.

* For the point of view of the text cf. e.g., NÖSGEN, *Geschichte der L. v. d. h. Geiste*, pp. 24 sq.: "Precisely with this writer (Tertullian) there begins, on the ground of Christian experience, to break through the recognition of the inner necessity of the Holy Spirit for the nature of the Triune God. . . . His interest in the third Person of the Trinity hangs on the fact that the Holy Spirit leads the children of God (*credentes agat*). . . . Accordingly it must not be made a reproach to him that he permits the immanent relation statedly to shine through only as the background of the self-revelation of the Triune One. It is precisely because he does this that he first marked out definitely the point of departure from which the peculiarity of the Holy Spirit as God and as trinitarian Person could be really grasped." Cf. KAHNIS, p. 296.

Hippolytus' relation as a pupil to Irenæus,* whose language in regard to the Trinitarian relationships approaches that of Tertullian most nearly of all previous writers, and from whom Tertullian himself frankly draws, is doubtless another factor of importance in accounting for the resemblance between the two tracts. But as we have already suggested, we are persuaded that this resemblance, so far as it is real, is mainly due to the fact that Tertullian and Hippolytus, alike heirs of the Logos-speculation, and alike determined to do justice to the deposit of truth in the Rule of Faith, were alike called upon in the new conditions of the early third century to uphold the common faith of Christendom against the subtlest form of the Monarchian attack. If this be true, nothing could hold out a better promise of enabling us to discriminate in Tertullian's statements the traditional element from his personal contribution than a comparison of them with those of Hippolytus.

The first thing that strikes us in attempting such a comparison is the extent of the common element in the two. We meet in Hippolytus the same terminology which we have found in Tertullian. He, too, employs the term Trinity;† and, as well, Tertullian's favorite term, "the Economy"‡—although perhaps not with the same profundity of meaning; even Tertullian's phrase, "the mystery of the economy."§ We almost feel ourselves still on Tertullian's ground when we read in Hippolytus: "For who will not say there is one God? Yet he will not on that account deny the Economy."|| This feeling is increased by the occurrence in Hippolytus of similar illustrations of the relations of the Logos to the primal Godhead. "But when I say another," he remarks, "I do not mean that there are two Gods, but that it is only as light from light, or as water from a fountain, or as a ray from the sun."¶ Even the same proof-texts are employed in the same manner. Thus the declaration in John x. 30, "I and the Father are one," is treated quite in Tertullian's manner. "Understand that He did not say, 'I and the Father *am* one, but *are* one.' For the word 'are' is not said of one person, but it refers to two persons and one power."** So again, like Tertullian, Hippolytus insists strongly on the true deity of Christ and supports it after much the same fashion. He calls Him "God,"†† "the Almighty,"‡‡ appeals just like Tertullian to Matt. xi. 27, and like Tertullian even applies to Him the great text, Rom. ix. 5, commenting: "He who is over all, God blessed, has been born; and

* Cf. e.g., HARNACK, *Chronolog.*, II, 213 and 223.

† Chap. 14.

‡ Chaps. 3, 4, 8, 14.

§ Chap. 4, no fewer than three times.

|| Chap. 3.

¶ Chap. 11.

** Chap. 7.

†† Chap. 8.

‡‡ Chap. 6.

having been made man, He is God for ever."* His doctrine of the Person of Christ, moreover, is indistinguishable from Tertullian's. "Let us believe, then, dear brethren," he says, "according to the tradition of the apostles, that God the Word came down from heaven into the holy Virgin Mary, in order that, taking the flesh from her, and assuming also a human, by which I mean a rational soul, and becoming thus all that man is, with the exception of sin, he might be . . . manifested as God in a body, coming forth, too, as a perfect man: for it was not in mere appearance, or by conversion, but in truth that He became man."† Underlying and sustaining all these detailed resemblances, moreover, is the great fundamental likeness between the two writers arising from their common application of the Logos-speculation to the facts of the Christian tradition, and their common opposition to the Monarchian heresy.

With a little closer scrutiny, however, marked differences between the two writers begin to develop.

In the first place, we observe that Hippolytus does not very well know what to do with the Holy Spirit. He repeats the triune formula with great emphasis: "We cannot think otherwise of one God," he says, "but by believing in truth in Father and Son and Holy Spirit." "The Economy of agreement is gathered up into one God: for God is One: for He who commands is the Father, and He who obeys is the Son, and that which teaches wisdom is the Spirit."‡ "We accordingly see the Word incarnate, and through Him we know the Father, and believe in the Son and worship the Holy Ghost."§ He manifestly desires to be led in all things by the Scriptural revelation: from no other quarter, he declares, than the oracles of God will he derive instruction in such things, and therefore as they declare to us what the Father wills us to believe, that will he believe, and as He wills the Son to be glorified, so will he glorify Him, and as He wills the Holy Spirit to be bestowed, so will he receive Him.|| Nevertheless it is quite clear that he can hardly assimilate the Biblical doctrine of the Spirit, and when he comes to speak out his mind upon Him, he makes it apparent that he does not at all think of Him as a person. It is curious to observe, indeed, the circumlocutions he employs to avoid calling Him a person. "I shall not indeed say there are two Gods, but one; two persons, however, while the third economy is the grace of the Holy Spirit. For the Father indeed is one, but there are two persons, because there is the Son also: and then

* Chap. 6.

† Chap. 17.

‡ Chap. 14.

§ Chap. 12.

|| Chap. 9.

there is the third, the Holy Spirit."* From a passage like this, Hippolytus' fundamental thought would seem to have been, like Justin's, a kind of ditheism, somewhat violently transformed into a tritheism under the pressure of the traditional faith.

When we look further we perceive that even this ditheism is far from pure. We observe a notable effort to avoid that clear assertion of substantial unity of the Father and Son which constitutes the very core of Tertullian's doctrine. When the declaration of our Lord in John x. 30, "I and the Father are one," is quoted,† Hippolytus' exposition is: "It refers to two persons and one"—not substance, as Tertullian would have said, but—"power." And then Hippolytus calls in illustratively John xvii. 22, 23, where our Lord expresses His desire that His disciples may be one, even as He and the Father are one, and asks triumphantly, "Are all [the disciples] one body in respect of substance, or is it that we become one in the power and disposition of likemindedness?"‡ "In the same manner"—thus he applies the illustration—"the Son . . . confessed that He was in the Father in power and disposition." This view of the unity of Father and Son as consisting in unity in mind and power only is consistently preserved throughout;§ and the revelatory character of the Son is in harmony with this, not on His identity with God, but on His character as the *image* of God.|| Accordingly, we discover that the Logos is not thought by Hippolytus to have been eternally with God, but is assigned an absolute beginning at a definite point of time previous to the creation of the world. Like Tertullian, he tells us that God subsisted from all eternity alone, having nothing contemporaneous with Himself. But he does not, like Tertullian, tell us that though thus existing alone, so far as things external to Himself are concerned, there was within Him another, His fellow, His eternal Word, a second to Him. Quite differently, he tells us that though alone, He was many,—a plurality.¶ And then he goes on to explain that this means that God was never "reasonless, or wisdomless, or powerless, or counselless, but all things were in Him and He was in all."** In other words,

* Chap. 14. That the personality of the Holy Spirit is here denied is held by MEIER, *Lehre von d. Trinität*, I, 88; HARNACK, E. T., II, 262, note; NÖSGEN, *Geschichte d. L. v. d. heilig. Geiste*, 20. Cf. also J. SJÖHOLM, *Hippolytus och Modalismen*, Lund: 1898. On the other hand, see DÖLLINGER, *Hipp. and Callist.*, E. T., 193-194, and HAGEMANN, *Röm. Kirche*, 268 sq. † Chap. 7.

‡ τῇδυνάμει καὶ τῇ διαθήσει τῆς ὁμοφρονίας ἐν γινόμεθα; § E.g., chaps. 8 and 16.

|| Chap. 7 fin. ¶ Ch. 10, *ad init.*, αὐτὸς δὲ μόνος ὢν πολλὰς ἦν.

** οὔτε γὰρ ἄλογος, οὔτε ἄσοφος, οὔτε ἀδύνατος, οὔτε ἀβοήλευτος ἦν· πάντα δὲ ἦν ἐν αὐτῷ. αὐτὸς δὲ ἦν τὸ πᾶν.

it is not of a personal Logos as the eternal Companion that Hippolytus is thinking, but of the ideal world, the *κόσμος νοητός*, as constituting an eternal "plurality" of God. Accordingly when in another place* he is again describing the origin of the Logos, the eternal existence which he attributes to Him is not an existence as a personal Logos, but only as the "indwelling rationality of the universe." The Logos thus for Hippolytus exists from all eternity only ideally. From this ideal existence He came into real existence for the first time when God, intending to create the world, begat Him "as the Author and Fellow-Counsellor and Framer of the things that are in formation,"† and "thus," says Hippolytus,‡ "there appeared another beside Him"—thus and then only. Here it must be remarked is a doctrine of the absolute origination of the Logos by the will of the Father, so that the Logos appears distinctly as a creature of the Father's will.§

Nor does Hippolytus in the least shrink from this conception. When explaining that Adam was made a man with the characteristics and limitations of a man, not by inadver-

* *Philosoph.*, x, 33 (xxix)—ἐνδιάθετος τοῦ παντός λογισμός.

† *Adv. Noëtum*, chap. 10—ἀρχηγὸν καὶ σύμβουλον καὶ ἐργάτην.

‡ Chap. 11.

§ On the extreme emphasis put by Hippolytus on the divine will, cf. HAGEMANN, *Röm. Kirche*, p. 197: "No one of the earliest representatives of Christian science lays such stress on the will of God as Hippolytus. With great emphasis, often several times in succession in almost identical phrases, he repeats, when speaking of the origin of the Logos or of creation in general, the formula in which he expresses his proposition that the whole revelation of God *ad extra* is grounded in His will, that He can create or not create, retain the Logos in Himself or permit Him to proceed out, as He wills. He even speaks once of the Logos himself as a product of the divine will (c. 13; cf. c. 8, 9, 10, 11)." For the fundamental significance of this see *ante*, October, 1905, p. 552 note ¶, and the references there given. Natural as this stress on the voluntariness of the divine action, even in the prolation of the Logos, was on the lips of the Apologists in protest against the natural processes of emanation taught by the Gnostics, there underlay it in its application to the prolation of the Logos a view of the relation of the Logos to the Father which scarcely did justice to the real state of the case, and was near to a conception of the Logos as absolutely originating in this act of the divine will, and hence as of creaturely character. This point of view was that of some of the Apologists, and was revived by the Arians. In opposition to it the Nicene Fathers (Athanasius, *Or. cont. Ar.*, iii; *de Decret. Nic. Syn.*; Ambrose, *De Fide*, IV, 9) learned to go behind the will of God in the generation of the Logos. There is a sense, of course, in which, as DÖLLINGER points out (*Hippolytus and Callistus*, E. T., 198), God as voluntary subject does all He does voluntarily; but after all said and done as the Arian contention that the Son owed His being to an act of will on the part of the Father was meant to imply that the Son was a creature, this mode of speech is Arian in tendency and it is best frankly to say—taking will in its natural sense—that the act of eternal generation is not an act of will but a necessary movement in the divine being. (Cf. DORNER, I, ii, 460.)

tence or because of any limitation of power on God's part, but by design, he says: "The Creator did not wish to make him a God and failed in His aim; nor an angel—be not deceived—but a man. For if He had wished to make thee a God He could have done so : *you have the example of the Logos.*"* To Hippolytus, therefore, the Logos is distinctly a created God, whom God made a God because, shortly, He chose to do so. He has indeed preëminence above all other creatures, not only because He was made a God and they were not, but also because He alone of creatures was made by God Himself while all other creatures were made by Him the Logos; and because they all were made out of nothing, while "Him alone God produced from existing things (*ἐκ τῶν ὄντων*)," and, as God alone existed, that means from His own substance.† The Logos is therefore only in this sense of the substance of God, that He was framed out of the Divine substance; although what the process was by which God thus "begat Him as He willed," Hippolytus declines to inquire as too mysterious for human investigation.‡ He has no hesitation, however, in speaking of him as a creature who came into existence at a definite time, is only what His maker willed, and is God and possessor of the power of God and therefore almighty only by gift and not by nature.§

It is not necessary to pursue this inquiry further. Enough has been brought out to show that Hippolytus' Trinity consisted in a transcendent God who produced at a definite point of time a secondary divinity called the Logos, to whom He subjected all things; and along with these a third something not very definitely conceived, called by the Church the Holy Spirit. Here is not one God in three persons; here is rather one God producing a universe by steps and stages, to the higher of which divinity is assigned. In other words, we see in Hippolytus a clear and emphatic testimony indeed to a rich deposit of Christian faith, but overlying and dominating it a personal interpretation of it which reproduces all the worst defects of the Logos-speculation. In this he forms, despite the surface resemblance of his discussion to Tertullian's, a glaring contrast with that writer. In Tertullian the fundamental faith of the Church comes to its rights and is permitted to dominate the Logos-speculation. And it is just in this that his superiority as a theologian to Hippolytus is exhibited. Hippolytus' thought remains in all essential respects bound within the limits of the Logos-

* *Phil.*, x. 33 (xxix).

† *Ibid.*

‡ *Adv. Noëtum*, chap. 16.

§ Cf. also chap. 6, where Christ is said to have been "appointed almighty by the Father."

speculation. Tertullian's has become in all essential respects a logical development of the Church's fundamental faith. It is, therefore, that it is he and not Hippolytus who became the Father of the doctrine of an immanent Trinity.

A comparison of Novatian's treatise *On the Trinity** will still further strengthen our respect for Tertullian. Novatian seems to have been a diligent student of Tertullian;† it might be presumed, therefore, that in this treatise he has drawn upon the master whom he honored by his imitation but never names. Despite, however, Jerome's declaration that the book is only "a kind of epitome"‡ of Tertullian's work, and the repetition of this judgment by a whole series of subsequent writers,§ we find ourselves doubting whether the presumed fact is supported by the treatise itself. Novatian goes his own way, and it is questionable whether there is much common to his treatise and Tertullian's tract against Praxeas which may not be best accounted for on the ground of the traditional elements of belief underlying both.|| No doubt Novatian must be supposed to have known Tertullian's treatise and his own thinking may have been affected by its teaching. But there seems little or no evidence that he has drawn directly upon it for his own work. Novatian's tract, unlike those of Tertullian and Hippolytus, is not in the first instance a piece of polemics with only incidental positive elements; but is primarily a constructive treatise and only incidentally polemic: moreover, its polemic edge is turned not solely against Monarchianism, but equally against Tritheism. In point of form it is an exposition of the Rule of Truth,¶ which requires us

*There seem no real reason for doubting the authorship of this book by Novatian, though HAGEMANN (p. 371 *sq.*) doubts it, and QUARRY even ascribes it to Hippolytus. Cf. HARNACK, *Chronologie*, II, 396, note 1. and 400, note 2. HARNACK dates it c. 240 (p. 399).

† Cf. HARNACK in the *Sitzungsberichte der k. p. Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin*, 1895, II, p. 562, and *Chron.* II, 399-400. ‡ *De virr. illust.*, 70.

§ E.g., LOOFS' *Leitfaden*, p. 105: "There is scarcely a thought that cannot be pointed out in Tertullian." But HARNACK, *Chronolog.*, II, 399-400, recognizes that in any event Jerome's statement is overdrawn, though he finds a real connection between the two books.

|| We have the support in this, at least, of HAGEMANN, *Röm. Kirche*, p. 379.

¶ Novatian's own phrase is always Rule of Truth, although the title of his treatise has Rule of Faith, whence KUNZE infers that the title is not from his own hand (pp. 5-6). Novatian, remarks KUNZE (p. 178), makes use of the Roman Baptismal Creed (Apostolicum), but evidently "only the Trinitarian formula stood to him as a Formula, and we may even say that to him the notion of *regala veritatis* belonged only to it and not to the 'Apostles' Creed,'; and to the 'Apostles' Creed' only so far as it is built up upon the Trinitarian Formula." This is, however, in effect the essential conception of all the early Fathers: that is to say, the Apostles' Creed to them is not the Rule of Faith, but only a commodious summary of it.

to believe in God the Father and Lord Omnipotent, in the Son of God, Christ Jesus, the Lord our God, and in the Holy Spirit, once promised to the Church; and its disposition follows these three fundamental elements of the faith (chaps. i-viii; ix-xxviii; xxix; with a conclusion, xxx-xxxi). To its expository task it gives itself with a conscious effort to avoid wandering off into the refutation of heresies, farther than may be necessary to subserve the purpose in view. "I could set forth the treatment of this subject," he remarks on one occasion when a heresy is engaging his attention, "by all the heavenly Scriptures . . . except that I have not so much undertaken to speak against this special form of heresy as to expound the Rule of Truth concerning the person of Christ."*

The positive exposition Novatian has set himself to give is very richly worked out and quite justifies Jerome's admiration of the book. In particular the exegetical demonstration of the divinity of Christ which it offers is very thorough and noble and can scarcely find its superior in ancient literature. Alongside of its zeal for the deity of Christ, its zeal for the unity of God burns warmly, and its Trinitarian doctrine seems to be dominated by the interaction of these two factors. The key to the whole is revealed by Novatian himself when he declares our chief duty to be to contend earnestly that Christ is God, but in such a way as not to militate against the Scriptural *fundamentum* that there is but one God.† It is indeed Tritheism rather than Monarchianism which causes Novatian the deepest anxiety and though he argues stoutly against the latter, it is his opposition to the former which most decisively determines his own forms of statement. Thus, although he exhibits little vital interest in the Logos-speculation for its own sake, and writes rather from the standpoint of the traditional faith, he is thrown back strongly upon the linear development of the Trinity which is the product of the Logos-speculation.‡ Laboring to secure the unity of God at all hazards, he feels that he can do this only by emphasizing the origination of the Son; and not attaining to a clear grasp of the conception of eternal generation, he is led to protect the origination of the Son by emphasizing His posteriority to the Father.§ Amid these ideas, it must be confessed, he somewhat flounders. He is earnestly desirous of doing full justice to the deity of Christ, and he feels that in order to do so he must assimilate Him to the eternal God. But he does not know quite how to do this consistently with a fitting proclamation of the unity of God.

* Chap. 21.

† See above, October, 1905, pp. 554-5.

‡ Chap. xxx, near the beginning.

§ Chap. xxxi.

Accordingly he tells us, on the one hand, that the Son "was always in the Father" because the "Father was always Father": but he at once turns to argue, on the other hand, that the Father must in some sense precede the Son, because it is "necessary that He who knows no beginning must precede Him that has a beginning"; and to insist over and over again that there would be two Gods, if there were two who had not been begotten, or two who were without beginning, or two who were self-existent. The doctrine of "eternal generation" is here struggling in the womb of thought: we do not think it quite comes to the birth.

And thus Novatian seems to us to fall back essentially upon the Logos-construction, but on the Logos-construction so far purified that it is on the point of melting into Nicene orthodoxy. In order to protect the unity of God, in other words, he was led to emphasize not the sameness of the Son and Spirit with God the Father, as Tertullian did with his developed doctrine of the numerical unity of substance, but their difference from Him. The nerve of Novatian's Trinitarianism thus becomes his strong subordinationism. Though he knows and emphasizes the difference between creation and procession* and urges as few others have urged the true divinity of Christ, yet our Lord's deity is to Him after all only a secondary deity. He had a beginning; He was not self-originated; He was the product of His Father's will; He exists but to minister to that will; though He be God, He is not God of Himself, but only because "He was begotten for this special result, that He should be God"; and though He is Lord, He is Lord only because the Father so willed and only to the extent the Father willed.† When He says "I and the Father are one," therefore, "He referred to the agreement, and to the identity of judgment, and to the loving association itself, as, reasonably, the Father and Son are one in agreement and love and affection."‡ Tertullian would here have referred to sameness of substance: even Hippolytus would have referred to sameness of power: Novatian's zeal for the unity of God holds him back, and though he believes the Son to be consubstantial with the Father in the sense that as the son of a man is a man so the Son of God is God,§ yet he must believe also that He is second to the Father in the strongest sense of that word.

* Cf. HARNACK, II, 259, note 3.

† All these phrases are from c. xxxi.

‡ Chap. 27.

§ Cf. BULL, III, 17, and see NÖSGEN, 26, note 2. Novatian is treated by BULL, especially pp. 131, 297, 479, 511, 528, 582, 597, 607, E. T. The best that can be said for him is there said.

This subordination of the Son to the Father is repeated, in his view, in the similar subordination of the Spirit to the Son. So clear is it that, with all his good intentions and upward strivings, Novatian remains, in his theoretical construction of the relationships of the three persons he recognized as God, under the domination of the Logos-speculation and fails to attain the higher standpoint reached by Tertullian. Revolting from the tritheism of Hippolytus, he yet does not know any other way to secure the unity of God but Hippolytus' way—that is, by so sharply emphasizing the subordination of the two objects of Christian worship additional to God the Father as to exalt the Father into the sole Self-Existent, Beginningless, Invisible, Infinite, Immortal and Eternal One. That he guards this subordination better than Hippolytus is a matter of degree and does not erect a difference of kind between them. Novatian marks, no doubt, the highest level of Trinitarian doctrine attainable along the pathway of subordinationism. That this level is lower than the level attained by Tertullian is only evidence that Tertullian's organizing principle had become no longer subordinationism but equalization. It is, in other words, Tertullian's formula of numerical sameness of essence with distinction of persons, not the formula of the Logos-speculation in which the stress was laid on subordinationism,* that had in it the promise and potency of the better things to come.

From such comparisons as these we obtain a notion of the nature of the step toward the formulation of the Church's ingrained faith in an immanent Trinity which was made by Tertullian. The greatness of this step is fairly estimable from the fact that Tertullian's statements will satisfy all the points on which Bishop Bull laid stress in his famous effort to show "the consent of primitive antiquity with the fathers of the Council of Nice." These points he sums up in four:† "first, that Christ our Lord in His higher nature existed before [His birth of] the most blessed Virgin Mary, and, further, before the creation of the world, and that through Him all things were made;

* Speaking of the Logos-doctrine, Prof. I. L. PAINE says truly: "In this view the subordination element is vital, and it became the governing note of the whole Logos-school" (*Evolution of Trinitarianism*, p. 31). Where Prof. PAINE is wrong is in not perceiving how deeply this subordinationism was contrary to the fundamentals of the Christian faith: and by this failure he is led to do grave injustice alike to Athanasianism—in which he discerns more subordinationism than really existed in it—and to Augustinianism—whose reproach to him is that it is determined to be rid of subordinationism. Prof. PAINE, in other words, misconceives both the historical development and its meaning.

† BULL, *Defence*, etc., Conclusion, *ad init.*, E. T., p. 655.

secondly, that in that very nature He is of one substance with God the Father, that is [that] He is not of any created and mutable essence, but of a nature entirely the same with the Father, and consequently very God; thirdly, which is a consequence of this, that He is coeternal with God the Father, that is a divine Person, coexisting with the Father from everlasting; lastly, that He Himself is, nevertheless, subordinate to God the Father, as to His Author and Principle." Tertullian teaches, in other words, the preëxistence, consubstantiality, eternity and subordination of the Son, and likewise of the Spirit. What, then, lacks he yet of Nicene orthodoxy? It is this question which Bishop Bull presses; but, as he presses it, he only makes us aware that Nicene orthodoxy cannot quite be summed up in these four propositions. Meeting these four tests Tertullian yet falls short of Nicene orthodoxy, retaining still too great a leaven of the Logos-speculation. But that he is able to meet Bull's tests, which none of his predecessors or contemporaries can meet, indicates the greatness of the step he marks toward the Nicene orthodoxy.

That we may fairly call Tertullian the father of the Nicene theology there seems to be wanting nothing but some clear historical connection between his work and that of the Nicene fathers. It is over-exigent no doubt to demand an external proof of connection. The silent influence of Tertullian's discussion supplemented by that of Novatian* supplies a sufficient nexus. But we naturally desire to trace in some overt manifestations the working of this influence. A step toward providing this is afforded by the episode of the "two Dionysii," in which the Roman Dionysius out of his Western Trinitarian consciousness corrects and instructs his less well-informed Alexandrian brother, who had permitted himself to speak of our Lord after a fashion which betrayed the most unformed conceptions of the relations of the distinctions in the Godhead. The letter of Dionysius of Rome (259-269 A.D.) *Against the Sabellians*, a considerable portion of which has been preserved by Athanasius in his *Letter in Defense of the Nicene Definition*,† is very properly appealed to by Athanasius as an instance of Niceneism before Nice. It seems clearly to be dependent on Tertullian, though, as Harnack puts it, "no single passage in it can be pointed out which is simply transcribed from Tertullian, but Dionysius has, rather in opposition to the

* On the great influence of Novatian's treatise see BETHUNE-BAKER, *Early History*, etc., p. 191.

† Chapter vi or §§ 26-27 (*Post-Nicene Fathers*, II, iv, 167-168).

formula of Dionysius of Alexandria, developed further in the direction of orthodox Tertullian's Trinitarian doctrine."* Quite in the Roman manner† Dionysius turned the edge of his polemic as much against Tritheism as against Monarchianism, and thus, by insisting on "the gathering up of the Divine Triad into a summit," preserved the unity of the common essence and so helped forward to the formulation of the *homoousios*. Similarly by his insistence that the Son was no "creature" (ποίημα) and was not "made" (γεγονέναι) but "begotten" (γεννησθαι), he laid the foundations of the Nicene formula of "begotten, not made," which also thus goes back through him to Tertullian. Nothing could be more instructive than the emergence into the light of history of this instance in the latter half of the third century of the greater readiness of the West to deal with the Trinitarian problem than the East.

We need seek no other historical link, however, between Western orthodoxy and the East than that provided by "the great Hosius" himself, who was the channel by means of which the formulas beaten out in the West, primarily by Tertullian, were impressed on the East in the Nicene symbol. We are credibly told by Socrates‡ that Hosius disputed in Alexandria on "substance" (οὐσία) and "person" (ὑπόστασις) prior to the Nicene Council; and his dominant influence with the emperor as well as the prominent place he occupied in the Council itself afford sufficient account of the successful issue of that Council in establishing Tertullian's formula of "one substance and three persons"—the *ὁμοούσιος* in effect—as the faith of the whole Church.§ If despite Athanasius' hint that it was Hosius who "set forth the Nicene Faith,"|| we cannot quite say that Hosius was the "draftsman" of the Nicene Creed,¶ since that Creed was formally framed by a series of amend-

* *Sitzungsberichte* of the Berlin Academy of Sciences, 1895, II, 563.

† Callistus, Novatian, Dionysius.

‡ *Hist.* c. iii 7.

§ Cf. HARNACK, iv, 5, 11 and 50, 121, and *Sitzungsberichte*, etc., p. 364, especially the former references where the matter is argued. See also GAMS, *Kirchengeschichte von Spanien*, II, i, 140. When Socrates (iii. 7) tells us that on Hosius' visit to Alexandria in 324 τὴν περὶ οὐσίας καὶ ὑποστάσεως πεποιθῆναι ζήτησιν, we are tempted to see not only a priming of the Alexandrians for what was to come, by this Westerner, the heir of the Western Trinitarianism, but in the choice of the term 'hypostasis' for 'person' a reflection of Tertullian's *substantiva res*,—especially as we are told that Hosius was on this occasion especially zealous in guarding against Sabellian tendencies. We must not, however, push the details of Socrates' report too far.

|| *History of the Arians*, c. 42.

¶ Mr. BETHUNE-BAKER, *Homoousios*, etc., p. 11, note: "That Hosius—for many years previously the most influential bishop in the West, the intimate friend and trusted adviser of Constantine—was the real 'draftsman' of the Creed seems

ments out of a formula offered by Eusebius of Cæsarea, yet what is implied in such a statement is essentially true. Hosius was the effective author of the Nicene Creed, and that is as much as to say that in its fundamental assertions that Creed is a Western formulary,* and its roots are set in the teaching of Tertullian. It was thus given to Tertullian to mark out the pathway in which the Church has subsequently walked and to enunciate the germinal formulas by means of which the Arians were ultimately overcome.

It would be wrong, of course, to derive from these facts, striking as they are, the impression that Tertullian's influence was the only important force operative in the Church for the formation of the doctrine of the Trinity. It would be truer to see in Tertullian and in his definitions only one manifestation of a universally working tendency making steadily toward this end. Wherever the Rule of Faith, which was rooted in the formula of the baptismal commission, formed the fundamental basis of Christian belief, and wherever the data supplied by this Rule of

certain." LOOFS, *Herzog*³, VIII, 378: "That Hosius, the confidant of the emperor, was of great influence at the Synod of Nice lay in the nature of the circumstances, . . . and the statement of Athanasius that 'he set forth (*ἐξέθετο*) the faith at Nice' (*hist. Ar.*, 42), although not exact in its affirmation—for the Nicænum was framed by amendments out of a draft offered by Eusebius of Cæsarea—nevertheless is in essence true." ZAHN, *Marcellus von Ancyra*, p. 23: "Hosius from the beginning of the Arian controversies exerted the most decisive influence on the course of external events, *i.e.*, on the Emperor. It was due to him that Constantine came forward so positively for the *ὁμοούσιος*, that Eusebius could speak as if the Emperor were the actual originator of that term. Hosius is said to have raised the question concerning *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις* on the occasion of his visit to Alexandria, and Athanasius makes his enemies declare of him, 'It was he that set forth the faith at Nice' (*hist. Arian. ad men.*, 42)—by which he assigns him not merely a share in the development of the Nicene faith, as HEFELE supposes (I, p. 280), but a controlling influence in the debates on the faith which took place at Nice, and that means nothing less than in the choice of the formula." ZAHN adds that Socrates' statement of what happened in Alexandria finds support in the independent report of Philostorgius (I, 7), that Alexander had come to an understanding with Hosius as to the *ὁμοούσιος* before the Synod. It seems clear, in any event, that antiquity thought of Hosius as bearing the prime responsibility for the homoousios in the Nicene Creed.

* LOOFS, *Herzog*³, II, 15, 16: "The Nicænum became what it is under Western influences"; II, 14, 54: "The positive declarations of the symbol can be historically understood only when we remember that the emperor was a Westerner and . . . was directed by the advice of Western counsellors, especially Hosius"; IV, 45-46: "Only the influence of the West—Constantine (although he understood Greek) had Western counsellors—explains the acts of the Synod of Nice: the characteristic terminology of the Nicænum fits, in its entirety, only Western conceptions."

Faith were interpreted in the forms of the Logos-speculation, there was constantly in progress a strenuous effort to attain clarity as to the relations of the distinctions in the Name designated by the terms Father, Son and Holy Ghost. And this is as much as to say that every thinking man in the Church was engaged with all the powers of construction granted to him in working out this problem. Even the Monarchians themselves, to whom in the providence of God it was given to keep poignantly before the eyes of men the items of the faith which were likely to be neglected by the Logos-speculation, were yet apt to express themselves more or less in its terms.* Accordingly from the very beginning Christian literature is filled with adumbrations of what was to come. Already in Athenagoras Tertullian's doctrine of eternal pre-prolate distinctions in the Godhead almost came to birth; already in Theophilus Origen's doctrine of eternal generation seemed on the verge of conception. Least of all did the great Alexandrian divines wait for Tertullian's initiative. Origen, for example, his younger contemporary, and at once the calmest and profoundest thinker granted to the Church in the Ante-Nicene age, went his own independent way toward the same great goal. Only, Origen sought the solution of the problem not with Tertullian by separating the Logos from the cosmic processes and thereby carrying the distinctions in the Godhead, freed from all connection with activities *ad extra*, back into the mysteries of the innermost modes of the divine existence, but by pushing the cosmic processes themselves, along with the Logos, back into, if not the immanent, at least the eternal modes of the divine activity. Thus he gave the Church in full formulation the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son of God, indeed, but along with it also the doctrine of eternal creation: and by his failure to separate the Son from the world, with all that was, or seemed to be, involved in that, he missed becoming the father of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity by becoming instead—well or ill understood, but at least not unnaturally—the father of Arianism. It was not along this pathway that the Church doctrine of the Trinity was to be attained, but rather along that beaten out by the feet of Ter-

* The same is true also of the Montanists—to whom the function was committed of emphasizing the doctrine of the Spirit in the Church—if we can judge by the example and trust the testimony of Tertullian. HARNACK (E. T., iv, 108) is right in assigning to them an important place in the development of the doctrine of the Spirit: he is wrong in the specific function assigned them in this development. If we can judge by the example of Tertullian, the effect of their movement was to elevate and deepen the conception of the Spirit and His work.

tullian.* And this, simply because the Church doctrine of the Trinity could not come to its rights within the limits of the Logos-speculation, and Origen's construction preserved the essential elements of the Logos-speculation while Tertullian's prepared the way for transcending it.

To put the matter into somewhat abstract form, the immanent movement of Christian thought, we conceive, took some such course as the following. The Logos-speculation laid its stress on the gradations of deity manifested in the Logos and the Spirit, and just on that account did less than justice to the Church's immanent faith in which the Father, Son and Holy Ghost appeared as equal sharers in the Name. That justice might be done to the immanent faith of the Church, therefore, it was essential that the stress should be shifted from gradations of deity to the equality of the persons of the Godhead. This correction carried with it the confession not merely of the eternity of these persons, but also of their unchangeableness, since not only eternity but also unchangeableness is an essential attribute of deity, and must belong to each person of the Godhead if these persons are to be seriously conceived to be equal. That justice might be done to these conceptions, it obviously was not enough, then, that a basis for the prolations should be discovered in the eternal existence form of God, nor indeed merely that personal distinctions underlying these prolations should be carried back into eternity, nor merely that the prolations themselves should be pushed back into eternity. In the last case the eternal prolates must further be conceived as in no sense inferior to the unprolate deity itself, sharers in all its most intimate attributes—not only in its eternity and unchangeableness, therefore, but also in its exaltation, or in the speech of the time, its "invisibility," including self-existence itself. But so to conceive them involved, of course, the evisceration of the entire prolation speculation of its purpose and value—as may be readily perceived by reading in conjunction the chapters of Tertullian (who is still so far under the control of the Logos-speculation) in which he argues that "invisibility" is the peculiarity of the Father in distinction from the Son, the very characteristic of the Son being His "visi-

* HARNACK (E. T., iv, 110), speaking of the development of the doctrine of the Spirit, although he recognizes that in his doctrine of the pre-temporal *processio* of the Spirit Origen is in advance of Tertullian, for Tertullian does not teach this *explicitly* (see above, pp. 27-8), yet remarks that "by the *unius substantiæ*, which he regards as true of the Spirit also, Tertullian comes nearer the views that finally prevailed in the fourth century."

bility,"* and the discussion of Augustine† in which he solidly argues that the Son and Spirit are, because equally God with the Father, also equally "invisible" with the Father.‡ The orthodox doctrine of the Trinity could not become complete, in other words, until, under the pressure of the demand of the Christian consciousness for adequate recognition of the true and complete deity of the Son and Spirit, the whole conception of prolations of deity for specific functions had been superseded by a doctrine of eternally persisting personal distinctions in the Godhead itself. The way was prepared for this historically, no doubt, in large measure, by pushing the idea of prolation back into eternity, as Origen did, where it took the form of a doctrine of eternal generation and procession, and in so doing lost its primary significance and grew nigh to vanishing away,—

* *Cont. Prax.*, xiv-xvi.

† *de Trinitate*, II.

‡ There is, of course, a stream of better teaching running through the very fathers who denied "invisibility" to the prolate Logos in the interests of the Logos-speculation. The passage in Ignatius, *Ad. Ephes.* (end of c. iii) sets the norm of this better mode of speech. See also Melito, *Frag.*, 13 (Otto, p. 419), and Tertullian himself who, despite his elaborate "distinction of the Father from the Son by this very characteristic, that the Son is visible and the Father invisible," nevertheless, "in the very same book and chapter"—viz., the fourteenth chapter of the *adv. Prax.*, remarks "that the Son also, considered in Himself, is invisible" (*BULL*, IV, iii, 9). But the doctrine of the like invisibility of the Son with the Father came to its rights only with Augustine. On the whole subject of the patristic ideas of the "visibility" of the Logos and the "invisibility" of God as such, the discussions—which certainly involve no little special pleading—of *BULL*, Book IV, chap. iii, are well worth consulting. To the general student of doctrine these discussions of *BULL* have an additional interest, inasmuch as—although it doubtless would have shocked him to have had it suggested to him—his defense of the subordinationism of the fathers on the ground that they conceived it due not to any difference between the Father and Son in essence or attributes but to an "economy," is equivalent to attributing to the fathers and adopting for himself the essential elements of what is known in the history of doctrine as the "Covenant Theology"—a theology that was being taught by many Reformed theologians in *BULL*'s day. When *BULL* says of the fathers (IV, iii, 12, E. T., I., p. 615): "They by no means meant to deny that the Son of God, equally with the Father, is in His own nature immeasurable and invisible; but merely intimated this, that all such appearances of God, and also the incarnation itself, had reference to the economy which the Son of God undertook,"—he has only in other words enunciated the Covenant idea. When he adds: "Which economy is by no means suited to the Father inasmuch as He had not His origin from any beginning and is indebted for His authorship to none"—apart from his unwonted phraseology, he does not necessarily go beyond the Covenant theologians, who were quick to contend that the terms of "the Covenant" are themselves grounded in the intrinsic relations of the three persons. These, they taught, are such as made it proper and fit that each person should assume the precise functions He did assume—as, in a word, made it alone suitable that it should be the Son and Spirit who should be "sent" and not the Father, and the like. The alternatives, in a word, would appear to be either an Arianizing subordinationism or the Covenant theology: all other constructions are half views and inherently unstable.

for what is the value of an essential, eternal and unchangeable prolation of deity which, just because essential, eternal and unchangeable, can have no inherent relation to activities *ad extra*? But the real goal was attained only when the whole idea of prolation, thus rendered useless and meaningless, had fallen away, and the Logos-speculation gave place to something better. And it was Tertullian's definitions, not Origen's speculations, which prepared the way for the attainment of this goal. So that it was not Origen but Tertullian who became the real father of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.

It is, of course, quite possible to exaggerate the measure in which this revolution of thought is traceable in the pages of Tertullian. It is first discernible in its completeness in the expositions of Augustine two centuries later. But it seems sufficiently clear that the beginnings of the line of development which ended in Augustine are perceptible in Tertullian.* Their mark is his insistence on the equality of the Son and Spirit with the Father, an insistence in which he fairly enunciated the great conception afterward embodied in the term *homoousios*. Tertullian, however, still lived and moved and had his being under the spell of the Logos-speculation; he did not even perceive, as did Origen, that the notion of prolations before time must give way to the higher conception of eternal generation and procession—much less that even this latter conception is of doubtful utility. Athanasius himself, indeed, did not perceive this last—and therefore the Nicene doctrine of the Trinity, worked out under his inspiration, still preserves these shells of outlived speculation, the kernel of which has withered away.† The phraseology in which they are embodied keeps its place even in the forms of statement of Augustine. The hold which the Logos-speculation had on the minds of men is in nothing made more manifest than in such persistence of its forms in subsequent thought, after they had lost all their meaning. In very truth the Logos-speculation provided the common ground on which the whole world of fourth-century Christian thought still stood; and Arian differed from Athanasian largely only as the left wing differs from the right wing

* Even DORNER, who does not perceive that Tertullian had in principle separated the Divine Persons as such from the world-process, yet admits that in his "conception of the Three Persons as inwardly connected (as *concertos, coharentes*)" Tertullian's view "includes a speculative element, to which the later doctrine of the Church was long in attaining" (*Person of Christ*, I, ii, 76-77).

† Cf. the very judicious remarks of DORNER (*Person of Christ*, I, ii, 327 sq.) on the survivals in the Nicene construction: see also pp. 184, 203-4, 491.

of the same fundamental type of thinking.* The merit of Tertullian is that his definitions, though still adjusted to the forms of the Logos-speculation, had in them the potency of a better construction and were sure sooner or later to burst the shell in which they were artificially confined. In his recognition of the eternity of the personal distinctions in the Godhead apart from all questions of prolation, and in the emphasis he laid upon the equal deity of these persons, he planted fruitful seed which could not fail of a subsequent growth. Men might still cling to the old forms and seek merely to match the downward development which emphasized the distinction of the prolations from the fontal deity until it had degraded them into temporal creatures of the divine will, by emphasizing for themselves rather their eternity and their equality with God.† But by this very movement upward it was inevitable that the very idea of prolation, which was the core of the Logos-speculation, should lose its significance and be pushed first out of notice and then out of belief,—until the whole conception of a linear trinity should disappear and there should emerge the completed Trinitarianism of an Augustine, to whom the persons of the Trinity are not subordinate one to another but coördinate sharers of the one divine essence.

It is, of course, not the close of this process of thought that we see in Tertullian, but its beginning. But in him already appears the pregnant emphasis on the equality rather than the graded subordination of the personal distinctions in the Godhead, by the logical

* Cf. HAGEMANN, p. 134: "When the origin of the Son out of the essence of God is placed in immediate connection with the creation of the world, there is needed in the way of great logical acuteness only a single unimportant step to set the Son in the sense of an Arius alongside of the world, as creature and Creator. No doubt Origen had guarded against this by ascribing not to the Son only but to the world as well an eternal origin: but the latter necessarily fell away as an open contradiction to the creed, and so nothing remained except either to join the Son so essentially with the Father that now the idea of His deity would come to its full rights and He should be recognized as in His Being wholly independent of the origin of the world, by which there would necessarily be raised again the problem of the unity of essence of the Father and the Son; or else so to connect Him with the temporal origin of the world that He should fall thereby out of the circle of the divine life and be conceived as a kind of created God in Plato's sense, as an Under-God by the side of or rather beneath the Father, who would embrace the whole divine world in Himself, the one God over all. Already in the case of Dionysius of Alexandria we have noted in *theory* a tendency to this latter development, even though his faith-consciousness remained free from this evil. In the case of Arius the theory, however, obtained a decisive victory over the faith. . . ." In this passage, we conceive, the essential logical relations of Orthodoxy and Arianism to their common basis in the Logos-speculation are lucidly set forth. Cf. DORNER, as cited, pp. 267-80, and pp. 454-5.

† Cf. DORNER, as cited, p. 328.

inworking of which the whole change in due time came about. So far as we can now learn it was he first, therefore, who, determined to give due recognition to the elements of the Church's faith embodied in the Rule of Faith, pointed out the road over which it was necessary to travel in order to do justice to the Biblical data. Say that he was in this but the voice of the general Christian consciousness. It remains that it was left to him first to give effective voice to the Christian consciousness, and that it was only by following out the lines laid down by him to their logical conclusion that the great achievement of formulating to thought the doctrine of the Triune God was at length accomplished.

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II.

THE INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF SAMUEL MILLER.*

SOME years since, when it fell to me to deliver the opening address of the session, I told the story of the preparation of Archibald Alexander, our first Professor, for his professorship. I had occasion at that time, when speaking of the founding of the Seminary, to mention the name of Samuel Miller who, with Ashbel Green and Archibald Alexander, was most active in the labors which brought the Seminary into being. I could only mention his name and characterize him in a sentence or two; but to these sentences I added the remark: "I hope to do later what the time allotted to this opening lecture will not permit me to do now; namely, so to set before you the life, character and work of this great founder and benefactor of the Seminary as will leave on you the impression I have received of his high intellectual life." I emphasized particularly his intellectual life because, in the impression which the present generation has received of him, his intellectual character is by no means so distinct as his spirituality, his goodness and his courtesy. We shall all agree that the noblest and the most desirable memory a man can "leave to the next age" is one of which high moral and religious traits are the dominating elements; even if they are so dominating as greatly to obscure, if not entirely to hide, those which are distinctively intellectual. Something like this has happened to Dr. Miller. His pupils were so strongly impressed and influenced by his spirituality, his kindness, his refinement and his urbanity, that in their reminiscences of him they have dwelt on these almost exclusively. So that we, who belong to a later generation and have not had the advantage of personal contact with him, are apt when we think of him to do scant justice to his extraordinary gifts, his large knowledge, his power as a controversialist, his varied product as an author, the wide circulation of his publications, the great immediate influence they all exerted and the permanent benefit many of them have conferred on the Church

*The opening address of the session of 1905-06 at Princeton Theological Seminary.

and society. I think it due to him that some one in this town, in which he spent so large a part of his life, and connected with this Seminary, of which, as Archibald Alexander said, "Samuel Miller and Ashbel Green were its chief founders," should so tell the story of his life as to revive the impression which Dr. Miller made on his contemporaries.

This is the more important, because it was precisely the fine symmetry or proportion of his faculties which was especially noted by those best qualified to judge him. This fact is nowhere better presented than in the commemorative discourse of Dr. William B. Sprague. Dr. Sprague knew Dr. Miller as long ago as when the latter was one of the pastors of the Church in New York, and was one of his students in the Seminary and an intimate friend and frequent correspondent throughout his teacher's life. And than Dr. Sprague, whose intimate knowledge of the lives of American ministers from Colonial days onward was unexcelled if not unequalled, no one was more competent to express an opinion on a minister's intellectual character. "Dr. Miller's mind," writes Dr. Sprague, "was distinguished rather for that harmonious blending of all the faculties, which generally secures the highest amount of usefulness, than for the striking predominance of some one quality, which often attracts more notice and admiration. You could not say that he was deficient in any faculty; you could not say that he exceeded others in any; but you could say that he exceeded most others in the symmetry and completeness of the intellectual man. His perceptions, if not remarkably quick, were remarkably clear; he hated intellectual and moral darkness, and knew how to distinguish between profound investigation and the wild sallies of an ambitious and dreamy philosophy. He had a ready and retentive memory, in which were carefully treasured the results of his study and observation. He had a sound discriminating judgment which never leaped in the dark and usually reached its conclusions by a legitimate process. If his imagination was not strikingly prolific, his taste was uncommonly exact; and every effort of the former was subject to the rigid control of the latter. He possessed in a high degree that admirable quality, common sense; which is so eminently a discerner of times and seasons, and which, even in the absence of what are usually considered the higher intellectual endowments, may be a security for an honorable and useful life. He had an unusually safe mind; a mind that moved luminously, effectively, yet cautiously; a mind that you would trust amidst agitating and convulsive scenes, and not be afraid to

read the report of its opinions and decisions. I remember," continues Dr. Sprague, "to have heard that the celebrated Joseph Priestly was much struck with the character of his mind while Dr. Miller was yet a very young man; and, little as he sympathized in his views of Christian doctrine, predicted that, if his life were spared, he would attain to great eminence in his profession." "Of his ability, learning and fidelity," said Archibald Alexander at his colleague's funeral, "there are hundreds of witnesses scattered over the land. No member of our Church has done more to explain and defend her doctrines than our deceased brother." †

It is a great pleasure to me that the duty of delivering the opening address of the session affords me the opportunity to unfold, as well as I may in so short a time, the life of the second Professor of the Seminary, with a view especially to bringing before you his intellectual character and work. Unfortunately, his life was so full and our time is so short, that I must necessarily do him injustice.

His first ancestor in this country bearing his family name was John Miller, his grandfather, who was born in Scotland. John Miller migrated to America in 1710, and made his home in Boston. He was a young man of good education, having a good knowledge of Latin. He was bred to the business of sugar refining. He established in Boston and carried on with success a sugar refinery and distillery. He became a member of the Old South Church. His wife, Dr. Miller's grandmother, was Mary Bass. Through his grandmother, Dr. Miller was related to the Rev. Edward Bass, the first Protestant Episcopal Bishop of Massachusetts, who died only three or four years before Dr. Miller began his defense of the validity of Presbyterian ordination against the exclusive claims of the Episcopalians of New York. Through his great-grandmother, Ruth Alden, Dr. Miller was descended from John Alden and Priscilla Mullins of the *Mayflower* and the Plymouth Colony, the hero and heroine of Longfellow's poem, *The Courtship of Miles Standish*. Dr. Miller's father, also John Miller, was born in Boston in 1722, and studied for the ministry. Licensed in 1748 by the Association to which his pastor, the Rev. Dr. Sewall of the Old South Church, belonged, Mr. Miller was called to Delaware, to the pastorate of the Presbyterian Churches of Dover and Duck Creek Cross Roads. He was ordained in Boston in 1749, and soon after moved to his new home. Here he lived until his death in 1791; a studious and devoted minister of the Gospel; a patriot also, devoted to the cause of the Colonies during the War for Independence. His life was one of great hardship. He lived on a farm the products of which were designed to

supplement his meagre stipend. The climate he found debilitating. Probably the lack of underdrainage, common in new countries, was more responsible than the climate for the languor and frequent illnesses with which he suffered. But the state of his health did not prevent him from doing his full work as the pastor of two churches widely separated, and doing it well. His Scottish and English blood united with his Puritanism to make him an uncommonly strong character. He stood firmly for his convictions in State and Church. He defended the rebellious Colonies; and without hesitation gave his blessing to his eldest son and namesake, a young physician as, early in the war, he joined the army as a surgeon. The son went through the anxious and severe campaign which included the battles of Princeton and Trenton, and died of exhaustion before its conclusion, after having earned and received from the department surgeon, the highest eulogy as a physician, a patriot and a man. The death of his son only deepened and made sacred the father's devotion to the cause to which the son gave his life. In the Church he fought strenuously for a large infusion of Congregationalism in the Presbyterian Church. After the adoption of the Form of Government and the organization of the General Assembly, he would not attend any judicatory higher than the Presbytery. In 1751, John Miller married Margaret Millington, the daughter of an English sea captain who had become a planter in Maryland. She was born an Episcopalian but, soon after her marriage, became a member of her husband's Church. She was a woman of great beauty, of ardent piety and of large benevolence; of whom her distinguished son writes long afterward: "I never think of her character without veneration, wonder and gratitude."

They had a family of nine children, of whom two died in childhood. Of those who lived to maturity, five were sons. Dr. Samuel Miller's son and biographer is able to make this remarkable statement concerning his grandfather: "With many temptations in his secluded residence and straitened circumstances to slight the literary culture of his children or content himself with a business training for his sons, he nevertheless made out to give every one of them that lived beyond childhood an education counted liberal in those times. The five sons he himself, assisted with the younger by the older, instructed with great care in the Latin and the Greek languages, and sent them afterward, four to the University of Pennsylvania where they were regularly graduated Bachelors of Arts, and one to a Seminary of almost collegiate reputation."

Of these parents, on the thirty-first day of October, 1769, two

years and a half before the birth of Archibald Alexander, Samuel Miller was born. During his early boyhood the great events of the Revolutionary War occurred. When eighteen years old, he was in Philadelphia during the sessions of the Constitutional Convention. "He often spoke of standing within the great hall of entrance of the State House, to observe the members of the Convention as they went to and from the chamber where they sat with closed doors." He also attended, as a deeply interested spectator, the first General Assembly of the Church of which he was to become so eminent a minister. He saw John Witherspoon call it to order, and John Rodgers, who was the intimate friend of his father and afterward his own colleague in the New York Church, and whose biography he wrote, preside over its deliberations as Moderator.

The school in which Samuel Miller passed through the most of the curriculum leading to the bachelor's degree was held in his father's house. His teachers were his father and his older brothers. They carried him successfully through the studies of the first three years of the college course; so that in 1788, when he was between eighteen and nineteen years of age, he was admitted to the Senior class of the University of Pennsylvania. So well had he been prepared and so gifted and studious did he show himself, that he was graduated in 1789 with the "first honor" of his class; and he delivered on commencement day the Latin Salutatory. The Provost of the University was the Rev. John Ewing, who was also the pastor of the First Presbyterian Church of Philadelphia. Dr. Ewing was one of the notable men of his day; a fine classical scholar, a man of scientific tastes and studies, a great administrator and the leader in Philadelphia of the Presbyterian Church. Dr. Ewing strongly influenced young Miller; and no more appreciative paper on his preceptor has been written than that contributed long afterward by Dr. Miller to Sprague's *Annals of the American Pulpit*.

Mr. Miller had already confirmed the vows of his baptism and become a communicant of his father's Church. During his College life the question of his son's future profession was a source of continual thought, it would hardly be right to say anxiety, to the father. The son did not determine the question for himself until he had been graduated and had returned to his home. It is characteristic of him that he approached it with deliberation and in a profoundly religious spirit. He set apart a day for its special consideration. He made it a day of fasting and prayer. "Before the day was closed," he writes in his diary, "after much deliberation and, I

hope, some humble looking for divine guidance, I felt so strongly inclined to devote myself to the work of the ministry, that I resolved in the Lord's name on the choice." The paper from which I have quoted is calm and serious. It does not breathe the spirit of the mystic. It is clearly the declaration of a man of judicial mind, who has reached a conclusion after the most conscientious study of his duty. What was true of most of the conclusions reached by Dr. Miller in later life was true of this one: he had no reason to reconsider or regret it. With the straightforwardness and sanity which always characterized him, he began at once to read divinity with his father. A few days later he wrote to his friend, Dr. Ashbel Green, then pastor of the Second Church in Philadelphia, requesting advice as to authors in theology, and announcing his intention of attending, after a year's study at home, the theological lectures of Dr. Nesbit, then President of Dickinson College.

In the midst of these studies his life was clouded by the death first of his mother and then of his father. It was an awful experience. He was sustained throughout it by his unfaltering faith, and emerged from it chastened in spirit, strengthened in character and fitted, as by nothing else he could have been, for the beginning of his great career as preacher and pastor. In the autumn of 1791, just after his father's death, he was licensed by the Presbytery of Lewes, and the succeeding winter he spent in Carlisle, to enjoy and be profited by the personal instruction of Dr. Nesbit. He lived as a member of Dr. Nesbit's family; and though he had not the benefit of hearing the celebrated course of theological lectures, he had, what was no doubt better, the privilege of daily intimate conversation with him. Dr. Miller has left on record his high estimate of Dr. Nesbit, and also his deep impression "of the immense advantage to be derived from coming into contact daily in the domestic circle with an acute, active and richly furnished mind." My belief is, that to this easy and habitual companionship with his teacher is largely due the ease with which Mr. Miller soon after threw himself into the learned society of New York, the ease also at which he put every one of his students, and the happiness they always found in conference with him in his own study.

In the spring of 1792 he went to New York to visit a Long Island Church "to which he had been invited as a candidate." In New York City he called on Dr. Rodgers, the friend of his father and the senior pastor of the Collegiate Presbyterian Churches of the city. At Dr. Rodgers' suggestion he remained for two weeks in New York, and preached several times in Dr. Rodgers' pulpit. He

then sailed up Long Island Sound to Newport, and from Newport he rode to Boston. He extended his travels in New England to Portsmouth, and returned through Connecticut. During his absence the United Congregations of the Churches of New York extended him a call to become one of the collegiate pastors. Before he had determined either to accept or decline it, his father's Church, of which he was born a member, earnestly urged him to become his father's successor. The simultaneous calls to these two fields of labor were striking testimonies to his ability, charm and character.

At the meeting of Presbytery both invitations were put into his hands and he accepted the call to New York. He began his twenty years pastorate in that city in January, 1793. New York in 1793 was, in population, the second city in the United States. Philadelphia was the metropolis; but New York, with forty-one thousand people, was rapidly pushing forward to the first place. It had, as it has at present, a less homogeneous population than either of its rivals, Boston or Philadelphia. And though more than a score of years were to elapse before the completion of the great canal which unites the lakes and the ocean at its harbor, its foreign trade was growing rapidly at the expense of that of Newport, of Boston and of Philadelphia. Presbytery was the earliest form of Church order organized on Manhattan island. But it was the Presbyterianism of the continent of Europe, and its Dutch Reformed Churches were held by ecclesiastical ties to the mother country during the very period when the Presbyterian Churches, having a British origin, were uniting to form a distinctively American Presbyterian Church. Besides the Collegiate Dutch Churches, the German Presbyterians had a Church and pastor, and so had the Scottish Seceders. The Presbyterians connected with the Synod, afterward the General Assembly of the United States of America, had begun to unite for worship in New York early in the eighteenth century. They suffered no little persecution from the English Governor, Lord Cornbury; but were finally organized as a Church in 1716. In 1719, the first house of worship was built; to this was added the Brick Church; and, three years after the settlement of Dr. Miller, the Rutgers Street Church was built to meet the needs of the growing population. The pastorate was collegiate; and each minister was the minister of the three congregations.

The senior pastor was the Rev. John Rodgers; one of the noblest figures among the ministers of the Revolutionary period; a man of strong character and deep piety. He was the sole pastor of the

Church at a time when such a man was needed to secure for the Presbyterian Church a position of influence in the city. The unfortunate separation of the Reformed Churches along national lines enabled the Episcopalian ministers, aided by Lord Cornbury, to assume that the Dutch Churches had a standing, owing to their connection with the Church of the Netherlands, to which the other Presbyterian Churches had no claim; and they did their best to fix upon the latter the name "Dissenters," one of the names given to the Presbyterians of England after the restoration of the Stuarts. The early years of Dr. Rodgers' pastorate were for this reason exceedingly trying. It would be difficult to exaggerate the benefit which our Church in New York City derived from the respect for himself and his office as a minister of the Church of Christ which Dr. Rodgers' strong and high character won from the community. The recognition he received when called to preside at the sessions of the First General Assembly was eminently merited. Younger than Dr. Rodgers, yet fifteen years older than himself, was Mr. Miller's other colleague, Dr. John McKnight, who, though he has not made so deep a mark on the life of the Church as either Rodgers or Miller, was a man of ability and learning, and a preacher of earnestness and power.

Mr. Miller was ordained and installed on the 5th of June, and at once made a favorable impression on the community. He was only twenty-five years of age. Dr. John H. Livingston was pastor of the Dutch, and Dr. John M. Mason of the Scotch Church. Dr. Livingston, though Scottish in his blood, had been educated in the Netherlands, and was a noble preacher and a learned man. Dr. Mason was one of the greatest pulpit orators of a period which produced Robert Hall and Thomas Chalmers, and his reputation was as high in Great Britain as in America. Mr. Miller very soon became a popular preacher in the community accustomed to the preaching of Livingston and Mason. If you were to read the sermons delivered by him during the early years of his ministry and published, as many of them were, you would see that they lack the distinguishing traits of twentieth century discourses. The eighteenth century, a retrospect of which he afterward wrote, yielded to him his models as a writer. His style was balanced and ceremonious, and his discussion was so elaborate as to be tiresome to us who are apt to see the highest achievement of style in the condensed epigram or the brilliant paragraph. But his sermons were written not for us but for a people who had learned to love the flowing sentences of *Rasselas*, and who were ardent admirers of the elaborate eloquence of Edmund Burke.

Had Mr. Miller been content with the popularity he so soon achieved, we may be sure that his career in New York would have been a brief one, and that we should not be meeting to-day to commemorate him. He brought, however, to the duties of his position a high ideal of the pastor's life. His native social gifts had been cultivated in his own growing family connections and in the admirable circle of society to which he was admitted while living in Philadelphia, at the house of his sister, as a student in the University. His good-will toward all he met, his affability and real courtesy, his ease and grace of manner and his love of social life made him at once what we are apt to call a social success. He learned to meet and converse with others without constraint; and his distinctively pastoral duties became a great pleasure to himself and his parishioners. His calls on the members of his congregation were not mere social visits. Few young ministers had undergone heavier affliction than he had; and no man ever esteemed more highly the personal ministrations of the consolations of Christianity than he esteemed them at this time, coming to his parish as he did from the newly made graves of his parents. In that series of letters called *Clerical Manners*, which embodies the highest wisdom and which might well be made the enchiridion of every pastor, Dr. Miller is only writing out of his own fidelity when he says: "If you desire to gain the love and confidence of your people; if you wish to instruct and edify them in a great variety of ways which the nature of pulpit address does not admit; if you deem it important to be well acquainted with their situation, views, feelings, difficulties and wants, then visit every family belonging to your congregation frequently, systematically and faithfully"; and when he gives this counsel concerning the self-inspection of the pastor; "Never retire from any company without asking yourself; 'What have I said for the honor of my Master, and for promoting the everlasting welfare of those with whom I conversed? What was the tenor of my conversation? What opportunity of recommending religion have I neglected to improve? From what motives did I speak or keep silence? In what manner did I converse? With gentleness, modesty, humility, and yet with affectionate fidelity; or with harshness, with formality, with ostentation, with vanity, and from a desire to avoid censure or to court popular applause?'" It was in the spirit of a lover of the cure of souls and with the ease and refinement of a cultivated gentleman, that young Samuel Miller went from house to house in his frequent, systematic and faithful visits. We can easily understand the solace that his senior colleague, the saintly

and venerated Dr. John Rodgers, himself one of the finest examples of the Christian pastor, must have found in his old age in the pastoral labors of the son of his old friend, whom he exerted his influence to secure as his co-laborer and successor.

Mr. Miller's fidelity as a pastor was put to the severest test. New York, then a city of fifty thousand people, was visited by the yellow fever. Half of the population left the city. In three months one-tenth of those who remained were dead. In the two collegiate Churches of which Dr. Miller was pastor, nearly two hundred fell victims to the pestilence. Throughout the visitation Dr. Miller remained in the city. His elder brother Edward was practicing medicine in New York and had become eminent in his profession. Charles Brockden Brown, the novelist, writes of Dr. Edward Miller and with special reference to this epidemic: "His skill exceeds that of any other physician." The two brothers were indefatigable in their labors for the sick; and though, as Samuel says, "they were both mercifully borne through the raging epidemic without any serious attack," they were exhausted when the fever had spent its force. The increased visits and the almost daily funerals might well have excused the young pastor had he omitted some of his public services. But "though only a few attended public worship," he preached every Lord's Day; and in his journal he moralizes, in the spirit of Thucydides when writing on the plague in Athens, over the diminished sensibility of the population and of himself, wrought by familiarity with "scenes of mourning and of horror."

The marked ability which he had shown in the pulpit and his fidelity to the duties of a pastor led the First Presbyterian Church of Philadelphia, just when the pestilence had abated or been overcome, to invite him to its pulpit as the colleague of the Rev. Dr. Ewing. This is a remarkable tribute to his character and gifts. Before he had reached thirty years of age he had thus been called to the most important pulpits of the two largest cities of the land.

It was while pressed with the cares and busied with the work of his pastorate that Dr. Miller first revealed the distinct character of his intellectual taste, and entered upon the historical studies and investigations in which he always delighted. His colleague, Dr. Archibald Alexander, from the time of his contact with his teacher, William Graham, exhibited a strong taste and aptitude for investigation in the sphere of abstract truth. Dr. Miller, so far as I have been able to learn, never discovered any deep interest in metaphysics, or in the kindred science of systematic theology. Whatever was the natural bent of his mind, he lived

intellectually in the sphere of the concrete. Of course he had theological convictions, and he could state and defend them, and they were in full accord with the faith of the Reformed Churches. But he was never a systematic theologian because he loved especially that study, as his colleague and so many New England divines loved it. His taste was historical. He was interested most in living men, in corporate institutions, in the Church of Christ, its organization, its ministry and discipline, and in the pastoral office, in the principles and rules of its right conduct. Hence his large literary product is mainly historical and biographical. The biographies or biographical sketches of Rodgers, Nesbit and the elder Edwards, the massive *Retrospect of the Eighteenth Century*, are works he produced without a sense of drudgery, because they sprang out of his native gift and taste. And in all his polemic works, as his letters on Prelacy, his defense of Presbytery, and his work on the Ruling Elder, his chief and best stated arguments are historical. Indeed, I think we may say, not only that his taste for historical study was his intellectual distinction, but that of the professors of this Seminary he has given to the world the most important historical product. I do not forget that Dr. Addison Alexander sympathized with Dr. Miller's distaste (if in Dr. Miller's case so strong a word can be used) for abstract study. But Dr. Alexander's strong literary and linguistic determination gave a special direction to his love of concrete facts. Nor do I forget that among Dr. Charles Hodge's works not the least valuable is his *Constitutional History of the Presbyterian Church*. But valuable as the *Constitutional History* is, we shall all agree that, in a good sense to be sure but in a real sense, it is a "tendency writing," the motive of which is to be found in systematic theology and not in history itself. Samuel Miller is by eminence our historian. And I think this a good point in my address at which to say that, considering the variety of his labors, the number and the character of his historical writings justify the statement that they exhibit historical talent of an exceptionally high order.

I say this now, because his love of historical work showed itself and his historical work began at just this time. As early as 1797, "he petitioned the Legislature of New York to allow him to search the records of the public offices of the State" under favorable conditions. This was with a view to his writing a History of the State of New York. None of Dr. Miller's ancestry settled in New York; but the native or acquired bent of his mind uniting with his residence in the metropolis impelled him to the work; and he organized a

method of search into the sources of New York's history which reveals that a high and severe ideal of study governed him. It was his interest in the actual movement of human life which led him to unite with other gentlemen of the city in organizing the New York Historical Society in 1804. He became its Corresponding Secretary. And the first historical paper published in its earliest volume is a discourse delivered by him commemorating the discovery of Manhattan Island by Hendrick Hudson.

The project of writing a History of the State of New York he was obliged to set aside for the time and, after he became professor at Princeton, finally to abandon. But while still in New York, and just at the beginning of the nineteenth century, he delivered to his congregation a sermon on the century just then closed. So impressed were those who listened to it with the writer's grasp of the subject and with its admirable generalizations, that they asked for its publication. The writer, on the contrary, was struck with its fragmentary character and its incompleteness in every sense. His dissatisfaction with it led him to plan and to write in three volumes the First Part (for he had in mind three more parts) of *The Retrospect of the Eighteenth Century*. During the past summer I read it with great pleasure and profit, and I wish to speak of it for a few moments.

The copy I read is the London edition in three volumes. As I have said, it is only the first of the four parts which he planned to write. Had he completed the work as he had projected it, it would have required at least ten or twelve octavo volumes. The three parts which he did not write were intended to set forth the theology, the moral theories and the politics of the century. The first part is complete in itself. Its title-page is as follows. "*A brief Retrospect of the Eighteenth Century, Part the First; in three volumes; containing a sketch of the Revolutions and Improvements in Science, Arts and Literature, during that period. By Samuel Miller, A.M., London, 1805.*" The work is dedicated to his father's and his own friend, John Dickinson, eminent as a soldier and statesman in Pennsylvania and Delaware, and a patron of the college at Carlisle which was given his name. Each of its three octavo volumes contains over four hundred pages. The titles of the chapters will best show the large design that this young and burdened pastor dared to entertain and to execute. Chapter first is on Mechanical Philosophy distributed into sections on Electricity, Galvanism, Magnetism, Motion and Moving Forces, Hydraulics, Pneumatics, Optics and Astronomy. The second is on Chemical Philoso-

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phy; and the others follow on Medicine, Geography, Mathematics, Navigation, Agriculture, Mechanic Arts, The Fine Arts, Physiognomy, Classic Literature, Oriental Literature, Modern Languages, The Philosophy of Language, History, Biography, Romances and Novels, Poetry, Literary and Political Journals, Literary and Scientific Associations, Encyclopedias and Scientific Dictionaries, Education, Nations lately become Literary, as Russia, Germany and the United States—the whole work ending with a recapitulation of the subject.

If the scope of the work was ambitious, nothing could have been more modest than the claims for himself made by the author in the Preface and the Introduction. He was at great pains to bring to the attention of the reader his own limitations, the necessarily superficial or, at least, general character of his narratives, and the fact that it must be thought of as a compilation. Nor do these disclaimers impress one as mere ceremony, but as the modesty of a man who really knew his subject. When one turns from the prefatory chapters to the book itself, he soon discerns that if it is a compilation, it is so in the sense in which every historical work, particularly every historical work embracing a great variety of subjects, must be a compilation. It is clear that before he wrote, his acquisitions passed through the alembic of a strong intelligence, for they reappear upon the pages of his book as distinctively his own. His sympathetic appreciation of intellectual achievements as wide apart as many of those recorded by Mr. Miller justifies one in saying of him that his mind must have been exceptionally catholic and hospitable; and that he was finely endowed with powers of acquisition. The "safe judgment," of which Dr. Sprague speaks so strongly in his commemorative discourse, shows itself in nearly every discussion. The author in the Preface, while calling attention to the fact that the work is a compilation, adds: "Yet the writer claims to be something more than a mere compiler. He has offered where he thought proper opinions, reflections and reasonings of his own; and though many of these are adopted perhaps too hastily from others, there are some of which all the praise and all the blame belong to himself." It is characteristic of the man, that if his judgments of men and of their attainments err, they err on the side of charity. Indeed, anticipating the criticisms of some religious readers, he feels bound at the beginning to remind them that "a man who is a bad Christian may be a very excellent mathematician, astronomer or chemist; and one who denies or blasphemes the Saviour may write profoundly and instructively on some branches of science highly interesting to mankind."

I think Dr. Miller's style is at its best in the *Retrospect*; and when at its best his style is admirable for the purposes of the historian. In his Preface and Introduction there is, to be sure, not a little of the conventionality, perhaps we may say artificiality, of the period: but as he proceeds this passes away, and the style becomes lucid and natural, without losing any of its grace or dignity. Of course, he was aided by correspondents. His one real co-laborer was his brother, Dr. Edward Miller, to whose learning and ability at a later date, when his brother passed away, he paid a high and loving tribute.

No one can examine the work even cursorily without justifying the high position to which it raised the author in the esteem of his contemporaries. It was widely read in America and was, as I have said, soon republished in London. The impression it made of the author's talents and knowledge called out friendly protests against the modesty of the Preface and Introduction. Union College and University of Pennsylvania hastened to confer upon him the degree of Doctor of Divinity, and he was at once elected a corresponding member of more than one foreign learned society.

I have selected the *Retrospect* for detailed notice because, unless we except the letters on clerical manners, it is the most genial of his literary works. It was written at that happy period of life when, though the ardor of youth has not abated, the judgment has been matured by experience; when acquirement is still easy, but when a sense of perspective has been attained by which acquisitions can be valued, and a large enough body of knowledge has been secured to enable the writer to correlate its elements. I am sure, that if you read the *Retrospect*, you will agree with me that nothing can be further removed than it is from the hasty and ill-considered work of the mere literary hack; and that if Dr. Miller had written nothing else, this of itself would have justified the honorable place he held among American authors of the period and his reputation as a man of large knowledge, strong intelligence, varied intellectual sympathies, and as, if not a great writer, at least, a writer of clear, strong and graceful English prose.

But this was not the only work he wrote at this period. Completed, as it was, under the hard conditions of feeble health and a laborious pastorate, it was scarcely finished when he was called to defend the ministry of his Church against an able and violent attack on its legitimacy. I suppose that until the whole Christian world is united in accepting either monarchy or democracy in the

Civil Government, the debate between Episcopacy and Presbytery in the Church will continue. Such a debate took place in New York at the beginning of the nineteenth century, as the result immediately of the publication by the Rev. John Henry Hobart, then rector of Trinity Episcopal Church, New York, and afterward Bishop of that Diocese, of a volume entitled *A Companion for the Altar*, to which he soon added *A Companion for the Festivals and the Fasts*. In these works Mr. Hobart took the position, logically involved in the Episcopalian premises, which is now so well known. But it was not so well known at that time in New York; for the exigencies of a new community had, just after the Revolution, effected, between the Episcopalians and Presbyterians of New York City, a *modus vivendi*, which involved courtesies not hospitable to controversy. Mr. Hobart, a man of marked ability and of convictions, felt that the time had come to assert the characteristic claims of his communion; and he did so with a frankness which left nothing to be desired. It seemed to Dr. Miller, as it did to his contemporary, Dr. John M. Mason, that both truth and self-respect demanded the vindication of Presbyterian ordination; and the vindication was carried forward with such spirit and learning and address by these two ministers as gave our Episcopalian friends plenty of work for several years. Dr. Miller's part in the vindication was published in a series of *Letters on the Christian Ministry*, in which what one of his reviewers calls, "his happy talent for the composition of a book," is conspicuous. Of course, the debate was even then an old one. So thoroughly had the materials been wrought over in the controversies through five reigns of British sovereigns that it would have been remarkable had any real addition to the argument been made by the combatants on either side. But if Dr. Miller did not add materially to the argument, he showed adequate scholarship, marshaled the proofs for Presbyterianism with great ability and popular effect, and kept his temper better than any of his opponents. What the Episcopalians wrote to cheer their champions after the conflict I do not know; but Dr. Miller, I am sure, must have felt himself compensated for his labors by the letters he received from two jurists like Brokholst Livingston, then a Justice of the United States Supreme Court, and James Kent, the Chancellor and author of the Commentaries, and from Noah Webster, the lexicographer. I wish that time permitted me to quote their earnest language of satisfaction and of praise.

Necessary as the composition and publication of his vindication

of his ministry seemed to him to be on grounds of self-respect and in the interest of the truth, polemical writing, I take it, he did not find a pleasure. Far more congenial was the third work written by him during his New York pastorate: I mean his biography of the Rev. Dr. John Rodgers. It is a piece of admirable biographical work. But it is more. Dr. Miller felt that he could not do justice to Dr. Rodgers without bringing forward the large relations he sustained to the State, and in particular to his communion. In this way it became not only an interesting biography, but a most valuable contribution to history; so that one, writing of it thirty years after its publication, justly spoke of it as a "richly replenished storehouse, in which Dr. Miller has introduced, naturally and appropriately, nearly everything that was known thirty years ago of the history of our Church." Besides these three considerable works, making five volumes, there were published during his pastorate in New York not less than twenty-five discourses and essays.

I have already spoken of the recognition of his talents and services by Union College and the University of Pennsylvania. But there were still more grateful recognitions. He was elected Moderator of the General Assembly. He was made a Trustee of Princeton College. When Andover Seminary was about to be established, he was urged to permit his election to one of its chairs. Dickinson College, Hamilton College, and the University of North Carolina each called him to its presidency. Dr. Ashbel Green, writing of his own election to the presidency of Princeton College, says: "Dr. Miller, without my knowledge or suspicion, had gone to every member of the Board and persuaded them to give me a unanimous vote, and to throw the responsibility of rejecting it on myself. Dr. Miller himself," he adds, "was the man that I had determined to nominate as the President of the College." I think we may safely say, that no other minister of our Church, at the time of which I am speaking, was so widely and favorably known as Dr. Miller, none was more admired as a man of great and varied gifts and learning, and none was more highly respected as a man of lofty character and of wisdom in counsel.

Like his friends, Ashbel Green and Archibald Alexander, he was fruitful in projects for extending the Church's influence and usefulness, and fertile in resource when trying to give his plans effect. I cannot even name them. Of one of them, however, it would be a grave omission not to speak in this place. Dr. Archibald Alexander, speaking at Dr. Miller's funeral, and setting aside his own important services, said: "No man in the Church was more zealous

and active in founding this institution. He and Dr. Green may more properly be considered its founders than any other persons." It would be invidious to institute any comparison in amount and value between the labors of Dr. Green and those of Dr. Miller in the establishment of this Seminary. No such comparison was made while they were living, and we are not in a condition to decide between them now. Certainly, Dr. Green took the first public action, which was the overture sent by him to the Assembly of 1805. But this overture appears itself to have been in large part the result of a letter written to him by Dr. Miller in which he said, as he had in substance said before: "I cannot help again mentioning my anxiety about the scarcity of ministers in our connection. I cannot help thinking that measures more speedy and vigorous ought to be contemplated. If anything can be done, I know of no individual either likely or able to do a tenth part so much as yourself in this very interesting matter." The overture followed the letter; and the two worked together in the most absolute harmony, until the Seminary was established and the services of Dr. Archibald Alexander were secured for its professorship.

Dr. Miller's large and complex work as a pastor in New York, as a patriotic public-spirited citizen, as a diligent student of his Church's and his country's history, and as one of the most influential and active ministers of his communion, was greatly aided, and many of his burdens transmuted into pleasures, by his enviable temperament, his deep Christian interest in individuals, and his fine gift for friendship and for social life. "He was a gentleman of the old school," writes Dr. James W. Alexander, "though as easy as he was noble in bearing; full of conversation, brilliant in company, rich in anecdote and universally admired." Probably, no minister of his day had a larger circle of correspondence or enjoyed his correspondence more. Among these, I am quite sure, were nearly all, if not all, of the more prominent ministers of the Presbyterian Church, and a large number of eminent ministers in New England. I have read the names of at least twenty-five of his foreign correspondents. And among those in America who were not ministers, it is interesting to find the names of John Adams, the second President, to whom he was related through his Bass ancestors, John Jay, the great Chief Justice, and James Kent, the Chancellor and great law writer. Among his ministerial friends living at a distance, he was perhaps most intimate with Ashbel Green, Edward Dorr Griffin and Eliphalet Nott, a group of notable men. His abundant hospitality was made more delightful than ever in 1804. For in that year he mar-

ried, in Philadelphia, Sarah Sergeant, the daughter of the Hon. Jonathan Dickinson Sergeant, an eminent lawyer of the Philadelphia Bar and the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth; a descendant of both President Jonathan Dickinson of the College of New Jersey and the Rev. Elihu Spencer of Trenton. Sarah Sergeant's brothers, John and Thomas, deservedly attained great eminence in public life; and she had as strong and active a mind as either of her brothers. Her social life in Philadelphia before her marriage, the exceptional charm of her person and manners and character, and her deep interest in religion united in preparing her for the social life to which her marriage introduced her. It would be pleasant to dwell longer on Dr. Miller's pastorate in New York. I can only say, that before it closed, the collegiate relation between the Pastors and the three Churches was dissolved. Dr. Miller became the Pastor of what is now known as the First Church; and before his pastorate closed led his Church in the work of building a new house of worship in Wall street.

Dr. Miller's life in New York was ended by his acceptance in 1813 of the call of the General Assembly to the professorship of Church History and Church Government in this institution. He left behind him in New York a vigorous and united congregation and one deeply attached to him. While they did not think proper to make any opposition to it, "they deeply lamented the proposed separation of their pastor." Dr. Miller, though he accepted the call, felt deeply, as any one called from the pastorate to a chair like that of Church History must feel, his want of special study; and he expressed this feeling in his diary. But the Church at large had no such feeling. He had shown, as no other man in the Church had shown, a deep interest in historical subjects, and the ability to produce valuable historical literature. Even before he was called to the chair he had been elected the official historian of the Church. His conviction of the Scriptural character of the Church's government and discipline and the Apostolic character of its ordination, he had defended with special scholarship and with marked ability in a great public controversy. And, so far as those subjects might be taught by him, his distinguished career as a preacher and pastor were the best guarantee of his ability to instruct the students in homiletics and pastoral theology. The whole Church was confident that the wisest choice possible had been made; and Dr. Alexander welcomed his friend of many years most cordially as his colleague.

The two men admirably supplemented each other in their gifts and

learning. The intellects of both of them were richly endowed by nature, and both were exceptionally industrious in their cultivation, and eager to seize every opportunity to increase their knowledge. It has not seldom been said that in native gifts they present a striking contrast. I am not at all sure that they do. Why Samuel Miller should not have become deeply interested in metaphysical and ethical studies, had he been taught by William Graham; or why Archibald Alexander should not have become enthusiastic in the investigation of the facts of human history had he been educated by John Ewing and at once been called to a city like New York or Philadelphia, I do not know. And why may we not say, that the spontaneous speech of the one and the other's elaboration of his theme in sermonizing are due, quite as much to the conditions under which they severally began their professional careers, as to any difference in native gifts? For, from all I can learn of Samuel Miller, I am confident that when the conventionality of the pulpit and the platform did not govern him, when he was one of a social company, he easily drew on his uncommonly rich resources; and, with a spontaneity like that of Dr. Alexander in the pulpit or on the platform, poured forth a stream of elevated and eloquent speech on any one of a great variety of high subjects, in the most captivating way, illustrating it with story and humanizing it with gentle humor, so as exactly to answer to James Alexander's description, "full of conversation, brilliant in company, rich in anecdote and universally admired." And, if only his perhaps too severe sense, I will not say of propriety, but of the conventional proprieties, had been relaxed, and he had carried the freedom he enjoyed in the company of his friends into the pulpit, as Dr. Alexander did, it is quite certain that—with his deep spirituality, his normal Christian experience, his fine sincerity and benignity, his power quickly to organize his knowledge in oratorical form, his large vocabulary, his wide range of knowledge, his rare wisdom, his human sympathies, his humor and his pathos—his preaching would have been marked by just the qualities which would have given him the reputation of a brilliant and thrilling preacher, instead of one—to quote Dr. James Alexander's words—"always instructive, calm and accurate, clear without brilliancy, accustomed to laborious and critical preparation, and relying little on the excitement of the occasion."

So far as I can see, neither of these remarkable men had the advantage of the other in point of what we call spontaneity; which is only the absolute possession of one's intellectual resources, the

immediate organization of them under oratorical categories, and the quick incarnation of them in forceful speech. The only difference between them in this respect that I can detect is, that Samuel Miller, who was eminently a man of the city and of the eighteenth century, enjoyed his spontaneity and attained his highest eloquence in the *salon*; and Dr. Alexander, living in a free community, like Attica, and at a time when it was pulsating under the domination of great ideas of civil freedom and religion, was spontaneous on the platform and in the pulpit, before public assemblies of his people. I am glad to give expression to this view of their underlying likeness. The contrast between them has been too often and too strongly emphasized.

Yet it is true, as I have already said, that there was between them just that difference in either natural or acquired temperament and taste which made them finely supplement one another. Thus the usefulness of each was increased. A deep and beautiful friendship resulted from their close association. Perhaps the absence of anything like jealousy, which Dr. Hodge remarks, ought not to be surprising, when we think of the largeness of the men and the depth of their religious characters. But it is a benediction to us to read these words, written by the son of one of them: "As years rolled on and old age arrived their concord and affection presented a beautiful and edifying spectacle. They conversed together and prayed together."

Dr. Miller was soon immersed not only in the public duties of his new position, but in the preparation of his lectures. He early completed courses in both departments committed to his care. He won at once the confidence of his students, and became very soon an admirable teacher. His study was open to them all; and his long experience as a pastor and his large knowledge of the Church made him a valued and most valuable adviser. But his activity could not be confined to the Seminary, just as in New York it could not be confined to his congregation. Indeed, what may be called his public life became even more strenuous. He preached almost as often as when he was a pastor. The calls upon him for special services brought him before widely separated congregations. He was one of the most active and influential Trustees of Princeton College. He worked hard to increase the endowments and especially the scholarship funds of the Seminary. He did his full share in contributing articles to the *Princeton Review*. When the theological and ecclesiastical agitation which culminated in the division of the Church began, he was deeply interested in

measures that he hoped would secure peace, and was active in inventing them. But as the agitation increased and it became impossible not to take sides, he with his colleagues ranged themselves on the Old School side; and rejoiced in the decision which affirmed the validity of the Excising Act. He was even more prolific as an author than he had been during his New York life, and he projected far more works than he was able to complete. But all he completed he published, and all he published were read by a large public. He defended the Christian doctrine of the Holy Trinity, in a series of letters, occasioned by the criticisms of his sermon at the installation of the Rev. William Nevins, of Baltimore. In Practical Theology he wrote the valuable manual, of which I have already spoken, called *Letters on Clerical Manners and Habits*, besides an admirable treatise on *Public Prayer*. His works in the department of Church Government, like his letters on *The Christian Ministry*, *Ruling Elders*, and the *Primitive and Apostolic Order*, were to be found on the book shelves of almost every minister of the Church. In biography he wrote an extended sketch of Jonathan Edwards, and a memoir of his theological preceptor, Dr. Nisbet. But I cannot stop even to name his published volumes. If his bibliography were written, I am sure that, counting his published discourses and his contributions to periodicals like the *Biblical Repertory*, it would consist of nearly, if not quite, two hundred titles.

A catalogue of his activities after he came to Princeton would reveal the fact that he responded sympathetically to the appeal of every good cause associated with religion, education and social improvement, and that his sympathy at once passed over into active effort. The President of the College and the senior Professor of the Seminary both knew him intimately; and each has put on record his tribute to the largeness and cheerfulness of his private charities. And so active was he as a Churchman that Dr. Carnahan said that "his biography in its public relations would be the history of the Presbyterian Church for fifty years."

The testimony of his pupils is abundant that he was an able teacher; interesting and informing in his lectures and successful in getting honest work out of his classes. No doubt, we have all heard the remark made that he was not so quickening and stimulating a teacher as was Dr. Alexander. It never made any impression on me except the impression that it was not a well-considered remark. Whenever I have heard it I have thought of their respective departments. Dr. Archibald Alexander taught Apologetics, and Polemic and Systematic Theology; and Dr. Miller taught Church

History and Church Government. Far be it from me, in this presence, to institute a comparison, in respect to the quality of interest, between the several departments of this Seminary. But I was once a Professor of Apologetics, and am now a Professor of Church History; and I may, not improperly, relate my own experience. In my former classroom it was impossible to find a student who did not bring to the recitation a more or less elaborated theory of the universe. And whether the subject before us was the argument for the being of God, or the nature of personality in man, or the freedom of the will, or the question whether mere probable proof can create obligation in the sphere of religion—only so the subject was an abstract one—it was my experience that even an indifferent teacher is not wholly unequal to the task of exciting interest and stimulating, momentarily at least, the minds of those before him. For, as Cicero long since pointed out, "Men without teaching have a certain anticipation of the Gods"; and the title of the third chapter of the first book of John Calvin's *Institutes of Religion* is those great words, "*Dei notitiam hominum mentibus naturaliter esse insitam.*" Hence the Apologist and the Theologian lecture to no absolutely unready minds. There, constitutionally impressed on every pupil, is the apprehension of fundamental truth, ready to be quickened, to be made distinct, to be corrected, and to be related to the human consciousness.

But when the subject taught is not abstract but concrete; when it is empirical facts; the stimulation of the pupil is by no means so easy a task. And whether the facts to be studied are the Hebrew etymology, or the syntax of New Testament Greek, or the names and dates included in the history of the Church during the Nicene period; the teacher cannot hope to find, as in the other case, to quote the phrase of Calvin, that "these have been impressed upon the mind by a certain natural instinct." And therefore, when I am told that Samuel Miller was not so stimulating a teacher as Archibald Alexander, I wonder whether the difference was not in the subjects rather than the men. Indeed, I once received important information on this general subject in the reply made to me by a young gentleman whom I had occasion rather sharply to correct in respect to some facts and dates which it seemed to me important that he should know. He said to me, with an accuracy and a sincerity that I wished his intelligence might equal: "I care nothing at all for the facts, but I am deeply interested in the philosophy of history."

I cannot carry you through the years of Dr. Miller's Seminary

professorship. It is not necessary to do so in order to revive the impression which he made on his contemporaries as a man of great intellectual power, attainment and accomplishment. Each of the first two Professors of this institution had a distinct individuality; its second Professor's was no less distinct than its first Professor's. Each did so large a work and each did it so well, that we who are their successors may well be humbled as we think of the ideal to which the career of each of them gave actuality. There was nothing like rivalry between them when they lived. If they were different in their gifts, their work, and the character of their respective impacts upon the minds of their students and the life of the Church, so much the better both for their students and for the Church. The result was, in the one case, a better theological education, and, in the other, a richer and more beneficent life. It has been my pleasure to have read almost all that each gave to the world, and to have studied in detail the careers of both. I cannot better reproduce the impression which this study has made on me than by saying, that they appear in our firmament as twin stars, moving around the Central Light of the Universe. The longer I contemplate them, the more nearly certain I become that they are stars of the same magnitude. Nor do they differ in their consummate glory. For their consummate glory is their unhasting and unresting movement in their common orbit around the Central Sun, their loving and adoring loyalty to their redeeming God.

Princeton.

JOHN DE WITT.

III.

PREACHING CHRIST.

IT cannot be said that Christ is not preached in our day. There is no name that figures more in our pulpits. There is a sense in which we may say, as did Peter before Cornelius, "to Him give all the prophets witness." Every preacher, of whatever shade of belief, has much to say about Jesus Christ. It is evident, however, there prevail differing apprehensions of what preaching Christ means. The phrase is not sufficiently definite as a direction or a criterion.

Some understand by it chiefly the inculcation of His teachings. That whenever we preach any precept or duty or doctrine enjoined by Christ we are preaching Him. That the name of an originating teacher stands for the system of truth which he taught. Hence the name Christ in such connection means the religion of Christ. So, by "Moses and the Prophets" as standards of authority among the Jews were understood the teachings which came from them. And when we read in the Book of Acts, "Moses hath in every city them that preach him," reference is had to the law and the system of worship and the other parts of writing given by Moses and heard in the synagogues. To preach Christ, therefore, in this conception of the phrase, is to unfold His Sermon on the Mount, His parables, His discourses in the temple, on the seashore and elsewhere. Very noticeable in the view which lays all stress on the teachings of Christ is the tendency to reduce itself to His merely ethical teachings. Hence the theological and profoundly spiritual discourses reported in the fourth gospel, and the parables of the kingdom and the eschatological revelations given by the Synoptists, soon sink out of sight, and the conception of Jesus as a teacher extends but little beyond the Sermon on the Mount and the moral relations which bind man to man. I have seen attributed to Froude the remark, which represents the view of many to-day, "We mean by Christianity the code of moral duties taught by our Lord on the Mount."

The personal teachings of Jesus, as recorded in the four gospels, are of course included in any full testimony concerning Him. His ministry on earth, however, was not simply for those of His own

generation, but for all time. And if His oral teachings in Palestine during His three years were designed to represent His chief relation to the world, and to embody His work for men, is it not strange, we would reverently ask, that the spirit of inspiration was pleased to preserve so little of it for the succeeding generations? To the people of His own day and of His own locality our Lord taught abundantly. His whole public life was filled with that work. "From that time Jesus began to preach." "He departed to teach and to preach in their cities." "He went about in all Galilee, teaching in their synagogues and preaching the gospel of the kingdom." "He went throughout every city and village, preaching and showing the good tidings of the kingdom of God." "He began to teach them many things;" "he spake unto them of the kingdom of God." "He taught in their synagogues, being glorified of all"—but these, as many like references to the fact of His much teaching, are accompanied by no report of what He said on those occasions. "I sat daily with you teaching in the temple," He told those who came out in the garden to take Him; but that public teaching during Passion week, except the merest fragment of it, was for their ears only and not for ours. For them of Emmaus, but not for us, He "expounded in all the Scriptures the things concerning himself." Of that particular discourse spoken in the synagogue of Capernaum, the marvelous effect of which upon the people is indicated by the special mention that "they were astonished at his doctrine" (Mark i. 22), not a word is preserved for us. Likewise His discourse in the synagogue at Nazareth, which so astonished the people and excited their wonderment at His wisdom. For us, only the fact is recorded and nothing of the teaching which so impressed that audience. And can we ever cease to regret, that after applying to Himself the word from Isaiah—"The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because He hath anointed me to preach the gospel to the poor, to heal the broken hearted, to preach deliverance to the captives"—that no report is given us of the "gracious words which proceeded out of his mouth," and at which the people "wondered"? Truly, concerning those of His time must we say, not only blessed were their eyes which saw but their ears which heard!

Thus but little, in comparison with His much teaching, has come to us, and the merest fraction it is in comparison with the legacies of instruction bequeathed by others who were only teachers, and who had disciples and founded schools. Dean Stanley once called attention to the fact that a single collection of the Prophet Mohammed fills no less than thirteen hundred folio pages: while the

Sermon on the Mount, he said, could be read through in fifteen minutes. And I may add that all the discourses of our Lord, as preserved in the four gospels (not counting those which are duplicate reports), might be printed in a small volume which could be read in two hours; while the unreported discourses and instructions, to which, as we are expressly told, He gave utterance, if before us in printed form would bulk very large. And it remains that the fact of His personal teaching to so small a degree being given to the world for which He came does not comport with the conception that His mission was chiefly that of teacher. Nor can it be claimed that those of His teachings which were not recorded in the gospels have been reproduced to any great degree in the writings of the apostles. These pertained largely to that "progress of doctrine in the New Testament," which, as the Lord more than once indicated, could only be revealed after He should have finished His work on earth. It would have been premature to set forth the complete significance of His mission in advance of His death and resurrection, by which that mission was to find its fullness of purpose.

In the conception under review the personal equation counts but little. Our Lord's incarnate birth, His miracles, His death on the cross, His resurrection and ascension, and His present prerogative as living Head of the Church and Prince of the kings of the earth, and His future function as the Judge of men—all these stupendous features in His history and His position make no figure. In this view all that Jesus Christ seems to stand for, all that His advent signified, and all that Christianity means, find embodiment and expression in those portions of His personal teachings which have come to our ears. If we have that, we have it all. True, certain incidents pertaining to His career are interesting and attractive, but they do not enter into the scheme of Christianity, any more than the fact that Socrates was condemned by his judges and ended his life by drinking hemlock have bearing on the Socratic philosophy.

It is certainly true, you can take away Plato and Platonism will remain, and you can eliminate the man Charles Darwin and still have Darwinism. But take away Jesus Christ, centre attention only or chiefly on the truths and principles He taught, and historic Christianity has no foundation. In this view Christ served no other purpose than being a spokesman for God. And surely it would remain a mystery why we should have a divine personage come from heaven and take our flesh only to communicate teach-

ings which we may assume a merely human prophet, in analogy with the former Jewish economy, and in an advanced stage of revelation, could well have been raised up of God to declare. But this supposition is needless. For we may rest assured that they who restrict the Saviour's work on earth to the function of teaching are sure to reduce Him to the rank of man; and the story of the incarnate birth at Bethlehem and the resurrection from Joseph's tomb, as well as all the intermediary features which made His career supernal, will soon disappear as myths—disappear because having no place, and serving no purpose, in their conception of what Christianity is.

And furthermore, the development of thought on such lines soon leads to a modification in the estimate of Christ's teaching itself. Apart from the strictly ethical elements in it, its main content is perhaps found in such doctrines as these: the fuller conception of the Fatherhood of God, Christ's own place as the Divine Son of God, the Holy Spirit in His nature and His office work, the significance of the death to be accomplished on the cross, the power of that death to effect the renewal of man and to exalt him as the child and heir of God and thus to impart a new dignity and worth to the human soul, the inner life of man shown to be more important than outward duties, and finally the doctrine of the kingdom of God on earth and in the world to come. Now it is not unjust to say that, with the exception perhaps of the first named (the doctrine of the Fatherhood of God, which, for dogmatic reasons, they are fond of pressing), these spiritual teachings, which bulk large in the gospels, receive but slight emphasis at the hands of those who aim to present the ethical discourses of Jesus as constituting the essence of Christianity. The spiritual discourses recorded in the fourth gospel, especially, soon cease to charm. These advocates show restiveness under what they term the mystical elements, and the Rabbinical elements, and the Jewish environment in much of the Master's teachings. His astounding assertions of divinity and equality with the Father, His disclosures concerning the world to come and His own prerogative therein—these become an embarrassment to those who desire to see in Jesus no other function or relation than that of an ethical teacher. Hence the disposition to exalt and emphasize the merely human and social and "this world" element, and to make the Sermon on the Mount their place of refuge. And even of that sermon it is curious to observe how much they are willing to eliminate as being either exaggerated and impracticable in its moral code, or as involving doctrines which do not strictly

pertain to the ethical relations of man with man, and for which they find no place in their scheme, such as the doctrine of divine providence in nature, the doctrine of prayer, of renewed heart and of man's destiny in the other world—involving, also, the teaching of Christ's divinity in nature and prerogative.*

We are not ignoring nor slighting in the least the teaching office of our Lord. His truest followers will always receive with devout thankfulness and joy, and with implicit faith, His personal teachings which have come to us from His Palestinian ministry, and with the profound and most serious sense of that woe which His own lips pronounced upon those who are "ashamed of His words." But the view which identifies the Lord's whole work and mission with His three years of teaching ministry, as far as that has been preserved in the four gospels, is altogether inadequate. The person of Christ, and His work in His offices of redemption, is presented but little, if at all. The thought is, that to restrict ourselves to the Sermon on the Mount and the general principles of ethics and of social philosophy as taught by Jesus, and to press these, in apparent opposition often, or at least in contrast with the epistles of Paul—that this is fully preaching Christ. In this class of sermons we hear of our Lord less as a Saviour than as a reformer and as a social and ethical philosopher. And in that relation too it is His teachings in the abstract that are exalted rather than Himself as the ever-living Son of God. In fact, in much of this preaching of Christ the Blessed One appears stripped of all personality and to be nothing other than a diffused, impalpable principle or potency. Dean Alford has well called attention to the circumstance that our Lord was never designated as a mere teacher until the days of modern Socinianism.†

Another attitude towards the question of preaching Christ may be thus described. While ready to emphasize His personal teachings even, it may be, to the disparagement of the apostles and their epistles, others will add thereto, as a source of power, the character and impress and the personal history of Jesus. They may even put this above His words. But it soon becomes manifest that it is not the entire history and personal record, including that which is both antecedent and subsequent to His manifestation on earth, that receives their emphasis, so much as it is the three years' career in Palestine. Our Lord's preëxistent state as the second person of the Godhead, and that "glory he had with the Father

* Matt. vii. 21-23.

† See his commentary on the New Testament, John iii. 2.

before the world was," and His place in type and symbol and prophecy, and then His mysterious birth of the Virgin as that "holy thing conceived by the power of the Holy Ghost"—these antecedent data in the history of the Son apparently do not so much appeal to their minds. What is predicated of Him as anterior to the Bethlehem birth and the Nazareth boyhood seems lost sight of; and it is as if they urged with the Jews of old, "Is not this Jesus, the son of Joseph, whose father and mother we know? How doth he then say, I am come down out of heaven?" Likewise the glories of Christ which followed His sufferings, and the continuance of His theanthropic personality on high as the energizing "Head over all things to his church" and "Prince of the kings of the earth"—this too receives but scant attention. They tell us it is the life of Jesus in the flesh they want—His kinship with the race, His contact with fellow-men, His intercourse and sympathy with the poor and the suffering, and His sublime spirit and attractive character. So, one of our religious journals a few years ago declared it is the human life and not the pre-natal nor the post-mortem that is for our study! If the cross is presented it is in such a way as obscures its real intent. The death thereon is made to appear not so much as a purposed and objective end in itself, but as a painful incident only, which was involved in a life of serving. This method of preaching Christ laudably indeed aims at setting forth a high ideal, and to infuse the Christly spirit, and by holding Him before men as an example and pattern, to stimulate to "Christ-likeness," but it is painfully inadequate.

Here, too, we say, this surely is included in preaching Christ: His human excellence and the powerful impress of His personality, and the love which through all His actions ran. But at the same time, if it is in His earthly relations and in the stamp of His personality among men and in the example He has left that He is principally to be contemplated, we are met by certain puzzles. One wonders why, for instance, that of our Lord's thirty-three years of sojourn on our earth, thirty of them are almost entirely withheld from us. With the exception of the record of His infancy, and the single incident of His boyhood visit to Jerusalem when twelve years of age, followed by the mention of subjection to His parents, we have nothing of that long period of His life. And furthermore, while we have only the short three years' glimpse of His manhood, its bearing on the question of His footsteps and the emphasis of His personal example is greatly modified by the fact that it is only His public and official career that is recorded. In the ordinary

walks of life—His relations in the home as a son and a brother; His life on the street, in the workshop; His social relations as a companion, a neighbor, a citizen, and in all the varieties of interest and pursuit and association which make up one's personal life, and in which one has so much in common with others—in all those spheres and experiences which would more nearly correspond with our own in the various periods from youth to middle age, how little is told of Jesus the man! We assuredly believe that all His thirty years at Nazareth and the large unrecorded part of the ensuing three years throughout Judea and Galilee was an exhibition of active and flawless righteousness in the ordinary walks, such as the people of His day, and we of this day, are called to tread. It could not have been otherwise. And how might they rejoice who think to follow "In His Steps" and to learn "What would Jesus have us do," had it pleased the spirit of inspiration to have given glimpses of that more personal life when "Jesus was here among men," before His public career opened, and during that period too when apart from the multitudes, and the captious Jew of the synagogue or the temple, and the dull-minded and wearying disciples! Would that some concrete deeds had been recorded of an ordinary, man-like and imitable philanthropy, pointing to which our ethical sermonizers to-day could bid, as Jesus did in reference to the specimen deed of the merciful Samaritan, "Go thou and do likewise!"

What is meant by thus speaking of Him whose whole public life was largely filled up with the works of benevolence? The meaning is this: outside of Jesus' miracles of mercy the gospel records tell of no special deeds of benevolence wrought by His hands. Of course I refer to temporal benefactions wrought for men, and which caused His "fame to spread abroad"—a fame for philanthropy and a fame for power—and which answered to the tribute universally accorded Him to-day, "He went about doing good." Among those who would put special emphasis on the personal example and footsteps of Christ for guidance in righteousness are to be found all who, disposed in some sense to confess His name, would yet refuse His claims to divinity. They exalt Him as the practical and efficient doer in the works of human kindness, but they either brush away or disesteem the miraculous and the supernatural elements in His career, regarding them as intrusive mists which only weaken and obscure the conception of the Good Man of Nazareth. But in this they cut off the very credentials of His beneficence and are left without evidence, as far as the records show, that He was in any special measure distinguished for philanthropy.

In supposed proof of their thought that to relieve human suffering and to brighten the earthly lot is the highest mission of Christianity, they make a favorite of Peter's tribute to the Saviour, "He went about doing good." And this is indeed an epitome of His unceasing ministry of love. In his wayfaring through the land during His years of ministry we are sure, whether recorded or unrecorded, His eye ever pitied, His hand always brought relief.

But what were those deeds of kindness? Rehearse them. Tell the tale of His philanthropy as it is told to us in the gospels. Point to His merciful deeds. We are speaking now not of spiritual blessings, nor of the good imparted to those who heard His words of sympathy and of instruction, or who had the privilege, as we have not, of looking upon His unrecorded life, who beheld Him, day by day, as the model man; but we are inquiring only for the temporal benefits wrought by His hands, which are written for our instruction, and which caused His "fame to go abroad" as a specially merciful and philanthropic man. What were those works, as far as the record informs us, if we eliminate His miracles? Did our Lord carry drugs and healing lotions with Him, and do good to the sick merely as a skillful physician might now do? Did he found hospitals and orphan asylums? Was he an organizer of relief committees and benevolent boards? Was His time specially devoted to visiting the widows and the fatherless, and in comforting them that mourn? We are sure Jesus engaged also in these simpler acts of kindness which come within the range of ordinary human power. No doubt had His life been recorded, as we now write biography, we would find it filled, in its every period and relation, in youth and manhood, with deeds of helpfulness and sympathy like unto those which it is in our power to do, and which might have been copy-lines for us of to-day. But the point is that such deeds do not make up, and are not even found in, that written record of His beneficence on which His reputation, and our knowledge of Him as a doer of good, is founded. The tales of His philanthropy are all tales of miracles. The instances selected by inspiration to illustrate for permanent history His abounding mercifulness to men, and on which is based the truth of the eulogy "He went about doing good," are the "miracles, wonders and signs which God did by him," and except in the spirit which prompted this kindness, it is not brought before us as an imitable example. And there is a sense in which the saying ascribed to the Roman Emperor Julian, known in Church history as "the apostate," is certainly true, namely, that "Christ did nothing worth speaking of,

unless we consider it a great thing to have cured the deaf and blind and to have expelled demons from those who were possessed."

The beautiful ascription to our Lord, "He went about doing good," was originally spoken by the Apostle Peter in the house of Cornelius at Cesarea. The connection in which it stands only emphasizes the fact I have been urging, that the benevolent works of Jesus, as far as they are recorded in the gospels, are miraculous works. Peter thus presents it: "God anointed Jesus of Nazareth with the Holy Ghost and with power, who went about doing good"—implying that His works of mercy were wrought by the divine anointing of power. And furthermore, the expression is immediately followed by the explanatory clause, "healing all that were oppressed"; that is, "who went about healing all that were oppressed of the devil, for God was with him." Like unto this testimony is the picture given in the gospels. "Jesus went about all Galilee . . . healing all manner of sickness and all manner of disease among the people" and "his fame spread abroad."

Surely they who would press chiefly the humanitarian character of the mission of Jesus, and exalt His practical benevolence as His strongest and almost only unchallenged claim, and in the light of this would emphasize His example as the main element of His Saviourhood, while yet they refuse to believe He had ever "done the works which none other man did"—surely these persons "know not what they do." They cut off the very limb on which their own feet stand, for it has pleased God that the fact of Jesus' miracles and the annals of His benevolence should be so indissolubly joined that we cannot deny the former without thereby forfeiting the testimony to the latter.

This is by no means to forget, nor to undervalue, the truth that Jesus left His example for His followers. But following Christ is something more than an attempt to imitate Him in certain isolate and particular deeds, even if the spirit of inspiration had been pleased to exhibit Him more fully and definitely in those respects. And it is evident that the Scripture in so presenting Him refers not so much to specific and concrete actions as to the spirit and disposition which exhibited itself in those actions. Washing the disciples' feet, He said, "I have given you an example that ye should do as I have done to you" (John xiii. 15). But it is an unwarranted interpretation, and one held by a very small fraction of His followers, to understand the Lord as commanding aught else than the spirit which stoops to lowly service for the brethren. The only other instance where the word "example" in connection with the record

of Jesus' life is set before us is when Peter, enjoining on Christians the exercise of patience under sufferings, refers to Christ "leaving us an example that ye should follow his steps, who when he was reviled reviled not again, when he suffered he threatened not but committed himself to him that judgeth righteously." In this sense Christ must be constantly before His followers, and the comprehensive exhortation be always sounding in their ears, "Let this mind be in you which was also in Christ Jesus." At the same time this whole thought of Jesus Christ as the model man, and the perfect Example in whose steps we are exhorted to walk, needs ever to be modified by the fact that while man he was not simply a human person but a theanthropic person.

We must try one further answer to our question. Preaching Christ certainly includes the elements already considered. But with these elements, and as superior to them in power to define His work for men, we must take His priesthood and His sacrificial death. We understand His mission only when we put emphasis on the cross. Without that, Jesus is before men but as the first of sages and the first of virtuous men; and what power is there in the best instruction and the best example to effect that renewal of man's spiritual nature which makes him before God a new creature? To efface the cross, or the evangelical significance of the cross, to preach Christ without preaching Him as the crucified One—what is this but to preach another Gospel? We may leave to Him all else—His wisdom, His grandeur of character, His charm and grace, His tenderness, and, as far as it is possible after eliminating His death on the cross, all His love—but He will not be the Saviour of men and He is not the Christ of revelation.

Had the Apostle Paul preached Christ to the cultivated Greeks only in his ethics, or in the aspects of His personal excellence and power of impress, I see not why His doctrine had been "foolishness" to them. On the contrary, there is every reason to think they would have hailed it. The Greeks theorized much about virtue, and gave ready ear to discussions of the good, the true and the beautiful. They delighted also in hearing of great characters and great achievements. And this way of preaching Jesus would have fallen in with their conception of deified heroes, or at least would not have seemed unreasonable or foolish to those who had been accustomed to the Olympian galaxy of gods. But an ignominious cross, and a meek, passive, unresisted death thereon; and, as if that were not sufficiently abhorrent, to hear this messenger of the tidings glorying in that cross and magnifying the blood shed as

a redemption price, and ever bringing that blood to the forefront!—this to the Greeks was “foolishness,” and the cross became an offense in their eyes. Under these conditions did there come to the apostle’s mind the temptation, not to deny, but simply to withhold at times that aspect of his message, or at least to make it less emphatic than was his wont? Did his own principle of being “all things to all men that he might win some” present itself? John Owen tells of certain Jesuit missionaries among the Indians, fearing to discourage their minds at the outset, so preaching Christ and so picturing Him in rude art before their eyes as to conceal His sufferings, and telling only of His glory and power. Possibly it was just then, and under such temptation, that Paul braced himself by “determining” to know nothing among the Corinthians “save Jesus Christ and him crucified.” And possibly it may have been the frequent risings of this untoward suggestion when among the scornful and philosophical that occasioned his impassioned outburst, “God forbid that I should glory save in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ!”

In preaching Christ we must ever point to the historic man of Palestine—portray His life, depict His character, unfold His teachings, tell of His compassion and His tender love, and press His example. But if we stop there, or if we put chief stress there, our message is incomplete, and Christ is not adequately preached. Very significant is it that we find the apostle describing the Gospel as “the word of the cross.”* Nicodemus could confess the new Rabbi as “a teacher come from God,” but the Master had to supplement that by telling of the brazen serpent and the “lifting up.” The prophets “testified beforehand the sufferings of Christ.” He was the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world, and the seed of the woman to be bruised, and the antitype of the smoking altars. He came to redeem by blood, to “give his life a ransom,” to “bear our iniquities” and to “put away sin by the sacrifice of himself.” The looming up of the cross was the hour for which He waited, the “baptism with which he was to be baptized.” It “behooved him to suffer.” The one topic of conversation between Himself and Moses and Elias on the Mount of Transfiguration was His decease. The significant answer He gave the Greek strangers who came inquiring for Him was that, like a grain of corn, he could avail for the world only as He should die. The ordinance appointed for perpetual commemoration of Himself pertains not to His birth, but

* 1 Cor. i. 18.

to the showing forth of His death—"do this in remembrance of me"—not as teacher, nor as exemplar, but as symbolizing that "blood of the new covenant which is shed for many for the remission of sins," so that

"To the cross the mourner's eye should turn,
Sooner than where the stars of Christmas burn."

This emphasis of the death becomes yet clearer when we observe the place it occupies in the testimony of the evangelists and the apostles. If the relative importance of events can be indicated by the fullness of their narration, then the large space given to the closing period of our Lord's life becomes very significant. Prof. M. B. Riddle, the well-known New Testament scholar, strikingly remarks that, "Even from a literary point of view it holds good that the four gospels place the emphasis, not on our Lord's beautiful ethical discourses, but upon His conflicts, His sorrows, and His death"; and that "nearly one-third of the Gospel of John deals with the twenty-four hours between the Last Supper and the burial of Jesus." The apostles were sent forth to witness of Christ—"whom we preach," said Paul. Their testimony, so far as it has been preserved for us, is found in the Acts, the Epistles and the Book of Revelation. It is very full. But it is noticeable how comparatively slight is the reference to that part of our Saviour's career which preceded the cross. Their discourses to the people and their epistles to the churches testify to the pre-incarnate glory and to the wondrous fact of His coming into the world in human flesh, and in great fulness they declare His death and resurrection, and His estate of exaltation at the Father's right hand with His name above every name, because of His "obedience unto death, even the death of the cross." They went everywhere proclaiming, chiefly, this one message, that Jesus had been slain for sin but was now alive for evermore, "exalted to be a Prince and a Saviour," "delivered for our offenses and raised again for our justification." That the object of His advent to the world was to die, "the just for the unjust"; that He "took part in flesh and blood," that is, became man "in order that through death He might destroy the works of the devil," and that "we have redemption through his blood." Paul declared to the Corinthians that in his preaching he would know nothing "save Jesus Christ and Him," not as a mere teacher or perfect man, but as a "crucified" one, and that he had delivered unto them "first of all," that is, as the chief and principal thing, "how that Christ died for our sins."

The testimony of the Book of Revelation is particularly striking

in the same way. It reveals the Lord Jesus in His return from earth to the heavenly state as the object of highest adoration and worship. And on what features of His work among men are these ascriptions based? Doubtless His deeds of philanthropy, His mission as wondrous prophet and teacher and His whole blessed life of sojourn among men are not forgotten by the spirits of the just in the home on high. And yet the chief strain in their glories is one which mingles the mementos of Calvary with the magnificence of the Celestial City. The song which John hears them sing is of the "Lamb that was slain," and who, out of every kindred and tribe and tongue, had redeemed them to God by His blood. Why, we might ask, with His work on earth finished and He on His throne of glory, why may not the offense of the cross now cease, and those painful experiences be allowed to pass away like a dream? Why must the shadow of Calvary project itself there, and why revive the memories of that which was "scandal in the Jews' esteem and folly to the Greek?" Can we not have done with reminiscences of the nails and the spear thrust? Can not the praising saints tune their songs to other aspects of the Redeemer's work in Palestine? And cannot the Lord's worthiness to receive power and wisdom and riches, and strength and honor and glory and blessing connect with something other than his death?

Christ's death on the cross together with his presentation of Himself in heaven, and His ever-continuing Priesthood and Kingship there—this is the chief material in preaching Christ. As the late Prof. Balman Bruce, of Scotland, once wrote, "Christ's death on the cross is the most important part of His revelation—far more important than His words of wisdom, precious as these are."*

But is such emphasis on the death of Christ undue, and will it disparage or induce a slighting of the record of His life? I answer, no; magnifying the significance of the death on the cross will never detract from nor disparage the story of the blessed life in Palestine. Rather, they who most profoundly acknowledge and preach the former will always be found the most believing admirers of the latter. Their sense of the value of Christ's death only prompts them more lovingly to dwell upon His life, and awakens that affection which would kiss the hem of His garment as in imagination they see their Lord going in and out among men. And further, they who thus emphasize the cross as the chief end in the revelation of Christ are always the most cordial and unreserved in their ac-

* *Chief End of Revelation*, p. 34

ceptance of the entire contents of the four Gospel narratives which they are sometimes charged with undervaluing. They take the story of the supernatural birth and the miracles. They take all the manifest marks of that human nature which link the Saviour to the race of man. And they take all the teachings, as reported for us, which fell from the lips of Him who spake as never man spake—even those particular utterances of His which are thought to strain one's faith, and on which some, "treating the Bible as literature," sit in judgment and regard as the conceptions of a mind without critical training and subject to the limitations of His environments and the crudeness of an unskilled age, thus unwittingly incurring the woe pronounced by the Master on those who shall be "ashamed of my words!"

Never was Jesus Christ more preached and more set forth in the world's literature than to-day. But is it always the full Christ who is exhibited? Is it as our Passover slain, or as the ascended One amid His blood-washed throng, or as advocate at the Father's right hand, of whom we are hearing to-day, so much as it is the three-year Christ of Palestine? And in respect to His brief Palestinian ministry, is it He of Calvary as much as it is He of the Galilean lake, of the mountain-side, or of the Nazareth carpenter shop? Are we dividing Paul's theme to the Corinthians, and eliminating the "Him crucified" part? A favorite Scripture note of our day is that of the three words, "He loved me," and it sometimes seems as if we were tuning all our praises on that one key. But let us take the whole clause—"He loved me and gave himself for me." And likewise, as we press the beautiful delineation, "He went about doing good," let us not forget the testimony which accompanies it—"whom they slew and hanged on a tree." Woe to us if the doctrine of the cross becomes an offense, and a suffering Christ possesses for our eyes no beauty that we should desire Him, and He be a spectacle from which "we hide as it were our faces from Him!" Shall Christ's power for our salvation be seen in His life alone, and divorced from His atoning death, and our ultimatum be that of the priests and scribes as they viewed the Calvary scene, "Let him come down from the cross and we will believe him!"

"Back to Christ" has been the cry of some. Very good—only let it be truly back. Back to the Christ of type and prophecy. Back to Him "of whom Moses in the law and the prophets did write." Back to the Christ of Bethlehem, "conceived by the power of the Holy Ghost," the Christ of Nazareth, of Galilee and of Cal-

vary. Also up to Christ, the ascended, living Christ, the God-man Christ of to-day with His Priesthood and Headship.

“We would see Jesus dying, risen, pleading.”

And not only back to Christ, and up to Christ, but forward to Christ, who is to come again to be admired of His saints and to judge the world. Let it be the full-orbed Sun of righteousness whom we preach.

St. Louis, Mo.

MEADE C. WILLIAMS.

IV.

THE SACRAMENTAL THEORY OF THE MEDIÆVAL CHURCH.

THE study of the sacraments introduces us to the theology of the Middle Ages at one of the two or three points where it was most busy and put forth its keenest speculative force. For the Latin Church, the results of this speculation continue to be of permanent authority. Against it the Reformers waged high war. It was here that Luther began his struggle. The four great constructions of the mediæval Church are the papal fabric, the sacramental system, the universities and the cathedrals. These all continue to move mankind profoundly. If Protestant Christendom rejects the two former, we may yet admire the patience and pious purpose with which the mediæval theologian labored to rear them. The critical questions with which Christian scholars of the present age are concerned he did not dream of. The integrity of the books of Scripture was assumed, and the superiority of the Christian system it did not enter into his head to question. He was living in another age. Metaphysics, not a critical apparatus, were his chief instrument of study. He knew nothing of negative criticism. His exegesis was not all sound and his conclusions were often at variance with apostolic teaching. This, however, he did: he attempted to construct something, and, as it proved, he constructed a vast doctrinal and ecclesiastical fabric fortified by arguments on every side. He confided in the powers of the human intellect to solve every possible question which may present itself from the heavens above or the earth beneath. His conclusions may be wrong, and at no point are they more wrong than in his teachings concerning the sacraments, but his high purpose deserves recognition, and his teachings deserve respectful study.*

* With the exception of Alexander of Hales, I have used and quoted the works of the Schoolmen at first hand. For Duns Scotus I have depended chiefly upon Seeberg's valuable volume, *Die Theologie des Johannes Duns Scotus*, Leip., 1900, as well as upon Schwane's *Dogmatik der mittlern Zeit*, Freiburg, 1882, and Stöckl's *Philosophie des Mittelalters*. Schwane's is the best work devoted specifically to the theology of the Middle Ages. Its learned author is a Catholic. The best Protestant works on the history of Christian doctrine are, in English, Prof. Fisher, and in German, Loofs, Harnack and Seeberg.

The period to which the construction of the mediæval sacramental system belongs covers 150 years, from 1150-1300, from Abælard to Duns Scotus. This leaves out Anselm, who contributed nothing to the discussion and touched upon the sacraments only in a passing way. Other great thinkers participating in the discussion were Hugo de St. Victor, d. 1141; Robert Pullen, d. 1155; Peter the Lombard, d. 1160; Alexander of Hales, d. 1145; Bonaventura and Thomas Aquinas, d. 1274, and Albertus Magnus, d. 1280—two Frenchmen, three Italians, one German and three Englishmen. To the narrower circle in this list belong Hugo de St. Victor, Alexander of Hales and Thomas Aquinas, and of these three the most eminent is Thomas Aquinas. Thomas, whom Leo XIII pronounced the chief authority for Catholic theology, gave to the doctrine of the sacraments its final theological statement. The substance of this statement was adopted by the Œcumenical Councils of Ferrara, 1439, and of Trent, a hundred years later, and thus became dogma for the Catholic Church.

Some idea of the importance ascribed to the sacraments by the mediæval theologian may be gotten from the amount of space he devoted to their discussion. Hugo de St. Victor devotes to it a special treatise of 440 pages.* Peter the Lombard gives 90 pages out of the 453 pages covered by his *System of Theology*, the *Sentences*;† Bonaventura 1003 pages out of the 3875 pages of his *System of Theology*;‡ and Thomas Aquinas 670 pages out of the 4854 pages of his *Summa*.§ These and other Schoolmen sought to exhaust the subject by answering every possible question that might suggest itself. In doing so, as in all their theological discussions, they freely quoted the Scriptures and, for the theological definitions, the Fathers, relied chiefly upon Augustine.|| Then by their own reasoning they elaborated and systematized the treatment.

* Migne's edition, Vol. 176.

† Migne's ed.

‡ Peltier's ed. The treatment of the sacraments is found in Vols. V, 241-709, VI, 1-535.

§ Migne's ed., Vol. IV, 543-1217. Thomas also treated the subject in his Commentary on Peter the Lombard's *Sentences*. More than 1000 pages of his *Summa* are devoted to the department of ethics, a subject omitted from our modern Protestant Systems of Theology. It is interesting to note the amount of space given to the treatment of the sacraments by some of our more recent works on theology. Dr. Charles Hodge's *Systematic Theology* contains 2260 pages and devotes to them 207 pages; Dr. Shedd's *Dogmatic Theology*, 25 pages out of 1348; Dr. E. V. Gerhart's *Institutes*, 84 pages out of 1666, and Dr. A. H. Strong's *Systematic Theology*, 30 pages out of 600.

|| Ambrose and John of Damascus are the next favorites among the Fathers, after Thomas Aquinas on the sacraments.

The number of the sacraments, which had been a matter of uncertainty in the patristic church, came to be fixed at seven largely by the authority of Peter the Lombard and Thomas Aquinas. Augustine had called exorcism and the giving of salt to catechumens sacraments, and also marriage, but he nowhere fixed their number. Bernard spoke of ten sacraments, including footwashing among them. Abælard and Robert Pullen enumerated five. Hugo de St. Victor in his special treatise *de sacramentis*, using the term in the wider sense of a religious rite, spoke of no less than thirty sacraments.* In this list he placed the sprinkling with ashes on Ash Wednesday and the application of holy water to the person.† The Third Lateran Council, 1179, also used the term in a wide sense and included the investiture of bishops and burial among the sacraments.‡ Thomas Aquinas also ascribed a quasi-sacramental character to such rites as the use of holy water and exorcism which he calls *quædam sacramentalia*.§ But of sacraments this Schoolman knew only seven, the number afterwards adopted at Ferrara and Trent—baptism, confirmation, the eucharist, penance, extreme unction, orders and marriage.

The indispensable mark of a Christian sacrament, according to Thomas Aquinas, is that it was instituted by Christ. All the Schoolmen were not agreed on this point, and Peter the Lombard expressly said that extreme unction was instituted by the apostles. Thomas replied that the unction with oil, commended by James, presupposes the prior ordinance of Christ.|| As for the sacrament of confirmation Thomas declared that, although no special command could be adduced in its favor, it was involved in the promise of the Holy Spirit. The command enjoining penance, as we shall see, the Schoolmen based upon a false translation of the Greek by Jerome.

* In his *System of Theology*, the *Summa sententiarum*, Migne, 176, p. 127 *sqq.*, Hugo seems to recognize only five—baptism, confirmation, eucharist, penance and extreme unction. He follows up their treatment with a treatment of marriage, but I do not see that he calls it a sacrament at this point.

† Migne, p. 473: The *aqua aspersionis*, mixed with salt, Hugo derives from Alexander, fifth pope from Peter. The use of palm branches he also includes in the list of the sacraments. ‡ Canon 7.

§ *Summa*, III; 651, Migne, IV, 597; *Supplem.*, XXIX, 1, p. 1025. The *Sentences* of Rolandus (afterwards Alexander III), ed. by Gietl, preceded the Lombard in fixing the number at seven. The old view that it was fixed by Otto of Bamberg is untenable. At a later period, Durandus denied to marriage a sacramental character. See Schwane, p. 586. In 1479, Peter, professor at Salamanca, was tried for excluding penance from the list of the sacraments.

|| The Council of Trent asserted distinctly of extreme unction that it was instituted by Christ (Sess. XIV, 1).

There were sacraments under the old dispensation, such as circumcision and the paschal lamb, but, as Augustine had said, these differ from the sacraments of the Christian dispensation, in that they did no more than to prefigure and give promise of coming realities. They did not contain and confer grace.* In man's estate of innocence the sacraments were not needed. Marriage in that period had no sacramental character.

Ingenious attempts were made to prove the necessity of seven sacraments, and no more. Their "congruity" was dwelt upon, that is their adaptation to meet all the wants and maladies of fallen man. As specific remedies are correlated to the diseases of the body, so these are correlated to all the defects and needs of the soul—baptism to the deficiency of spiritual life, confirmation to spiritual weakness in those recently born, the eucharist to the temptation to fall into sin, *labilitas animi ad peccandum*, penance to sins actually committed after baptism, extreme unction to sins not cleared away by penance, ordination to the lost condition of the race, marriage to concupiscence and the annihilation of the race by natural death. The seven correspond to the seven virtues—baptism, the eucharist and extreme unction to faith, love and hope, ordination to enlightenment, penance to righteousness, confirmation to endurance, and marriage to continence. Bonaventura elaborates at length a stimulating comparison drawn from the career of the soldier. The sacraments furnish grace for the spiritual struggle and strengthen the spiritual warrior at various stages of his conflict. Baptism equips him on entering the battle; confirmation encourages him in its progress; extreme unction helps him at the finish; the eucharist and penance renew his strength; orders introduce new recruits into the ranks and marriage furnishes men to be recruits.

In defining what constitutes a sacrament, *quid est sacramentum*, the Schoolmen all start from Augustine's definitions. A sacrament is a symbol of a sacred reality, the visible sign of an invisible grace.† They are visible signs of divine things and may be compared to uttered words, *quasi verba visibilia*. The African Father made a distinction between the sacramental symbol and the virtue residing in the sacrament, so that in his controversy with the

* Thomas Aquinas, *Summa*, III, 62, 6; Migne, IV, p. 569: "sacramenta veteris legis non habebant in se aliquam virtutem qua operarentur ad conferendam gratiam justificantem," etc.

† Albertus Magnus, Bonaventura (*Breviloquium*, Peltier's ed., VII, p. 311) and other Schoolmen also quote Augustine's definition: "sacramentum est in quo sub tegumento visibilium rerum divina virtus secretius operatur salutem."

Donatists he was able to declare that heretical baptism was valid baptism, and yet that the full virtue of baptism is not realized until the person so baptized has entered the true Church. The Schoolmen were right in claiming Augustine for the theory of inherent sacramental grace.

Beginning with Hugo de St. Victor, the Schoolmen in unmistakable language assert that the sacraments contain and confer grace. They have virtue in themselves. Thomas Aquinas states that a sacrament is a symbol of a sacred thing so far as it has sanctifying power.* They are more than visible channels and signs of grace. They do more than signify. They sanctify. They are the efficient cause of gracious operations.† Grace is so inevitably connected with the symbol that where the symbol is there grace operates. This theory was adopted with the use of the term, *ex opere operato*, by Thomas Aquinas, who in this followed Alexander of Hales. He said "the sacraments justify and confer grace *ex opere operato*."‡ The Councils of Ferrara and Trent both use the expression that the sacraments "contain and confer" grace.

The favorite illustration for the operation of the sacraments is medicine. Hugo de St. Victor said God is the physician, man the invalid, the priest the minister, grace the antidote, the sacrament the vase. The physician gives, the minister dispenses, the vase contains spiritual grace which cures the invalid. Bonaventura entitled his chapters on the sacraments in the *Breviloquium* "Sacramental Medicine." The sacraments are remedies which the great Samaritan provided for the wounds of original and actual sin.

It would be false to conclude that the Schoolmen taught that this gracious operation of the sacraments was effected apart from Christ or irrespective of the disposition of the recipient. High Churchmen as they were, these theologians made the distinction between the ultimate cause of this operation and its instrumental cause. The virtue of the latter, that is the virtue of the sacrament, depends upon God's appointment and working.§ Protestant writers have often gone too far when they have represented the Schoolmen as ascribing a magical virtue to the sacraments, if not

**Summa*, III, 60, 2; Migne, IV, p. 543: "signum rei in quantum est sanctificans homines."

† Hugo of St. Victor says, *Summa*, IV, 1: "sacramentum est visibilis forma invisibilis gratiæ in eo collatæ, quam, scilicet confert ipsum sacramentum."

‡ "sacramenta justificant et gratiam conferunt ex opere operato." Thomas repeats this again and again.

§ *Summa*, III, 62, 1; Migne, IV, p. 562: "causa vero instrumentalis non agit per virtutem suæ formæ sed solum per motum quo movetur a principali agente."

irrespective of the divine appointment, then irrespective of the attitude of the recipient. Thomas Aquinas declares that the interior operation is due to Christ,* or, as he says in another place, to the blessing of Christ and the administration of the priest combined. As to the attitude of the recipients, the presupposition is that they are in a religious condition. They possess the disposition of Catholic Christians, or desire to have it. Thomas even says that faith is an element required for their proper reception. The virtue "of Christ's passion passes over to us through faith and the sacraments."† That the disposition is a matter of importance is shown by the requirement for baptism. Children of unbelievers and Jews, arriving at mature years, if they would be baptized must have the desire for the rite. And no children were to be baptized without the consent of their parents. That is, faith in one of its stages was required. Duns Scotus alone forms an exception on this point and allowed the forcible baptism of the children of Jews and even of Jewish adults, on the ground that their descendants in the fourth and fifth generations often proved to be good Christians. It is true that it remained for the Reformers to present the meaning of faith as it is set forth by Paul. With the Schoolmen faith is chiefly either intellectual assent as opposed to unbelief, or it is the assurance of things unseen. Faith, according to Hugo de St. Victor, is itself a sacrament, the sacrament of future contemplation. Contemplation is the reality of which faith is the symbol or prefiguration. Bonaventura says the Church received the sacraments from Christ and dispenses them to the salvation of the faithful,‡ *ad fidelium salutem dispensat*, that is to those who have a Christian disposition. It is well to lay emphasis on such points in order that, as far as possible, all barriers to Christian fellowship may be removed out of the way.

Duns Scotus, whose opinions were set aside by the Council of Ferrara for those of Thomas Aquinas, insisted that God can impart grace apart from the sacraments, and that their efficacy is felt through an action of the will of the recipient. The sacraments involve a psychological process in the recipient. As symbols they remind the soul of God's grace and draw the soul to it. It is sufficient for the reception of the sacraments if there be no moral im-

* *Summa*, III, 64, 3; Migne, p. 583: "interiorem sacramentorum effectum operatur Christus."

† "virtus passionis Christi copulatur nobis per fidem et sacramenta" (Migne, IV, p. 568).

‡ *Breviloquium*, VI, 5; Peltier's ed., VII, p. 316.

pediment,* or, as Duns puts it in another place, no impeding indisposition.† It is the very excellency of the sacraments of the new law that the very reception of them is a sufficient disposition to grace.

The relation the priest sustains to the sacrament is a vital one and, except in extraordinary cases, it is an essential one. The efficacy of the sacrament, however, does not depend upon the moral character of the officiating priest. To use the mediæval illustration, pure water is conveyed through a leaden pipe as well as through a silver one. The priest, empowered by the Church, acts not in his own name, but in the name of the Church, and in using the appointed ritual he gives voice to the intention of the Church.‡ Even if the intention of conferring grace be absent from the priest's mind, the efficacy of the sacrament is not withheld on that account. This was Augustine's teaching, and the Schoolmen follow him also in insisting that ultimately it is Christ who works the effect of the sacrament. The priest, according to Thomas, does not confer grace by any power in himself, but this is wrought by Christ who exercises his power through his priestly instruments.§ What other answer than this can Protestants give when we are confronted with the cases of unworthy ministers who have administered baptism and the Lord's Supper? The good effect of their ministerial acts does not depend upon the minister but upon God. Duns Scotus, with his hair-splitting refinements, differed at least in appearance from the great Dominican Thomas by declaring that "a virtual intention" on the part of the celebrant is essential to the efficacy of the sacrament. He illustrates his position by a pilgrim on the way to the shrine, say, of St. James. The pilgrim may not think of the saint during the whole progress of the journey, but he starts out with a "virtual intention" to go to the shrine and keeps on the way. A priest during the progress of sacramental administration may allow his mind to wander and forget what he is doing, nevertheless he has the virtual intention of performing the rite.

With an eye, perhaps, to the heretical sects of their age, the Schoolmen allowed a certain "usefulness" to the sacraments when

* *obix* is the word used. See Schwane, p. 581.

† "nisi impediatur indispositio ejus cui adhibetur," quoted by Seeberg, p. 343.

‡ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa*, III, 64, 8: "minister sacramenti agit in persona totius ecclesiæ," etc.

§ *Summa*, III, 64, 5; Migne, IV, p. 586: "minister non gratiam conferunt sua virtute, sed hoc facit Christus sua potestate per eos sicut per quædam instrumenta."

administered outside the pale of "holy mother Church," as Bonaventura put it. They do not inure to salvation unless the recipients afterwards enter within the fold of the Church, outside of which there is no salvation. This he illustrated by Augustine's comparison of the Church to the garden of Eden. The four rivers flowing through Eden passed into different lands. Neither to Mesopotamia nor to Egypt, whither their waters flowed, did they carry the felicity of life which was felt in Eden. Nevertheless they were useful. So it is with the sacraments when administered outside the pale of the true Church.*

A distinction was made between baptism and the eucharist on the one hand and the other five sacraments on the other. It was a question not of divine institution but of degree of excellency. The first two, to use the precise term, are "the mightiest" of the sacraments, and of them the eucharist is the "most mighty," *potissimum*.† It is the "crown" of the sacraments, and for three reasons: (1) It contains Christ Himself after a substantial manner; (2) the other sacraments are preparatory to it; (3) all may participate in it—those who are in orders as well as those who are baptized and not in orders. Three sacraments have an indelible character—baptism, orders and confirmation. Their gracious mark cannot be erased. They cannot be repeated. The other four can be repeated and, to follow Thomas Aquinas, are necessary to life only as a horse may be necessary to a journey.‡

One sacrament alone is indispensable as a condition of salvation, baptism. Not the defect of the other sacraments damns, but the contempt of them. Hugo de St. Victor no doubt expressed the view of the mediæval Church when he said that "God might have saved man without the sacraments, but no man can be saved who rejects them."§ There is no sufficient evidence that the Schoolmen were led to construct their sacramental system by the spread of the mediæval heretical sects. That system was the natural product of the impulse to construct a complete body of theology whose parts should be closely compacted together by dialectics. The mediæval *summa* was the impregnable citadel of Church doctrine. And the theory of the Church as an outward institution, which Augustine also had expounded, controlled the minds of the great

* *Breviloquium*, V; Peltier's ed., VII, p. 317. The illustration is carried out at length.

† Thomas Aquinas, III, 62, 5; Migne, IV, p. 568.

‡ *Summa*, III, 65, 4; Migne, IV, p. 601.

§ *de sacr.*, I, 9, 5; Migne, 176, p. 325: "potuit enim deus hominem salvare etiam si ista non instituisset, sed homo nullatenus salvari posset si ista contemneret."

thinkers of the Middle Ages as well of its great actors, like Hildebrand and Innocent III. In building up their system of the sacraments, they felt they were strengthening the Church, for that system was the Church's chief gift from above and its chief weapon on the earth. They went too far. Their specious argumentation was without warrant in Scripture. It fed the superstitious reverence for the visible Church and the person and sacerdotal acts of the priest. The importance of the immediate contact of the soul with Christ was dimmed or lost. The sacramental system became the Church's Babylonish Captivity, as Luther called it in his famous tract, in which the rights and liberty of the Christian soul was fettered by the traditions of men.

A succinct statement will set forth the fundamental views of the Schoolmen on each of the sacraments in detail.

Baptism was defined by Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventura and others as "the door" to the other sacraments and to the kingdom of heaven. It is indispensable to salvation, except in the case of those who desire to be baptized and have no opportunity to receive the rite. The desire on the part of such persons to be regenerated by water and the Spirit is certain evidence that they have already been regenerated.* It is the sacrament of regeneration and removes the guilt and punishment of original sin † and incorporates the recipient into the passion of Christ. The ablution of water signifies the clearing away of all guilt, and the freezing of water the subtraction of all punishment.‡ Baptism confers grace, and this effect is symbolized by the clearness of water.§ It followed that the whole pagan world and all unbaptized children dying in infancy are lost.

The validity of the sacrament requires the full use of the triune name. Bernard had allowed the use of the formula, "I baptize thee in the name of the Father and of the true and holy cross." Hugo of St. Victor confessed himself to be in doubt whether the name of God alone or of Christ alone were sufficient or not. The later Schoolmen took the positive ground that the full name of the Trinity is required. Bonaventura acknowledged that in early times the Church had often been satisfied with baptism into the name of Christ, but said that in such cases the Trinity was understood.

* Thomas Aquinas, *Summa*, III, 68, 6; Migne, IV, p. 636.

† "omne peccatum per baptismum tollitur," Thomas Aquinas, III, 69, 1; Migne, p. 652; "ille qui baptizatus liberatur a reatu totius poenæ," Thomas Aquinas, III, 69, 2.

‡ This strange figure is used by Thomas Aquinas, III, 69, 2, 4.

§ Thomas Aquinas, III, 69, 4; Migne, p. 656.

He declared that since the deliverance of the Fourth Lateran Council, 1215, the omission of a single syllable from the triune formula invalidated the baptism.

The proper administrator of baptism is the priest, but in case of necessity a layman may baptize, man or woman, for, as Thomas Aquinas said, "In the kingdom of heaven there is neither male nor female."* This theologian went so far as to affirm the validity of baptism administered by an unbaptized person, provided it be administered in the triune name and with the purpose of baptizing. The chief reason he gives for this judgment is that the benefits of salvation might be extended as far as possible.† The strictness with which the necessity of baptism was held is shown by the treatment which Hugo de St. Victor gave to the question whether the children of Christian parents are saved when the parents are put to death in a besieged city and the children themselves die unbaptized. After looking at it from different aspects, this reasonable theologian left the question unanswered, saying, "There is no authority for saying what will become of such children."‡ So there was at least one question which the Schoolmen left unsettled.

Children are proper subjects of baptism because they are under the curse of Adam. It is not a question of faith on their part, but of the sponsorial duty of the Church. As the mother nourishes her offspring in the womb before it can nourish itself, so in the bosom of mother Church infants are nourished and receive salvation through her act.§ There was no exception among the Schoolmen to the belief that all unbaptized dying children and adults are lost. "They cannot be saved," said Hugo de St. Victor, "because they have no faith." The other Schoolmen agree with him in assigning to unbaptized children dying in infancy the mildest of

* The Synod of Mainz, 1233, and other Synods allowed parents in case of necessity to baptize their children. Nothing could attest the high or superstitious regard in which baptism was held better than the act of the Synod of Treves, 1310, which ordered that a child taken from its mother after her death and itself unbaptized should be buried in unconsecrated ground. See Hefele, *Conciliengeschichte*.

† *Summa*, III, 67, 5; Migne, IV, p. 628.

‡ *Summa*, V, 6; Migne, 176, 132. The perdition of infants dying before birth is also affirmed by the Schoolmen. Duns Scotus, *Sent.* IV : 4, 3, 3; Paris ed. XVI : 406, 410, makes it plain that children still unborn are under the law of sin not because they are connected with the bodies of their mothers but because of their own bodies. He excepts from the law of perdition unborn infants whose mothers suffer martyrdom. This is blood baptism, and applies to such children as well as to children outside of the womb who are put to death by violence.

§ Thomas Aquinas, III, 68, 9; Migne, p. 646; Bonaventura, *Breviloquium*, VII, Peltier's ed., VII, p. 320.

punishments, for to original sin they add no actual transgression. We will not be too severe on them for this view when we recall, to take a single instance, that that strong Calvinist, Isaac Watts, the author of the nursery songs for children, so late as 1740 elaborated the view that all unbaptized children outside of Christian households dying in infancy were annihilated. He espoused this view as a relief from the alternative view that they suffered conscious pain throughout eternity.* As has already been indicated, the most of the Schoolmen agreed with Thomas Aquinas that it was unlawful to baptize the children of Jews and infidels against the will of their parents.†

Water is essential to baptism. From Hugo de St. Victor and Peter the Lombard, the Schoolmen agreed that wine, oil or other liquid is no substitute.‡ Immersion was preferred by Thomas Aquinas, and he speaks of it as the more general practice in his day.§ Peter Lombardus, without qualification, declares it to be the proper mode. Thomas allowed aspersion or effusion where life might be jeopardized by the application of water to the entire body or where it was inconvenient to immerse, as in the case of the 5,000 and 3,000 mentioned as baptized at the same time in the Acts. Bonaventura held that water must be applied to the whole body or at any rate to its noblest part, the head.|| Both triune immersion and single immersion were allowed by Peter the Lombard, Bonaventura and Thomas Aquinas. Triune immersion symbolizes the trinity and the three days in which Christ lay in the tomb; single immersion the unity of the Godhead and the uniqueness of Christ's death.

The doctrine of baptismal regeneration was based by the Schoolmen especially upon John iii. 5: "Except a man be born of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter the kingdom of God." The doctrine follows the letter and misses the real meaning of Scripture. In extending the validity of baptism the Schoolmen seem to have been as tolerant as our own General Assembly. The Assembly of 1845 (Old School) denied the validity of Roman Catholic baptism,

* In his *Rise and Recovery of Mankind*.

† "non habet hoc ecclesiæ consuetudo quod filii infidelium invitis parentibus baptizentur," *Summa*, III, 68, 10; Migne, p. 648.

‡ Duns Scotus said in regard to baptism in beer that its validity would depend upon a scientific test whether the liquid continued to be a species of water or not. See Seeberg, p. 359.

§ "quamvis tutius sit baptizare per modum immersionis," etc. (*Summa*, III, 66, 7).

|| *Breviloquium*, VII; Peltier's ed., VII, p. 319: "requiritur mersio, vel ablutio per elementum aquæ in toto corpore vel saltem in digniore parte."

against the protest of Dr. Charles Hodge. The Assembly of 1875, without pronouncing a categorical decision on the question, left the question to each session to decide. If Roman Catholic priests rebaptize persons entering their communion, they use a hypothetical formula: "If this person has not been baptized, I baptize thee."

The sacrament of confirmation may be dismissed with a few words. The Schoolmen devote little space to it. They rest it upon no specific command. It was implied in the promise of the Holy Spirit. The consecrating element, oil, is to be applied to the forehead, where the shame shows itself which the fearful feel in making known their Christian profession. The sacrament confers hardihood, *robur*, and is, as it were, a consummation of baptism.* It is performed by the bishop, the successor of the apostles, through the imposition of whose hands the gift of the Spirit was conferred in the primitive Church.

In the celebration of the eucharist and in the worship of the Virgin Mary the piety of the Middle Ages found its chief expression. The feast of Corpus Christi, commemorating the assumed fact of transubstantiation, had its origin in the thirteenth century. The ritual, which Thomas Aquinas at the command of the Pope prepared for it, is one of the most solemn services of the Church and is used to this day. Who dare venture to deny the devotional element in this ritual when he reads Thomas' eucharistic hymns celebrating the change of the elements:

"Pange lingua gloriosa corporis mysterium."†

Albertus Magnus devoted to the eucharist a special treatise, in which allegory is given full rein. He and the other Schoolmen treat it at great length.

The Fathers did not work out a careful statement of the Lord's Supper. From their highly figurative language the doctrines of the real presence and the transmutation of the elements may easily be drawn. The controversies of Paschasius in the ninth and of Lanfranc in the eleventh centuries stated the doctrine of transubstantiation clearly, and prepared the way for the elaborate discussions of the Schoolmen and the dogmatic definition of the Fourth

* Thomas Aquinas, III, 72, 11; Migne, IV, p. 693; P. Lombard, IV, 7, etc. For the custom of anointing on the forehead, Thomas quotes Ezek. III, 8: "I have made thy forehead hard against their foreheads."

† See Schaff's *Christ in Song*, p. 465 *sqq.* The hymn is contained in the Presbyterian Hymnal, No. 329, omitting the verses depicting the transubstantiated elements.

Lateran Council, 1215. With the exception of Duns Scotus, the Schoolmen regarded the doctrine as susceptible of proof from Scripture. Duns Scotus took the ground that it cannot be so proved, but must be accepted on the authority of the Church. The doctrine was not foisted upon the Church by the Lateran Council. The Council simply gave authoritative statement to the belief already prevalent in the Church. The passages relied upon by Thomas Aquinas and others were the words of institution, "This is my body," and John vi. 53, "Verily, verily, I say unto you, except ye eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood, ye have no life in you." The symbolical theory and the theory of impanation were discussed and set aside. Rupert of Deutz (d. 1135) seems to have been the only Schoolman of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries of any note who dissented from the doctrine of transubstantiation.* The change in transubstantiation occurs not by the annihilation of the bread and wine, as Duns contended, but by the transmutation of their substance. Thomas Aquinas found an illustration for this in the air from which fire is generated and which is thereby not necessarily annihilated.

The secondary characteristics of the bread and wine remain—the accidents so-called—weight, taste, color, dimensions. Luther declared there might as reasonably have been set up the theory of transaccidentation as of a change of substance. Thomas anticipated his objection and gave three reasons why the accidents remain: (1) because it is repugnant to the usual habit of Christians to partake of human flesh and blood; (2) in case the accidents were changed, Christians would in eating expose themselves to the charge of being cannibals and become a laughing stock to the scorner and the infidel;† (3) the bread retains its accidents that faith may have opportunity for exercise. Creation, this great Schoolman said, is less difficult to understand than transubstantiation; for creation is out of nothing, but in transubstantiation the accidents remain while the substance is changed. The body and blood of Christ are really on the altar, though they cannot be apprehended by the senses or by the mind. They are apprehended by faith only.‡ Though the substance of bread and wine disappear,

* His theory, according to Bellarmin and other Catholic writers as well as Neander and Schröckh, was the theory of impanation, or the existence of the body of Christ at the side of the elements. See Schwane, p. 641.

† Thomas Aquinas, III, 75, 5; Migne, IV, p. 724. Peter the Lombard dwells at length on this consideration.

‡ Thomas Aquinas, III, 75, 1; Migne, IV, p. 716.

the two elements continue to preserve the virtue of their substance.*

In the use of the wine, water is to be mixed. Thomas and Albertus Magnus rely in confirmation of this practice much upon the alleged custom in vogue in Palestine and the words of Proverbs ix. 5, "Come, eat of my bread, and drink of the wine which I have mingled for you." Water symbolizes the people; wine Christ; their combination the union of Christ and the communicant. The mixture of the two elements is not essential, Thomas Aquinas said, to the validity of the sacrament.

The question seriously engaged the attention of the Schoolmen what it was that Christ held in His hands at the Last Supper, and they do not hesitate to say that it was His own body and blood. Thomas says he had "them in his hands and in his mouth." What Christ partook of Himself, He gave to the disciples. Hugo de St. Victor alone shrunk from discussing this question, stating that in the case of such mysteries reverence was more seeming than discussion.† This question involved the further question whether Judas partook of the true body and blood of the Lord. Leaning upon Augustine and by a manipulation of the accounts of Luke xxii and John xiii, the Schoolmen took the position that the bread and wine had been distributed before Judas took the sop. The sop was delusive. Judas was deceived.‡ Much time was also spent upon the question whether the disciples during the time of our Lord's entombment partook of His real body. Duns Scotus, falling back upon his theory that a body has several forms, answered the question in the affirmative.

The doctrine of "concomitance,"§ elaborated by Alexander of Hales, involved the presence of Christ's divinity wherever His body is. From this the conclusion was drawn that the properties of Christ's divinity are in the sacrament of the eucharist, as well as the properties of His body, flesh, bones, blood, nerves.|| It was necessary to make this doctrine plain, in view of the fact that in

* "quamvis non sint substantia, habent virtutem substantiæ," Thomas Aquinas, III, 76, 6; Migne, IV, p. 755.

† *Summa*, II, 8; Migne, 176, p. 462: "ego in ejusmodi secreta divina magis veneranda quam discutienda cerneo."

‡ So Hugo, P. Lombardus, Thomas Aquinas, etc. The expression "Judas communion" was current and used by the Synod of London, 1175, etc. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa*, III, 81, 3, approves the lines:

"The King, seated with the Twelve at the table,
Holds Himself in His hands. He, the food, feeds upon Himself."

Schwane, p. 645, agrees that this conception was general among the Schoolmen.

§ The Council of Trent adopted the word and the theory.

|| Thomas Aquinas, III, 76, I; Migne, IV, 732.

the words of institution the Lord mentioned His body only. The further doctrine that the whole Christ is in each of the elements was also fully elaborated for the first time by Alexander of Hales. Anselm had asserted it a hundred years* before Alexander, who was followed closely by Thomas Aquinas, who laid emphasis upon the doctrine in order to justify the withdrawal of the cup from the laity, a custom which came into vogue in the twelfth century. This that theologian flatly demanded, that the laity might be taught the doctrine that the whole Christ is in each of the elements. Thomas Aquinas observed that Christ distributed bread to the 5000, but not wine or water. How much reverence for the sacred elements had to do with developing the custom of withholding the cup it has been impossible to determine. It is fair to suppose that the fear of profanation by spilling the blood was the most prominent factor. The Council of Constance gave, among other reasons for the custom, the danger of defilement to the wine by coming into contact with the long beards of laymen, and the possibility of its turning sour or freezing while being carried to the sick. The custom, widely prevalent, of taking the wine through a tube or reed,† was also probably a product of undue reverence. The custom of taking a meal immediately after the eucharist was an ancient practice and arose from the feeling of reverence for the elements. In the Middle Ages it was a frequent custom to give to the communicant a rinsing cup which he used after he had partaken of the elements.‡ Mediæval Councils guarded carefully against the possible profanation of the blood, as did also Thomas Aquinas. Should a drop happen to fall on the priest's garment, the piece was to be cut out, burned and carefully thrown into the sacrary. Should a drop fall on the altar cloth or the *corporale*, the cloth was to be washed three times, the water being drunk by the priest. English Synods ordered the church bells to be rung every time the mass was celebrated, that the

* Ep., IV, 107; Migne, 159, p. 255: "in acceptatione sanguinis totum Christum, deum et hominem; et in acceptatione corporis similiter totum accipimus." Anselm, however, was having no reference to the withdrawal of the cup from the laity.

† The terms used are *fistula*, *canna*, *tuba*, *siphon*, etc. Some Lutheran Churches continued to follow this practice down into the eighteenth century. Smend, in his *Kelchversagung und Kelchspendung*, Göttingen, 1898, gives the interesting history of the custom.

‡ The object was to prevent the loss of any of the sacred element by vomiting. A Synod of Soissons of the twelfth century enjoined all to rinse the mouth after partaking of the elements. Archbishop Peckham in 1281 enjoined upon the priests to instruct the people that in partaking of the bread they were partaking of the whole Christ, and that the cup was given that they might the more easily swallow the sacred body.

workman in the field and the woman in the kitchen might bow in solemn adoration.

The sacrament of the eucharist confers grace, and it was very natural that the question should arise as to the effect the host consecrated would have upon a mouse which might happen to eat it. Albertus Magnus, Bonaventura, Thomas Aquinas and other Schoolmen devoted their talents to solve it.* Bonaventura concluded that under such circumstances the body of Christ was withdrawn. Not so his contemporary Thomas. It would not be withdrawn, said this theologian, even if the elements were to be cast into the mire. Such a statement involves no disparagement of Christ's body, which God allowed to be crucified by wicked hands. His solution of the question was that the mouse, not being created to eat bread as a sacrament, when it ate the host, ate not after a sacramental manner but through the accidents, *non sacramentaliter, sed per accidens*. This theological and metaphysical curiosity is presented with all gravity. Peter the Lombard, perhaps anticipating Bonaventura, had said: "An animal does not take the body of Christ in eating the consecrated bread. But what it does take and eat, God only knows." A similar question had been propounded by that subtlest of dialecticians, Duns Scotus:† "What effect would the baptismal water have upon an ass who might drink it?" He replied that the question was an asinine refinement, *subtilitas assinina*, for the virtue in such water no ass can drink. In the end the answers were the same.

The communion of children, practiced in the early Church and attested by Augustine, was still general in the time of Pope Paschal II, as a letter of his, 1118, bears witness. The *Supplement* of Thomas Aquinas justifies the abandonment of the practice on the ground that the eucharist, like extreme unction, requires "real devotion in the recipients."‡

As a sacrifice, the eucharist has a wider application than it has as a sacrament. As a sacrament it benefits only those who partake; as a sacrifice those who partake and others also. This teaching Thomas Aquinas confirms by a combination of the accounts of Matthew and Luke. In the one the blood is said to be "shed for

* Thomas Aquinas, III, 80, 3; Migne, IV, p. 789; Albertus Magnus, *In Sententias*, IV, 13, 38; Borgnet's ed., XXIX, p. 397; Bonaventura, *Sentenc.*, IV, 13, 2, 1; Peltier's ed., V, p. 550.

† *Sent.* IV, 6, 3, 2; Paris ed. XVI: 558. See Seeberg, p. 360.

‡ "exigit actualem devotionem," *Supplem.*, XXXII, 4; Migne, IV, p. 1038. The Council of Trent anathematized those who declare the communion of children necessary. See art. "Kinderkommunion" in *Wetzer-Welte*, VII, 459, and Herzog, 3d ed., X, 289.

you"; that is, those who were present. In the other it is said to be shed "for many"; that is, for those present and others. Concurrently the doctrine was developed that the benefits of the eucharistic sacrifice accrue upon the consecration of the priest, and do not depend upon its use by the people.

That the belief in transubstantiation was adopted by the priestly as well as the popular mind, is evident not only from the teachings of the mediæval theological treatises and the decrees of Councils, but also from the stories related by such popular writers as Jacob of Voragine and Cæsar of Heisterbach. To give a single one. The intelligent German monk, Cæsar, asserts that he looked with his own eyes upon the bloody host of St. Thronð. The case happened in 1223. A woman, in the hope of inflaming the love of her lover, hurried from the altar, holding the host in her mouth, and kissed him. After imprinting the kiss, she was unable to swallow the sacred morsel and, wrapping it in cloths, carefully hid it away. Her mind was so troubled that she told the secret to a priest, who in turn communicated it to the bishop of Livland who happened to be in the town. Accompanied by the woman, they found the host and on it three drops of blood. The abbot was then called in and it appeared that one-half of the host was bread and one-half flesh. The good bishop, anxious to be possessed of so wonderful a relic, essayed to carry it away with him, but was prevented by sixty strong men, and the relic was carefully laid away in the Church of St. Thronð. Cæsar solemnly attests the story. He was not more credulous than his age, and wrote down the particulars, as he said, for the advantage of many ages then unborn.*

The sacrament of penance was elaborated at even greater length by the Schoolmen than the sacrament of the eucharist.† The virtue asserted of it was one of the most baneful teachings of the Middle Ages. Penance was placed in close connection with baptism.‡ Baptism serves for the deletion of original sin; penance for the deletion of mortal sins committed after baptism. Using the illustration of Tertullian, the Schoolmen called it "the second plank" thrown out after shipwreck to the sinner, as baptism is

* See A. Kaufmann's edition of *Cæsar of Heisterbach*, 2d Part, p. 203 *sqq.*

† The Lombard devotes two and a half times the space to penance that he devotes to the sacrament of the eucharist; Hugo St. Victor three times as much (Migne's ed., pp. 550-578, as against pp. 462-471 on the eucharist); Thomas Aquinas (Migne's ed.), pp. 852-1023, as against pp. 695-852 on the eucharist, and Bonaventura nearly four times as much space (Peltier's ed., V, 533-709, Vol. VI, 1-129, as against V, 415-533, on the eucharist).

‡ The Council of Trent, referring to the works of satisfaction, calls penance a sort of "laborious baptism."

the first.* Scriptural warrant enough was found for the doctrine of penance. Thomas Aquinas, tracing its institution to Christ, quoted Jerome's version of Luke xxiv. 47, that "penance and remission of sins should be preached from Jerusalem." The words of James (v, 14), calling upon Christians to confess their sins one to another, were appealed to. The Vulgate translates the Greek word *metanoeo* by *agere pœnitentiam*, and the Rheims Version perpetuates the mischievous mistake for English readers by usually translating the word "do penance," thus transferring the sphere of repentance from the heart to external performances. A strong proof was also found for penance in the interpretation the Schoolmen put upon the Lord's words, "Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven." They were explained to confer upon the priest the authority to pronounce judicial sentence of forgiveness or condemnation over the sinner.

On several features of the sacrament of penance much light has been thrown by the recent researches of our own Dr. Henry C. Lea and the two German Protestant experts in Mediæval History, Karl Müller† and Brieger.‡

About the year, say, 1200 the mediæval doctrine of penance came to be fixed. Thereafter the Schoolmen invariably defined penance to consist of four parts—contrition of heart, confession to the priest, satisfaction by the performance of certain exercises prescribed by the priest, and absolution by the priest. These were all declared to be essential to a right standing before God. Before 1200 there was no uniformity in the teaching on this subject. Karl Müller, in his learned treatise, and Köhler, § in an admirable collection of documents, have shown conclusively that in the twelfth century a radical change took place in the Church's teaching and practice in the matter of penance. Peter the Lombard bears witness to the unsettled mind of the Church in his day, about 1160, on three questions, namely, whether contrition of heart is not all that is required in penance, whether confession to the priest is essential, and whether confession to a layman is not sufficient. This eminent theologian declared that the opinions on the subject, handed down from the

* Tertull, *de pœnitentia*, XII. So also Jerome. See the Lombard, *Sent.*, XIV, 1; Thomas Aquinas, III, 84; Bonaventura, *Sent.*, XIV, 1; *Breviloquium*, VI, 10, etc.

† *der Umschwung in der Lehre von der Busse während d. 12ten Jahrhunderts*, Freiburg, 1892.

‡ *D. Wesen des Ablasses am Ausgang des Mittelalters*, Leip., 1897.

§ *Dokumente zum Ablassstreit vom 1517, Tübingen*, 1902.

Fathers, were diverse if not antagonistic,* and he himself denied that confession to the priest is essential to forgiveness. On the other hand, sixty years later, Alexander of Hales, in his *Summa universæ theologiæ*, positively affirmed that contrition of heart is not sufficient, and that confession to the priest and priestly absolution are essential. He was followed by the later Schoolmen. According to Thomas Aquinas, all mortal sins may be blotted out by penance except the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost.†

Contrition, the first element of penance, was defined to be sorrow of the soul for its sins, an aversion from them and a purpose not to repeat them. Gratian joined Peter the Lombard in teaching that this state of the heart was a sufficient ground for the divine forgiveness, and needed not the supplement of confession to the priest or his absolution.‡ At the side of this doctrine Alexander of Hales introduced the dangerous doctrine of attrition which was further developed by Albertus Magnus, Bonaventura and Thomas Aquinas. It is the negative element of contrition, a sort of half-way repentance, or, as the Germans call it, *Galgenreue*, repentance induced by fear of being hung. It is servile fear, the dread of punishment. Thomas Aquinas defined it as a partial displeasure with one's sins.§ It is a sufficient preparation for confession to the priest and the other stages of penance. The feeling of attritio is likened to the feelings which the prodigal son had when he started to go to his father. Towards the close of the Middle Ages, Gabriel Biel took the position that attrition is changed by confession and priestly absolution into contrition. Harnack|| is very severe upon this mediæval fiction as the dry-rot in the Catholic system. According to it, as it would seem, a man may be forgiven who is actuated simply by the fear of hell and has neither faith nor filial love in his heart.

As for confession to the priest, its necessity was fully recognized by the Fourth Lateran Council, 1215, when it demanded that it be made once a year by every true Catholic. Bonaventura argued

* *Sent.*, XVII, Migne, p. 880, in his docti diversa sentire inveniuntur quia super his varia ac pene diversa tradidisse videntur doctores. Albertus Magnus says the same thing (*In sent.*, IV, 17, A. Borgnet's ed., XXIX, p. 655).

† "omne peccatum in hac vita per poenitentiam veram deleri potest" *Summa* III, 86, 1; Migne, p. 881.

‡ Schwane has strong words of condemnation for this opinion of the Lombard, p. 662.

§ "attritio significat quamdam displicentiam de peccatis commissis sed non perfectam" (*Supplem.*, I, 2; Migne, p. 919). He is much more moderate on the subject than Alexander, Bonaventura and Duns Scotus.

|| *Dogmengesch.*, II, pp. 482, 504 sqq. The Council of Trent adopted the theory of attrition and the word, and defined it as not sufficient in itself and requiring priestly aid (Schaff's *Creeds*, II, p. 145).

that subsequent to Council's decision the denial of its necessity was heresy, before the decision it was not. Thomas Aquinas said that confession is as necessary as baptism. Not even the Pope has the right to grant a dispensation from it, any more than he may offer salvation from original sin without baptism.* Confession is not required for venial sins. Such sins do not separate the soul from God or from the Church. The Church makes daily supplication for them, and that is enough.† In case of necessity a layman may hear confession. This will avail for the offender's reconciliation to God. To be reconciled to the Church, he must at the first opportunity repeat his confession to a priest who stands in Christ's stead.‡

The practice of satisfaction for sins by outward performances prescribed by the priest, the third element in penance, Thomas Aquinas and the other Schoolmen base upon the general theory which Anselm applied in his discussion of the doctrine of the atonement. A compensation must be made to the divine honor which is offended by sins. Quoting Anselm, Thomas declared that an act of satisfaction is something we deprive ourselves of, whether it be of the good things of the soul or of the body or of outward possession. The final teaching was that a payment of money was an acceptable compensation of this sort. Satisfaction has this advantage over contrition of heart and confession: The two latter the offender may perform only for himself. Satisfaction he may perform for others. For this view Thomas Aquinas quoted Gal. vi. 2, "Bear ye one another's burdens," where the apostle evidently has in mind not guilt and punishment for sin, but common needs and sufferings.

As for the fourth element in penance, absolution by the priest,§ here the change which the teachings of the Church underwent in the twelfth century is again apparent. Peter the Lombard declared the power of the keys to be a declarative function. Sixty years later Alexander of Hales defined it to be a judicial function, and the world of theologians swung around to Alexander's view. The priest's absolution, Thomas Aquinas said, was not an act like the priest's declaration of cleanness over the leper, who was already

* Thomas Aquinas, *Supplem.*, VI, 9; Migne, p. 939.

† "ad deletionem venialis peccati non requiritur infusio gratiæ," etc. (*Summa* III, 65, 1; Migne, IV, p. 597).

‡ "nullus est qui non habeat iudicem Christum, cui per suum vicarium confiteri debet" (*Supplem.*, VI, 3).

§ Schwane calls it the most important element in the sacrament of penance, p. 670.

healed, but a sacramental sentence effecting the pardon of sins. He vindicates against all other formulas the formula, "I absolve thee, in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost." Hugo de St. Victor before him had pronounced the contrary form more laughable and frivolous than worthy of refutation.*

The two important questions arose how far the virtue of priestly absolution extends. Does it cover guilt as well as punishment, and does it extend to the punishments of purgatory as well as to the punishments due in this life? The answer to these questions was also positive and distinct from the time of Alexander of Hales. Richard of St. Victor had emphasized the distinction between the priest's right to remit the punishment of sin and God's sole prerogative which is to forgive its guilt.† Peter the Lombard shared this view, but he was opposed by the Schoolmen of the thirteenth century. With one consent they teach that the priest absolves from the guilt as well as the punishment of sin. This absolution extends also to purgatory. Thomas Aquinas argued that if the good offices of the Church do not avail for persons in purgatory, then the Church prays in vain for its dead.‡ Such souls are still within the jurisdiction of the Church, *de foro ecclesiæ*.

The sacrament of penance found its ultimate mediæval expression in the indulgence. This Thomas Aquinas called "one of the noblest and most efficacious" acts of the Church. An indulgence is the substitution of a lighter work of satisfaction for a heavier one. The first known historical case is that of the Archbishop of Arles in 1016. He gave indulgence for a year to those participating in the erection of a church building. The Crusades were a fruitful occasion for the Popes to dispense this form of spiritual gratuity as a means of raising armaments to break down the power of the Saracen in the holy places. In 1199 Innocent III promised to all who contributed toward the impending Crusade "remission according to the amount of their contribution." They then used it to attract and reward the courage of Crusaders against the heretical sects. And finally they resorted to it to put down Antipopes, as did Innocent II against Anacletus and Roger of Sicily. On what ground did the Church claim the right to grant indulgences? For ground there was, real or invented. The Schoolmen never accepted what, according to their own standard, they did first not

* Thomas said it was not sufficient to say "the omnipotent God absolve thee" (*Summa*, III, 84, 3; Migne, p. 857). See Hugo, *de sacram.*, II, 14, 8.

† See Schwane, p. 661, and Hergenröther-Kirsch., *Kirschengeschichte*, II, 690.

‡ *Summa*, IV, 83, 5: "suffragia eccles. valent illis qui sunt in purgatorio," etc.

prove. The invention must be accredited chiefly to Alexander of Hales, whom Bonaventura and Thomas Aquinas followed, lights of the Franciscan and Dominican orders respectively. It is the *thesaurus meritorum*, or heap of merits. The teaching was that Christ, the Virgin Mary and the saints did more good works than was required of them. These supererogatory works constitute a fund of merit, a sort of savings bank account which stands in the name of the Church. Upon this account the Church may draw at pleasure to pay the debts of sinners. It is at the Church's disposal by reason of her nuptial unity with Christ, Col. i. 24. Thomas Aquinas declared that the merits of the saints, and especially those of Christ, are so superabundant that they would more than suffice to pay off the debts of all the living.* Christ relaxed the punishment due the woman taken in adultery, and she did no works of satisfaction. So likewise may the Pope.† Checks drawn on this fund are a substitute for works of satisfaction which otherwise would be required. And the best thing about it is, as Pope Clement VI announced in 1343, that the more the fund is drawn upon the more it grows.‡ It was like the wood of the holy cross: it had the faculty of self-expansion. The construction of bridges, the erection of churches, the building of roads were frequent grounds of granting the indulgence in England as well as on the Continent. The prelates of England in 1247 were so good as to announce a remission of all penances for six years and 140 days to all who would worship the Holy Blood at Westminster.§ As early as 1140 Abælard had condemned the lavish use of the prerogative by prelates who apparently were guided by motives of cupidity rather than of benevolence toward the people.||

The theory came to prevail that the indulgence directly absolved from the guilt and punishment of sins, *culpa et poena peccatorum*. It set aside or remitted that which acts of penance had been designed to remove. Leaning upon the storehouse of merits, it was sufficient for the Church to pronounce the mortal offenses in a given case forgiven. Catholic theologians were inclined at one time to deny that Popes ever remitted the guilt of sins, and even declared the letters granting such remission spurious. But there can now be no doubt on this point. The chief dispenser of this boon was John XXIII. As early as 1294, Cælestin V granted such an

* Thomas Aquinas, *Summa*, III, 83, 1.

† Thomas Aquinas, *Supplem.*, XXV, 1; Migne, 1013.

‡ See Friedberg, *Corpus juris can.*, Vol. II, p. 1304 sq.

§ M. Paris, Luard's ed., IV, pp. 90, 643.

|| In the *Ethica*, XL, Köhler gives the passage, p. 8.

indulgence to all who on a given day of the year worshiped in the Church of St. Mary de Collemayo, the church in which he had been consecrated.* Boniface VIII, his successor, recalled this bull, but it is doubtful whether he meant to condemn the formula *a culpa et pœna peccatorum* which it contains. Boniface himself announced a "full pardon for all sins," which John Chappius, the editor of the *extravagantes communes*, speaks of as "that indulgence by which plenary indulgence was given for all guilt and punishment," *totalis culpæ et totius pœnæ*. Thirty years before, about 1263, Thomas of Chantimpre had declared that an indulgence absolves immediately from guilt and penalty. The popular belief on the subject is embodied in the lines of Peter the Ploughman's Crede:

"The power of the Apostells they posen in speche
For to sellen the synnes for silver or other mede
And pulyche a *pœna* the purple assoileth
And a *culpa* also, that they may catchen
Money other money wothe and mede to fonge."

The Council of Constance attempted to put some check upon this practice.† Tetzels a century later offered "remission and indulgence of guilt and penalty." Luther's references in a letter to the Archbishop of Mainz make it plain that the people expected to receive precisely what was offered.

There was one more step to which the Church in the later Middle Ages descended. The efficacy of the indulgence was independent of the person who brought it. In his bull of indulgence, 1476, granted to the Church of Xaintes, Sixtus IV announced that persons on earth, by the payment of a fixed sum to the papal collectors, may redeem their kindred from purgatorial pains. From the purchaser contrition and confession were not required.‡ The criminal as well as the saint was able for a stipulated sum to relieve the distress of the dead. The invention of man could scarcely further go to defeat the first principles of the Gospel. Wyclif spoke out clearly against many of the evils of the sacrament of penance, and the marvel is that the people should not have broken away from them till the voice of Luther was heard through Europe.

* See Köhler, *Dokumente*, p. 27. It is the merit of Dr. Lea to have brought out the significance of this document (III, p. 63).

† Alexander V, prior to the Council of Constance, had granted to the members of the Council of Pisa one of the most notable of these indulgences—"absolutio plenaria a pœna et culpa" (Von der Hardt, *Conc. Const.*, III, 688).

‡ See Lea, III, 595 *sq.*, and the instruction of Albert of Mainz quoted by Brieger: "*nec opus est quod contribuentes pro animabus in capsam sint corde contriti et ore confessi.*"

The fifth of the sacraments, extreme unction or unction of the sick, *unctio infirmorum*, is to be administered to those in peril of death. The earlier view that it was instituted by the apostles, represented by Peter the Lombard, was also held by Hugo de St. Victor and Bonaventura. Duns Scotus followed Thomas Aquinas in deriving it directly from Christ. In the absence of a specific precept, Thomas remarks that the Lord did many things which are not recorded in the Gospels.* It may be repeated, but it is to be denied to children, as is also the eucharist, on the ground that their bodily diseases are not caused by sin.† There was a difference of opinion among the Schoolmen as to the effects of the sacrament, whether it was to remit venial sins or the remainders of mortal sins left after penance.‡ Thomas distinctly mentions this difference of opinion.

Marriage, according to most of the Schoolmen, was not a sacrament till after the Fall.§ It is assigned the last place among the sacraments because it has the least of spirituality connected with it.|| The Vulgate is in part responsible for its being included among the sacraments, for it translates Eph. v. 32, "this is a great sacrament" (*hoc est magnum sacramentum*). The Rheims Version perpetuates the mistake for English readers. At first the bed was undefiled and parturition was without pain. Since the Fall marriage has become a remedy against lust and incontinence.¶ It is a cause of grace, the sacramental symbol lying chiefly in the words of consent between the contracting parties. Thomas Aquinas also adds that the priest's benediction has a certain sacramental character.** The angelic doctor was inclined to permit the marriage of boys after fourteen and of girls after twelve. The impediments of marriage were carefully discussed and listed. The children of persons married within the forbidden limits of consanguinity were to be

* *Supplem.*, XXIX, 3; Migne, IV, 1027.

† *Supplem.*, XXXII, 4; Bonaventura, *Brevil.*, VI, 11; Peltier's ed., VII, 326. The Synods of Cologne, 1279, Lambeth, 1330, etc., limit the age to fourteen.

‡ Bonaventura confines its effects to venial sins (*Brevil.*, VI, 11); Thomas Aquinas to mortal sins (*Summa*, III, 65, 2; Migne, IV, 597; *Supplem.*, XXIX, 1).

§ Bonaventura regarded marriage as a sacrament before as well as after the Fall (*Brevil.*, VI, 13).

|| "quia minimum habet de spirituale" (Thomas Aquinas, *Summa*, III, 65, 2; Migne, IV, 598; P. Lombardus, IV, 27, 2. So also Hugo de St. Victor, Bonaventura, etc.).

¶ Alanus de Insulis, *Reg. Theol.*, 114; Migne's ed., p. 681: "conjugium sacramentum remedii contra incontinentiam." Hugo de S. Victor, *de sacr.*, II, 11, 3; P. Lombardus, IV, 26, 2; Migne, p. 908, etc.

** "benedictio sacerdotis est quoddam sacramentale" (*Supplem.*, XLII, 1; Migne, p. 1083).

regarded as illegitimate, even though the marriage had been performed inside the church.

Death dissolves marriage and leaves the survivor free to remarry. Otherwise the marriage bond is perpetual, *vinculum matrimonii est perpetuum*. This follows from two considerations. Marriage involves the sacred duty of training children, and it is symbolical of the union between Christ and the Church which endures forever. Divorce, which is allowed for one cause only, fornication, is separation; not a release with license to marry again. Marriage cannot be annulled by the act of man. "What God has joined together let not man put asunder." Not even may the innocent party enter into another marriage contract till the other is dead. But either party, without the consent of the other, may enter a convent.* The Schoolmen might have been less severe had they not been monks. They based their regulation upon their interpretation of Matthew xix. 6. I have not found any of them expressing any abhorrence of second marriages or looking upon marriage as a spiritual tie extending beyond the present life, as did Tertullian.

Ordination, according to the emphatic teaching of the Schoolmen, confers an indelible character, an indestructible power. Once a priest always a priest. Sacramental grace is exhibited in its highest form in empowering the priest to celebrate the mass. The episcopate is a function, and consecration to it has no sacramental character. Thomas Aquinas says again and again that the episcopate is not a distinct order.† Consecration to it has no sacramental character. There is more reason for regarding ordination as a sacrament, said Thomas, than there is for ascribing a sacramental character to the other sacraments, for ordination confers the power of administering the rest. The question of the validity of the acts of priests receiving ordination from heretics and schismatics seemed to Gratian and Peter the Lombard to be well-nigh, if not altogether, insoluble.‡ The difficulty was increased by the acts of Councils which had condemned as invalid the ordinations of antipopes and the ordinations which bishops, appointed by antipopes, performed.§ The argument of Thomas Aquinas is difficult at this

* Thomas Aquinas, *Supplem.*, LXII, 5; Migne, IV, 1184.

† "episcopatus non est ordo" (*In Sent.*, IV, 24, 3; *Supplem.*, XI, 5; Migne, 1074, etc.). The Canon law has not yet settled whether the episcopate is a separate order or not (see Friedberg, *Kirchenrecht*, p. 150). The Council of Trent spoke of the "hierarchy of bishops, priests and deacons," but Innocent III included the subdeacon in the *ordines majores*.

‡ P. Lombard., IV, 25, 1; Migne, p. 905.

§ For example, the Ninth Œcumenical (see Hefele: *Conciliengeschichte*, V, 380) and the Eleventh Œcumenical Councils pronounced this judgment, naming the antipopes.

point to understand. He makes a distinction between the power, *potestas*, of ordination and the jurisdiction to administer ordination, *jurisdictio*. A bishop on becoming heretic or schismatic retains "the power of conferring orders" and the other sacraments; otherwise, when such a bishop returns to the Church, he would be ordained over again. But he does not "give grace with them, not because of the inefficacy of the sacraments, but because of the sins of the recipients who receive them in the face of the Church's prohibition." Such a bishop lacks jurisdiction. Thomas is emphatic in declaring that under no circumstances can the power or virtue given in his consecration be taken away from a bishop falling into heresy and cut off from the Church. Such a bishop, however, loses the power of conferring orders. The indelible character of the bishop imparted in consecration remains.* The right and ability to exercise his authority are forfeited.

The student misses the best use of Church History if his study has not a bearing on the problems of the present day. The mediæval system of the sacraments in all its leading features has entered into the dogmatic statements of the Roman Catholic communion, and the question arises what bearing the results of this study have upon the problems of Christian recognition and of cordial coöperation between the different branches of the Church. The general considerations most worthy of note are these:

1. We should remember that, if the greater mediæval theologians were mistaken, gravely mistaken, in some of their views on the sacraments, they were not so with any intention to injure the cause of the kingdom of Christ, but to promote it. The mediæval Church shows how capable theological thinkers are, while holding to the form of ecclesiastical institutions, to introduce theories and practices which go far in the way of subverting them. Protestant thinkers have done the same. And though the mediæval Church has erred, it is not to be treated as an institution apart from the Church of Christ. Our spiritual ancestors, as well as the ancestors of the Roman communion, lived in it and worked out their own salvation through it. We have our rights there; and we do, to say the least, unwisely in putting the great theologians of the Middle Ages into an apartment by themselves, to be, as it were, stared at as curiosities. They have their place, and not an unimportant one, in the development of the doctrine of the Church universal.

2. The fundamental religious principles underlying the sacra-

* *Supplem.*, XXXIX, 2; Migne, 1065.

ments are the same for Protestants and for the mediæval theology. With both, baptism signifies the washing away of sin through the sole merit of Jesus Christ. Penance implies the unholiness of sins and abhorrence for them. Confirmation implies the requirement of an open and steadfast Christian profession. The eucharist signifies union with Christ as the Head of the Church and the sacredness of the atonement. Orders involve the importance of the Christian ministry; extreme unction the solemnity of appearing before God in judgment. Marriage lays stress upon the divine institution of the family. These things are of infinitely more importance than the rituals which have been heaped around the seven ordinances, and the effort should be made to so emphasize the great truths for which they stand that we shall be ready to recognize the Christian character of persons who follow theories and forms very different from our own.

3. The most serious differences between the mediæval theory of the sacraments and our own seem to me to be the following: (1) that the eucharist is a sacrifice; (2) that penance is an obligatory series of outward performances; (3) the implications in ordination. Why is not transubstantiation included in the list? For this reason: Although the doctrine seems to myself to be unreasonable and unscriptural, there are passages of Scripture which, if taken alone and applied literally, can easily be made to yield the doctrine. There is the additional reason that Christians can worthily partake of the Lord's Supper, and through it come into communion with Christ, who hold the theory of transubstantiation.

With the three other questions the case is quite different. To say the least, the New Testament nowhere calls the eucharist a sacrifice and nowhere speaks of an altar in the ministries of the apostles or of a "victim of the altar." In regard to penance, the Lord seems to have set aside obligatory penitential performances and relegated repentance to the heart, leaving the outward expression to each individual soul. It is true Paul seems to have performed the Nazarite's vow, but his injunctions embrace patience, brotherly kindness and other virtues, but not penitential exercises. As for orders, the mediæval theory advocates a hierarchy, hedged about by an ecclesiastical ritual, outside of which there can be no valid ministry or dispensation of grace. It is essential to the Church. Where such ministry does not exist, there is no Church. I am inclined to believe that, of all the unscriptural theories of the Christian centuries, the theory of the priestly character of the ministry which was emphasized so much in the Middle Ages, but

did not by any means start there, offends most against the fundamental principles of the New Testament, and has wrought most harm by clouding the plain way of access to Christ, by creating bitter distinctions among Christian people, and by justifying offensive legislation by one part of the Christian body against others, even unto bloody inquisitions and religious wars.

In a recent article, Professor Briggs has dealt with this matter of clerical ordination and expressed the opinion that orders do not constitute the serious barrier to Church union they are usually supposed to be.* He speaks of the ease with which persons pass over from the Episcopal Church to the Roman communion, and from the non-Episcopal Churches to the Protestant Episcopal and Anglican Churches. Reordination is a comparatively little matter, he thinks, and there are not many who are deterred from making such changes by the requirement of reordination. Dr. Briggs lays stress upon the intention to ordain as determining a full, valid ordination. The ordination of the Anglican communion was rejected by Leo XIII on the ground that it was defective in the element of intention. But, Dr. Briggs argues, that while the intention in Anglican ordination may be defective, nevertheless there is a certain amount of intention, and that is good as far as it goes. As for the Lutheran, Reformed and other Protestant Churches, there is also intention in their ordination, though not so much as in the Anglican ordination. In other words, the amount of intention is less, howbeit what there is of it is good enough. And this amount ought to be recognized by the Roman Catholic and Anglican bishops when they reordain. The Roman Catholic and Anglican communions should adopt formulas recognizing these amounts of intention, while at the same time it is understood that the ordination which they give adds something more, so that when a man comes finally to be ordained by the Roman Catholic bishop he is recipient of full ordination.† By this method the cause of Church union would be furthered. I do not understand that in making this statement Dr. Briggs means that he himself holds to the theory of various degrees of difference in the measure of intention. He is presenting the views that hold in the Christian

* *The Independent*, August, 1905, pp. 197-200.

† Perhaps the expression "a more ample ordination" would cover fairly well what is meant. This is the expression which Bishop Stevens of Pennsylvania used when he reordained a Moravian presbyter in Philadelphia, September 30, 1881. The British Parliament had recognized the validity of Moravian ordination in 1749, and it had been customary for the Protestant Episcopal Church to accept the Moravian orders.

communions, and is suggesting a way to remove the barrier thus presented to the reunion of Christendom.

Dr. Briggs is engaged in the laudable attempt to promote the unity, or corporate union, of the Church universal. Sharing with him the desire for Church fellowship and Christian recognition, we are forced to express the hope that Church union may not be sought in any way which seems to involve the obscuration of a true principle and real distinctions. For the question of the ministry is an essential one with us in the non-Episcopal bodies. The Protestant Churches not only recognize the validity of the ministry of their sister body of the Reformation, the Anglican communion, but also the validity of the ministry of the Roman Catholic communion. But for their own ministry they want no further ordination at the hands of men. More ample ordination it certainly needs, and that is the added empowerment of the Holy Ghost. And God grant us that. But that is all. We stand upon the principle enunciated by Paul in the Galatians: "We have received our apostleship not of man nor by man, but of God." Luther's view, that the ordained ministry is a matter of expediency and nothing more, is quite tenable when we recall that the priesthood of all believers is enunciated in the New Testament. In that case ordination is simply a recognition. It confers no grace.

How, then, are we to expect the removal of these three greater differences which now interfere with hearty and full coöperation between those who hold to the so-called mediæval views of the sacraments and ourselves? So far as human agency is concerned, it seems to me we must look for such removal in ways such as these:

1. All parties must agree upon the Scriptures as the safe and all-sufficient guide to the teachings and mind of Christ concerning His Church. Here no compromise can be made. The teachings of "the Church" so-called, or of the "primitive Church"* so-called, and the decrees of Councils, however august, must yield before the plain teachings of the Greek New Testament. I presume that it is quite possible for our Protestant Churches to make some progress in this regard by abandoning dogmatic assertions on some questions. And we can only hope that the signs of a stronger emphasis being put upon the supreme authority of the Scriptures in the Catholic Church may come to yet more full expression.

2. Christ must be exalted. Devotion to His person must be

* The expression "primitive Church," as used by High Churchmen and also by Dr. Briggs in the article above referred to, includes customs which the New Testament has no record of. Customs which were introduced from 100-451 are included.

recognized as the chief unitive principle between Christian people, and the sufficient ground of the saving hope wherever it exists.

3. The removal of these barriers may be expected as the result of honest Christian living and of Christian love. Controversy is not apt to bring about this result. The practical fruits of Christianity are, I suppose, of more value than metaphysical articles of doctrine. When we come to estimate at their full value the moral precepts of the Gospel and to honor their practice in the state, in society and in the home, then Christians will come close together on the platform of a simple but devout submission to Christ. And as we come closer together in the activities of the Christian life and in Christian charity, we shall probably lose sight of the barriers which sacramental systems have raised up. The old terms may be retained, but in the genial atmosphere of Christian love the distinctions will melt away as between Christian man and Christian man, and into the old rituals will be poured a devotion common to them all. The importance of sound teaching is great. The importance of Christian love is also great. And love is the best panacea to break down differences and heal separations. It unifies where explanations divide. Other ways have been tried. It remains to try this new way, which follows the "new commandment." John, who insisted upon the confession of Christ as the Son of God, also said that "he who loveth dwelleth in God, and God in him." Not by self-confident and swelling comparisons of Church tenets, but by the cultivation of love can we expect to come most near Christ and most near those who love Him. Difficult as it may be, will we not do well to endeavor to recognize that under the ritual of the two, or the seven sacraments which others use, are commemorated the same great realities to which we also firmly hold? The realities are of the substance of our religion, and it is the substance which most concerns us, for the substance abides.

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V.

EXEGETICAL NOTE ON II COR. V. 16, 17.

"16. Wherefore we henceforth know no one after the flesh; even though we have known Christ after the flesh, yet now we know [him so] no more. 17. Wherefore if one is in Christ, there is a new creation; the old things passed away; behold, there came about new."

In presenting an interpretation of these verses that differs from the usual one, it is expedient to note a few assumptions that affect their interpretation. Two things have commonly been taken as a background of all that Paul writes in this Epistle: (1) A strained relation between Paul and the Corinthian Church, arising from his not making the visit he intimated (1 Cor. xvi. 3-9); (2) A large party in that church antagonistic to Paul. The first leads expositors to interpret much of the Epistle, and especially almost all of the first six chapters, as meant to conciliate, and to remove the strain. The second leads to understanding that Paul vindicates himself against his disparagers; and consequently, from the beginning of the Epistle onwards, one and another expression is interpreted as a reflection on such persons. Such meanings, however, are far from obvious. And, moreover, when it is noted near the end of the Epistle how Paul handles his opponents "without gloves," one may rather assume that he would not and does not reflect on them indirectly and by innuendo.

Involved in these two assumptions is a third, viz., that although Paul uses the first person singular when speaking particularly of himself, nevertheless, when using the first person plural he also speaks for the most part for himself; and that only in the fewer instances, and where the context compels this sense, does he speak for himself and his fellow-ministers.

Interpretation in this fashion dates back to Chrysostom, who may be said to have "set the pace" in this respect for all subsequent expositors. This influence of Chrysostom, however, is not due to his possessing sources of information on these points apart from the New Testament writings, i.e., that we do not possess ourselves; for he nowhere refers to such sources.

A very protracted study of the Corinthian Epistles has convinced me that the assumptions just stated are misleading, and that for correct interpretation of 2 Corinthians we must understand: (1) That Paul speaks to a situation of mutual confidence between himself and his readers; as he says: "We are your glory, even as ye also are ours" (i. 14); (2) That Paul's primary aim is to train the Corinthian Church

in ability to vindicate the ministry by which they were saved, and to glorify it, viz., the ministry of the new covenant. Thus he asks: "Are we beginning again to commend ourselves?" (iii. 1); which invites the reply: No, you are showing us how to commend your ministry. And the chapter goes on to say that the Corinthian Church is itself an "epistle, known and read of all," commending that ministry. And again, just before our present text, Paul says: "We are not again commending ourselves unto you, but speak as giving you occasion of glorying on our behalf, that ye may have wherewith to answer them that glory in appearance and not in heart" (v. 12); and (3) when Paul, in this Epistle, uses the first person plural he means himself and fellow-ministers of the same gospel. The few exceptions are like: "We all, with unveiled face," etc. (iii. 18), where the context shows that he includes all believers. In what Paul says of himself and fellow-ministers, he is primarily "coaching" his readers to qualify them for giving account of that ministry that was their salvation. Note that it is the ministry, not the ministers as persons, that is the subject of glorying. In 1 Cor. i. 10-17, iii. 1-9, Paul represses the latter effectually.

The discourse on the ministry begins ii. 14. In ii. 17 he says: "For we are not as the many who retail the word of God; but as of sincerity, but as of God, in the sight of God, speak we in Christ." It is purely due to the misleading assumptions referred to above that *kapeleúontes* is here rendered "corrupting." A *kápelos* was a small dealer, in contrast with *émporos*, a merchant and importer, who got his goods from the producers. Like huckster, hawker, it has a secondary sense of dealer in debased goods. But as in English, so in Greek, something in the context must denote that sense. In the present context there is nothing of the sort. Every expositor understands this ii. 17 to claim that the ministry of which it speaks is derived directly from God. A seller says much more for his wares by affirming: I am not a retailer, I import the goods directly from the producers; than if he said: I am not a huckster of cheap imitations, I import direct. So it weakens what Paul says (ii. 17) when one translates "corrupting." "The many who retail the word of God" is a good descriptive designation for such as honestly imparted God's word in that small way that Scripture learners, not themselves inspired, were doing. There were "the many" that were doing that. Paul claims that he and his fellow-ministers imparted a word of God received directly from God Himself. Paul does not in either Corinthian Epistle intimate that there were many in that church that made a party against him. In 1 Cor. xv. 12 he says: "How say some among you that there is no resurrection from the dead?" 1 Cor. iv. 18: "Some are puffed up"; 2 Cor. x. 2: "I think to be bold against some."

Paul's first point is, that this ministry is immediately from God (ii. 14-17). His next distinctive point is, that the Mosaic ministry

was done away by the more glorious Christian ministry (iii. 1-18). His third distinctive point is, that the Christian ministry is for all men and not for Israel only (v. 11-19); and this includes our verses. With each of these points something is said about the ministers, affirming their insufficiency in themselves, but also their fidelity and effectiveness; whereby it appears that the power was of God, as the ministry itself was.

Turning to this third point, Paul says: "We persuade men" (v. 11). "Men" has here an emphasis which means that the persuading is not limited to a public comprising only some kind of men. This ministry is to all men. Note the thrice repeated "all" in verses 14, 15: "One died for all—all died—and he died for all." The amplitude intended by "persuade men" may be interpreted by the thrice repeated "man" (*anthropos*) of Col. i. 28: "Whom we preach, admonishing every man, and teaching every man, . . . that we may present every man perfect in Christ."

In justification of this universal preaching Paul says: "For the love of Christ constraineth us" (v. 14); he means the love Christ showed by his death. This justification is amplified in a series of reasoned judgments: "Because we thus judge," says Paul. The first judgment is: "That one died for all." The second is: "Therefore all died"; which is completed as to its meaning by the third: "And he died for all, that they which live should no longer live unto themselves, but unto him who for their sakes died and rose again." This third judgment, a double one, expresses an effect of Christ's death by which one kind of living came to an end and another came in its place. The distinction between the two kinds of living is noted in the second of these clauses; the old way was marked by men living to themselves; the new way is marked by living to Christ. In such antithesis, "living to themselves" cannot mean individual, selfish, egotistic living. "Living to Christ" finds the source and object of life in Christ. "Living to themselves" describes, not persons taken individually, but a solidarity of men that find in their social solidarity the resources and object of living. For such the gospel of life is: be part of us and you will live. By Christ dying for all, the gospel of life becomes: be part of Christ and you will live. "Living to themselves" is thus descriptive of God's chosen people under the Mosaic dispensation, *i.e.*, under the old covenant. As such it is an expression of fact, and not of censure, and refers to a former providential dispensation. That Paul refers to this becomes plainer as he goes on in our verses 16, 17.

His fourth reasoned judgment is: "Wherefore we henceforth know no one after the flesh." This is inference of conduct necessitated by the foregoing judgments; and the "we" shows that he is accounting for the conduct of himself and his fellow-ministers in "persuading men." The word "flesh" here is illustrated by texts like Rom. i. 2, 3, ix. 3, 5; 1 Cor. x. 18; 2 Cor. xi. 18, 22; Eph. ii. 11; Phil. iii. 3,

where it denotes the distinction between Jew and Gentile. Eph. ii. 11, 12, is very good: "Remember that aforetime ye, the Gentiles in the flesh, who are called Uncircumcision by that which is called Circumcision, in the flesh, . . . were at that time separate from Christ, alienated from . . . Israel, and strangers from the covenants of the promise." In this passage the corporal mark, which in Gentiles was the presence, and in Jews was the absence of the same part, is impartially referred to by "in the flesh." The mark of Gentiles stood for non-participation in the covenants of promise, and thus for separation from the promised Messiah. The mark in Jews stood for rightful possession of these privileges. Knowing Jews and Gentiles in these respects was knowing them after the flesh. This way of knowing men, Paul says, we ministers of the new covenant have renounced; and we persuade men without distinction. "Henceforth" intimates a date. It is not a date in the personal experience of Paul or of his fellow-ministers. It is the date of Christ's dying for all, which involved the consequences that Paul is stating.

"Even though we have known Christ after the flesh, yet now know we [him so] no more." This states a particular that was involved in the general conduct of knowing men after the flesh. If Gentiles known after the flesh were separate from the promised Christ, and Jews known after the flesh had covenant right to Christ; then Christ himself, as known in the covenants of promise, was known after the flesh, viz., as promised to the Jews and not to the Gentiles. Paul here concedes that he and his fellow-ministers once knew Christ in this way, after the flesh, but affirms that knowing him that way ceased. The dates implied by "have known" and by "now" are the same as in the foregoing statement. This particularizing of once knowing Christ after the flesh, and of now not so knowing him, has special point, because Paul is accounting for the conduct of the ministry of himself and his fellow-ministers. Preaching Christ was its function. The ministers preached him as Christ who died for all, and not as they once knew Him as promised only to Israel.

It is to be noted that nothing in our text intimates that knowing men and knowing Christ after the flesh was wrong knowing in the period of the past to which Paul refers. No other way of knowing was possible then. It was knowing the actual situation, which continued to be the same till Christ died. It was the divinely appointed situation for that time. After Christ died, knowing after the flesh was wrong knowing; and this is what Paul is setting forth by these reasoned judgments about Christ's death.

It should be remembered, that Paul did not himself come to this renunciation of knowing men and knowing Christ after the flesh by such reasoning as he uses here. That was learned by him just after his conversion, when the Lord Jesus, by Ananias, told him that he was "to bear his name before the Gentiles and Kings and the children of

Israel" (Acts ix. 15). The present reasoned judgments are, as Paul himself declares, for the use of his readers, prompting them how to vindicate the ministry of the new covenant.

It should be also noted, that by knowing after the flesh is meant purely objective knowing, *i.e.*, it was observing and knowing a religious situation as it was, which situation was quite distinct from the person knowing it. It was not in the least subjective knowing. What was known was known as it was in itself, and not as prejudice, or the like, gave a mistaken aspect to the object. Noting this is very important in many respects. Its immediate importance in understanding the text is this, that also ceasing to know after the flesh appears to be a matter of the same objective reality. It is because of a real situation that has succeeded the other real situation. There is nothing here like the Copernican astronomy succeeding the Ptolemaic; where one might say: We astronomers once knew the sun as revolving around the earth, but now we know that the earth revolves around the sun. Paul has usually been supposed to speak like that in this place. Understanding him so weakens all that he is saying. If his former knowing was subjective and wrong, his present ceasing to know in that way and knowing in another way is also subjective, and may be wrong too. Or what will show that it is not? The Copernican astronomy has science, with Newton and others that increase the scientific demonstration of it. We have nothing since Paul and his fellow-evangelists that increases the demonstration of what he affirms is the present right way of knowing men and knowing Christ.

The sum of what our verse 16 expresses is said, Gal. vi. 15: "For neither is circumcision anything, nor uncircumcision." And what our verse 17 goes on to express is there concisely said by the adversitive affirmative supplement: "but a new creation."

Paul's fifth reasoned judgment from "One died for all" is: "Wherefore if one is in Christ, there is a new creation; old things passed away; behold new things have come about." This is closely literal translation. What is so stated completes the negative representation of verse 16 by the affirmative positive, *viz.*, by what is now to be known. This is a situation labeled "in Christ." The believer is in it; but it is wholly objective to him. It is a reality. He observes and knows it for what it is in itself. It is that in itself, and not something only as his subjective state apprehends it. Only he that believes and is spiritual observes and knows this situation; but that does not make the knowing subjective.

The three following predicates do not describe the observer. The second does not say that "the old things" in him have passed away; but that "the old things" that made a former situation have passed away. The first predicate does not say that he is a new creation, which would say that he is a new creature; it says a situation that is new has been created. "Creation" directly presents the thought of

the Creator, of God, as making the new situation, and dispensing with the old. The meaning is, that the change referred to could be made only by God Himself, and that what has been so made requires in men a way of living that corresponds to it; it must be living on entirely new terms with all men. "Old things passed away; behold new have come about." "New" (*kainé, kainá*) denotes a new order of creation and things; not a new (*neós*) fashion of the same things.

Paul has specified an old thing that concerns his present subject, which subject is the ministry of the new covenant. It was that "knowing after the flesh"; and he has affirmed its passing: "We know so no more." He goes on to specify the new as it concerns the same ministry. He does not leave God's agency to be inferred solely from the word "creation"; he affirms it (verse 18): "And all things are of God, who reconciled us to himself through Jesus Christ and gave us the ministry of reconciliation." The "us" in both these clauses means "us ministers." Hold fast to that construction, and there is a grand and, for ministers, a tremendous way of stating things. The ministers Paul describes were first themselves reconciled to God through Christ, and then God gave them the ministry of bringing all men to be reconciled to God. This remains to this day the true and necessary qualification for the gospel ministry.

Paul goes on, verse 20: "On behalf of Christ therefore we discharge an embassy, as of God exhorting through us. We beseech, on behalf of Christ, be reconciled to God." The words, "We beseech . . . to God," are not exhortation addressed to the readers. These had been so exhorted already, with such effect that they became the living epistle that iii. 2, 3, says they were. These words express the message that the ambassadors of God delivered as they went about "persuading men."

NOTE.—My interest in the foregoing subject led me to read *Die Entstehung der Paulinischen Christologie*, von Dr. Martin Brückner, Strassburg, Heitz u. Mündel, 1903, which was reviewed in the PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW of January, 1905. The author, interpreting "we have known after the flesh," says: "Paul, too, as Jew had known only 'after the flesh,'" that is, "he had regarded everything with national limited prejudices, also the Christ. That is what he would here express: If we have known the Messiah also in fleshly fashion (*i.e.*, with Jewish national prejudice), still we now know him so no more." The sole point of agreement between this interpretation and that of my article is, that "knowing after the flesh" expresses knowing a religious situation according to the distinction of Jew and Gentile. Brückner does not intimate whether he has or has not met that interpretation elsewhere. I have met it in no other writer beside himself.

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VI.

REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE.

I.—APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY.

CHRISTIAN BELIEF INTERPRETED BY CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE. Lectures delivered in India, Ceylon and Japan on the Barrows Foundation. By CHARLES CUTHBERT HALL, President of the Union Theological Seminary. With an Introductory Note by the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Bombay. The Barrows Lectures, 1902-1903. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. London: T. Fisher Unwin, Paternoster Square. 1905. 8vo; pp. xli, 255.

These lectures constitute the third course delivered in India upon the foundation endowed by Mrs. Caroline E. Haskell, administered by the University of Chicago, and denominated "The Barrows Lectures" in honor of the late Rev. John Henry Barrows, D.D., under whose influence the lectureship was founded. The idea of this lectureship was one of the fruits of the Parliament of Religions which was held in Chicago during the Columbian Exposition in 1893. Dr. Barrows himself delivered the initial course, which was published under the title *Christianity, the World Religion*; and the second course was given by Principal A. M. Fairbairn, D.D., of the Mansfield College, Oxford, but these lectures have not been published.

The conditions upon which these lectures are delivered are unique and somewhat delicate. If the lecturer is himself a Christian, as so far in each case he has been—although the terms of the foundation explicitly allow the appointment of "Scholarly representatives of non-Christian faiths"—he cannot dismiss from his mind the consciousness that, in a very important way, he is for the nonce the spokesman for the Christian world and that he must be held rigidly to account for the faithful and worthy presentation of the Christian view which he sets forth. Then, again, he is speaking to an alien, if not a hostile, audience. His object is to enlighten ignorance, to remove misapprehension and to commend his own faith to the intelligence, the reason and the conscience of those who reject it; although he may not be there to preach, he is not there simply to amuse or to entertain, nor yet simply to "make literature." And, moreover, he has his instructions from the terms of the lectureship. The lectures are to be given "in a friendly, temperate, conciliatory way and in the fraternal spirit which pervaded the Parliament of Religions. The great questions of the truths of Christianity, its harmonies with the truths of other religions, its rightful claims and the best methods of setting them forth, should be presented to the scholarly and thoughtful people of India" (p. x).

The apologetics of this platform must be irenic. The dialectics of its debate must be bloodless and "temperate." This condition is best secured and assured

by the fact that the lectures are to be, as Madame de Stäel said of Coleridge's conversations, monologues and not dialogues.

Evidently, Dr. Hall has had careful regard for these threefold conditions. That he has pleased the people of the East is common fame, confirmed by their request that he be reappointed for the next course of lectures on this same foundation. That he has met the conditions imposed upon him by the terms of the foundation is evident from the fact that the trustees of the University of Chicago have granted this request. That he has pleased his great Christian constituency there will be differences of opinion, just as there are different points of view and different standards of judgment from which the answer will be given.

It is easy to believe that the personal equation, in this instance, lent itself readily to the spirit of the lectureship. Even if the inference were unsupported from without, the reader of these pages would not be long in inferring that the lecturer is a man of most genial temper, affable to alien ideas, amiable in all his mental moods, and hospitable to every new claim or creed. And yet, he has not contented himself with letting his hearer discover this for himself; again and again he declares as much. As is well known, Dr. Hall is a Presbyterian minister, a member of the Presbytery of New York; but, judging from these lectures, it was not told in Madras, neither was it published in the streets of Calcutta. We sometimes think in perusing these lectures that Dr. Hall doth protest too much. He may know the Eastern mind, but that mind has two or three characteristics which stand out so obviously that we wonder that the lecturer did not reckon upon them a trifle more than he seems to have done. The Oriental enjoys keen dialectics whose sharp edge shall not be too much dulled by fulsome protestations of underlying agreement: he is fonder of philosophizing than he is of philosophy, and our philosophizing Pundit or Babu is not always most amenable to religious approach along the line of his haughty and well-guarded philosophical defenses: he is not so devoutly intent upon unbiased search for truth as not to relish a frequent resort to subtle sophistries, and he is not so childlike and bland as not to penetrate transparent adulations and amenities or quickly to draw the conclusion that if many of his own cherished doctrines are so profound, so worthy of reverence and so indispensable to a complete interpretation of Christianity, surely the rest of them cannot be so far wrong; and, indeed, on the whole, that his status, Christians themselves being judges, is not so desperate as to call for a speedy surrender of his sacred traditions for that religion of the West whose shortcomings are so fully conceded and, in the interest of frankness, so freely, though parenthetically, paraded.

The lecturer's aim seems primarily to be to find the points of agreement between Eastern and Western views of religion and, incidentally, the points of difference. The first lecture is devoted to the work of effecting a mutual acquaintance between him and his auditors. It is true that the Oriental is often dreamily unconscious of the lapse of time, and yet we wonder whether the audience did not sometimes heartily wish that the speaker would just skip his irksome courtesies and say on what he was there to say. Whether or not the view presented is agreeable to the hearer, a certain type of mind will be prejudiced by a display of excessive effort to lubricate the thought with protesting clauses of fraternal love and innocence of cruel or unkind intent. Would they not become weary of being repeatedly assured, that the lecturer is only "a fellow-seeker after truth"; that he comes "not as a Churchman but as the representative of the University that is itself a seeker after truth"; that he has "no desire to set the excellencies of Christianity in competition with the excellencies of other faiths;" and that he "has little zeal for making proselytes"? On pages 238, 239, we find an eloquent and glowing passage, too long to quote, in which the author indulges himself in what seems to us an altogether extravagant expression

of his appreciation of the treasures of the East. Truly Dr. Hall has drunk deeply from those old fountains and is much inebriated with the wine of the Oriental spirit.

To the real substance of his thought Dr. Hall makes his approach in his second lecture. He grapples boldly with the problem of Pantheism, on its own soil, and, throughout, the discussion is in the main true to the Christian philosophy. The author's own ground, though not formally announced, is evidently that of the idealistic realist (p. 80), though in some of his positions he finds it convenient to call Caird and Royce to his support. He argues for the distinct personality of God and of man, and for a doctrine of the reality of the external world which is midway between materialism and a doctrine of illusion. We believe that his argument is of the strongest kind, though we cannot give assent to the conception of personality which the author develops and predicates of God in this, namely, that personality has its origin and condition in self-realization by means of relationships with other beings. We are not now concerned with the question of social conditions as *conditiones sine quibus non* of personality, but rather, granting that view, with the question of its applicability to God's personality as contingent upon his relation to human beings. The eternal society of the Persons of the Godhead is a necessary postulate in the philosophical interpretation of the Christian doctrine of Trinitarianism and of the Scriptural dictum "God is love"; but we had already noted in the margins (pp. 54, 100) that Dr. Hall was employing the very same line of arguments which would necessitate the conclusion of the eternity of man. That we had not mistaken his meaning was made clear when we came up to a later page where we read, "Man is necessary to God even as God is necessary to man" (p. 125). This is following Royce too closely. It is only a certain philosophical view. Prof. G. H. Howison believes in the Eternal Commonwealth of God, and that creation is simply the name of an eternal relation between God and his unoriginated human *socii*. We do not believe that this is either Christian philosophy or necessary to a defense of Christian philosophy; and though it may have been presented in India as Christian truth, it is not, at least *prima facie*, consistent with the first pages of the Christian Scriptures, nor do we believe it is consistent with the right conception of the true and living God.

The four elements in the Christian conception of God which Pantheism disallows are his timelessness, his presence, his character, and his manifestation; and much of the latter part of the lectures is given to a development of the last three of these. The whole tone of these lectures is reverent and their spirit deeply evangelical. The author clearly announces his personal belief in miracles (p. 101); he declares Christianity essentially soteriological, and affirms "its central message to humanity to be deliverance from sin through a Saviour, which is Christ the Lord" (p. 123); he discusses sin as the negative side and holiness as the positive side of the great ethical meaning of true religion, realized only in Christianity, and he strongly argues that Christianity is the only faith which furnishes the dynamic that actually emancipates the soul from the bondage of its sin.

We can understand why these lectures were so well received in the East. The warmth of a charming personality suffused them in every part and gave them concrete meaning and vigorous exemplification. But this, to be sure, cannot be sustained in the same degree on the printed page. There are omissions which we regret. Limitations of time may explain and excuse some of them; but it would not have taken long to refer in the proper place to the unique elements in the Christian doctrine of Revelation, and to the peculiar significance of that truth without which Christianity is never worthily presented, namely, the Atonement, which, by the by, is almost wholly overlooked in these lectures. If

in this course the lecturer understood himself to be only laying the foundation on which he is to build in his next course, then we may well withhold judgment until his work is completed. We cannot believe, however, that the Oriental consciousness is so unlike our own as to require any very different presentation of the elements of Christianity. Psychology is a great name with which to conjure nowadays; but the old proverb which the lecturer recalls, "Human nature is the same at bottom everywhere," is very true, and it is easier to believe that the warping forces of the ages have had their effect upon the minds and hearts of the East and of the West than upon the changeless and universal elements of the truth of God. It is a great opportunity which opens itself up to Dr. Hall to speak to the best minds of the East, and we are sure that he feels deeply the gravity of his task, and we may well hope that in the next course, presupposing what he has done in this, he will go on to a more definite and explicit unfolding of the interior content of Evangelical Christianity.

Trenton.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

THE FREEDOM OF AUTHORITY. Essays in Apologetics. By J. MACBRIDE STERRETT, D.D., The Head Professor of Philosophy in the George Washington University. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1905. Svo; pp. vii, 319.

This volume of essays on contemporary themes is one of the brightest and best, one of the most thoughtful and most suggestive, that we have had the pleasure of reading for some time. The author is a high, though not a haughty, Hegelian; and his speech betrayeth him, whatsoever may be his theme. If we have to choose, however, between Empiricism, *alias* Positivism, *alias* Agnosticism, on the one hand, and Hegel, on the other, give us Hegel first, last and all the time. The first part of this book is devoted to a thorough discussion of the great questions which have been raised by Sabatier, Harnack and Loisy. Accordingly, the first paper has for its topic, "The Freedom of Authority," and this title gives name to the book. The author understands by "Authority" any "power or influence through which one does or believes what he would not do of his own unaided powers" (p. 6). Sabatier, in his extreme reaction from ecclesiastical institutionalism toward religious individualism, repudiates the normal and necessary element of authority which man, as man, cannot evade if he would, and which he should not if he could. He calls himself a Protestant, but he throws off the conserving principle which Protestantism must ever retain if it is to live at all. It is a mistake to declare that Protestantism stakes everything on the "right of private judgment"; what it insists upon is *personal conviction*, with, however, two fundamental limitations: (1) it must be based upon Scripture, and (2) it must conform to the consensus of the priesthood of believers. Protestantism has always devoutly repeated the article in the Apostles' Creed: "I believe in the Holy Catholic Church." The author's philosophy opposes all atomistic separatism, for the individual is nothing except as he is an organic part of an organic whole. As Aristotle has said, "A hand cut off from the living body is no longer a hand." The Protestant faith has its organic relation to the faith of the Church of God, both before and after. It is easy to see how and why the author takes issue with all individualistic views and his discussion is vigorous and stimulating throughout; he relentlessly traces the thought of Sabatier and Harnack back to ultimate Agnosticism.

The great work of Abbé Loisy, *L'Evangile et L'Eglise*, is that of a Roman Catholic, written as a polemic against the Protestantism of Sabatier; and yet, strangely enough, while there are important differences, it has the very same postulates as those of his distinguished antagonists. Loisy is a French theo-

logian, a spokesman of *L'Americanisme*, which is so offensive to the Ultramontanists of Europe, and which our author says "bids fair to become dominant in the future, unless Rome has forgotten her cunning of flexibility and of bowing in due time to the inevitable" (p. 107). Harnack and Sabatier begin with the alleged meagre facts of primitive Christianity and trace them down along a line of continuous degeneracy to this present. Loisy begins with the same impoverished historical equipment and traces the Church down along a line of normal and legitimate development. All alike agree that Christianity has been transformed since New Testament days; but while the former say that this transformation has been a vitiation, the latter says that it has been a healthy and proper growth. According to one interpretation, Church history records a great apostasy; according to the other, it traces a true development. Loisy is just as agnostic as the others. However, his appeal is not, with Sabatier, to the unmediated faith of the isolated soul (which, by the by, is individualistic mysticism), but to the faith of the collective Church. In the one case, the faith appealed to is individual; in the other, it is "communal": but in both cases it is an *appeal*. Harnack, with his Ritschlian distaste for the ontological in the sphere of faith, Sabatier, with his purely subjective and individualistic criteria, and Loisy, with his appeal to a Church whose divine establishment by Jesus Christ he accepts not as historically demonstrable but simply as *un objet de foi*, are all of one kind; and yet, while all of them are subject to the author's same condemnation, with his own conception of history as an unfolding which has its origin, its immanent principle and its goal in Pure Reason, he is bound to accord no small credit to the Churchman as against the rest. "So far, then, as Loisy stands for a Christianity that is the age-long self-interpretation and self-objectifying of a communal consciousness or faith, so far does he commend his view as giving a rational authority for individual faith and action" (p. 119).

The paper on "The Historical Method" is just such as we should expect from one seeing from the author's point of view. Scarcely anything could be better for present-day thinking than for men of science and men of religion alike to learn a few of the lessons which Dr. Sterrett would fain teach them. He wages relentless war against any merely mechanical theory which sets itself up as final. Science and history, too, are, *per se*, only a kind of Positivism, and are to be regarded as a method and not as a metaphysic. Science is simply descriptively phenomenological. "Rigid science has nothing to do with final causes, with freedom or with God" (p. 191). "The ideal method of science is anti-teleological. . . . It is only a source of intellectual confusion for the idealistic view to coquet with the empirical view. It is nonsense to explain a mountain in terms of morals; it is no less nonsense to explain morals and the moral institutions of man in terms used to explain the mountain" (p. 201). This sounds bold, but there is a fine sense in which it is all right. The man of science, *as man of science*, has to do with what he finds. Certainly physics always implies metaphysics; but science, *qua science*, will not muster out these metaphysical *implicita*. Philip drunk may appeal to Philip sober. Philip drunk, then, is the man of science, and Philip sober is the philosopher. Happy will he be if both Philips are one and the same man; but, in any case, let not Philip drunk annihilate or excommunicate or abominate Philip sober. This division of labor in the broad service of truth would tend to clear up much confusion that now exists, even though it should be that the same workman, violating the laws of the modern labor unions, should work in some other department than that in which he is most at home. The essays on "Ecclesiastical Impedimenta" and "Ethics of Creed Conformity" again show the undisguised hand of the Hegelian. History is a rational unfolding or, perhaps better, an unfolding of the rational; and of course, no stage in the evolution is to be regarded as a finality. Creeds, therefore,

are only reports of progress, chips from the hewings of the thinkers. The three notes of Christianity are polity, creed and worship. Polity is incidental (the author tells us that he is an Episcopalian, though with Scotch-Irish Presbyterian blood in his veins, for which he is devoutly thankful); technical orthodoxy is now about dead; and so cult or worship is the rising mark of vital Protestantism. The paper on "The Ground of Certitude in Religion" is keen and suggestive. The need is not for grounds, but for *the* ground. We must quit mistaking the psychological for the rational. Many are disposed to turn subjective anthropology into objective theology. We may throw external proofs to the winds and, taking our place in the midst of the priesthood of believers, as the heirs of all the ages, we may say, not "I believe," but, "*We* believe," seeing that the I always implies the We. Altogether, we are bound to say that while the author's point of view has, as we see it, some very serious defects, yet there is here a robust virility, a clear perception, a strong philosophic grasp, and withal a lucid and almost brilliant power of expression, which will amply repay the few who have the culture to appreciate, along with the ability to digest, the words of a man who evidently is at home in handling the most important philosophical and theological questions of the time.

It should be added that the book is marred by many evidences of careless proof-reading. When one finds "tetology" one is forced either to overwork the linguistic imagination or to blame the printer (p. 10). On another page two mistakes appear, in the former of which we read, "The physical development has (been) seen to be logically possible"; and in the latter, "It is to this, the ideal, the future, the end that has no actuality, as an environment that we must look to" (p. 198)—a slip of the author's pen which the proof-reader should have corrected; and on still another page we must get the author's meaning in spite of what the printer makes him say: "We return again to our assertion that with mere mechanism there can be (no) progress towards a goal, and without a progress towards a goal there can be no development, and moreover that without this ideal being an efficient factor there can be no change from a lower to a higher" (pp. 180, 181). The proposition here intended is too important and too vital to the author's conception to be thus contradicted by the printer in his omission of the first "no," but, happily, it is too obviously true to be misunderstood by the careful reader.

Trenton.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

BUDDHIST AND CHRISTIAN GOSPELS. Being Gospel Parallels from Pāli Texts now First Compared from the Originals. By ALBERT J. EDMUNDS, Honorary Member and American Representative of the International Buddhist Society of Rangūn; Translator of the Dhammapada, the Buddhist Genesis, etc.; Member of the Oriental Society of Philadelphia. Third and Complete Edition. Edited with Parallels and Notes from the Chinese Buddhist Tripitaka by M. ANESAKI, Professor of the Science of Religion in the Imperial University of Tōkyō. Pamph., 4to; pp. iv, 230. For sale in America by the Open Court Publishing Company, 1322 Wabash Avenue, Chicago, Ill. For sale in London by Messrs. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd., 43 Gerrard Street, Dryden House. 1905.

This work is the first comparison of the Gospels with "the Pāli texts themselves." The comparison is preceded by an "Historical Introduction" which discusses "The Antiquity of the Pāli Texts," "The Place of the Native Suttas in the Canon," "The Christian Infancy Sections," and "The Possibility of Connection between Christianity and Buddhism." The comparison itself is carried on under the following headings: I. "Infancy Legends"; II. "Initiation and

Commencement"; III. "Ministry and Ethics"; IV. "The Lord"; V. "Closing Scenes, the Future of the Church, Eschatology." An Appendix presents some "Uncanonical Parallels" and an Index of Passages.

In all respects this work has been well done. It is characterized throughout by becoming seriousness, by exact scholarship, and by broad culture; and the clearness and beauty of the page do great credit to the Yūhōkwan Publishing House, Tōkyō, by whom the book was issued. Indeed, as a comparison of Buddhist and Christian Gospels has long been a real desideratum, so we owe a large debt of gratitude to Mr. Edmunds, to his editor, and to his publishers, for giving us so excellent a comparison as that which is the subject of this notice.

The author's motive in presenting these parallels is not to prove borrowing on either side—Christian or Buddhist—though he admits, as we have all known, that later Buddhism has borrowed not a little from Christianity. "We offer no theory," he says, "but give the parallels as facts." "They at least belong to a world of thought which the whole East had in common." His position is more precisely defined as follows: "I hold to the independent origin of Buddhist and Christian Scriptures, provided we mean their fundamental documents. The Epistles of Paul, the Gospel of Mark, and the Logia-Source are dependent for their primary inspiration upon the life and deeds of Jesus; and secondly upon the Old Testament oracles, the current beliefs of the times, as embodied in works like Enoch, and the personal convictions of earnest men like Paul, Peter and Matthew. But when we come to late documents such as Luke, John, and the canonical First Gospel, other influences have crept in. This is now admitted by all historical critics, and the most that I advance in this direction is the possibility of the Gentile Gospel of Luke, in certain traits extraneous to the Synoptical narrative, having been tinged by the Gotamist Epic."

While, however, our author's claim as to a connection between Christianity and Buddhism is thus moderate, and while he expressly denies that any parallelism between the language of the Gospels of the two religions is to be expected, it is perfectly clear that he would show that, "apart from the external embellishment of the two Gospels, Buddhist and Christian, there is, as Schopenhauer maintained, a profound agreement between them. On the surface, *i.e.*, in the realm of emotion, they are diametrically contradictory. Yet, deep in the region of truth, the twain are one."

Whether the very numerous alleged parallels in thought between the Gospels of the two religions which Mr. Edmunds has collected are true parallels; and if so, whether they prove his implied contention—these are questions which each one must decide for himself, and which each will be likely to decide largely in accord with his preconceptions. For ourselves, and with reference to this whole subject, we would offer the following remarks:

1. That the Scriptures of the two religions should have much in common is only what is to be expected from the fact that they are both religious writings. They must, therefore, be conditioned by man's religious nature; and this nature is not manifold, but one. It would be very strange, consequently, if "deep in the region of truth" Christianity were not in numerous respects to run parallel with Buddhism. The favorite modern argument for our religion is that it is adapted to the needs of our religious nature, and so of the Buddhist nature, as is no other faith. It is precisely where and because God himself speaks from heaven that the deepest depths of man's nature will be found. In a word, it is in the unique naturalness of the Gospels that their supernaturalness strikingly appears.

2. That the Scriptures of the two religions are "cast in the same Asiatic mould" proves nothing as to sameness of origin. Indeed, were the Gospels not Oriental in their style and characteristics, that of itself would argue against their being

from God. It is always his way to use men and nations and civilizations as he finds them. In a word, supernatural revelation ever follows the lines of Providence. It would, therefore, be contrary to all analogy were the Gospels not to run parallel with the Buddhist Scriptures in many respects. Addressed to Asiatics as they were, they must be "cast in an Asiatic mould, or God would go back on his invariable method."

3. When we examine the alleged parallels closely, we find that many are such in appearance only; and that as regards what is specially distinctive of the Christian revelation, as redemption through vicarious sacrifice, grace, the glory of the life everlasting, etc., there really are no parallels. Probably the nearest approach to a parallel to John iii. 16, 17, is the following: "Lohriva the Brahmin spoke thus unto the Lord: 'O Gotama, just as if a man had caught another by the hair who was falling over the precipice of hell, lifted him up, and set him safe upon firm land; just even so have I, who was falling over the precipice of hell, been lifted up and set safe upon firm land by Gotama.'" After reading this, can we help feeling that, if Buddhism be the best product of man's religious nature, then Christianity must be a communication from God himself? The greatest service which Mr. Edmunds' scholarly work can render, and the one which, we believe, it will render, is to show, perhaps more strikingly than it could otherwise be shown, the supernaturalness of the Gospel of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

THE RELIGION OF THE ANCIENT EGYPTIANS. By GEORGE STEINDORFF, Ph.D., Professor of Egyptology at the University of Leipzig. 8vo; pp. ix, 178. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, The Knickerbocker Press. 1905.

Dr. Steindorff gives us the fifth series of the "American Lectures on the History of Religions." He has done his work in the scholarly manner that might have been expected from his position, and he has also written with simplicity and grace not always attained even by scholars of his eminence. His subject is discussed under the following heads: "The Egyptian Religion in the Earliest Times"; "The Development of the Egyptian Religion"; "Temples and Ceremonies"; "Magic Art—The Life after Death"; "Graves and Burials—The Egyptian Religion Outside Egypt."

Dr. Steindorff holds the view "that the oldest form of the Egyptian religion accessible to us is composed of extremely varied elements." "On the one hand, we have the local divinities; on the other, cosmic beings standing at an infinite distance from man. The two became blended by theological speculation, and from the combination an almost new religion arose." In tracing this development of the Egyptian religion our author brings out many interesting facts, as, for example, that, in the earliest period of the history, contrary to the statement of Herodotus, women were "often employed in the temple," and "frequently as priestesses"; and also that it was precisely when, after the death of the last Rameses, the Church prevailed over the State, that "it sealed the death warrant of the national glory for all time."

Before closing, Dr. Steindorff discusses the influence of the religion of Egypt on other religions, and particularly on that of the Israelites. His conclusions are temperate and as sound as could be expected from one who finds himself compelled to regard as unhistorical whatever is supernatural. Hence, while he would not deny that there is an historical foundation for Genesis and Exodus and admits that they reveal an excellent knowledge of the conditions in ancient Egypt, he adds: "To the best of my knowledge and belief, we ought hardly to assume as historic facts more than the existence of Hebrew tribes in Egypt and

the personality of Moses." On the other hand, while he is sure that "the Hebrews carried away with them from Egypt many manners and customs derived from the civilization of that country," and while he thinks it "probable" that the religion founded by Moses was influenced by Egyptian beliefs, and that the law and the worship of the Israelites contained numerous Egyptian elements, he repudiates decidedly the view once widely held that "the monotheism of Israel was a theological legacy from the priests of Heliopolis," and he affirms that "what is best in the poetry of the Bible belongs without any doubt to Israel itself." So, too, in considering the influence of the religion of Egypt on Christianity our author is disposed to be moderate. What that influence has been cannot now be determined, but "Egyptian ideas were not solely responsible even for the development of eschatological beliefs." Indeed, Dr. Steindorff would regard the religion of Egypt as a decidedly infantile production, as interesting largely because it is infantile, as containing no deep mysteries, as not to be compared with Greek philosophy or Christianity. That it has left its mark on them may not be doubted, but that it has produced or powerfully modified either one of them may not for a moment be maintained.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

THE MOSLEM DOCTRINE OF GOD. An Essay on the Character and Attributes of Allah according to the Koran and Orthodox Tradition. By SAMUEL M. ZWEMER, Author of *Arabia, the Cradle of Islam*; *Raymund Lull*, etc. 8vo, pp. 120. New York: American Tract Society, 150 Nassau Street. Also Boston and Chicago. 1905.

This little book is another and an excellent example of the versatility and industry of our missionaries. There is almost no department of knowledge to which they have not contributed, and there are some in which their contributions have been fundamental. This is specially true as regards Comparative Religion, and it is also true that this essay of Dr. Zwemer's will rank with the most fundamental and valuable. Brief and unpretentious though it is, it should be an authority on the subject which it discusses. Unlike most of the interpretations of Islam, which are based on the Koran alone, this considers also the Hadith or "the records of the authoritative sayings and doings of Mohammed," which "have exercised tremendous power on Moslem thought since the early days of Islam, not only by supplementing but by interpreting the Koran." Though Dr. Zwemer confines himself to the doctrine of God, yet this requires him at least to touch on most of the topics of Moslem theology. The subjects formally considered are the creed, "There is no God but Allah"; "Allah the Divine Essence"; "The Ninety-nine Beautiful Names of Allah"; "Allah's Attributes Analyzed and Examined"; "The Relation of Allah to his World"; "Mohammedan Ideas of the Trinity"; "Predestination versus Fatalism"; "The Completed Idea and its Insufficiency." These subjects, with those which they involve, are discussed with a perspicuity and an appreciation, and with a wealth of references both to the Mohammedan authorities and to the ablest interpreters of these, which leaves nothing to be desired. Of special value is the chapter in which the attributes of Allah are analyzed and examined. This brings out strikingly how holiness is ignored in the Mohammedan conception of God; how, consequently, the doctrine of sin has been degraded and evacuated; and how what began as an absolute monotheism has become, as Palgrave calls it, "a pantheism of force." We must confess to a little disappointment with the chapter on "Predestination versus Fatalism." This is not because the fatalistic character of Mohammedan predestination is not presented with sufficient clearness. Nor is it because it is not the fact that a fundamental difference between the Calvinistic and the Moslem doctrine of the

decree is that the former conceives of God as holy love, whereas the latter regards him as absolute and arbitrary force. It is that there are other and important differences which, though they may be implied in the chapter referred to, still need to be stated expressly. For example, in the Moslem decree the purpose of God is related in the same way to all the free acts of his creatures; but in the Calvinistic decree God, while he permits and controls evil, purposes himself to effect only what is good; and in the Moslem decree God purposes without reference to the nature of his subjects, whereas in the Calvinistic or Scriptural decree God's purpose fulfills itself in accordance with and by means of the nature of his subjects. He does not violate their wills; he "makes them willing in the day of his power." This criticism, however, is really a commendation. The writer indulges in it only because the book as a whole is so excellent that he wishes to contribute something to the perfection of the second edition which will be demanded surely and soon.

Princeton,

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

MAN'S RESPONSIBILITY; OR HOW, AND WHY, THE ALMIGHTY INTRODUCED EVIL UPON THE EARTH. By THOMAS G. CARSON. 8vo; pp. v, 524. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, The Knickerbocker Press. 1905.

As an appreciation from the standpoint of a phrenologist of the interrelation and interaction of the so-called mental and moral faculties of man, and as a plea for the application of phrenology to individual, social and political life, this book is clearly and strongly enough written to be worthy of notice, if not of approval. As a solution of the problem of evil, "the mystery of mysteries that has occupied the attention of men in all ages and has been pronounced unaccountable," it is, in spite of the author's confident claims, worthless. His answer to the psychological question, How was evil introduced upon the earth? is that it was "by the hand of the Almighty himself"; and that He did this by giving to man the power of self-determination and by so constituting him that his various endowments, moral, mental and physical, while good in themselves, could not but become occasions of evil and themselves evil, if abused. This, however, is not wholly true; and in so far as true, it is not new. If evil originated in man's self-determination, it is not true that God is the efficient cause of it because he created man self-determining. That man is *self-determining* renders him the real author and the responsible author of his own states and acts. Nor, while it is true and important, is it new that man being both self-determining and finite, his nature must be capable of abuse and so of evil. We have all known that. *The* mystery here is, How could the exercise of self-determination on man's part, if unrestrained by the grace of God, issue certainly and invariably in sin? This mystery our author leaves unconsidered, not to say unexplained. How a good nature, simply because left to itself, should determine itself to evil—this is the insoluble problem. It is not how self-determination could produce evil in the case of a finite being. It is how it could be certain that the self-determination of a good being would be toward evil. Our author's answer to the other and theological inquiry, viz., Why should an infinitely holy and powerful God allow evil in his creation? is simply that he did it for the sake of variety. In a word, he did it to prevent the monotony of goodness. This explanation, however, is inconsistent with the character and so with the existence of God. To a perfectly holy being goodness can never be monotonous, and to an omnipotent being goodness need never lack variety.

Princeton,

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

II.—EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY.

HET PRINCIPIUM THEOLOGIE IN ZIJNE BETEKENIS VOOR DE ARCHÆOLOGIA SACRA. Openbare Les gehouden den 22te September, 1904, aan de Vrije Universiteit te Amsterdam, door Dr. C. VAN GELDEREN, Lector in het Hebreuwsch en de Bijbelsche Archæologie. Wageningen: Nederbrog & Co., 1904. 8vo; pp. 30.

In undertaking his work as Lector in Hebrew and Biblical Archæology in the Free University at Amsterdam, Dr. van Gelderen puts in a plea for reckoning the latter branch a department of specifically theological study. It is true it is given a place, even in the Free University of Amsterdam, in the Literary Faculty. But Dr. van Gelderen points out that this is a result of the arrangement of studies under the practical impulse, rather than an indication of strictly theoretical judgment. For even in science, he tells us, the law holds, *primum vivere, deinde philosophari*—although this does not at all imply that philosophy is not after a while to come to its rights. "For although the branching of even the tree of knowledge has been determined by practical interests, yet its roots are set, along with the practice itself, in the eternal thoughts of God. If not the thought of man, yet certainly the thought of God underlies the distribution of the faculties. And it is these thoughts of God which the man of science must reverently follow and to which he must adjust his practice." In his effort to do this with respect to the branches of study committed to him, Dr. van Gelderen asks that Biblical archæology be recognized as a theological discipline governed by the *principium theologiae*, that is to say, the inspired Word of God.

The particular place in the Encyclopædia of Theology to which he would assign Biblical archæology is within the Bibliological Group—he appears to have adopted Dr. A. Kuyper's nomenclature—alongside of Biblical History and its sister disciplines. That is to say, in his view "sacred archæology" is an exegetical science, and in order to retain its place among the theological disciplines must strictly confine itself to its task as such. This means two things: (1) that the contents of this discipline are strictly limited by the contents of Holy Scripture, and (2) that its contents derive from the Scripture the stamp of divine truth, both with respect to their historical reality and with respect to their theological significance. The lecture consists of a development of these two propositions.

In the first place, then, "Biblical archæology" cannot be conceived as Hebrew, Jewish or still less as Hebrew-Jewish archæology. Of course, there is such a thing as Israelitish archæology; but this is not identical with Biblical archæology. It includes more and it includes less; seeking material on the one side outside the Scriptures, excluding on the other Biblical material which does not specifically concern Israel. Biblical archæology, to vindicate a place for itself, must be strictly an *archæologia sacra*, that is to say, the "systematic description of the conditions in which Special Revelation took place, as these conditions are made known in the Revelation record itself."

So conceived, Biblical archæology deals with materials of absolute trustworthiness, historically considered, and must prosecute its task in that confidence. In this it separates itself radically from the recent attempts to construct a critical archæology of the Hebrew people. How recent these attempts are may be observed from such facts as that not only did old writers, like Jean Astruc, the father of modern Pentateuchal criticism, and J. D. Michaëlis and J. E. Faber, never think of disputing the historical trustworthiness of the Biblical material, but it was not until the advent of the new criticism of Vatke, Graf, Kuenen and Wellhausen that any serious reconstruction of it took place. If somewhat slow-coming,

however, the change is radical enough now that it has come. Take Benzinger and Nowack as examples of the new archæology on the basis of the new criticism; and to see it at its completest, look at the archæology of the religious life. Here the contrast with the old construction is nothing less than startling. "According to the new theory there was no thought of a single place of worship before Josiah, or at least Hezekiah. The worship at the *bamôth* and similar holy places was entirely legitimate, and the condemnation of it in the Books of Kings is the result of a later point of view. Solomon's temple was not meant for the exclusive sanctuary, but only for the royal one. The Tabernacle, as it is described in Exodus, is an imaginary construction of the author of the Priest Code and just as little as the temple-vision of Ezekiel ever had any reality. The Levites were not yet at the date of Josiah discriminated from the Priests, and were only under the influence of the Priest Code separated for the higher services. The great day of Atonement, such as it is appointed in Lev. xvi, arose only after Ezra. And the regulations for Levitical cleansing are casuistical developments of men of the same spirit with Ezekiel." To all this a truly Biblical archæology must be alien: for a truly Biblical archæology is and must be a faithful transcript of what the inspired Word teaches of the circumstances of God's people of old.

And even so we have not done complete justice to a truly Biblical archæology. The content of a truly Biblical archæology derives from the Holy Scriptures the stamp of divine Truth, not merely with respect to its historical reality but equally with respect to its theological significance. "Above Israel's temporal importance as a people rises its eternal significance as a revelation of Christ's Church. And if Biblical archæology wishes to be really *archæologia sacra* it must take serious account of this. The development of the symbolical and typical element forms thus an important part of the task of our archæology." And in dealing with this element the Holy Scriptures as the *principium unicum* must be given the fullest validity. Nor will dependence on the Holy Scriptures as *principium externum* suffice; we must have the Holy Spirit as the *principium internum* if we are to set forth these high things duly and successfully for their end as they lie on the pages of Holy Writ.

Such is the high spirit and deep reverence with which Dr. Van Gelderen approaches the study and teaching of "sacred archæology."

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

THE PROBLEM OF SUFFERING IN THE OLD TESTAMENT. By ARTHUR S. PEAKE, M.A., Professor of Biblical Exegesis in the University of Manchester; Tutor in the Primitive Methodist College; and Lecturer in Lancashire Independent College; Sometime Fellow of Merton College, and Lecturer in Mansfield College, Oxford. London: Robert Bryant, 48, 49 and 50 Aldersgate St.; E. C., and C. H. Kelly, 2 Castle St., City Road, E. C. 1904.

Prof. Peake's subject gave him an opportunity. Suffering as a practical reality touches every one, directly or indirectly. And although the author's title limited him to the problem of suffering as it is viewed in the Old Testament, he evidently did not intend that this limitation should be interpreted narrowly. Nor will any one regret the liberty which he has taken, at least in giving us also something out of his own experience, as he does especially in the Preface, and also in the strong serious chapter with which the book concludes. For this is one of the most profitable features of the book. Whether you agree entirely with Prof. Peake or not, these portions are the pondered utterances of a good and thoughtful man in the presence of one of the greatest perplexities of life. The reader could almost wish that he had given us more out of his own experience, for he leaves the impression upon us that his religion is better than his theology.

The author professedly is going to tell us, at least, what the Old Testament view

of suffering was; but before telling us what the Old Testament itself said, he frequently tells us what the Old Testament meant to say, or what it should have said, or what a considerable number of scholars think it ought to have said. So that, instead of telling us exactly what the Old Testament says, he frequently substitutes the authority of Wellhausen, and Duhm and Budde, and Giesebrecht and Marti, who are his favorite quoted authorities. The heart of the Christian Church has been and is charitable; but it still beats true to the teachings of the Old Testament, and not only its deepest piety but its keenest thought is becoming a little impatient of the unbelieving criticisms of just such men. Prof. Peake is at his best when he cuts himself loose from their company.

But, with or without these men, what does he make out of the problem of suffering in the Old Testament? He says that suffering as a problem was not grappled with at all in the early Old Testament days. "It was not till a comparatively late period in the history of Israel that the problem of suffering engaged the attention of her thinkers."* Does he mean by this that in the early days of Israel no reason was assigned for suffering? No! He says, "The ancient Hebrews, like kindred peoples, looked on their disasters as a token of the Divine anger."† But why this Divine anger? And against whom was it directed? Prof. Peake's view, in common with many modern critics, is, that until the Babylonian captivity dashed to pieces the national hope of Israel, the suffering sent upon them by an angry God was regarded as sent upon them, not as individuals, but as a nation, and that the idea of individual responsibility, and therefore of individual punishment or suffering, arose out of the wreckage of their national hopes at that time. "The problem of suffering did not become acute till Jerusalem had fallen."‡ The independent reader of Scripture will find it difficult, however, to agree with Prof. Peake here. He will ask, Was not individual responsibility an essential element in human nature, and how did the Israelites or any other people come to have the idea of corporate responsibility without possessing the idea of individual responsibility? And did not Cain voice it when he said, "My iniquity is too great to be forgiven" (A. V., "my punishment is greater than I can bear")? Did not Abel realize it when he offered a sacrifice of a life for his own sin?§ The devotional passages of the Old Testament, moreover, surely do not support this view. "Have mercy upon me!" is the cry of the individual. And he, too, had a theory about suffering which Prof. Peake has overlooked. It was not entirely attributed to the "anger" of God. The Psalmist saw a higher purpose in it. "It was well for me that I was afflicted." Prof. Peake regards this theory as important, for he considers that the origin of the idea of individualism was epoch-making. He says, "This doctrine of individual responsibility created a revolution in religious thought and life.|| In interpreting Ezekiel, however, in accordance with it, is he fair to Ezekiel when he says that "he seems to set on the throne of the universe a self-centred egoist who bends the whole course of history to magnify His own holy Name?"¶

Having taken the position that so much of the problem of suffering in the Old Testament had reference to the nation rather than to the individual, our author endeavors to gather all of the references to the "suffering servant" into this same count. While the treatment here is not as fresh or suggestive as we had expected, it exemplifies how far Prof. Peake is willing to go in altering the Hebrew text

* P. 1.

† *Ibid.*

‡ P. 17.

§ In this connection the insertion in verse 8, Gen. iv, in the Jerusalem *Targum*, though without Hebrew MS. authority, is interesting: "And Cain said to Abel his brother, come and let us go to the face of the field; and it came to pass when they both went out to the face of the field, Cain answered and said to Abel his brother, there is not justice, and there is not a judge, and there is not another world, a good reward is not given to the righteous, and there is not vengeance taken from the wicked, etc." (Jerusalem *Targum*, Gen. iv. 8).

|| P. 24.

¶ P. 32.

when it will accord with his theory. *E.g.*, in Isa. lii. 13 he accepts what he calls "Budde's brilliant emendation," reading *ישראל* instead of *יִשְׁכִּיל*—"Lo my servant shall deal wisely" (R.V.) is thus made to read "Lo my servant Israel."* But is there not a vicariousness about this servant's suffering? Yes! And Prof. Peake claims that this, too, is referable to Israel as a nation, suffering vicariously for the heathen world.

Prof. Peake has his theory of Satan, too. He swells the number of those who have recently appeared as the champions of that once much-censured personage. According to our author, the Old Testament teaches that Satan was a very useful and respectable character, a kind of ecclesiastical detective, the dread of the hypocrite. "The Satan is one of the sons of God, in other words, belongs to the order of Elohim, is the zealous servant who exists to do Yahweh's will." Thus his zeal seems to have been his chief fault according to this view . . . "whose function was to detect. . . . As a specialist he naturally exaggerates the worth of his criteria."†

Apart from the experiential portions of the book, the author's treatment of the problem in the Book of Job is perhaps the best. Considerable attention is given to the apocalyptic passages in the Books of Daniel, Zephaniah, Ezekiel, Zechariah and Joel, in their bearing upon suffering; his theory being that in such passages "the seer wrapped up in an allegory what it was unsafe to utter without disguise."‡ But is he correct in his interpretation, *e.g.*, when he thinks that Joel inferred Judah's sinfulness only from the calamity which God was sending, and that "the trouble was healed by a solemn assembly, not by a moral reformation and the forsaking of definite sins"?§

As you read Prof. Peake's book you feel that, although it contains much that is helpful and suggestive, he has scarcely interpreted the Old Testament teaching upon this great subject. Where is the fundamental cause of his failure? It is this: he does not begin with the Old Testament doctrine of the origin of suffering; he does not locate its roots in human sin. And will any theory of human suffering which does not begin there harmonize with Scripture or satisfy the questioning of the human heart? After saying that God must be answerable for what He has done in connection with man's lot in this world, Prof. Peake says, "With all the inherited passion derived from untold ages of brute ancestry we need not marvel that man seeks the immediate pleasure, and that his will will clash with the holy will of God."|| In striking contrast with this, the Old Testament links the "In sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life . . . in the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread" and the "in sorrow shalt thou bring forth children" to the sin which had been committed by disobeying God. Assuredly, if we are going to give an account of the problem of suffering as it is set forth in the Old Testament, we must not make the mistake of picking up a volume of Darwin instead of that Old Testament.

Every reader, however, will thank Prof. Peake for much that he has said. All will agree with him when he finds the Old Testament teaching regarding suffering incomplete, that even the vicarious sufferings of Christ do not remove all the difficulty, and that immortality alone will make it clear. And all, in common with him, will find some consolation in his conclusion, that as the Old Testament gave peace to a special few at least without a solution, so the New Testament goes further at least in emphasizing the love of God; and "with this assurance we can be at rest."¶

Lincoln University.

W. D. KERSWILL.

* P. 51.

† P. 78.

‡ P. 119.

§ P. 121.

|| P. 137.

¶ P. 147.

THE OLD TESTAMENT DOCTRINE OF SALVATION; OR, HOW MEN WERE SAVED IN OLD TESTAMENT TIMES. By WILLIAM DEAS KERSWILL, M.A., D.D., Professor of Hebrew Language and Exegesis in the Theological Faculty of Lincoln University, Pa., U. S. A. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath-school Work. 1904. Price, \$1; postage, 7 cents.

Treatises on questions of doctrine are at a discount nowadays. The trend of religious thought has been for a great number of years against Dogmatics. We hail with delight every effort made to break this spell and to bring to the attention of the Christian world treatises on important doctrines. The book of our lamented author ought to come into the hands of many readers, for it contains a timely subject, written in good style and popular in its character. In a technical sense the author does not add anything to the further development of theology, but the perusal of his book stimulates thought and forces the reader, even where he has to withhold consent, to consider carefully his own position. The subtitle, *How Men were Saved in Old Testament Times*, is more appropriate than the more general one, *The Old Testament Doctrine of Salvation*. In eight chapters the author speaks successively of the theological Oversight and Emphasis, the Old Testament Conception of Sin, God's Attitude toward the Sinner, the Place of Messiah in Old Testament Salvation, Jehovah, the God of Redemption, Grace and Faith in Old Testament Salvation, the Old Testament Conception of the Saved Life and Old Testament Salvation in Relation to the Individual and to the World.

From this table of contents the reader notices that the author touches upon the fundamental principles underlying his subject, and also the development of his theme, until the climax is reached, the goal attained. It is also clear that he treats his subject historico-dogmatically, combining the "Biblical Theology" method with the more strictly dogmatical process.

The exegetical character of the book is emphasized by the author. Says he in his Preface: "I have not labored to make the conclusions square with any particular 'school,' but have sought to place in concise form what the Old Testament itself taught to men of its day as to their salvation. Authorities other than the Scriptures have been read, and where definitely used have been carefully recognized, but the preparation has been predominantly exegetical. The purpose has been to discover, not what men think, but what the Old Testament says."

It is a laudable endeavor to be entirely objective and to reject every "school" on account of the subjectivity clinging to it. But is such a position possible? Is there a mind capable of grasping the objective truth without any alloy of subjective elements? If our epistemology enables us to see things as they are in themselves and not as they appear to us, then certainly we are the sole authority. We then stand on the pinnacle of certainty. The result will be, that our estimate of the positions of others will be radically critical. Says the author, "We are glad to acknowledge the debt we owe to those who have given an exaggerated emphasis to individual features of salvation. We would have been very much poorer without them. Who would have been without the statement of the Divine supremacy, even though exaggerated, of Augustine, or of human capability of Pelagius, or the extreme legalism of Anselm? Have we not learned something from the ecclesiasticism of Bellarmine, the mysticism of Osiander, the 'dependence' of Schleiermacher, the subjectivity of Ritschl?"

The author is, according to his own statement, free of any school; he does not want to give us the thoughts of men, but the statement of the Old Testament itself. He is set against *exaggeration*, which, in his estimation, is the true character of heresy. Alas! all before him have been guilty of exaggeration, from Augustine to Ritschl. Truly, he has taken a lofty position. But it is, after all, the Aristotelian *juste milieu*, or the Hegelian synthesis—a human thought indeed—and the question remains, whether he has succeeded in telling us exactly what the Old Testament says of salvation.

I have put several interrogation marks on the margin of the text of the author's book. In this brief notice I cannot point to all of them. The most emphatic one points to the following statement: "Knowing—he speaks of the Old Testament believer—less than we do, not only of 'secondary causes,' but also of the ground of atonement, he did not place anything between God and himself. God was real and near."

Do I exaggerate when I say that, according to Dr. Kerswill, a believer of the Old Testament did not need a Mediator, but that he had an open entrance into the presence of God? If I am not mistaken in my interpretation of this extraordinary statement, then I ask, Does the Old Testament say this, or is it Dr. Kerswill's opinion?

The great mistake of the author consists in ignoring the unity of the Old and New Testaments. The Bible as an organism is given by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit; both Testaments contain the same salvation, which cannot be conceived of without a Saviour. Voetius and Coccejus discussed the question, whether Christ in the Old Testament was *fidei-jussor* or *expromissor*, but to eliminate from the actual faith of the Old Testament saints the mediatorship of Christ is, if not an exaggeration, then certainly a distortion of the truth.

Where the writer does not enter into psychological questions, he is, in harmony with the *school* of orthodox theologians, generally correct in his statements. His book is a praiseworthy attempt to present to his readers his thoughts on Old Testament salvation, as experienced by Old Testament saints; but he is mistaken when he says, This is what the Old Testament says on the subject. He ought to have been satisfied with saying, This is my view of the matter.

Notwithstanding this fundamental mistake, there is a great deal of information in his book, which deserves careful consideration.

Holland, Mich.

N. M. STEFFENS.

THE MESSAGES OF THE BIBLE. THE MESSAGES OF THE PSALMISTS. The Psalms of the Old Testament Arranged in their Natural Grouping and Freely Rendered in Paraphrase. By JOHN EDGAR McFADYEN, M.A. (Glas.), B.A. (Oxon.), Professor of Old Testament Literature and Exegesis in Knox College, Toronto. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1904. Pp. xxii, 334.

"The Psalmists," whose messages find a place in this neat volume, are not only the poets whose hymns have been included in the Psalter, but also, justly enough, the writer or writers of the Lamentations. These laments over Jerusalem form the conclusion of this collection. The reason for this wider inclusion is, doubtless, the convenience of treatment. But if further justification is sought, it is found in the not remote possibility that the poet who bewails the sorrows of his people sang also some of the songs of Zion which compose the hymn-book of the sanctuary.

The attempt is made to classify the Psalms topically, and with a good measure of success—quite as much as the author claims for it. The arrangement is convenient, and it reveals the scope of the religious thought of the ancient Israelite when his soul was holding intercourse with God. Thought went forth to God and fixed itself on his character and his works, his revelation, his kingdom, and his providence; and on man the sinner and on man the saved. Prof. McFadyen's classification is as logical as Hupfeld's, and has the decided advantage of greater minuteness of analysis. It is an advance over the grouping made by Schultz even, serviceable though that has been; and the titles are happier, being formulated in brief, definite and elegant statements of the poet's theme. Occasionally, doubtless, infelicities occur, as when the First Psalm is entitled, "Its Mastery [*i.e.*, the mastery of Scripture] the Secret of Success." The First Psalm refers not to the mastery of the Bible, but to the guidance of life by God's law.

It is confessedly more difficult to paraphrase the poetry of the Hebrews than their histories and laws. We are wedded to the familiar language of the English version. It has been found to be the perfect vehicle for the expression of our spiritual life in its deepest experiences. "Other words are almost sure to be worse words; and the powerful effect of the parallelism is all but inimitable." Still the paraphrase has a place. It is a commentary, and a commentary with an object of its own. It is an attempt to explain obscure passages, and to translate ancient Oriental imagery into the forms and proprieties of modern Western thought; and it aims also to cause phrases that fall unheeded on the ear, because familiar sounds, to awaken attention by their new tones and suggestions. What listless reader can fail to be suddenly aroused out of his lethargy on reading in the Seventy-second Psalm, "May the Spanish kings . . . bring him tribute"? Or, to turn to a passage where the interpretation adopted is not the ordinary one, many a lover of Scripture will get a new idea of the meaning of Psalm xxxii. 1, 2, from the rendering: "O how happy is the man whose transgression is forgiven, whose sin is covered! How happy is the man who confesses with sincerity! for Jehovah imputes no guilt to him." At first one is perhaps at a loss to know where the opening statement of the second sentence came from, and something seems to have been omitted. But on repeating the first two verses of the Psalm as held in the memory, surprise and delight are experienced at the revelation of a meaning. It is found that Prof. McFadyen has worked over the results obtained by exegetical ingenuity, and given new shape and development to the proposed interpretation by a bold paraphrase. It is the rush of suggestion from renderings of this sort, whether they meet with acceptance or not, that furnishes the sufficient excuse for the existence of this book and its companion volumes. But since a paraphrase is a form of commentary, and not a translation, the reader is always under the necessity of testing its interpretation; and because this little volume requires critical exegetical study, it is scarcely a "guide," but rather a help.

Of much of the criticism which underlies the work we do not approve. Of course, in respect to the Psalms the data are not always sufficient to be compulsory in their testimony; and differences will exist among competent scholars. Still an argument that is advanced for any position is a silent appeal for examination. Now, in regard to the titles, the fact that the superscriptions of the Greek version do not "quite" agree with those of the Hebrew, and that the Syriac also shows divergences, does not warrant the conclusion: "Had the titles been original to the Psalms, such variety would have been impossible. Therefore, it is fair to conclude that the titles are no part of the Psalms, but were added afterwards." Is it hard to believe that Prof. McFadyen would have repeated this argument of his recent predecessors, and adopted this conclusion, had he given the matter careful thought? The divergence between the Hebrew text and the versions in this matter is not essentially different from the divergence between them in other points. It simply means that the titles of the Psalms must be subjected to the same rigid tests of textual criticism as is the text of the rest of the Scriptures. That text is not cast aside by wholesale because in places the versions diverge from it. Neither may the titles of the Psalms be unceremoniously rejected on that ground.

And again, the author goes too far, we think, when he of himself gives to a Psalm the definition and coloring of a congregational song. Take, for example, the Fifty-first Psalm. Prof. McFadyen's paraphrase is printed in the first column, and the rendering of the English version in the second.

8. May it be mine to hear glad
cries of joy sent up by the members
of my broken body.

Make me to hear joy and gladness,
that the bones which thou hast broken
may rejoice.

13. Then shall I be fit to be thy missionary servant, teaching the heathen thy ways, and turning the godless to thee.

Then will I teach transgressors thy ways; and sinners shall be converted unto thee.

18. Now hear my prayer, O Lord, for the holy city and temple. According to thy grace, remember for good the temple on Zion's holy hill; and build up the broken walls of Jerusalem.

Do good in thy good pleasure unto Zion: build thou the walls of Jerusalem.

19. In those glad days, when we can worship thee once more, thou wilt accept the sacrifices prescribed by the law.

Then wilt thou delight in the sacrifices of righteousness.

It is, therefore, not merely because of the grandeur and literary beauty of the Psalms in their original form, and their attested power to voice the spiritual needs of man, and the hallowed associations which cluster about their very words, that we much prefer a faithful and elegant translation like the English version; but also because the effort has been made, consciously and deliberately, by the men of the Revision Committee to reproduce the original so exactly as to leave all such questions open and let the Psalms speak their message for themselves.

Princeton, N. J.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

INTRODUCTION TO THE OLD TESTAMENT. By JOHN EDGAR McFADYEN, M.A. (Glas.), B.A. (Oxon.), Professor of Old Testament Literature and Exegesis, Knox College, Toronto. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son, 3 and 5 West Eighteenth Street; London: Hodder & Stoughton. 1905. 8vo; pp. xii, 356. Price, \$1.75.

The volume before us is characteristic of its author. It shows the familiar traits and wears the genial expression of Prof. McFadyen's writings. It is written, without any apparent sense of insecurity and without the slightest shudder, from the standpoint of the Graf-Wellhausen school of criticism, in easy and graceful literary style, and with fine religious fervor.

Naturally the book invites comparison with the standard English work on Old Testament introduction from the viewpoint of this same critical school. How does it differ from Dr. Driver's *Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*, and why does it differ? 1. In the first place, it differs in size. It contains scant ten thousand words, while Dr. Driver has used in the neighborhood of thirty thousand, exclusive of the indices. 2. Secondly, it differs in respect to the readers which it has in view. Dr. Driver felt that "the needs of Hebrew students could not with fairness be neglected," and accordingly it was not desirable "to avoid altogether the introduction of Hebrew words." Prof. McFadyen "does not pretend to offer anything to specialists," but has aimed to furnish a book for popular use. "It is written for theological students, ministers, and laymen who desire to understand the modern attitude to the Old Testament as a whole, but who either do not have the time or the inclination to follow the details on which all thorough study of it must ultimately rest." It is designed "to bring the discussion within the range of those who have no special linguistic equipment." Hence the absence of technical expressions and Greek and Hebrew words from the pages, the lack of a conspectus of literature as a preface to the several books, the omission of the citation of authors in the course of the discussion, and the refusal to enter into details. 3. It differs, thirdly, in its literary and religious flavor. Dr. Driver writes with clearness and

directness. Prof. McFadyen confesses to a definite literary aim. "Above all things I have tried to be interesting." He succeeds. He had already justified himself before the public in this respect, and in others, as the favorite pupil of Prof. George Adam Smith. The author was also actuated by the purpose "to indicate the religious value and significance of its several books." Too many of the commentaries which have been put forth by members of the critical school to which Prof. McFadyen belongs are sorely deficient in the marrow of religious truth. They are taken up with the literary analysis. This volume is a refreshing exception. It makes room for an exhibition of the religious teaching of the narratives and the religious value of the events, as well as for the doctrines of the prophets. There is much clear spiritual discernment in evidence. In brief, Prof. McFadyen's book impresses one as being an abridgment of Dr. Driver's *Introduction*, with the omission of the technical material and discussions, rewritten in chaste rhetoric and with an elaboration of the religious teaching.

The book, of course, suffers from the evils inseparable from brevity. The interpretation placed by the author on certain passages of Scripture, important by reason of their bearing in criticism, is commonly stated dogmatically, that particular exegesis being given which has become traditional with the school of Wellhausen and which is essential to the maintenance of its contentions. When thus stated dogmatically, the unlearned reader is apt to imagine that this exposition is uncontroverted and incontrovertible. To one who possesses an ordinary acquaintance with Scripture some of the arguments advanced will doubtless appear puerile and begotten of the desire or the need for these things to be. At the same time, cordial recognition must and will be given by critics of a different school from Prof. McFadyen's to the weight and worth of other of his contentions. The latter only have value for the criticism of the future. Much of the interpretation of the Messianic teaching of the prophets corresponds with the exposition given by Dr. Beecher in his *The Prophets and the Promise*. Here also brevity is a disadvantage and a hindrance to a real understanding. The reader will do well to obtain Dr. Beecher's insight into the deeper aspects of these prophecies and their correlation and the manner of fulfillment which they demand.

We do not think that the publishers have done justly by this book. It is printed on poor paper and not well bound. The proof-reader has allowed the disturbing error of "Samuel" for "Samson" to creep in once on page 79.

Princeton, N. J.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

THE MESSIANIC HOPE IN THE NEW TESTAMENT. By SHAILER MATHEWS, of the Department of Systematic Theology. The Decennial Publications, Second Series, Vol. XII. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1905, Pp. xx, 338. \$2.50.

This volume of the Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago contains two distinct elements. One is of a purely exegetical and historical nature and consists of an inquiry into the place which the Messianic hope holds in the several types of New Testament teaching. The other is of a dogmatic or philosophical nature and represents an attempt to show, that in all these types of teaching, and in the Christian religion in general, the Messianic concept belongs to the form, not to the essence, that it can be dropped and has been dropped without detracting anything from what is of real religious value in Christianity. With regard to the former of these two elements the book must be considered a very creditable production. The author has, so far as the New Testament is concerned, a thorough knowledge of the exegetical facts and shows considerable skill in tracing their historical correlation. Less successful than the treatment

of the New Testament writings themselves in point of lucidity and convincing character is the discussion of the Messianism of Judaism in Part I. The lines of the Messianic hope of the prophets are not drawn firmly, owing largely to the fact that the author does not seem to have reached any definite conclusion as to the genuineness and date of the Messianic prophecies, on which question, of course, the entire historic interpretation depends. He takes for granted that the source of the Messianic conception was an "elemental optimism" of the Hebrew people, only subsequently ethicized by the prophets. Even with the prophets the "ethicizing" was very incomplete, for, as we are told on p. 7, "The prophets had expected that the divine deliverance would consist in the establishment of a Hebrew nation as untranscendental as Assyria and Egypt, its confederates, and through the agency of no more miraculous intervention than would be involved in any political readjustment like the triumph of Assyria or of Cyrus." It is not many years ago that Volz argued against the pre-exilic origin of all Messianic prophecy on the ground of the miraculous, magical, unethical character of the processes whereby the Messianic transformation is brought about. He found the hope too transcendental to be ascribed to the prophets as the modern school of criticism loves to conceive them. According to Prof. Mathews, there was very little transcendental or miraculous about it. While bound to disagree with Volz in his critical conclusions, we feel convinced that in his exegetical appreciation of the prophecies he is more nearly right than our author. In the field of the literature that lies between the two canons Prof. Mathews is particularly at home, as his *History of New Testament Times in Palestine* in the series edited by himself abundantly proves. We read the two chapters devoted to this period with great interest, and if we are somewhat disappointed by finding that the subject as a whole has not become preceptibly clearer to our apprehension than it was before, we do not feel warranted in laying the blame for this on the author. The phenomena in the apocalyptic literature are so confused and confusing, that it is perhaps impossible to reduce them to historic law. Strange to us is the hypothesis stated on p. 22, to the effect that the apocalyptic mode of writing is a literary form of expounding the day of Jehovah which results from Hellenistic influences. If the spirit and general tendency of the apocalyptic literature were anti-Hellenizing, it is somewhat difficult to believe that the form was borrowed from Hellenism.

But, as stated above, the center of the book lies in its exposition of New Testament teaching and here our admiration of the author's work and our agreement with his results, so far as exegesis is concerned, can be expressed with much less qualification. A piece of excellent work, quite unusual for its balance and discrimination, is the discussion of our Lord's kingdom-concept. Prof. Mathews here skillfully avoids the two extremes of a de-eschatologizing spiritualism, such as has been quite recently exemplified once more in Muirhead's *Eschatology of Jesus*, and of a hyper-eschatological historicism, which will not recognize any present spiritual kingdom in the genuine teaching of Jesus. Several other points might be mentioned in which the author evinces great independence of exegetical and biblico-theological judgment over against the vogue of modernizing interpretations. The presence of an absolute predestinarian element, and of the concept of vicarious penalty as entering into the atonement, are candidly recognized in Paul's teaching, and the center of his system is sought in eschatological Messianism. In this connection we quote an interesting sentence from p. 173: "Historical orthodoxy, as represented by the older Protestant theologians and practically all those of the Roman Church, has come closer to the center of the Apostle's thought than those later interpreters, who have made the mystical union of the believer with Christ or faith as an incipient and potential righteousness the center of Paulinism." It is true, over against such points stand others in regard to which we cannot accept Prof. Mathews' interpretations,

and that not merely because we wish to adhere to the older Protestant theology, but, as we believe, for good exegetical reasons. We think it an error, both from the point of view of Jesus and from that of the Synoptists, to speak of an incarnation in the life of our Lord in virtue of His possession of the Spirit. Our Lord's possession of the Spirit is viewed in the Synoptic Gospels throughout as of charismatic not of personal moral or religious significance. The author evidently conceives of the filial relation and the possession of the Spirit as interchangeable to our Lord's consciousness, distinct not in reality but only in point of view. The treatment of the Pauline eschatology, notwithstanding many excellencies in other respects, suffers somewhat from the author's espousal of the theory that the Apostle placed the Kingdom of Christ as a preliminary, temporary kingdom after the Parousia; in other words from ascribing to Paul a mild form of Chiliasm. With this is connected the refusal to acknowledge that Paul in some sense identified the kingdom (of Christ) and the Church. We do not think that on this view sufficient weight is given to the fact of the resurrection of Christ, which must have appeared to the Apostle as anticipating the eschatological resurrection and therefore in its immediate consequences also anticipating the eschatological kingdom. The only other point we desire to touch upon concerns the Christology of Paul. By treating of it exclusively with reference to the Messianic concept, even where the (real) preëxistence comes under consideration, the higher sonship which lies back of the Messiahship has been obscured, and the classical passage in Phil. ii. is scarcely touched upon. Only from this defect can we explain to ourselves the statement made in connection with the Epistle to the Hebrews to the effect that this Epistle goes farther in its ascription to Christ of a preëxistent metaphysical sonship than Paul. We also think it unproven that in Hebrews the metaphysical sonship appears as an inference from the Messianic exaltation of Christ. The Epistle merely shows that the pre-existent glory of the Son and His official greatness in the state of exaltation are mutually adjusted. The one fits the other, but that the thought of the one was developed out of that of the other it gives us no reason to suppose.

All these, however, are matters of relatively small importance compared with the main contention of the author, viz., that the Messianic interpretation of Jesus and His work belongs to the perishable form and not to the imperishable essence of Christianity. Throughout his exegetical and historical discussion, in which we can recognize much that is unusually good, he keeps this dogmatic goal constantly in view. We are not supposed to forget for a moment that all the things Jesus and the Apostles believed under the head of the Messianic eschatology were so many accidental modes of thought now ready to be discarded. It would be little to the point to say that such a view is destructive of the authority of the Word of God, for evidently Prof. Mathews does not occupy a standpoint to which the plenary inspiration of the Scriptures appears a living issue. The matters at stake here are far deeper and more fundamental than the question of Scriptural authority. The whole concept of revelation must have undergone a radical transformation, where it is possible to assert that an idea which has played such a rôle in Biblical religion as that of the Messiahship, an idea which came down through centuries from the Old Testament into the New, which formed one of the two great crystallizing points around which the thinking of our Lord grouped itself, which so vitally coalesced with Jesus' self-consciousness as to become inseparable from the latter, which shaped and moulded all subsequent Apostolic teaching—that such an idea represents a mere fringe to the garment of revealed truth. What remains on such a view of the adjustment of the content of revelation to its form it would be hard to tell. Who can shut his eyes to the fact that a theory like this, which makes Jesus the Supreme Revealer of God, and yet makes the larger part of the doctrinal consciousness of Jesus a mere

passing phase of thought, must greatly weaken the position of Christianity both dogmatically and apologetically? Once let the element of relativity enter into these large moulds and forms into which the revelation of truth was cast, and it will be difficult to persuade people that its essence, however defined, can be absolutely permanent. In such an internecine war between the content and form of revelation, revelation itself bids fair to suffer most in the end. Besides this, the Messiahship of Jesus [is that aspect of His Person and work which lies historically at the basis of our religious approach to Him. Whosoever denies the essentialness of the Messiahship will necessarily be under strong temptation to declare with Harnack that in the true Gospel, the Gospel stripped of all its historic accidentals, Jesus stands not on the side of God as an object on whom religion terminates, but on the side of man, or, to use Harnack's own words, that in the gospel as preached by Jesus there is no place for Himself. Now we desire to emphasize strongly that Prof. Mathews does not draw this inference, and it has been a source of satisfaction to us, in reading his book, to observe this. It is explicitly stated on p. 133 that "on the basis of Jesus' own self-estimate and the results of a reverent criticism, a man may believe in Him as the incarnation of God, as the revealer of a forgiving God, as the type and teacher of the perfect human life, as the Risen One who brought life and incorruption to light," of course, "without necessarily committing himself to a formal acceptance of his strictly Messianic interpretation." Passing by the other phrases, because they are of somewhat uncertain definition, here at least "the Risen One who brought life and incorruption to light" guarantees a substantial content to the conception of Christ as an objective religious value. And on p. 222 we learn that this life of which Christ is the source for the Christian "is at bottom not moral, but ontological with moral corollaries," there is in it "a process of development we can only call hyperphysical." And in harmony with this the author also believes that the resurrection of Christ, as a historically authenticated fact, belongs to the essence of the Christian religion. Life, therefore, has a clearly defined supernatural content. What Prof. Mathews offers us is by no means identical with the vague Ritschlian concept of "eternal life." As just stated, for this we cannot but be grateful, even though the suspicion can hardly be suppressed that the author's Baptist affiliations, rather than a general desire to uphold objective Supernaturalism, are at the bottom of this emphasis on supernatural life as the essence of Christianity. But the question arises, how does Prof. Mathews separate this essence from the historically conditioned forms in which Christianity presented itself to the minds of Jesus, Paul and the other New Testament writers? The criterion which he applies for distinguishing between the religious essence and the eschatological form is, that the former can be shown to have been the fruit of direct personal, practical experience. The objection might be raised, that the ontological, hyperphysical life as such cannot be the object of experience, so that after all the danger arises of paring down the idea of life to that of a phenomenal, moral or emotional state. But apart from this, the whole distinction between inherited eschatological form and life content is purely abstract and impracticable. Life, as Jesus speaks of it, and as the Apostles refer to it, is a thoroughly Messianic idea; of any abstract life not correlated with the eschatological scheme of thought they know nothing. In their case as well as in ours, and in the case of every normal Christian, the experience of life is largely dependent on the doctrinal perception of what life means. Christianity did not come into the world as a life, without the previous and concomitant as well as the subsequent interpretation of the concept of life in a theology. As already remarked, Prof. Mathews himself has such a theology, which fixes for him the definition of life. So that after all it is not the distinction between

experience and theoretical belief which separates for Prof. Mathews the form from the essence in the New Testament teaching, but rather the comparison of the New Testament doctrine with his own semi-modernized mode of thought. Because this comparison shows that the two have only the idea of life in common, the latter is declared the substance, the former the accident of Christianity. We on our part prefer to take our concept of supernatural life in the frame of its Scriptural, Messianic, eschatological interpretation. We feel the need of an external authority to tell us what life means, what are its antecedents, its consequences and its implications. Neither experience nor historical observation are sufficient for teaching us this. We know full well that the modern spirit of the times is not favorable to the eschatological element in the Gospel. But we also know that this is but one of the symptoms of the anti-supernaturalistic spirit of the age in general. A thoroughgoing supernaturalism will always demand an eschatological Messianic Saviour. Nor do we quite see how Prof. Mathews' position can escape the charge of inconsistency. By accepting the resurrection of Christ as a historically authenticated fact, he himself introduces the element of the supernatural at a central point in his system. Why should it be said, after this, that "recently the rise of an entirely new conception of the universe through the philosophy born of the new physical sciences is rapidly removing this apprehension" (i.e., the Pauline eschatological interpretation of the work of Jesus)? p. 204. If evolution enters a protest against eschatological Messianism, why does it tolerate the resurrection of Jesus as a supernatural fact? There is good reason for holding that creation, the resurrection of the Messiah and eschatology stand and fall together, and that any evolutionistic philosophy which takes exception to one of these ought to reject the two others likewise. And it should always be remembered, that in this debate about the permanence of the eschatological Messianic element in the Gospel, something more than the mere physical or ontological destiny of the world is at stake. The eschatological Messiahship of Jesus involves the judgment and through this indirectly the question of justification. Consequently to declare it unessential means in principle to abandon the great doctrines of vicarious atonement and justification. In point of fact, our author seems not to hesitate to take this step, for on p. 198 he declares with reference to the vicarious interpretation of Christ's death by Paul: "The modern mind, which does not think of God's relation to the world in monarchical and judicial terms, is naturally perplexed when it attempts to reconstruct this section of Pauline teaching. But it will be a sad mistake if, because we recognize the fact that the problem came from a controlling thought that has passed away, we should ignore the Pauline teaching." In our opinion the controlling thought from which the Pauline problem arose has not passed away and can never pass away, so long as the Pauline conception of God as a judge and the Pauline sense of sin remain, and these are as ineradicable as the human conscience. If the modern mind does not think any longer of God in monarchical and judicial terms, we can but look upon this as a sad symptom of its religious perversion. For those who do continue so to think of God, no Christianity will suffice which is not built up around the atonement as its very core and center. Even a religion of supernatural life falls short of the religion that man needs to save his soul. And only in a religion which is more than this, can Christ permanently retain his central place as a necessary object of religious trust. For all the other functions of the Saviour there is no *a priori* reason assignable why they should not have been performed by God directly without the mediation of Jesus. It would be rash to assert that for the introduction of supernatural life into humanity the Christ is absolutely indispensable. Only when we come to the function of atonement, it immediately appears that the Messiah sustains a relation to God and us which secures for Him, as the Christ, an absolutely permanent place and an eternal value in our religious life.

Like all the other volumes of the Decennial Publications, the book is handsomely printed. The only criticism we have to offer in this respect is that the citation of the title of books and treatises in the notes is frequently inexact. Wernle's *Reichsgotteshoffnung* is cited repeatedly as *Reichsgotteshoffnungen*; Kautzsch is sometimes *Kautsch*; the title of Kennedy's book is once given as *The Eschatology of Paul*, instead of *St. Paul's Conceptions of the Last Things*. Also the Scripture references are more often inaccurate than should be the case in a volume so carefully edited as a whole.

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

THE TEACHING OF JESUS CONCERNING THE HOLY SPIRIT. By LOUIS BURTON CRANE, A.M. New York: American Tract Society. Price, 75 cts., postpaid.

This little book has a decidedly practical and edifying character. This study is offered to Christians, the author says, "with the prayer that the Spirit of the Truth with whom it is concerned may make effective whatever in it is His work, and overrule for the truth's sake whatever is inspired by the spirit of error." This prayer certainly will be heard, and Christians who read the book prayerfully will be blessed.

Everything which does not concern Christians as such is relegated to the preface. It is gratifying to notice that Biblical theologians "cannot confine themselves to the words of the Lord exclusively." Our author finds it necessary to devote 23 pages to "the Spirit of God in the Old Testament." Truly, the Bible is an organism; the words of the Lord (*die Herrenworte*)—allow me this paradox—are only a part of the words of the Lord. The Word of God is His, by whom it may have been spoken.

The disposition of the subject-matter might be a little more lucid, but the matter itself is substantial and good.

Some statements seem strange, although the brevity of treatment may be responsible for the obscurity of meaning. It is modern indeed to say, that what "He—the Servant of Jehovah—does, He does as the idealized head of the true Israel, the Servant of Jehovah will come to be in Him, in the new times of which the prophet speaks." Or when the writer calls the Holy Spirit in the Old Testament the "divine principle," working for the redemption of men. Or when he says that the Holy Spirit was "perhaps" the cause of Christ's conception. Or when in treating of the sin against the Holy Spirit, he favors the pietistical view of terminism.

There are a few more such, in my estimation, unfortunate statements in this book. But as a whole the book is a good and popularly written tract on the teaching of Jesus concerning the Holy Spirit.

Holland, Mich.

NICHOLAS M. STEFFENS.

THE TEACHING OF JESUS CONCERNING CHRISTIAN CONDUCT. By ANDREW C. ZENOS, D.D. New York: American Tract Society. Price, 75 cts., postpaid.

Dr. Zenos' book on Christian Conduct is the first in the series on the Teaching of Jesus which has an ethical character. The author has given us an interesting and well written treatise on this subject. The development of his subject is logical and clear in detail throughout. He speaks of the presuppositions of Christian Conduct, of the Antecedents of Christ's Teaching of Conduct, of Love, of the Golden Rule, of Self-Culture and of the Sabbath. After he has finished these general phases of his subject, he views a Christian in his several relations. Some parts of his book are exceptionally fine, especially the fourth chapter, which treats

on "The Main-spring of Christian Conduct." In speaking on the Golden Rule I was glad to read, "The pith of the Golden Rule is the principle of *mutualism*. . . . The temptation in social life is to regard self as the center, and all that ministers to self as proper and right. All other things or persons are mere means. The gospel of altruism, at least in some of its forms, goes to the opposite extreme. It reduces self to a means, and other means and other persons 'as in Buddhism' to ends." There are many sound statements in the book. It is only a pity that Dr. Zenon thinks it necessary to break the sharp points of his statements by inserting clauses which have to serve as defenses against possible attacks from the side of critical theologians. "Er gießt Wasser in seinen Wein," as Germans say.

On this account I do not like the author's introductory chapter to his book. He knows quite well the peculiar character of a popular book. Why he does not adhere to the sound position taken in his preface I do not well understand. The too brief treatment of critical questions does not enhance the value of his book as a condensed and brief statement in popular form of the essentials of Jesus' thought.

Holland, Mich.

NICHOLAS M. STEFFENS.

WHAT CAN WE KNOW OF JESUS? (1) DIE QUELLEN DES LEBENS JESU. Von Prof. D. PAUL WERNLE, Basel. Pp. 89. (2) WAS WISSEN WIR VON JESUS? Von Prof. D. WILHELM BOUSSET, Göttingen. Pp. 79. (3) JESUS. Von Prof. D. W. BOUSSET, Göttingen. Pp. 103. Gebauer-Schwetschke Verlag, Halle a S., 1904.

The interest in these three little books lies in the fact that they are written by leading representatives of the so-called "religious-historical" school which has of late risen into prominence in Germany, and that they exhibit in popular form the method of the most recent German criticism in dealing with the Gospel narratives. Bousset's *Was wissen wir?* is an enlargement of an address delivered before the Protestantenverein in Bremen, and the other two pamphlets are in the series of *Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher für die deutsche christliche Gegenwart*, projected by Lic. F. M. Schiele, of Marburg. The aim in all three is to bring the results of scientific New Testament criticism to the attention of lay readers, and in point of style and arrangement of material all three are models of popular exposition, and Bousset's Bremen address is worthy of high praise merely as a literary production. The success of the attempt to popularize the newer views has since called forth the series of pamphlets, called *Biblische Zeit- und Streitfragen*, from the conservative wing.

Both writers lead us through a comparison of the fourth Gospel with the Synoptics, and of the Synoptics with one another, to the conclusion that none of the Gospels is to be accepted as an historical document. The ultimate reason for rejection is not the lateness of date, for Wernle assigns the first three Gospels to the years 70 to 90 A.D. It is the conviction, in the case of both writers, that the Gospels give us, not the facts of the life of Jesus, but what the Church had come to believe about His life; and with both the faith of the Church is a distorting medium, so obscuring the truth as to make any consistent picture of the life or even of the teaching of Jesus impossible. Wernle follows the usual argument to show the differences between John and the Synoptics, and then in spite of the acknowledged points of agreement we are made to face the dilemma: Either John or the Synoptics. The rejection of John leads to a detailed discussion of the synoptic problem which closely follows the fuller treatment of the

author's *Die Synoptische Frage* (1899). The conclusion is the usual one that Mark is the earliest Gospel and that Matthew and Luke use, independently, our Mark and a collection of speeches. The word "logia" is not used, as Wernle believes (*Syn. Frag.*, p. 118f.) that Papias in speaking of the Logia thought of nothing else than our Matthew. The earlier Marcan tradition being taken as the standard, we may discard as unhistorical the early chapters of Matthew and Luke, of which Mark knows nothing, together with those details relating to the Passion and Resurrection with which the Marcan narrative has been supplemented. Have we reached, then, in Mark, the earliest Gospel, the bed-rock of reliable tradition? The answer is disappointing. We are uncertain of the sources from which Mark drew his material. If it was from Peter, it was the practical rather than the historical preaching of Peter which Mark worked over. Wernle's view is that Mark found a number of scattered traditions, and that he organized them under the influence of a ruling idea. This idea was that Jesus was the Messiah, the Son of God. From the first verse (reading *υιὸν Θεοῦ*) through the voice from heaven, the confession of demons, the use of Old Testament prophecy, and above all the miracles, the whole narrative is subordinated to the purpose of proving that Jesus is Messiah and Son of God. It is an "apology," not a history. The miraculous evidence is forced into the foreground, the great nature miracles being even more prominent than those of healing, and even the preaching of Jesus is so infected with this miraculous element that it is uncertain what He preached. "The historical portrait has been dimmed, the picture of Jesus distorted into something grotesque and fantastic" (p. 60). To get back to the historical Jesus, therefore, we must free ourselves as much as possible from Mark's organizing ideas and from the arrangement of his material. Since, however, the whole Gospel is ruled by the idea that Jesus is the Messiah and Son of God, the historical residuum reached by the extrusion of everything that favors this idea cannot be large. The critic must reject the very material which Mark would regard as really significant. "What remains," after the conscientious application of his method, is, as Wernle himself tells us, "at first sight poor enough." We lose "what for centuries has belonged to the fixed portrait of Jesus" (p. 82).

The argument which leads to this important conclusion has, it will be seen, several interesting features. In the first place the dilemma, "Jesus is the being whom the Synoptists have described or the one whom John sets before us," loses its sharpness when we discover that in point of fact He can be neither the one nor the other. The suspicion of circular reasoning can hardly be avoided when it is argued first that John is to be rejected mainly because he, in distinction from the Synoptists, emphasizes the supernatural elements in the person of Jesus; and then that Mark, the earliest and most reliable of the Gospels, is to be rejected because he too is ruled by the idea that Jesus is the Son of God. The difference, at least, does not seem in the end so essential or irreconcilable as to justify the wholesale rejection of John on the ground of the difference. Again, the acute and interesting discussion of the Synoptic problem seems largely beside the point for the purposes of the present argument. Wernle's mastery of the material, as shown in his brilliant work, *Die Synoptische Frage*, has won for him the right to speak upon this subject, and the discussion of it would be wholly in point if the conclusion were that only the earlier strata of tradition were to be regarded as trustworthy. To establish the priority of Mark, for instance, is to discredit the other Evangelists where they can be shown to differ from the Marcan picture. But the priority of Mark is no reason for the rejection of Mark itself. The ultimate reason why we have no trustworthy account of the words and acts and thoughts of Jesus is not to be found in the literary analysis of the Synoptics. It really lies in a characteristic possessed by all the Synoptics in common, and

indeed by John. All were written under the influence of and in the interest of "faith." Even in the earliest discoverable tradition we are brought to the *impasse*: "Between Jesus and us stands always the faith of the Church" (p. 83). At this point the old question of the external evidence assumes considerable importance. Wernle's treatment is necessarily brief, confined to two pages of fine print (pp. 7-9), but its importance for his argument is obvious. If the Gospels were written by Apostles and men occupying known relations to the Apostles, it will be more difficult to believe that their narratives represent in the first instance the faith of the Church, and not the historical facts upon which the faith of the Church rested. If Mark, for instance, wrote the Gospel narrative as Peter preached it, there is strong probability of its being true, and little room for inserting an anonymous or collective tradition between the actual facts and the narrative as we have it. It is interesting to compare the treatment of the Papias tradition as to Mark's connection with Peter in the *Quellen* and in the earlier *Synoptische Frage*. In the earlier work he finds strong internal evidences of "Petrinism" in Mark itself (pp. 203, 204), and nothing in the Gospel to throw doubt upon the Papias tradition. "Mark is actually the Petrine Gospel" (p. 208). In the *Quellen*, the connection with Peter is formally accepted as probable (p. 70), but in two passages, once in speaking of the external evidence, the author contents himself with an expression of doubt (pp. 8 and 58). The assumption seems to be that Mark's material came to him in the form of anonymous tradition, that "the individual narratives first passed for a long time from mouth to mouth" (p. 63). "Mark is only a collector of individual tradition which he first combined into a conjectural whole" (p. 82). The comment here is obvious. If Mark followed the preaching of Peter, as Papias is at pains to assert, and our author himself in his former work saw no cause to doubt, then the Gospel, whether trustworthy or not, cannot be rejected on the ground that it represents a collective "faith of the primitive Church."

Bousset's *Was Wissen wir von Jesus?* is in form a polemic against the sensational contention of Kalthoff (*Das Christusproblem*, 1903; *Die Entstehung des Christenthums*, 1904. See *Theol. Rundschau*, June, 1904) that no such person as Jesus ever existed. Jesus, says Kalthoff, is the "religious embodiment of communism." The Gospels were written in Rome in the second century, and Christianity and the figure of Christ were the product of the religious, political and economic conditions existing in the Roman Empire at that time. More particularly the causes of which Christianity was the product were Jewish Messianism, Greek philosophy, the social conditions of the Roman Empire, the longing of the lower classes after light and happiness, and the mystery-clubs of the late Greek religion. Kalthoff's negations may seem so extreme as scarcely to deserve serious notice, but Bousset's reply is at least worth reading as a piece of unusually clear and cogent reasoning. He has indeed an easy task in showing that the principles upon which the historical reality of Jesus is denied would destroy all historic truth, and the evidential value of the Pauline letters is effectively set forth. More difficult is the task of determining how much we really can know of the historic Jesus. Here Bousset follows closely the method of Wernle. There is the same apparent circle in treating of the relation of the fourth Gospel and the Synoptics. First, we are made to choose between the "divine-human figure" of John and the "simple human picture" of the Synoptists—to the exclusion of John; and then are told that even for Mark Jesus is the "miraculous eternal Son of God, and in this respect that the first three Evangelists are to be distinguished only in degree (*graduell*) from the fourth" (p. 54)—to the disparagement of the Synoptists. Like Wernle, Bousset distinguishes various strata of Synoptic tradition, and finds the earliest tradition (Mark) untrustworthy; but he is clearer than Wernle in stating the reason for

his rejection. This does not lie, he says, in the contradictions in the Gospels, for these are such as are incidental to any history, and the agreements outweigh the differences; nor in the fact of a supposed translation from the Aramaic, for this would affect only the *nuances* of the narratives; nor, lastly, in the lack of a reliable chronology, because in spite of, or really on account of, the lack of development in the record and of historical *milieu*, the figure of Jesus stands out in its simplicity and glory. In the individual sayings we still have the substance, and in the parables the very form of His teaching. The real reason for rejection is that the Gospels are the expression of "a believing Church speaking of Him whom they revere as the exalted Lord" (p. 54). And, it is added, "it can be said with a certain truth that faith is the foe of history" (*der Glaube der Feind der Geschichte sei*). Men cannot take an objective view of one whom they believe in and revere. The result is "that we only know the Christ in whom the Church believed, and that the underlying historical Jesus is for us forever inaccessible." In one point especially the truth of the principle that faith obscures history is illustrated. "The picture of Jesus is drawn from the standpoint of the miraculous. The Jesus who here walks upon earth is the miraculous Son of God, who heals the possessed with a word, who walks upon the sea, commands the winds and the waves, feeds the thousands with a little bread—the mighty Prince of Life who calls the dead to life. The historian can scarcely do otherwise than admit that here, where such miracles are related, legends and not history lie before us" (p. 55). Here we touch the deepest reason for the rejection of the Gospel story. It is not the differences between John and the Synoptics, nor the differences between Mark and Matthew-Luke, but the miraculous element which they all have in common. The miracles of healing and of dispossession are indeed admitted as being "psychologically conceivable," but what is regarded as the supernatural proper in the person and work of Jesus seems to be as rigidly excluded by Bousset's principle as by the *à priori* assumption that "miracles do not happen." The faith of the Church, instead of being an argument, from effect to cause, for the supernatural character of Jesus, presents a hopeless bar to the record of the supernatural, even supposing the supernatural events to be true. Suppose for a moment that Jesus was actually raised from the dead, as related for example by Luke. There never could be, Bousset apparently teaches, a credible record of that event. Unbelievers would not describe it, in the nature of the case, and the testimony of believers must be thrown out of court, if faith is the enemy of history. Our author might appeal to the apocryphal miracles in support of his principle; but we have only to compare these with any of the Gospels to show the difference between faith and credulous fancy, and to compel respect for the sobriety at least of the Gospel writers. Prof. Mahaffy's recent words are here in point: "Compared with these (the apocryphal Gospels) the books of the Canon are exceptional in their broad, open-air, noonday simplicity, and their desire to bring everything to the test of fair evidence. This is the rationalistic spirit in the proper and useful sense" (*Progress of Hellenism in Alexander's Empire*, 1905, p. 140).

The question between Kalthoff and Bousset is,

"Whether 'twere best opine Christ was,
Or never was at all, or whether
He was and was not, both together."

The difference between the two writers appears to be one of degree rather than of principle. With Kalthoff the Jesus of the Gospels is wholly a legendary being; with Bousset He is a legendary being so far as the supernatural elements in His life are concerned. With Kalthoff the faith of the Church is both the author and finisher of the portrait of Jesus; with Bousset faith paints in the supernatural colors. In the view of both writers faith is the foe of historical science.

With Kalthoff it is "the faith in isolated heroes," who are made to take the place of impersonal social forces; with Bousset it is faith in an exalted Lord, who takes the place of a merely human Jesus. One cannot but admire the brilliancy of Bousset's style, his clearness of statement, his candor and his skill in debate; but his method of dealing with the Gospel history does not commend itself as the best way to arrive at the truth. A more sober historical criticism might apply to him the words which he himself applies to the more radical method of Kalthoff: "The feet of those who shall bury this 'new method' stand before the door."

The other book of Bousset's, *Jesus*, in the same series as Wernle's *Quellen*, is avowedly based in its view of the Gospels upon the latter work, and calls for no extended comment here. It is now accessible in English in the "Crown Theological Library." There is, as in the other two books, a disinclination to admit anything that savors of a Christology. So much is ruled out as to cut deeply both into the narrative portions of the Gospels and into the discourses. We must not only discard the miraculous birth, the greater miracles, the sacrificial death, the formula and institution of baptism and the sacramental supper, and the resurrection (except apparently as an event in the souls of the disciples), but must give up as well all the teaching which implies that Jesus founded the Church, sent his disciples upon a universal mission, or declared that He was in any way the centre of the Kingdom of God, or was to come as judge of the world. The Messianic title, "Son of Man," Jesus adopted from Daniel and applied to Himself as He came gradually to see the necessity of His death, but He did not appropriate the associated ideas of pre-existence and world-judgment. The body of the book is taken up with a discussion of the teaching of Jesus, and the treatment of the ethical teaching is often exceeding fresh and suggestive.

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WILLIAM HALLOCK JOHNSON.

THE STUDENT'S CHRONOLOGICAL NEW TESTAMENT. (Text of the American Standard Revision.) With Introductory Historical Notes and Outlines. By ARCHIBALD T. ROBERTSON, Author of *Life of John A. Broadus*, etc. New York, Chicago, Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Company. [1904. 8vo, pp. lxvi + about 250.

"There is no edition of the New Testament in a standard translation which is acceptable for general use and which also presents the books in a probable chronological order." So says the Preface of the volume before us,—in preparation for accounting for the publication of the volume. The volume essays to supply the lack here indicated, so far as the convenience of the reader allows. The text used is that of the American form of the current Revised Version. The arrangement of the book follows, in the main, the order "of the unfolding history," so that the reader, "as he reads, passing from book to book," may proceed "as nearly as possible" in "the actual order of the historical facts." The Gospels are placed first, followed by Acts, because the history recorded in these books was, in the main, enacted before the other books were written: but an effort is made to arrange the Gospels themselves in a chronological order. All Paul's epistles are placed together: but an attempt is made to arrange them among themselves chronologically. The actual arrangement, therefore, is a mixed topical and chronological one. Whether a strictly chronological arrangement would have been better, and if so whether the dates of the production of the books should supply the *schema* or the time of the events treated in them; or whether a purely topical arrangement would have been better, and if so, what topical arrangement—opinions will differ in such matters. Enough that in Dr. Robertson's view, a mixed chronological and topical arrangement has seemed the best for the readers

he had in mind; and he has given it here, according to his best judgment. The reasons for his decisions are, in general, obvious enough; though the position given to James among the "historical books" and apart from the "remaining general epistles" will be apt to raise questionings.

The book is made up of the text of the New Testament, with a brief Introduction prefixed to each book. These Introductions, though distributed through the volume, are paged continuously. The text of the New Testament is without pagination. Possibly this is to be accounted for by supposing that the text has been printed off from plates made for another purpose than for use in this volume, and that the Introductions are to be, or perhaps are already, published also in separate form. An anomaly in the headings of the gospels may also receive its explanation from such a supposition. The American Revisers headed the gospel of Matthew thus: "The Gospel:—According to Matthew," and the succeeding gospels merely "According to Mark," "According to Luke," "According to John"—the words "The Gospel:—" being understood as the general heading of all four. In the present volume the Gospel of Mark is placed first and appears with the simple heading "According to Mark," while Matthew, which succeeds it, still appears with the general heading: "The Gospel:—According to Matthew."

Dr. Robertson's own contribution to the volume, besides its arrangement, consists in the brief "Introductory Historical Notes and Outlines," which in the mass cover some sixty pages. These notes are carefully and simply written and reflect a sane historical and critical judgment: they together constitute a very helpful guide to the sound understanding of the historical setting and contents of the New Testament books. Dr. Robertson speaks with notable modesty on all really disputable questions; and with a commendable firmness on those which are beyond dispute. In matters of minute criticism he cannot, and does not, expect all fellow-workers to agree with him, and he advises his readers of the differences. The present reviewer would prefer, for example, a differing order for the Synoptic Gospels and for Paul's Epistles of the First Imprisonment. But these things are trifles; and he thankfully recognizes that in these introductory notes the general reader will find precisely the kind of information he needs to enable him to read the New Testament with profit from the historical side. For the other and higher uses of the book, as Dr. Robertson crisply says, "The New Testament tells its own story."

Princeton.

BENJ. B. WARFIELD.

III.—HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.

THOMAS CRANMER AND THE ENGLISH REFORMATION, 1489-1556. By ALBERT FREDERICK POLLARD, A.M., Professor of Constitutional History, University College, London; Examiner in Modern History in the Universities of Oxford and London; Author of *Henry VIII, England Under Protector Somerset*, etc. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1904. 12mo; pp. xv, 399.

This contribution by Mr. Pollard to the *Heroes of the Reformation* will easily rank as one of the ablest and most valuable members of this series of popular yet critical biographies. The work is unquestionably the most adequate life of Thomas Cranmer we have. The editor is to be congratulated on having secured the help of so distinguished an authority for the treatment of this confessedly difficult subject.

The author, indeed, professes to find the character of Cranmer much simpler than it is generally supposed to have been. We are assured (p. 303) that the

"ambiguities which obscure his career arise not from the complexity of his mind, but from the contrasts and contradictions of the age in which he lived"; that (p. iii) "the obscurity is not in his character, but in the atmosphere which he breathed, and atmosphere is the most difficult of all things to create." The reader will, of course, sympathize with the writer's desire to give as full a picture as possible of the really trying situation with which the great ecclesiastic had to deal. There can be no doubt, moreover, that Mr. Pollard, by his subtler analysis and more accurate interpretation of some of the facts in this period of English history, has really succeeded in placing the archbishop before us in a more favorable light. But it may be questioned whether, in his attempt to give the true psychology of some of this hero's unheroic deeds, the historian should not have focused our attention a little more critically upon those elemental traits of character which from the first marked the Reformer as a man of compromise, and which certainly have done their part to make the "atmosphere" surrounding him so depressing to all who have ever come within the radius of its influence. We cannot quite believe that the simplicity of Cranmer's mind was the simplicity of those stronger and nobler personalities in whom singleness of purpose, governed by pure motive and sustained by fixed principles, becomes the simplicity of genuine sincerity. In saying this, however, we would not imply that the biographer actually tries to make his material fill the largest moulds of heroic achievement. But if we may allow Prof. Pollard's generalization that "Cranmer's story is that of a conscience in the grip of a stronger power," we may add that the author has given us a thoroughly complete and just idea of the "stronger power," but hardly so satisfactory a conception of the kind of "conscience" that so often failed to decide its truly perplexing problems according to the highest principles of morality.

It is therefore with the customary and the perhaps inevitable feeling of disappointment that we read the latest story of this life so rich in dramatic interest, so noble in many of its less conspicuous self-revelations, so valuable to the Church and State of his day, and so largely beneficial to those higher interests of humanity for which he often labored, with set purpose but with too little courage and consistency of effort, in his fight for the freedom of conscience. It is, of course, not the biographer's fault that his subject presents no better arguments for its being subsumed under such a caption as the *Heroes of the Reformation*. It may be said that the author has done what the strictest conformity to the highest standards of historical composition has permitted. Indeed, we shall have done him a grave injustice if we have conveyed the impression that his primary concern is to have us pass the most favorable verdict possible upon his client. On the contrary, Mr. Pollard reveals on every page not only the rich knowledge of the painstaking investigator, but the fairness, the candor, the balance, the delicacy of touch, and the judicial calmness of a model historian. In full sympathy with his subject, yet thoroughly familiar with every flaw and weakness in Cranmer's character, he is content simply to get the true explanation of the man's conduct. There is no attempt to conceal the less admirable phases of the Reformer's career; again and again we are impressed by the altogether unusual fairness of his treatment of a theme concerning which most Englishmen find it difficult not to evince the one-sidedness of a partisan interest. But Mr. Pollard, by the use of some new material, and more especially by his masterful presentation of circumstances hitherto not viewed from the right angle and not duly taken into the account, has been able, with perfect candor and fidelity to his thorough knowledge of the facts, to make us take a more favorable, because a really truer, view of the unfortunate archbishop.

The work is particularly meritorious in its treatment of the intricate problems of canonical law and constitutional government involved in the establishment

of the Anglican Church. It must be said on the other hand, however, that the discussion of the distinctively theological questions is not altogether adequate. We have been given to understand that this series of works is to deal with the essential points in the theology of the Reformers. To be sure, the author was here at some disadvantage, owing to the unsatisfactory condition of research along these lines. We can understand, too, how a more precise discussion of the influence, let us say, of John Laski or of the Augsburg Confession upon the work of Cranmer might have detracted from the merits of the book as a popular treatise on the English Reformation. The fact remains, however, that the thoroughly adequate monograph on Cranmer will have to meet this further need of a more satisfactory exposition of his theological views, both as to their genesis and as to their influence upon the Book of Common Prayer.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

MISCELLANEEN ZUR GESCHICHTE DER EVANGELISCHEN KIRCHE IN RUSSLAND, NEBST LASCIANA, NEUE FOLGE. VON DR. HERMANN DALTON. Berlin: Verlag von Reuther und Reichard. 1905. 8vo; pp. viii, 472.

The greatest living authority on Protestantism in Russia here offers his fourth and concluding volume of *Beiträge zur Geschichte der evangelischen Kirche in Russland*. This book, like the whole series of which it forms a part, presents a somewhat disjointed and fragmentary appearance. The first volume, which appeared as long ago as 1887, dealt with the history of the organization of the Lutheran Church in Russia; then in 1889 appeared the second volume, an *Urkundenbuch der evangelisch-reformierten Kirche in Russland*; while the third volume, entitled *Lasciana, nebst den ältesten evangelischen Synodalprotokollen Polens 1555-1561*, appeared in 1898. Before this series of studies was published the author's special interest in John Laski (or à Lasco) had yielded the most comprehensive monograph on this cosmopolitan Reformer (Gotha, 1881, pp. 578).

The author has followed his previous plan of prefacing the documents themselves with an explanatory introduction and accompanying them with elaborate discussions and instructive notes. The following topics constitute the Miscellanies: (I) "Die älteste lutherische Gottesdienstordnung in Russland"; (II) "Aus den Anfangsjahren der deutschen Ansiedlungen an der Wolga"; (III) "Amtsreise eines lutherischen Pastors in Irkutsk"; (IV) "Eine evangelische Missionsansiedlung im Kaukasus"; and (V) "Aus dem ersten Jahrhundert der reformierten Kirche und Schule in Sluzk."

Though these studies will be of little general interest to the Protestant world on this side of the water, they no doubt will be duly prized by those Germans of the present day who will find in Dr. Dalton's life-work the first really satisfactory account of the missionary enterprises of their evangelical forefathers in Poland, Russia and the contiguous countries.

The Lasciana have a broader attractiveness. This is not only because the life and work of this much-traveled Reformer have of late received so much attention, but because these letters and other documents, so laboriously collected from the archives of Krakau, Königsberg, Båle, Berlin and St. Petersburg, really add to our knowledge of this interesting personality, and serve in the author's hands as most admirable *pièces justificatives* for his interpretation of the man and his doctrines. Upon the basis of these paralipomena Dr. Dalton devotes over 150 pages to the refutation of Lic. Kruske's treatise, *Johannes à Lasco und der Sakramentsstreit* (1901) and Prof. Kawerau's article, "Der Reinigungseid des Johannes Laski" (*Neue Kirchliche Zeitschrift*, X, 430ff.). Dalton follows the Reformer step by step through his wanderings and sojournings in East Frisia, England, Denmark, Frankfort-on-the-Main and Poland, and shows how Kruske's narrative puts the whole development of Laski, especially the decisive influences

of Bucer and Calvin during the sacramentarian controversy, in a wrong light. Dalton comes to substantially the same view of Laski's first stay in East Frisia and his homogeneous Calvinistic doctrine of the Lord's Supper that Karl Hein had independently formed in an earlier dissertation (*Die Sakramentslehre des Johannes à Lasco*, 1904).

The other "Auseinandersetzung" pertains to the question of the date of the purgation oath against Romanism taken by Laski. The author here nobly redeems the promise he made two years ago to defend Laski against the charge of perjury, made on the supposition that the oath in question was taken after Laski's acceptance of the Evangelical cause. Kuyper, in his edition of the works of this Reformer, had fixed upon the date 1526, and this is likewise the result of Dalton's lengthy argument against the much later date (1542), advocated originally only by inimical Romanists, but recently also by Kawerau in the above-named article. Dalton's considerations are not absolutely conclusive, but they furnish a high degree of probability that Laski cannot justly be charged with perjury. It may confidently be expected that, with renewed study of the now available sources and the additional light that may be obtained from other Lasciana still to be discovered, the man's character will be put beyond the reach of so serious an accusation.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

CHRISTUS LIBERATOR: An Outline Study of Africa. By ELLEN C. PARSONS, M.A. Introduction by SIR HARRY H. JOHNSTON, K.C.B., Author of *British Central Africa*, etc. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1905. 12mo; pp. 301.

CHRISTIANITY IN MODERN JAPAN. By ERNEST W. CLEMENT, Principal Duncan Baptist Academy, Tokyo, Japan; Author of *Handbook of Modern Japan*. With Map and Illustrations. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society. 1905. 12mo; pp. viii, 205.

It gives us pleasure to note the appearance of these modest but most serviceable outline histories of the missionary situation in the countries named. The volumes will commend themselves to all who wish to know the outstanding facts concerning the evangelization by all the denominations of these large and increasingly interesting fields.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

THE HEART OF ASBURY'S JOURNAL. Edited By EZRA SQUIER TIPPLE, D.D. New York: Eaton & Mains. 1904. 8vo; pp. xii, 720. Price, \$1.25 net.

Bishop Francis Asbury, for forty-five years (1771 to 1816) an itinerant preacher and one of the strongest organizers of the Methodist Episcopal Church in this country, well merits the attempt here made by Dr. Tipple to make his diary or *Journal* more widely useful. The three volumes of the original work are reduced to one. The unimportant entries are omitted; some judicious explanatory notes are inserted; numerous inaccuracies are removed; and many handsome illustrations of persons and places mentioned in the *Journal* are reproduced, by the courtesy of the publishers, from Hurst's *History of Methodism*.

The work in its new form is a most readable chapter from the romantic period of American history. It gives us an intimate acquaintance with a man whose ecclesiastical career, so far as extent of travel, variety of service, and range of permanent achievement are concerned, had few parallels even in that period of heroic missionary enterprise. Every page of the *Journal* breathes the spirit of a fervent piety and an indefatigable zeal, despite the torments of bodily afflic-

tion and the general hardships of the pioneer's life, to bring as many as possible under the power of the gospel of Christ. There is something touching in those frequent entries that tell us how this man of God rose at five in the morning to spend whole hours in prayer for himself and his fellow-men. The book may be regarded as an important source for the early history of Methodism throughout the Middle States, but its greatest value for the average reader will be found in the vivid picture it gives of the colonial life in general, and, in particular, of the noble achievements, amid those trying circumstances, of a most useful servant of God.

Princeton.

F. W. LOETSCHER.

CORPUS REFORMATURUM, VOLUMEN LXXXVIII. HULDREICH ZWINGLI'S SAEMMTLICHE WERKE, herausgegeben von Egli und Finsler. Berlin: Schwetschke und Sohn, 1905.

Among the most important theological publications of the Continent of Europe is this republication of the works of Ulrich Zwingli by the firm of Schwetschke & Son, of Berlin, who have already put the Church under great obligations by the publication of Luther's and Calvin's collected works. The editors of this new issue of Zwingli's works are Prof. Emil Egli, Professor of Church History in the University of Zurich, assisted by Prof. George Finsler, of Basle. A new issue of the works of the great Reformer is necessary, as since the last publication of his works by Schulthess, 1828-42, considerable new material has been found, the results of which, however, have been incorporated in the latest and best of the lives of Zwingli by the late Prof. R. Stahelin, of Basle. The editors are publishing Zwingli's works in chronological order, beginning with his first works written at Glarus, as his poem, "The Fable of the Oxen." Of this edition six parts have already appeared, carrying them down to the first disputation at Zurich, in 1523. Each work of Zwingli's is prefaced with a carefully made list of sources and the notes give careful annotations of the different readings, leaving nothing to be desired. The edition will be a splendid monument to the memory of this great Reformer, a credit to the publishers and editors, as well as a great boon to the theological world.

Philadelphia.

J. I. GOOD.

ZWINGLIANA. 1904. No. 1, to 1905, No. 1, inclusive. Zurcher und Furrer, Zürich.

The publication of these valuable pamphlets giving new material on the Swiss Reformation is continued. The first pamphlet of 1904 discussed Zwingli's visit to Monza, Italy. The second number of 1904, because of the 400th anniversary of Bullinger's birth, is devoted to Bullinger's life and his relation to Zwingli. An interesting discussion is given on the question whether Zwingli, before his death, had suggested Bullinger as his successor as Antistes and head of the Zurich Church.

Philadelphia.

J. I. GOOD.

HEINRICH BULLINGER'S DIARIUM. Basle. 1904. 145 pages.

In honor of the quartocentenary of Bullinger's birth, July 18, 1904, the Zwingli Society of Zurich, under the leadership of Prof. Emil Egli, published this Diary of Bullinger. It is an exceedingly valuable and interesting narrative of the events of his life, beginning with a reference to his birth; but it is especially full during the period of his ministry, calling attention to many of the events of the day in their relation to the Reformation. It is partly in Latin and partly in German, and is one of the most important of the original sources of the Swiss Reformation.

Philadelphia.

J. I. GOOD.

DIE ETHIK HULDRICH ZWINGLI. VON CONSTANTINE VON KUGELGEN. Leipsic. 1902. 109 pages.

This is a brochure on the moral teachings of Zwingli, aiming to gather and state the moral teachings of this great Reformer, as Baur and others have stated his dogmatical. Following Kant, he divides his book into two parts: (I) from virtue to pardon or grace; (II) from pardon to virtue. The first he defines to be Zwingli's morals in their personal worth; the second explains Zwingli's teachings on morality in its effect on individual piety, as prayer, and on our practical life, as in the family, social and political relations. He shows that Zwingli's views on prayer did not limit it to formulas or place or time. In regard to his views as to the relation of Church and State, where Ritschl and Luthardt claim he held to a theocracy, which Stahelin and Schweizer combat, he says that both should be considered, but it was not a theocracy but a State Church to which Zwingli held. The book is interesting, in view of Ritschl's present-day ethical theology, as showing Zwingli's sympathy with morals.

Philadelphia.

J. I. GOOD.

LA THEOCRATIE À GENÈVE AU TEMPS DE CALVIN. Par EUGÈNE CHOISY. Genève. 280 pages.

L'ÉTAT CHRÉTIEN CALVINISTE À GENÈVE AU TEMPS DE THEODORE DE BEZA. Genève. 614 pages.

These are two important works on a subject that greatly needed elucidation, the ecclesiastical government of Geneva in the Reformation. About this many erroneous views are held by English readers—much of the Church government of Lasco is confused with that of Calvin, etc. It is therefore very important to get facts at first hand from the original records. Rev. Mr. Choisy, a pastor of Geneva, has performed this work in these volumes and herein lies the value of his work. It is perhaps the first attempt to present with any fullness and completeness the early Church government of Geneva.

The first book gives a careful historical description of the Church organization, from the days of Farel through Calvin's exile and return to the time of the latter's death. He traces the various revolts against it by the Perrinists, Bolzec and Servetus, and the final victory of the theocratic régime over the *césaropapistie*. He closes with a minute description of the ministry, the worship and discipline of the Calvinistic theocracy. He then examines critically the governmental system of Calvin, which he says was an application to society of the fundamental principle of his theology, the sovereignty of God—that he tried to realize in Geneva the ideal of the kingdom of God. The author criticises Calvin's theological positions in making God the God of the Old Testament rather than of the New, in giving the Bible a juridical conception based abstractly on law and not on the loving conception of Christ. According to the Calvinistic theocracy the Church needed the State and the State the Church, the former to be the supreme resort in matters religious. "This theocratic system," he says, "appeared as a phenomenon analogous to that of the primitive Church. After the Apostles the early Church, unable to rise to the spirituality of Paul, descended to legalism. So there was a descent after the Reformation for want of such a leader as Calvin." How to maintain the supremacy of the Church in this double-headed government of Church and State was the problem with which Beza had to wrestle. This is described in the second work. His life was a continual struggle against the unceasing demands of the political powers for supremacy. The author's description of the historical events is exceedingly interesting—the final victory of the political government (1572), the gradual secularization of education by establishment of a Law Department at the University (1573), the abolition of subscription to the Confession of Faith by students (1576), until Beza, weary of the strug-

gles against the secular power, voluntarily resigned the presidency of the Venerable Company in 1580, and Beza's death, which finds the political arm permanently in control. He closes by reviewing the distinctive character and spirit of the Christian State of Geneva. His discussions on the relation of Calvinism to society, to science, to modern liberty, are very interesting and valuable, although in many places the reader will not agree with his criticism of the dogmatical principles of the great Reformer, Calvin, made in the spirit of modern critical dogmatics. But to the student of ecclesiastical government these volumes are a boon, and they correct mistaken notions about Calvinism. Calvin may have been the founder of republics, but Geneva was far from the political and civil freedom of modern republics; for not until three centuries later, in the early part of the 19th century, did religious and civil liberty overturn her aristocracy.

Philadelphia.

J. I. GOOD.

CALVIN, EIN ACTENGETREUES LEBENSBILO. Von H. DIENER-WYSS. Zürich. 138 pages.

This is a popular life of John Calvin in pamphlet form; yet, though popular in style, its scientific basis is good. Luther bulks largely in the German mind and yet Calvin is not forgotten, as is shown by the recent publication of his entire works by Schwetschke. Cornelius, Lang of Halle, and others like the author of this pamphlet are keeping the memory and work of Calvin bright before the minds of the Germans.

Philadelphia.

J. I. GOOD.

THOMAS PLATTER AND THE EDUCATIONAL RENAISSANCE OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY. By PAUL MONROE, Ph.D. New York, 1904. 224 pages.

In the excellent Educational Series published by the Appletons there is a proper tribute paid to this Swiss teacher as one of the beginners of Protestant education. He is interesting to us as the great printer of Basle and publisher of Calvin's Institutes. But his autobiography given here gives an important insight into some phases of education peculiar to that time, as the wanderings of the students and the different kinds of schools, as the cathedral, parish, guild and burgher schools. His efforts to gain an education were heroic. From goatherd to school-boy, to student, to teacher and printer is the story of his life. Hungering for an education, he came to Zurich and heard the new doctrines of the Reformation. He followed his great teacher Oswald Myconius to Basle, where he was first professor in the pedagogium and rector of the Castle school for thirty-one years. As an educational study this autobiography is valuable. The Calvinistic Church has always stood high in education and literature. She needs to honor her famous sons more. As Froschauer the printer of Zurich in the sixteenth century was a whole Bible Society in one person, and Pestalozzi, the creator of the new education of Europe, Platter finely combines both the teacher and the printer.

Philadelphia.

J. I. GOOD.

JEAN FREDERICK OSTERWALD (1663-1747). Par R. GRETILLAT. Neuchatel, 1904. 294 pages with Appendix.

At last the life of this distinguished French-Swiss theologian has found a suitable biography. The previous biographies having become antiquated by reason of the new material and also of the new point of view of our age, a new book was needed. The author has based it on originals in Neuchatel and Geneva, and gives at the end a reprint of the letters of Osterwald to his dear friend, A. Turretin of Geneva, 132 in number. The biographer follows his life chronolog-

ically, taking up his various works as they were written. It is interesting to know that it was the father of Osterwald who prevented individual subscription by the Classis of Neuchatel to the Helvetic Consensus, and the son therefore gained by inheritance his opposition to that creed; in whose repeal he, with the others of the second Swiss theological triumvirate, Werenfels and A. Turretin, was successful. The problems of Osterwald's theological positions, due to his departure from traditional Calvinism, as his doctrine of original sin, his reputed Socinianism, are handled with ability. The author reveals that while Osterwald differed from Calvin by denying the totality of depravity, and virtually ignoring predestination, he still believed in the divinity of Christ, and in some sense the substitutionary sacrifice of Christ; and yet, strange to say, Osterwald, while refusing to be a Calvinist, criticised the Arminians. Probably his mind was of such a type that he found refuge from such metaphysical questions in ethics, for the peculiar emphasis of his catechism and dogmatics is on the ethical and practical. Every doctrine must be practical; in this he was a forerunner of Rothe. Indeed in his ethical theology Osterwald was in many respects the forerunner of the ethical theology of to-day as found in Ritschlianism abroad and the sociological dogmatics at home. Exception might be taken to one or two points, as to his statement of the early repeals of the Helvetic Consensus by Bern and Zürich, but so excellent is the work that it is not necessary.

Philadelphia.

J. I. GOOD.

ARNOLD BOVET, SA VIE, SON OEUVRE. Par PIERRE DIETERLEN. Neuchatel. 380 pages.

This Reformed minister, though unknown to English readers, was widely known in his native land of Switzerland and on the Continent of Europe as the apostle of the White Cross, or of temperance, going everywhere to teach total abstinence. One quickly sees the results of his labors when visiting Switzerland, in the difference between German and French Switzerland, the latter being far in advance on temperance, owing largely to his labors. At the same time, his quarter-century pastorate of the Free French Reformed congregation of the city of Bern the capital gave him unusual avenues of influence and usefulness. Those interested in religious philanthropy or in studying the work of temperance in its world-wide aspects cannot well pass by this book.

Philadelphia.

J. I. GOOD.

PIONEERS PARM LES MAROTSE. Par ADOLPHE JALLA. Florence. 1903. 369 pages.

The annals of this mission field in southeastern Africa deserve to be placed alongside of those in the New Hebrides by John G. Paton. The wonderful mission among the Marotse, begun by probably the greatest of the French missionaries, Coillard, who went to his rest last year, is being continued by his successor, the author of this volume, who in it describes his missionary experiences and labors (1889), to his return to Europe (1900). Its value is increased by a number of pictures of the mission and a valuable map of the region of the upper Zambesi, with its wonderful falls of Victoria Nyanzi, showing the location of the mission stations. An appendix containing a history of the Marotse tribe, the traditions of their royal family, and other interesting information concerning this tribe, which seems destined to become an important factor politically in the British history of South Africa, adds to the value of the volume.

Philadelphia.

J. I. GOOD.

DIE SACRAMENT-LEHRE DES JOHANNES A. LASCO. Von Lic. KARL HEIN. Berlin: Schwetschke und Sohn. 1904. 188 pages.

The writer in his preface states that Lasco's theological position on the second

sacramental controversy cannot be understood without a close examination of his doctrine of the Lord's Supper. He then proceeds to examine Lasco's views—first Erasmian, then Zwinglian, then Calvinist. As to the question whether Lasco was Humanist, Unionist or Calvinist, he clearly shows that he was the last; until at length his doctrine, though with a slight difference of emphasis, comes in full agreement with Calvin's. He shows that ten years before their meeting at Frankfort, Lasco had been influenced by Calvin, but for ten years had withheld his subscription to his views. There remains, as the author suggests, room for a work on the Church government of Lasco as distinguished from that of Calvin, though both are Presbyterian. For it is a question whether Calvin has not gained a good deal of credit that belongs to Lasco, the founder of the first Presbyterianly organized congregation at Austin Friars, London.

Philadelphia.

J. I. GOOD.

DER DOM ZU BERLIN. VON CARL SCHNIEWIND. Berlin. 1905. 203 pages.

It is quite fitting that just at the time when the Emperor of Germany should dedicate his new cathedral at Berlin last February, a history of this cathedral should be published; and it is quite proper that Rev. Dr. Schniewind, who is the only Reformed minister among the present court-chaplains, should be the one to write it. He narrates its history from its foundation in 1450 up to 1905. He describes the three buildings, the first built in 1451 in the Castle, the second built in Reformation times in the Castle Square, the third built by Frederick the Great in 1750 in the pleasure garden of the palace, and the new cathedral dedicated in 1905. He also describes the various court-chaplains; also the cathedral school and crypt. Very interesting to us of the Calvinistic faith is the scene on Christmas, 1613, when Elector John Sigismund of Brandenburg joined the Reformed Church, and also the giving by his son Elector George William of Brandenburg in 1632 of the cathedral forever to the Reformed faith; that no matter what changes of faith might occur in Brandenburg or in its ruling family, the Reformed of Berlin should always have a place of worship there (as a result the ancestors of the present Emperor of Germany have been Reformed). But this gift of the cathedral forever to the Reformed has been nullified because the King of Prussia in 1817 united the Lutheran and Reformed faiths and made the cathedral belong to the United Church; so that now it is more Lutheran than Reformed, and of its four court-preachers only one is Reformed, and he very mildly confessional. The book is enriched by a great many pictures and portraits, many of whose subjects were prominent, as Jablonski, and also a reprint of important documents bearing on the history of the Church.

Philadelphia.

J. I. GOOD.

GESCHICHTE DER ENTSTEHUNG UND ENTWICKELUNG DER EVANGELISCHEN KAPELLE IN HEIDELBERG. VON KOHRIG. Heidelberg. 1904.

The brochure reveals how Heidelberg, once a centre of Evangelical Christianity in the days of the Reformation and of the Heidelberg Catechism, has become a waste through rationalism in the pulpit and professor's chair. It describes the new beginning of Evangelical Christianity made in the 19th century by the few who had not bowed their knees to Baal and its growth in the City Mission, until, though once ostracized and even in a measure persecuted by the powers that be, it is now recognized as doing a splendid work for the regeneration of that city. As an illustration of the work of the innere Mission of Germany it is an important study.

Philadelphia.

J. I. GOOD.

THE CHURCH AND THE FUTURE LIFE. By DAVID VAN HORNE, D.D., LL.D., President and Professor of Systematic Theology in Heidelberg Theological Seminary (Tiffin, Ohio). Cleveland. 1904. 247 pages.

This volume contains a part of the theological lectures of Rev. Prof. Van Horne, who for nearly twenty years has taught in the institution over which he presides. It is a continuation of his previous work, *Reason and Revelation*, published some years ago. As that covered the beginning of dogmatics, this covers the end. It takes up the subjects of ecclesiology and eschatology. His theological position is that of the positive traditional theology. He aims to be Calvinistic in the sense of the Heidelberg Catechism. On eschatology, unlike modern new theology, which reduces it to a minimum, he is quite full, and his positions are sound and safe. The work reveals careful, industrious study and thought; and while it lacks the fullness of [such larger dogmatics as Smith's, Shedd's or Strong's, still it will occupy an honored place among the Reformed dogmatics of our day.

Philadelphia.

J. I. Good.

IV.—PRACTICAL THEOLOGY.

WORDS OF HELP ON BELIEF AND CONDUCT. By the Right Rev. H. C. G. MOULE (Bishop of Durham), Rev W. T. A. BARBER, D.D., Rev. G. S. BARRETT, D.D., Rev. J. G. GREENOUGH, M.A., Rev. R. F. HORTON, D.D., Rev. J. D. JONES, M.A., B.D., Very Rev. W. LEFROY, D.D. (Dean of Norwich), Rev. ALEXANDER McLAREN, D.D., Rev. G. H. C. MACGREGOR, M.A., Ven. T. J. MADDEN (Archbishop of Warrington), Rev. A. T. PIERSON, D.D., Rev. JOHN WATSON, D.D. ("Ian Maclaren"), Rev. W. H. GRIFFITH THOMAS, B.D., and Rev. F. S. WEBSTER, M.A. Edited by the Rev. A. R. BUCKLAND, M.A. New York: The American Tract Society, 150 Nassau Street. 8vo, pp. 280. Price, \$1.00.

This very neat volume contains a fine selection of papers, by a great variety of writers, upon a wide scope of subjects. The whole collection is accurately, though rather indefinitely, designated by the title given to the book. Some of the papers are not only thoroughly evangelical, but also distinctively evangelistic. For example, Dr. Alexander McLaren's paper, "Under which King?" is a splendid appeal to the unconverted man to be saved by accepting Jesus Christ as his Saviour and King. The next paper, on "Choice and Decision," by the Rev. W. T. A. Barber, B.D., shows a yielding to the common temptation to indulge oneself in a psychological treatise on the power of the will rather than to set forth a motive which will elicit that power in the right direction. Dr. Horton's paper, "Why I am a Christian," gives the broadly experiential reason—a reason, by the by, which could have had no direct force with him before he had himself become a Christian, and which therefore has its limitations as a persuading motive to the unbeliever. Ian Maclaren's paper, "Christ the Answer to Human Need," is a fine evangelistic presentation of the theologically Ritschlian idea that the key which fits the lock is good enough to open the door. This idea has a tremendous meaning and value in the evangelistic appeal, although in a certain aspect of it it is the very essence of the phenomenological theology,—which aspect of course, Dr. Watson never alludes to. The papers cover a wide range of topics. The one on "Gambling" is excellent and very timely. Dr. Barrett's essay on "The Vitality and Value of the Bible" is rich and suggestive, while the same writer's paper on "The Conflict of Rome with Civil and Religious Liberty" is

a fine, intelligent controversial treatment of the question of the menace to civil liberty which grows out of the claims of the Papacy. The Tract Society has placed American readers under obligation for this contribution to the devotional and practical literature of the time, a contribution which is almost wholly from the pens of British writers.

Trenton.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

JESUS CHRIST AND THE CHRISTIAN CHARACTER. An Examination of the Teaching of Jesus in its Relation to Some of the Moral Problems of Personal Life. By FRANCIS GREENWOOD PEABODY, Plummer Professor of Christian Morals in Harvard University. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1905. 8vo; pp. 304. Price, \$1.50.

This book embodies the "Lyman Beecher Lectures" at Yale University for 1904. The opening chapter deals with "The Modern World and the Christian Character"; Chapter II discusses "The Character of Jesus Christ"; the ensuing three chapters are concerned with the contents of Christian Character; and Chapter VI is a study of "The Social Consequences of the Christian Character." The two concluding chapters (VII and VIII) are entitled respectively "The Ascent of Ethics" and "The Descent of Faith." By the "ascent of ethics" the author means the Christian's discovery of the source of Christ's system of ethics as being "communion with God." "The normal development of the Christian character . . . leads . . . from the plain of ethics to the heights of religion" (p. 265). The normal Christian character, according to the author, begins with the performance of duty, and gradually grows "from duty to insight," or from moral conduct to faith. By the "descent of faith" is meant the necessity in Christ, and in his followers, of adding practical helpfulness to the ecstasies of the higher experiences of oneness with God—as illustrated, for example, in the Master's prompt descent from the Mount of Transfiguration to heal the epileptic boy. The complementary principles of these last two chapters are forcibly stated and brilliantly amplified. The book as a whole, indeed, reveals fine scholarship, originality, and a marked brilliancy of thought and language. The special admirers of Dr. Peabody will regard the decided *up-to-dateness* of these lectures as not the least element in contributing to their attractiveness.

There is a wide divergence between the author's point of view and that, say, of James Denney's *The Death of Christ*. As every one who is acquainted with the latter work knows, its author teaches that the atoning death of Christ is the sole starting-point of genuine Christian character. Says Denney, "Nothing can beget in the soul that life of which we speak except the appeal of the Cross, and what the appeal of the Cross does beget is a life which, in its moral quality, corresponds to the death of Christ itself." One or the other of these theologians must be wrong, for the question is fundamental. Apparently there is no important place in Dr. Peabody's creed for the Atonement. We do not recall that the word is once mentioned in his book, nor that emphasis is once given to the supreme fact indicated by the term as a potent force in spiritual character. One of the minor slips of the author is his reference to the first answer in the Westminster Shorter Catechism as an illustration of the tendency of Christian thought during the past to detach religion from practical life (p. 275). But is it not an error to understand the phrase, "and enjoy Him forever," as merely a definition of the content of the first phrase, "to glorify God"? Rightly understood, "to glorify God" as used in the Catechism is not to be viewed as meaning an unpractical or transcendent act of the soul, but is to be read in the light of St. Paul's word, "Whether therefore ye eat, or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God" (1 Cor. x. 31).

His illustrative element is particularly fine. On the whole, this volume gives us the impression of strength—a personality that is very symmetrical, and virile in thought, experience, spiritual feeling, evangelical zeal and hopefulness. Perhaps we should regard the sermon on the Atonement—its title is "Life for Life"—as the most helpful and striking of this collection; but all are good, and every body ought to be the better for the reading of them.

Cranford, N. J.

GEORGE FRANCIS GREENE.

THE CHILD AND GOD. By Rev. M. T. LAMB. Introduction by Rev. HENRY COLLIN MINTON, D.D. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society. 16mo. Paper; pp. viii and 121.

This little book, by the State Secretary of the Children's Aid Society of New Jersey, is a plea for the work of that Society, which aims to find homes for the homeless children rescued by its agents. This book is wider in its scope than the work of the Society. It is a call to parents to get back to the Biblical basis of the family and regard their children as committed to them by God. Alas! that there should be need for such a plea. Mr. Lamb lays much emphasis upon the importance of family life in the training of the individual and the maintainance of society. He is even old-fashioned enough to think that the best support for his argument is the authority of the Bible. It is a good book for all parents, and for all who ought to be parents, to read. If husbands and wives are not fathers and mothers, they ought to ask what their duty may be to the homeless children of the land. This book will help them to answer the question. It calls attention to that method of child-saving which, as Dr. Minton points out, "is God's method; and, of course, then the true method."

Princeton.

W. B. SHEDDAN.

Bible Class Primers. Edited by Principal SALMOND, D.D., Aberdeen. **EZEKIEL: HIS LIFE AND MISSION.** By the Rev. W. HARVEY-JELLIE, M.A., B.D. (Lon.), Cheltenham. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George Street. London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & Co. (Ltd.). Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. 16mo; pp. 99.

A model of its class. Popular character has been secured without the slightest sacrifice of completeness or scholarly accuracy or literary excellence. The style is clear, forcible and elegant. The very index is eloquent in its suggestion of the beauty and variety of the gems of literature in the prophecies of Ezekiel. As a model primer, the little book teaches the elements of its subject and so accurately that its statements will be found true and satisfactory as the student gains a minuter acquaintance with the writings of the prophet through advanced exegetical and historical research. Disputed matters could not be altogether avoided, even in an elementary book; but in these pages they will seldom be recognized except by the penetrating vision of the expert, and they have been treated fairly. The Bible class will not be falsely indoctrinated by this text-book whichever critical view be regarded as false. To cite the most trying statements: one who objects to speaking of Ezekiel's "correct forecasts of future events" will find comfort in the allusion to his vision of the glory of God as "miraculous experience" (pp. 17 and 22).

Princeton, N. J.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

RELIGION IN HOMESpun. By F. B. MEYER. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co. Price, \$1.00 net.

In this, his latest book, Mr. Meyer has swung wholly free of the field of Scriptural exposition and the interpretation of subjective truths, and is dealing with the

more practical objective phases of Christianity—its application to the every-day life of the individual. Penetrating in its wisdom, straightforward in method, the book treats of the doubtful amusements, the family altar, Christian commerce, "neighbors and neighboring," and cognate subjects. Its author cuts fearlessly across current opinion where his views disagree; but he is never unreasoningly dogmatic, always shrewdly logical.

Stevenson somewhere makes the questionable assertion, "Gentleness and cheerfulness . . . they are the perfect duties, and it is the trouble with moral men that they have neither one nor the other." Mr. Meyer shows forth in the pages of this little homily his gentle, cheery personality, in constant flashes of whimsical humor and in exhortation to his readers to realize more fully the joy and sweetness of the Christian experience.

Religion in Homespun should especially find a place in the library of the Christian whose habits of life are not rigidly set.

New Britain, Conn.

HOWARD ARNOLD WALTER.

V.—GENERAL LITERATURE.

JAMES RUSSELL LOWELL. By FERRIS GREENSLET. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1905.

We have many miscellaneous sketches of the life and work of Lowell, but few biographies proper. Howells, Higginson, Haweis, Hale, Underwood, Stedman, Woodberry, Curtis, James, Whipple, Bolton, Wendell and others have written of him, more or less incidentally, as have all those, such as Pancoast and Richardson, who have presented the *History of American Letters*. The *Letters of Lowell*, edited by Norton, furnish an amount of biographical and autobiographical material to which every student of Lowell is especially indebted, while the recent *Life of Lowell* by Scudder may be said to be the only complete and satisfactory biography extant. Mr. Greenslet, therefore, in his recent treatise, may be said to meet an urgent need in American literary history, and, by reason of his efficient relation to American letters and his personal and official relations to the *Atlantic Monthly*, is exceptionally fitted to discuss so representative a writer. The method of his narrative is simple and yet sufficiently full for all historical purposes, following, as it does, the chronological and logical development of Lowell's life and art, from his birth in 1819 to his death in 1891. After sketching the first twenty years of his life (1819-39), he discusses, in successive chapters, his early literary work; his relation to the exciting Abolition movement of his time; his career as Professor of Modern Languages at Harvard, and as editor of the *Atlantic Monthly*; his relation to the Civil War and the *North American Review*; his diplomatic career at Madrid and London; his character as a man, and the intrinsic quality of his verse and prose. Emphasis is laid upon the early trials which he confronted and conquered; upon his educational and journalistic work; upon the consistent though often misunderstood position which he assumed as to the stirring civic questions of his day; upon his signal success as an Ambassador at the Court of Spain and, especially, of England; on the more attractive features of his domestic life, and on his just place and mission as an American poet and prose writer and critic. Mr. Greenslet's biography is particularly valuable and praiseworthy in giving us an impartial estimate of Lowell's literary art and product; dealing fairly, as we believe, with his merits, and, what is far more difficult and rare, with his manifest defects. When, in writing of his poetry, he emphasizes the defects of "The Vision of Sir Launfal" as to structure and meaning, and the "absence of the old afflatus" in "The Cathedral"; when he notes Lowell's too

frequent mistaking of metre and verbal correctness; when of the three hundred poems of the last collection he remarks "that less than fifty possess any vivid poetic life," the critic is on tenable ground, as much so as when he tells us of his "fervent sincerity," of "the amount of mind that lay back of his verse," of his "consistent ideality," and his skill in poetic satire and humor and his ethical earnestness. So, as to his prose, the biographer deals justly with his subject, noting his "lack of firmness of outline"; the "impression of hastiness" which, at times, he gives us; of his lack of "coherence" and of "lucid order" and of "unity"; as, per contra, his happy union, as to words, of "vitality and antiquarianism"; his "full and flexible" diction; the "savory" quality of his style; his fine use of figure, and the general attractiveness of his pages. When he speaks of his lack of "balance and catholicity" as a critic, and his indulgence in "extreme and unguarded statements," he is quite as correct as when we are told of his "scholarly ideals" as a critic, and his "sympathetic insight," and his marked success in uniting "culture and conscience," literature and life. Herein, we repeat, is the chief excellence of the biography before us, in that its author has succeeded in overcoming that "hesitancy which a good many writers about Lowell have shown in uttering their whole mind." Mr. Greenslet has "uttered his whole mind," and we are grateful to him for it, even when we cannot agree with him, as he says in closing his sketch, that Mr. Lowell "was the first true American man of letters." To this we demur, in justice to the memory of Irving and Bryant and Longfellow and Taylor. A notable presence in modern English literature, his limitations, both in prose and verse, are too characteristic and pronounced to entitle him to a place among the highest. Here, as elsewhere, the name of Lowell suggests that of his distinguished British contemporary, Matthew Arnold.

Princeton.

T. W. HUNT.

THE JORDAN VALLEY AND PETRA. By WILLIAM LIBBEY, Sc.D., Professor of Physical Geography, Princeton University, and FRANKLIN E. HOSKINS, D.D., Syria Mission, Syria. With 159 Illustrations. Two Volumes. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, The Knickerbocker Press. 1905. 8vo; pp. xv, 353, and viii, 380.

The authors of these volumes tell an interesting story. Incidents of camp life and adventures are varied with descriptions of scenery; bits of history are interspersed with scientific observations and details of the road. Nothing is continued long enough at a time to become wearisome; and yet, far from being kaleidoscopic in its effect, the narrative gradually impresses a few distinct pictures on the mind severally of travel, of present-day conditions in Moab and Edom, of the military genius of the Crusades and the disastrous military, as well as moral, blunder committed in this corner of the Crusaders' Palestine, of the geology of the region, and of the strange city of rock.

The first 250 pages of volume I may be regarded as introductory. This preliminary narrative is full of interest, and this earlier part of the trip yielded data for the geological theory that resulted from the journey (vol. II, p. 251). But Petra and the Arabah south of the Dead Sea were the real objective of the expedition; and the contributions to biblical and geological learning begin with the approach to the canyon of the Arnon. From this point on the records by camera and pen have especial value. The biblical student notes the incidental references to the disappearance of trees from this region (vol. I, p. 285; vol. II, pp. 24-274). It also becomes clearer than ever why the Israelites kept in the wilderness on the southern side of the Arnon until they drew near to Jahaz, instead of crossing at Aroer or Dibon (Num. xxi. 13, 16, 21; Deut. ii. 26, 32). Biblical stu-

dents have pointed out that military strategy alone did not determine the choice of route, but the purpose evidently existed to avoid the gorge of the Arnon, encumbered as they were with their families and their herds. The photographs and the description of the chasm furnished by Libbey and Hoskins make vivid and impressive, as probably nothing else has done, the absolute necessity compelling the Israelites to seek an easier crossing.

But scholars are placed under greatest obligation by the work done at Petra, known in Old Testament times by its Hebrew equivalent Sela. The few travelers scarcely a score, who have succeeded in visiting the place in modern times have paid only the most hurried visits. Libbey and Hoskins, on the other hand, were encamped in the valley for five days and nights, under full government recognition and ample protection; and they conducted the most thorough and extensive examination ever made. They noted and explored a road not before remarked by travelers; found the explanation of the preservation of the great high place and the geological possibility of its great antiquity; discovered a second high place, at a lower elevation, conformably to customs existing elsewhere; and report that two trails, leading to the city from the outside world, in addition to the entrance through the Sik, were really roads and of such importance as to have been paved by the Romans. And Prof. Libbey from an examination of the geological features of the region promulgates, and with a substantial array of facts defends, a new theory of the Jordan Valley and its puzzling peculiarities. The theory has the merit of simplicity and intelligibility. It remains for geologists to examine it and pass judgment concerning its fitness to be regarded as the final explanation.

Some trifling flaws may be mentioned. Commas are sprinkled too plentifully over the pages, sometimes without reason. The spelling is eclectic. Jehoshaphat, Zebulon, Elizabeth and Zachariah are not found in the English Bible, though they appear here in naming a king, a tribe of Israel and the parents of John the Baptist (vol. I, pp. 270, 273, 274; vol. II, pp. 61). The identification of a biblical site is sometimes assumed too positively. It is open to grave doubt whether the modern Ahsa is the brook Zered (vol. II, p. 248). The identification of Jebel Haroun with Mount Hor by no means commands the assent of scholars to the degree which the emphatic assertion on page 243 of volume II would lead one to suppose. But these defects are small and quite incidental. The narrative of this journey is a considerable contribution to man's knowledge of the topography, archæology and geology of Petra and the Jordan Valley.

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

COMPENDIOUS SYRIAC GRAMMAR. By THEODOR NÖLDEKE, Professor of Oriental Languages, University of Strassburg. With a Table of Characters by JULIUS EUTING. Translated (with the sanction of the author) from the Second and Improved German Edition by JAMES A. CRICHTON, D.D. London: Williams & Norgate, 14 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden. 1904. Price 18s. net.

This is not the place to criticise the original grammar of Theodor Nöldeke, except to say that the remark of the translator in his preface is now generally accepted, to wit: that Nöldeke's Syrian Grammar is the "leading modern" grammar of the Syriac, and that "it may be regarded as authoritative and leading" and its "pre-eminent position" hardly "open to challenge." In fact, with the exception of Duval, no other grammar has the same purpose and range—of those at least which have been written within the last generation.

Of the merits of the translation, we have naught but the highest praise. We can heartily join in the thanks of the original author for the "care and ability" with which Dr. Crichton has performed his task. In view of the very useful addi-

tion of the full and lengthy index of passages cited in the grammar, it would have been fair to the translator if some allusion to this valuable labor had been made upon the title-page. For the purposes for which the writer of this review usually consults a grammar like Prof. Nöldeke's, its usefulness would have been much augmented had a thorough *Index rerum* been added. The table of contents at the beginning of the volume does not answer fully the demands of one who uses a grammar like this for reference. Few men have time so completely to master the contents as to find for themselves all which the grammar contains on a given subject. Besides, having done so much and done it so well, it seems a pity that the utmost possible utility of so good a book should be diminished in the least for lack of so easily prepared and so comparatively inexpensive an additional facility as such an index would have been. However, this growl is not at the lack of marrow in the bone, but at the difficulty in getting readily at it. And so, thanking once again the translator for his admirable rendering of an incomparable original, we end this review by commending the book reviewed to all those who wish to perfect themselves in the greatest of Aramaic tongues.

Princeton.

R. D. WILSON.

SELF-CONTROL: ITS KINGSHIP AND MAJESTY. By WILLIAM GEORGE JORDAN. New York, Chicago, Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Company. 16mo; pp. 192.

This series of essays, first published in the *Saturday Evening Post*, comes to us in permanent form. They are full of striking epigrammatic passages; as, "When a man fails in life he usually says, 'I am as God made me.' When he succeeds he proudly proclaims himself a 'self-made man.' " "The banknote that is the most difficult to counterfeit successfully is the one that contains the fewest lines and has the least intricate detail." "Showing how a family degenerated from a noble ancestor of generations ago to the present representative is not a boast; it is unnecessary confession." "If your life has led you to doubt the existence of honor in man and virtue in woman; if you feel that religion is a pretense, that spirituality is a sham, that life is a failure, and death the entrance to nothingness; if you have absorbed all the poison philosophy of the world's pessimists, and committed the folly of believing it—don't syndicate it. If your fellow-man be clinging to one frail spar, the last remnant of a noble shipwrecked faith in God and humanity, let him keep it. Do not loosen his fingers from this hope, and tell him it is a delusion. How do you know? Who told you it was?" Especially noteworthy are the essays on the "Power of Personal Influence" and on "Failure as a Success." However, one rises from these pages with the impression that the book itself is an example of the thing which it decries. It preaches the gospel of the "Simple Life," but does so in the style of its most strenuous advocate. One misses the quiet literary mastery of Irving or Lamb.

Princeton.

W. B. SHEDDAN.

PHYLLIS BURTON. By Mrs. S. R. GRAHAM CLARK. Philadelphia: Griffith & Rowland Press. 16mo; pp. 489.

It is a common charge that the Sunday-school books used to be so unnatural that they perverted the taste of their readers. Evidently that style of book still survives. A girl who takes a wild ride to save full-grown men from walking into an unbridged stream in broad daylight, and who is taken to Europe by a rich stranger for apparently no reason at all, exists only in a morbid imagination. The religious life depicted is no more natural. Better put *Little Women* and *The Mill on the Floss* and *The Scarlet Letter* in the Sunday-school library.

Princeton.

W. B. SHEDDAN.

DICTIONNAIRE D'ARCHÉOLOGIE CHRÉTIENNE ET DE LITURGIE. Publiée par le R. P. dom FERNAND CABROL, Abbé de Saint Michel de Farnborough (Angleterre). Fasc. III, IV, Afrique-Alexandrie.

The article *Afrique* is completed in the third fascicle. Leclercq's section on African archæology is devoted chiefly to the basilicas. His survey of the *Langues parlées en Afrique* is an interesting departure from the ordinary field of the *Dictionnaire*. In the article *Agape* he has given unquestionably the most useful presentation of the subject that we have. The other articles in the fascicle are Leclercq's *Agaune*, Paul Allard's *Ste. Agathe* and Cabrol's *Concile d'Agde*.

The article *Agneau* by Leclercq extends into the fourth fascicle. It offers nothing new regarding the primitive symbol, but contains a good survey of the monuments and many reproductions. In treating of the Cemetery of St. Agnes Leclercq furnishes some interesting tabulations by galleries of the results of the excavations and includes in the article a description of the basilica of St. Agnes and of the mausoleum of S. Costanza. Other contributions by the same author are the articles *Agricoles (classes)*, *Manuscrits liturgiques d'Aix*, *Akhmtn* (a résumé of Förster's and Gerspach's work on the Coptic tapestries), *Catacombes d'Albano*, *Alchimie*, and *Cimetière et Basilique de St. Alexandre*. F. Cabrol is the author of the articles *Agrapha* and *Alcuin*, W. Henry of *Agnus Dei* and *Aix-la-Chapelle*, S. Pétrides of *Aivoi*, and B. Menthon and J. P. Kirsch of the article *Aigle*. The elaborate description of ancient Alexandria, begun by Leclercq, is unfinished in this fascicle.

Princeton.

C. R. MOREY.

* [NOTE.—The earlier numbers of this publication have been noticed in former issues of this review.—Ed.]

The Princeton Theological Review.

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THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

No. 3—July, 1906.

I.

CHRISTIAN FAITH AND THE TRUTHFULNESS OF BIBLE HISTORY.*

IT will be generally agreed that the above subject has the merit of timeliness. For some time past the assertion has been made, and it is being made in our own day with greater confidence and insistence than ever, that our Christian faith and historical facts have very little or nothing to do with each other. Most frequently this assertion is made with reference to some one particular event of Sacred History, which has for the time being become the subject of debate from the point of view of its historicity. Those who incline to doubt the historical truthfulness of some such narrative as, *e.g.*, that of the supernatural birth or the resurrection of the Saviour, or at least incline to consider it an open question, are, when their skepticism awakens remonstrance from the conservative side, ever ready with the answer that Christianity is something too great and too deep, too inward, ideal and vital to be dependent in its essence on this or that single occurrence in the world of history. They protest that their own faith lives far superior to the level where such questions are discussed and decided, as to whether Christ was supernaturally conceived by the Virgin Mary or rose bodily from the grave on the third day. And they are not slow to make their own subjective faith in this matter the standard of

* Address delivered at the Religious Conference held in Princeton, October 10-12, 1905.

what is possible to Christian faith in its essence. But, while most commonly asserted with reference to such single facts, the position tends, from the nature of the case, to become a general one, involving the severance of the Christian faith from the historical facts in the widest sense. For, even if no other considerations came into play, the circumstance that the facts from which faith has thus begun to emancipate itself are not subordinate, but the great cardinal facts of Sacred History, leads straightway to the inference: if these facts are not essential, if the Christianity of the heart can subsist and flourish without them, then assuredly the mass of minor historical events may be considered as of next to no importance. He who has once become reconciled to the idea that perhaps the resurrection-account arose from a delusion of the disciples, or that the story of the Virgin-birth was the product of pagan conceptions, and thinks that his practical religion has suffered no loss through familiarity with such an idea, is not apt overmuch to vex his soul with the question, whether Abraham ever emigrated from Ur of the Chaldees, or whether the walls of Jericho fell down at the sound of the trumpets. Thus people are gradually made ripe for the conviction that Christianity can survive, even though the whole substratum of history, on which hitherto it has been supposed to rest, should be withdrawn from under it. Twenty-five years ago, this would have seemed to most a glaring paradox; at present it has become in many circles one of the dull commonplaces of religious opinion. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the subject of the relation between Christian faith and the truthfulness of Bible history is a timely subject to consider, not for abstract theological reasons merely, but even more so for eminently practical reasons touching the vital interests of the religion of the heart. We propose to deal with the subject by putting and briefly answering three questions:

(1) What causes are operating to spread this opinion, that Christian faith is in its essence independent of historical facts?

(2) What difference must it make to the content and nature of Christianity, whether it be considered necessarily connected with historical facts or the opposite?

(3) What is the general Biblical teaching on the question whether Christianity is thus dependent on or independent of historical facts?

In the first place, then, we ask: What causes are operating to spread this opinion, that Christianity is in its essence independent of historical facts? Under the head of this question undoubtedly

the first place should be given to the remarkable development of historical criticism. Our age prides itself upon being preëminently the age of historical research. Nor is this a vain boast. More than in any previous period the records of the past are made the object of thorough, painstaking investigation. And what is most characteristic of this modern development of the study of history is, that it possesses in a high degree the prime ingredient of the historical spirit, the faculty to throw itself back into the subjective mind of the past, to read and understand the conditions and developments of former times not in terms of the present, but in the terms of those who were the living actors and makers of the history itself. We have reason to congratulate ourselves, not merely as cultivated men, but as Christians, that our lot has been cast in an age which thus honors the past by respecting its individuality. The kind of rationalism which ruled supreme more than one hundred years ago was sadly lacking in this very respect. It investigated not for the purpose of appreciating the mind of former generations, but only to expose after a schoolmasterly fashion the crudeness and folly of the ideas cherished by the past. The present age has, at least in the sphere of history, divested itself of this magisterial air. Whatever we may be in other departments of science, as historians we are more humble and less self-centred. We do not feel confident of being in the absolute possession of pure reason, and no longer identify history with the irrational or relative as such. And who would deny that great gains have accrued to our knowledge of revelation and Scripture from this growth of the true historical spirit? It has enabled students of the Word of God to lay aside their preconceptions and prejudices, to steep themselves in the atmosphere which enveloped the truth when it came fresh from heaven, to assume that receptive, responsive frame of mind which, if anywhere, is needed in appropriating a revelation of God. We know immeasurably more in result of the work of the last century than we would otherwise do of the conditions and circumstances under which the supernatural truth of God made its first appearance among men, and in consequence immeasurably more also of the everlasting content and purport of this truth. Nay, one can go farther than this. Even where the historical investigation of the origin and growth of revealed religion and of Scripture has been conducted with a naturalistic bias and with the use of foolish methods—even there God has made the wrath of men to praise Him. We venture to say that the dissection of the Law and the Prophets, absurd though it be in itself, has had the indirect bene-

ficial result of making us more intimately acquainted with the minutest peculiarities of the Word of God than we could have been, had not the necessity of defense, that was laid upon it, compelled Christian scholarship to scrutinize and re-scrutinize the content of Holy Writ, so that not one jot or one tittle escaped investigation. Modern criticism has at least preserved or cured the Church from one fault—the fault of indolence in research with regard to the facts of God's revealed truth.

Unfortunately, however, there is another side to the matter. The historic spirit has not always worked in harmony with the principles that should govern its operation upon the Word of God. The danger that this might happen was inherent in the new method itself. As already stated, it is the aim of modern historical research to view developments from the inside, to catch the subjective tone and color of a period, to study it preëminently from its human point of view. Applying this to Sacred History and the Scriptures leads almost inevitably to a wrong distribution of the emphasis. In redemption and revelation naturally not the human, subjective side, not the religious views and sentiments of men, stand in the foreground, but the great objective acts and interpositions of God, the history as it is in itself, not as it reflected itself in the mind of man. Facts, rather than the spirit of times or the consciousness of periods, should be here the primary object of investigation. But this imposed a certain restraint upon the trend of modern historical study, and the restraint has not always been exercised. I think we are all to some extent conscious of how much more interesting and congenial it is to study the Bible from the point of view of the human experience of the people of God than from that of the divine procedure of redemption and revelation. Thus, without any necessary evil intent, the facts, the works of God, are relegated to the background, and involuntarily the perception of their importance becomes obscured. If I am not mistaken, the teaching of Sacred History in our Bible classes and Sunday-schools stands to some extent under the influence of this wrong tendency. It does not always sufficiently recognize what is primary and what is secondary in the Bible; it places the emphasis on the human instead of on the divine factor, while, to use the words of the late Dr. Davidson, the Scriptures contain almost exclusively a theology, God being the dominating and creative factor in the relation between Israel and Himself.

But how much more dangerous must such a tendency become when it goes hand in hand with other most powerful forces working

in the same direction. First of all, we are face to face with the fact that the immemorial conflict between naturalism and supernaturalism has, more than ever before, concentrated itself in the field of history. This could not be otherwise, because it is a conflict which always assumes the specific form of whatever mode of thinking is characteristic of the age. Formerly, when the historical spirit was comparatively dormant and the speculative spirit supreme, this fight was largely waged in the philosophical field. Then the question was: Is the supernatural conceivable on the general principles of reason? Now the question is: Is the supernatural necessary according to the empirical data of history? In other words, historical study has become a powerful instrument in the service of the anti-supernaturalistic spirit of the modern age. Professing to be strictly neutral and to seek nothing but the truth it has in point of fact directed its assault along the whole line against the outstanding miraculous events of Sacred History. It has rewritten this history so as to make the supernatural elements disappear from its record. It has called into question the historicity of one after the other of the great redemptive acts of God. We need not say here that the apologetic answer to these attacks has been able and fully satisfactory to every intelligent believer. But the Christian public at large is not always able to distinguish between well-authenticated facts as such and historical constructions in which the facts have been manipulated and their interpretation shaped by *à priori* philosophical principles. People are accustomed to look upon history as the realm of facts *par excellence*, second only to pure science in the absolute certainty of its concrete results. They do not as easily detect in historical argumentation as they would in philosophic reasoning the naturalistic premises which predetermine the conclusions. It is not difficult, therefore, to give the popular mind the impression that it is confronted with an irrefutable array of evidence discrediting the Bible facts, whereas in reality it is asked to accept a certain philosophy of the facts made to discredit the Bible. Hence there has arisen in many quarters a feeling of uneasiness and concern with regard to the historical basis of facts on which Christianity has hitherto been supposed to rest. People have begun to weary of the endless attack and endless defense, and to ask themselves whether it may not after all be possible to escape from the wear and tear of these endless controversies by construing a Christianity which shall be independent of the facts of history. It appears to many a consummation devoutly to be wished to have the highest

interests of the Christian faith on its practical side sheltered in some harbor where they would be absolutely safe, even though without the waves of criticism should sweep away the whole fabric of objective supernatural facts.

It were a mistake, however, to think that historical criticism is the only force driving people in this direction. Equal, if not more, influence must be attributed to the dislike of dogma and theology which is so widespread in our days. The present religious mind has a veritable dread of everything that is not immediately practical or experimental. Faith must be reduced to the most simple and direct terms attainable. In the rush of modern religious activities, in the eagerness to make Christianity keep pace with the secular forces of life in their accelerated and intensified movement, there is a nervous desire to throw overboard everything that can be in any sense considered superfluous ballast to the craft of practical religion. Thus the whole theoretical side of faith has fallen into neglect, and this neglect involves, besides other things, the historic basis of facts. In two ways this is brought about. In the first place, the mere dwelling of the mind upon the facts as such easily assumes the appearance of being so much energy lost. The facts partake of the same objective, impersonal, seemingly religiously indifferent character as do the doctrinal formulas of the creeds. They are no more to be suffered to interpose themselves between the soul and God than the Bible and the church dogma. And in the second place, it is perfectly well understood that, where the great supernatural facts are allowed to enter or to remain as the necessary correlates of faith, that there the doctrines cannot be consistently kept out. For what else are the doctrines but the theological interpretation of the facts? In order to become the proper object of religious contemplation at all, the history must necessarily first pass through this doctrinal alembic. It is safe to say that a Christianity which plants itself squarely upon the foundation of the supernatural history will always be a doctrinal Christianity and *vice versa*. Now from this it follows that a great share of the odium which attaches at the present day to every pronounced and vigorous doctrinal type of faith will inevitably fall upon the type of faith which clings firmly to any historical supernatural support. Hence, as Dr. Ernst Cremer has well observed,* the peculiarity of the present situation is not merely that the facts are neglected, but that in the name and for the sake of the integrity of the Christian faith itself the non-essentialness of the facts is clamorously

* Cfr. *Der Glaube und die Thatsachen* in *Greifswalder Studien*, pp. 263-283.

insisted upon. It is held that where the facts play a central and necessary part in the psychological process of religious trust, that there faith must lose its purity and power.

The influences so far considered are rather popular and practical in their nature. To these, however, we must add in conclusion the influence of the positivistic philosophy of the times, voicing itself in the theological sphere through the Ritschlian school. The fundamental principle of this philosophy is that the human mind is incapable of knowing the metaphysical reality of things and must content itself with cognizing phenomena, appearances. This applies in the field of religion to all metaphysical knowledge of God of a doctrinal nature; but it applies, of course, with equal pertinence to the cognition of the supernatural in history. For to know the supernatural in its historical embodiment would be nothing less than to know the metaphysical reality of God obtruding itself into the world of sense. The events of history belong to that surface-world of appearance, from which theoretically there is no transition to the realm of the unseen and eternal. If it be impossible to reach the invisible background of things in general, how much more impossible must it be to reach it in its highest form of supernatural operation?

Hence Harnack, the most eminent historian of the school, tells us that history is not able to take cognizance of any miracle as a scientifically ascertained occurrence, because by doing so it would abandon the basis on which all historical investigation proceeds (*i.e.*, the basis of causally concatenated phenomena). And here also not merely the historical inaccessibility of the supernatural facts is asserted, but at the same time their elimination from the sphere of faith is joyfully hailed. This shows that in the position it takes this Ritschlian movement is determined not by purely philosophical motives, but is an exponent of the practical spirit of the age in its impatience of whatever may appear cumbersome in religion. For, where the conviction of the unknowableness of things in themselves rests on purely theoretical grounds, it is usually attended by a sense of dissatisfaction: the natural mind of man, thirsty for knowledge, rebels against the restrictions put upon it and seeks to regain in some practical way what it thinks to have lost theoretically. From this modern theological positivism such a note of resignation is entirely absent. It glories in its religious deliverance from the supernatural facts. The theoretical side in religion is not merely undervalued but scorned. This is simply the counterpart of what we see happen in the sphere of secular science.

Notwithstanding the boast of our age of being supremely scientific, it might be truly said that the impelling force of its scientific development is not the desire to know but the desire to rule over nature. In religion it is precisely the same spirit which prevails: the desire is not to know the higher world, but, to use Ritschl's own definition, "with the help of the spiritual power which man adores, to solve the contradiction in which man finds himself as a part of the natural world, and as a spiritual personality." And, if we are not mistaken, precisely here lies the strength of the appeal which this theology makes to the consciousness of our age. It offers a deliverance from the troublesome and compromising supernatural facts which is not seized upon, as it were, under the stress and compulsion of the onslaught of criticism, but which seems to rest on a respectable philosophical and theological foundation. People no longer have to say: Christianity must be possible without belief in the facts, for the facts have become uncertain and religion is a necessity. They are now able to say: Christianity from its very essence, as we construe it, can dispense with the facts, and, if history fails to authenticate them, this makes us neither cold nor warm, because our faith is superior to such considerations. It requires no pointing out how much more comfortable and dignified the latter position is than the former.

Thus we see how the positivistic principle leads to the rupture of the bond between religion and history. And yet, strange to say, Ritschlianism boasts that of all systems it alone founds Christianity exclusively on the historic revelation of God in Christ. Nor need we wonder, from another point of view, that it takes this ground, for, where all natural theology is ruled out, there all the greater emphasis must be placed upon the historical source of the knowledge of God we possess. So the apparent contradiction arises that on the one hand religion is to be independent of the facts, and that on the other hand it is to rest on the historic revelation of God in Christ. We wish to show in a few words that the contradiction is largely apparent, and that therefore not too much credit should be given for this seeming recognition of the historic factor. The truth is simply this, that when Ritschlians speak of the revelation of God in the historic Christ, they do not mean the same thing by the use of these words as we would mean in employing them. To us the history of Christ, and therefore the historical Christ, means the entire life of the Saviour with all its eternal issues included, replete with supernatural elements, involving the incarnation, the miracles, the resurrection; in other words, we find nothing in the two con-

ceptions of the supernatural and historical which would be mutually exclusive. A thing is no less historical because it is supernatural; the supernatural is the highest history. Not so the Ritschlians. To them the historic Christ who reveals is not the Christ in the totality of His life, but a distinction is made between revealing and non-revealing elements in the history of Jesus. And if we inquire more closely we find that the revealing elements consist in this, that in Christ there was presented to mankind a piece of perfect moral and religious consciousness and mediately through this an indication of what God is for man. The much-used phrase, "the historical Christ," therefore means the empirical, phenomenal Christ and that subjectively considered. The phrase is not meant to cover the great supernatural events, which to our view form the backbone of Gospel history, that in which we would say its revealing significance centres. Not the supernatural birth, not the atonement, not the resurrection, not the ascension, not the sitting at the right hand of God, not the return to judgment—not these make Christ the revelation of God to us, but the religious trust displayed by Him, the faithfulness He showed in His vocation, the perfection of His ethical conduct. The controversy about the Apostles' Creed which years ago so deeply stirred the Evangelical Church of Germany led the Ritschlian school unequivocally to define its position in this matter, and its representative spokesmen have held in every case that the fundamental facts registered in this ancient creed cannot, even apart from every dogmatic interpretation, as pure facts, be said to belong to the essence of the revelation Christ brought to the world or to enter vitally into the consciousness of the faith which appropriates this revelation. We see, therefore, that even in Christ the barrier which shuts us out from the supernatural in history is not effectually removed. Christ Himself struck at the bars in vain. The Saviour's own consciousness, so far as it was to Him a reflection of an assumed supernatural background of His life (in a transcendental sense), has no revealing authority for us. The historic revelation of God in Christ, instead of bridging over the gulf between the world of phenomena and the world of supernatural realities, is itself as absolutely surrounded by that gulf as our own consciousness. It reveals God as Love, but for other questions we must not expect from it an answer.

Let us now proceed, and that more briefly, to answer the second question: What difference must it make to the content and nature of Christianity, whether it be considered necessarily connected with

historical facts or the opposite? Whenever the assertion is made that the essence of the Christian religion and the facts of sacred history, as critically determined, have nothing to do with each other, this assertion is entirely beside the point, so long as no previous agreement has been reached as to what the essence of Christianity consists in. The assertion is usually offered as a sedative to Christian people whose nerves have become unsettled by the critical methods of dealing with the Biblical facts. One would be justified, therefore, in assuming that the phrase "essence of Christianity" would be used in the sense given it by those for whom the comfort is intended. But this is by no means the case. The implication always is that, because these writers have accustomed themselves to hold a certain opinion as to the essence of the Christian faith, therefore the great majority of believing people will be ready to adopt that opinion, and as the basis of it to declare even the most radical criticism harmless. Now, as a matter of fact, the people who are disturbed by the present-day criticism have their own view as to what the essence of the Christian faith consists in—a view they hold with a considerable degree of conviction; and it implies an astounding *naiveté* on the part of the defenders of the negative criticism to suggest that they shall derive assurance from the fact that a type of Christianity which is not their own, nay, in many respects diametrically opposite to their own, is untouched by the critical conclusions. What shall it profit me to know that somebody else's Christianity is indifferent to the facts, when I also know that my own Christianity fundamentally differs from his, and that precisely in the point at issue, its interdependence with a system of facts, so that not even by the greatest stretch of tolerance can I call him a Christian in the sense in which I apply this name to myself? That the matter actually stands thus, a few moments of reflection will make abundantly clear. The difference between those who think they can do without the facts and us who feel that we must have the facts, does not lie on the periphery of the Christian faith: it touches what to us is the centre. It relates to nothing less than the claim of our holy religion to be a supernatural religion, and a religion which objectively saves from sin. It would be easy to show that a Christianity which can dispense with the facts of Bible history must, from the nature of the case, be a religion confined by the horizon of the present life and the present world, lacking that supernaturalistic eschatological outlook which is so characteristic of the Biblical religion as a whole, and of historic Christianity as well. But for the purpose of avoiding ab-

stract theological discussion, we confine ourselves to the other more immediately practical aspect of the question, which concerns, as has been stated, the claim of our religion to be a religion which objectively saves from sin. It is in regard to the soteriological, or, if another more popular term be preferred, the evangelical character of Christianity that the old and the modern conceptions differ. Let us suppose for a moment that our religion aimed at nothing more than the disclosure of a system of truth for the spiritual enlightenment of mankind—that there were no sins to atone and no hearts to regenerate and no world to transform. In that case its connection with historical facts would have to be regarded as a purely incidental matter, established for the sake of a more vivid and effective presentation of the truth, and therefore separable from the essence of the truth itself. Obviously, further, it would on this supposition be of no consequence whether the historical mould into which the truth was cast consisted of a record of actual events, or of mythical and legendary lore having only a partial basis of facts, or of conscious literary fiction having no basis of facts at all. The same will apply to every view of religion which makes the action of the truth consist exclusively in the moral suasion exercised by it on the human mind. It is plain, however, that both these conceptions of the function of Christianity, the intellectualistic as well as the moralizing, are tenable only from the standpoint of Pelagianism with its defective sense of sin. To the Christian Church, in the most catholic sense of the word, supernatural religion has always stood for something far more than a system of spiritual instruction or an instrument of moral suasion. The deep sense of sin, which is central in her faith, demands such a divine interposition in the course of natural development as shall work actual changes from guilt to righteousness, from sin to holiness, from life to death, in the sphere not merely of consciousness but of being. Here revelation is on principle inseparable from a background of historic facts, with which to bring man's life into vital contact is indeed the main reason for its existence. He who has once clearly perceived this will not even for a moment consider the possibility that his faith and such criticism as destroys the supernatural facts can peacefully dwell together in the same mind. To him the facts are become the very bread of life. Though you tell him a thousand times that the value of the Biblical narratives for moral and religious instruction remains precisely the same, whether the facts occurred or not, it will not satisfy him, because he knows full well that all moral instruction and religious impressions combined cannot save

his soul. In his thirst for redemption from sin he will not rest in anything short of an authentic record of how God wrought wonders in history for the salvation of His people. History we need, and that not only in the form of the tale of a certain perfect ethical and religious experience, which has somewhere come to the surface on the endless stream of phenomena, but such a history as shall involve the opening of the heavens, the coming down of God, the introduction of miraculous regenerative forces into humanity, the enactment of a veritable drama of redemption between the supernatural and the natural world. Whether we like it or not, criticism can touch the essence of our religion, because religion has become incarnate, and for our sakes had to become incarnate and make itself vulnerable in historic form. As the Son of God while on earth had to expose Himself to the unbelief and scorn of men, so the word of the Gospel could not be what it is for us unless it were subject to the same humiliation.

If what has been said be correct, it will follow that the proposal to declare the facts inessential betrays a lamentably defective appreciation of the soteriological character of Christianity. As a matter of fact, if one carefully examines the representations of those who claim that the results of criticism leave the religious substance of the Old Testament intact, one finds in each case that the truth left intact belongs to the sphere of natural religion and has no direct bearing on the question of sin and salvation. Such truths as monotheism and the ethical nature of God may still be found in the reconstructed Old Testament; what we look for in vain is the Gospel of redemption. But the most convenient test for this is furnished by Ritschlianism. Sin is here treated purely as a matter of consciousness, and its deeper source in the corruption of nature is left out of account. And not only this, the seriousness of sin, even as a conscious state or act, is inadequately realized. Outside the sphere of Christianity all sin is interpreted as virtually a matter of ignorance. Its essence is not opposition to God, but the failure to recognize the true attitude of God towards man as love. The most pronounced form of sin is unbelief with reference to the love of God in Christ. That with such a view of sin, and from a standpoint which makes love the only knowable attribute of God, the Church doctrine of satisfaction has no ground left to stand on is plain. What Christ has done to save us is not to bear the curse of sin in compliance with the demands of divine justice, but by holding fast to his vocation and trust in God notwithstanding his sufferings, He has assured us that, in spite of our sins, we are objects of

the divine love. Thus our justification consists in nothing else than our being introduced by Him into the actual experience of the forgiveness of sins. Everything here, it will be perceived, moves within the sphere of the subjective consciousness: it is not a change of being, nor even a change of relation, but a change of thinking that is aimed at and brought about. The same method is applied to the various stages of what we call the mystical operation of the Holy Spirit upon the soul of the believer and his mystical union with Christ. Even where the terms are retained as expressive of the thoughts which faith inclines to form, but which are unnecessary to its completeness, their meaning has become totally different. One cannot help receiving the impression that essentially the same effects might be produced by the ideas of the religious forces operating, though the forces were non-existent themselves. No wonder then that a theology to this extent oblivious of the crying soteriological needs of the sinful world easily reconciles itself to the thought that the supernatural in history lies outside of the province of our practical concern. We, for our part, believe, and we say it deliberately, that it were a thousand times better for the Church to be torn and shaken for many years to come by the conflict with criticism than to buy a shameful peace at the stupendous doctrinal sacrifice which such a position involves.

There is one more point we must briefly touch upon under this head. It might be said that the above line of reasoning, while perfectly applicable to the great cardinal facts of redemptive history, is not suited to guarantee the historicity of the great mass of smaller supernatural events recorded in the Scripture narrative. Granted that our salvation stands or falls with the actual occurrence of the supernatural birth of Christ and His resurrection, can we affirm the same with reference to, say, the historical character of Noah and Abraham and all that is related of their lives? To this we would answer as follows: If we can show that revealed religion is inseparably linked to a system of supernatural historical facts at its culminating epoch in Christ—as we think can be done—then this creates the strongest conceivable presumption that the same will hold true of every earlier stage of the process of its development. It is certainly reasonable to assume that God will have adjusted the course of things that led up to Christ, to the fundamental character of the work of Christ—in the sense that He will have scattered over it great miraculous interpositions, to shadow forth the true nature of redemption, and, more than this, that He will have hung it not on the slender thread of legend and fiction, but on the solid

chain of actual history. We confess that it would impose a severe strain not merely on our intellectual belief in supernaturalism, but also on our practical faith, were we compelled to admit that back of the time of the prophets or of Moses there lies a great prehistoric blank, in which for aught we know God remained a hidden God. Redemption and revelation, in order to be intelligible and credible, require a degree of continuity. A system of supernatural interpositions which suddenly emerges from the mist of an immemorial evolutionary past satisfies neither our intellect nor our heart. And therefore we say, it is not a matter of small consequence whether or not we are permitted to continue to believe in the historical character of the account of the exodus or the patriarchal narrative. To make light of such questions is but a symptom of the spiritual levity of our age. Supernatural history is an organism, not a mechanical aggregate of pieces, and it behooves us to treat it with the respect that is due to the organism of a divine economy of grace. In every one of its parts, even those that might seem to us to have but the remotest connection with the centre in Christ, it is worthy of our defense and protection.

We must endeavor to be very brief in giving the answer to the third question: What is the Biblical teaching on the subject before us? For this reason we confine ourselves to the testimony of the New Testament writers. It is plain at a glance that the faith of the Apostles and the faith of the Apostolic Church revolved around the great redemptive facts in which they found the interpretation of the inner meaning of the Saviour's life. To the earliest Christian consciousness doctrine and fact were wedded from the outset. Facts, like the incarnation, the atonement, the resurrection, the ascension, the future coming of Christ, were believed not merely in virtue of their miraculous character, as so many grounds of faith; they belonged to the very essence of the object of faith, constituted that in which faith laid hold of God. Of Paul it is unnecessary to show this, since it is universally admitted. The only question can be, whether by giving Christianity this historical content doctrinally interpreted, the Apostle has not perhaps modified its original idea, a question to which we shall revert presently. In the Petrine type of preaching the events of the earthly ministry of Jesus obtain greater prominence, as was natural in the case of one who had companied with the Saviour to the end. But none the less here also the Gospel and the Gospel-faith centre in the death, resurrection and return of Christ. The same applies to the teaching of St. John.

Notwithstanding the broad treatment of the entire life of Jesus as an incarnate revelation of the Father, the principle is here also firmly upheld that we can ascribe such a character to it only in virtue of our affirmation of the coming of the preëxistent Christ into the flesh, as a supernatural historical fact; and in the same manner the spiritual union between the believer and Christ is made dependent on the Saviour's glorification, another supernatural historical fact. The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews defines faith as "the assurance of things hoped for, the proving of things not seen," and thus makes it directly refer to the historical developments of redemption, as well as to the invisible realities of the supernatural world. Now it is, of course, possible to assert that in all this the Apostolic conception of Christianity already represents a departure from the original idea of discipleship as preached by Jesus according to the synoptical tradition. Such a position, however, is an exceedingly precarious one to take. If it were true that the Apostolic teaching had fundamentally modified the Gospel of Jesus by substituting for a life taught and lived by Him a dogma about Him, then we would be face to face with the incredible fact that in the introduction of the Gospel into the world ordinary care had not been taken that those who were its first witnesses and heralds should correctly apprehend its fundamental meaning. Who will believe that a Gospel, thus cast adrift from its infancy, is a supernatural revelation of God? But, apart from this, it is not true that the synoptical tradition of the teaching of Jesus contains a message essentially different. Of course it was impossible for our Lord to make in His popular mode of preaching the great redemptive facts of his life the central theme, before these facts had transpired. But the important thing to observe is this, that on the one point at issue, the vital nexus between the Gospel and a complex of supernatural facts, the synoptical teaching is entirely in harmony with the doctrine of the Apostles. Jesus everywhere proclaims the Gospel He summons men to accept as a Gospel of the Kingdom of God. And the Kingdom of God, what else is it but a new world of supernatural realities supplanting this natural world of sin? If the Ritschlians do not clearly perceive this, it is due to their unhistorical, essentially modern interpretation of the kingdom as an ethical organization of mankind and nothing more. As soon as the incorrectness of this is recognized, the choice plainly appears to lie between acknowledging that Christianity is in its very origin, in the mind of its founder, and therefore in its essence, a system of facts, the Gospel an interpretation of facts, or assuming that the misapprehension

of the true nature of the Gospel which enters into the Apostolic teaching reaches back into the consciousness of Jesus Himself, that He did indeed bring the new revelation of God, but at the same time inadequately realized its import and subsumed it under a false category. For us, who actually believe in the supernatural origin of Christianity, the choice between these alternatives ought not to be difficult.

But what, it will be asked, about the objection that historical facts ought not to be allowed to obtrude themselves between God and the believer? We would answer, that to the New Testament writers this concentration of faith upon the historic realities of redemption does not in the least interfere with its personal character as a direct act of trust in God and in Christ. The Person is immanent in the facts, and the facts are the revelation of the Person. The history of Abraham, according to Paul, was written for our sake that we might believe in God, and that this our faith in God might be a faith in Him that raised up Jesus, our Lord, from the dead, who was delivered up for our trespasses, and was raised for our justification (Rom. iv. 23-25). "If thou shalt confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and shalt believe in thine heart that God raised Him from the dead, thou shalt be saved" (Rom. x. 9). Let us be humble; that we need this external embodiment of the principles of salvation as they exist in God is because we are sinners. Let us not ask here on earth what belongs to the state of the immediate vision of God in heaven. No doubt there is an element of danger that the facts may become separated in our minds from the living God, who stands behind them. But this danger is unavoidable, so long as faith must have any intellectual content at all. The source of the danger does not lie in the facts or doctrines as such, but in the religious apathy and superficiality of our own minds, which seem no longer capable of responding to the wealth of spiritual forces stored up in the world of redemption. There is not a fact in which the Bible summons us to believe that is not the exponent of some great principle adapted to stir the depths of our religious life. The normal believer would feel the heart-beat of religion in every dogma and in every fact. To join in the outcry against dogma and fact means to lower the ideal of what the Christian consciousness ought normally to be to the level of the spiritual depression of our own day and generation. How much better that we should all strive to raise our drooping faith and to reënrich our depleted experience up to the standard of those blessed periods in the life of the Church, when the belief in Bible

history and the religion of the heart went hand in hand and kept equal pace, when people were ready to lay down their lives for facts and doctrines, because facts and doctrines formed the daily spiritual nourishment of their souls. May God by His Spirit maintain among us, and through our instrumentality revive around us, that truly evangelical type of piety which not merely tolerates facts and doctrines, but draws from them its strength and inspiration in life and service, its only comfort and hope in the hour of death.

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II.

BROAD CHURCHISM AND THE CHRISTIAN LIFE.*

BROAD Churchism is the tendency to regard Church union as more important than Church distinctions. This tendency will, of course, vary greatly in degree. At first disposed to give up only the minor distinctions of polity in favor of union, it is eager at last to set aside fundamental doctrines and even to unite organically Churches whose regulative principles are contradictory. In every one of its forms, however, it differs from the tendency toward federation. The two are radically unlike. Federation is animated by love of the truth. For the sake of the truths which the Churches agree in holding it would have them coöperate in work, while for the sake of the truths which are distinctive of them it would have them retain their individuality. Broad Churchism, on the contrary, in all of its forms, is characterized by more or less of indifference to truth. It is ecclesiastical utilitarianism. Distinctions in polity and in doctrine it would overlook or ignore or deny because of the greater efficiency which it is supposed that organic union would secure. Hence, federation approves of creeds; and while it recognizes that, in the last analysis, each individual, because an individual, must have a creed of his own and so must form with the Lord Jesus a Church of his own, it would make the sincere acceptance of a less minute creed—but still the more precise the better—the basis of those larger associations of believers which we call the denominations. Broad Churchism, on the other hand, cares little for creeds; it would regard unity of purpose and character the ground of Church union; it adopts the words of the poet:

“For forms of faith let graceless bigots fight;
He can't be wrong whose life is in the right.”

Broad Churchism prevails widely and is increasing. It is one of the chief characteristics of the Christianity of our day. That this

* A paper read before the Religious Conference in Princeton Theological Seminary, October 10, 1905.

is so, appears in the passion for denominational union. This passion is the more conspicuous and the more significant because we now find it alongside of the tendency toward federation. Not to multiply illustrations, we have only to refer, on the one hand, to the Evangelical Alliance, to the Alliance of the Reformed Churches holding the Presbyterian System, and to the Inter-Church Federation Congress to be held by the representatives of twenty-seven denominations on November 15 in New York; and, on the other hand, to the movement for Church unity by the Episcopal Church, to the proposed union now under deliberation between the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America and the Cumberland Presbyterian Church, and to the numerous other Church unions advocated from time to time with more or less of seriousness, as, for example, that between the Congregationalists and the Methodists, movements which are all alike in this, that, if not always avowedly, still really, they would sacrifice denominational distinctions to organic union. That this latter tendency, so contradictory, as we have seen, of the one toward federation, should exist and increase directly alongside of that indicates how vigorous, how deeply rooted, it itself must be. All this is explained and reaffirmed when we consider the soil in which Broad Churchism is growing. Indifference to religious truth is well-nigh universal, and as pervasive as it is extensive. Theology is the least popular department of our literature, and in theology it is on Christian doctrine that the fewest books are now being read or issued. The preaching of to-day is anything and everything but doctrinal: let it be known that a minister is given to preaching doctrinal sermons, and few are the congregations that will think it safe to call him. Creeds are commonly laid on the shelf as having only an historical interest. When they are still allowed some present and practical importance, as by our own Church, it is "the brief" and so very partial, as well as unauthoritative, "statement" that is usually given the preference. Even among us it is not generally thought worth while to teach our children our matchless "Shorter Catechism." Of our eight thousand six hundred and eighty-one Sabbath-schools, in only three thousand three hundred and twenty-six was the Catechism taught last year. Year before last, however, though our schools numbered eighty less, the Catechism was taught in two hundred and seventy-two more; and ten years ago, though our schools were eight hundred and twelve fewer than last year, those in which instruction in the Catechism was given were four hundred and ninety more numerous.

And this decline has gone on in spite of intelligent and persistent effort on the part of our Board of Publication and Sabbath-school Work to arrest it. With facts like these before us, it must be admitted that indifference to religious truth is a prominent characteristic of our day, and it is not difficult to account for the Broad Churchism which meets us everywhere. Did it not do so, it would be most strange. The wonder is rather that there should be also the movement for federation.

The question which it is proposed to discuss, and which, indeed, must be discussed, concerns the bearing of this Broad Church tendency on Christian life. Is it likely to issue in purer morals, in larger beneficence, in heartier consecration, in a fuller realization of "the life hid with Christ in God"?

I. We should grant that it might be presumed to do this. Such is at least its avowed aim; and until the contrary has been proved, it ought to be regarded as doing what it proposes. For we are bound to give the Broad Church movement credit for sincerity. It is indifferent to the truth of Christ, not because it is hostile to it, but only because it would emphasize what it regards as more important, viz., the life of Christ. Hence, it would not burden children with the Catechism. Doubtless this is true, but they need all their time to learn the application of Christianity to childhood. It would not discuss the differences between creeds: perhaps they are real, but they are unimportant when a lost world still waits for salvation. It would do away with doctrinal preaching: this may have been useful once, but that was before the days of slum work and of foreign missions. It would put theology under a ban: this is not to be disrespectful to Paul; it is only to go back to Christ Himself and to the ethical Gospel which He preached as well as lived. Surely, when such is its declared aim, we may not question that Broad Churchism means right. It would be loyal to our Lord. It would bring in His kingdom.

This it might be argued that it is doing. Never was the Church so organized or so aggressive as now. She would "go into all the world and preach the Gospel to the whole creation," and that "within the lifetime of the present generation." She has societies to meet almost every need of every social class. She plans for revivals of religion on a world-wide scale, and she prepares for a speedily coming day when at least the brotherhood of man shall attest the establishment of the kingdom of God. Nor is it otherwise as regards individual life and character. True, bad men abound and vice is rampant. To judge from the daily press, society would

seem to be rotten to the core. Yet look back two hundred years, or even much less, and it will be easy to discern the progress of Christian principles. Jonathan Edwards was expelled from his Northampton parish for presuming to protest against what would not be tolerated to-day in any Church. But there is not time for proof or illustration. If Broad Churchism declares its aim to be Christian living, and if the increase of Broad Churchism is being accompanied by the more general manifestation of the Christian life, is it not a just inference that the former is the cause of the latter? And does not this inference become necessary when we observe that there seems to be a sufficient reason for this causal relation between the two? In that Broad Churchism expressly puts the emphasis on Christian living rather than on Christian thinking, must it not tend to produce the former?

II. I believe not. I believe, on the contrary, that Broad Churchism is one of the great foes of Christian living; and for this conviction I would advance the following reasons:

1. The Broad Church attitude of mind is essentially sinful. Its sinfulness appears in at least two respects. First, it tends toward mental suicide. As has been remarked, it would secure the organic union of Churches by ignoring or denying the differences between them as regards polity and even as regards doctrine. Is it not, however, precisely through the recognition of differences that the mind is developed? Watch the little child. It is by distinguishing between this familiar object and that familiar object that his intellect begins to assert itself. Observe the scholar. In the last analysis his scholarship consists in his discernment and appreciation of distinctions. Nor may it be replied that there is another and higher process, that of generalization. There is; but this itself, when legitimate, depends on and is by means of the recognition of differences. You may say that because all men are religious they should, in spite of the numerous and striking differences between them, be put in one class and be treated as one class of beings. The suggestiveness of this generalization will, however, be in proportion to the clearness with which we see and the justice with which we estimate these differences. To one who does not perceive how unlike men are it will mean little to say that they are all alike in being religious. Indeed, one who ignores differences cannot generalize; for this consists in the recognition of a common element in those that have already been recognized as individuals, and therefore as different. The Broad Church attitude of mind must, consequently, in and of itself be opposed to mental clearness and

vigor. It must tend to arrest that discernment of differences by which the intellect is sharpened, and in so doing it must also impair that power of generalization in the exercise of which, more than in aught else, vigor is developed. Hence, the issue of Broad Churchism, if unchecked, must be the destruction of the mind. Though it be a mere tendency, it can be toward but one result, and that is intellectual suicide. It will, therefore, be essentially an immoral tendency. We have no more right to destroy the mind or to permit the destruction of the mind than we have to destroy the body or to permit the destruction of the body. Indeed, by as much as the mind is the higher because the animating and controlling factor of our life, by so much must mental suicide be a more grievous sin than physical suicide. Consequently, the influence of Broad Churchism cannot be favorable to morality. Purity of life cannot be the result of a tendency toward the destruction of the higher life. The spirit of intellectual suicide, whatever it may avow to the contrary, can neither originate nor foster the spirit of holiness. To think that it could would be to suppose that evil could produce good.

The other and the more significant aspect of the sinfulness of the Broad Church attitude is that it expresses indifference to God and thus is a direct insult to Him Himself. That any Broad Churchmen are deliberately guilty of this most serious sin is not asserted. That they are Broad Churchmen makes it impossible that they should be. Whoever counts himself a Churchman must mean to be loyal to the great Head of the Church. An insult, however, may be real though not intentional, and it is so in this case. As we have seen, Broad Churchism is rooted in indifference to truth. The Broad Churchman would secure the organic union of Churches because he appreciates the strength that comes from true union, and does not appreciate the importance of the distinctions in polity or doctrine which stand in the way of such union. His failure to appreciate the importance of these distinctions is due to his lack of discernment of what they are and involve. This lack of discernment is rooted in indifference to truth in general and to religious truth in particular. A lower value is put on it than on intention and conduct. Hence, ethics soon supplants dogmatics. What is the duty which God requires of man? becomes the question. The inquiry, What are we to believe concerning God? loses all but a merely academic interest. It is even urged that loyalty to God demands that it should be so. He would have us give our attention to the work which He wishes us to do rather than to Himself. Such is Broad Churchism when reduced to its lowest terms.

Now this attitude, however unintentionally, is a direct insult to God. Truth is the correspondence between what is thought and what is. It is the real conception of reality. Of such conception God is the author. He is the creator of reality which is its object. "By Him all things were made." He is the Maker of the faculties by which we perceive and conceive. "The inspiration of the Almighty giveth men understanding." He brings our faculties and their objects into relation. It is by His appointment and in this sense by His revelation that we see and hear and comprehend. He preserves all our powers in their integrity. It is in Him that we even "live and move and have our being." Thus in every sphere truth is God's work: He is its Author. Consequently, indifference to it is disrespect to Him and must be unfavorable to the life hid with Christ in Him. Especially is this so, however, in the sphere of religious truth. Here God is not only the author of truth; He is himself "the truth." That is, He himself is the object of our perception and conception. He is the reality before our minds and into agreement with which we try to bring our thoughts. The various doctrines, therefore, which result from this effort are just so many different views of God Himself. Whether absolutely correct or not, they are God as we see Him. Hence, to be indifferent to them is to be indifferent to Him. It is as though a child were deliberately to turn his back on what he took to be his father coming toward him. Could such a frame of mind be expected to issue in the higher life? Must not such disrespect cut the root of all morality? "Even as they refused," says the Apostle, "to have God in their knowledge, God gave them up unto a reprobate mind, to do those things which are not fitting." Such sin could not issue otherwise.

2. We see at once how this is when we inquire into the nature of truth and its relation to moral character and so to Christian life. There is a widely prevalent theory, that truth may be of the feelings as well as of the intellect; that it may not only come thus from two independent sources, but may be contradictory so that what is true to the feelings may be false to the intellect and *vice versa*; and that as moral character and so Christian life are rooted in the voluntary nature, of which the feelings are an expression, the Christian life may be developed and, some say, would better be developed, without reference to such intellectual conceptions as doctrinal statements. This theory in its less extreme form was brought into special prominence, so far as our own country was concerned, by a sermon on "The Theology of the Intellect and that of the Feelings,"

preached in Boston by Prof. Edwards A. Park in 1850, and profoundly reviewed and completely refuted soon afterward in three essays by Prof. Charles Hodge. It was quite recently developed to its logical conclusion and widely popularized by Prof. Auguste Sabatier. At the present time it has pervaded all our Churches, and few even of our ministers have altogether escaped its influence. You may hear them contrasting the theology of the head and the religion of the heart; affirming that there is a knowledge of the heart as well as of the head, and that the former is far superior to the latter; and even when insisting, as they have been taught, that the knowledge of the head is necessary, at least insinuating that that of the heart is quite independent of it.

This theory is radically false. There is no knowledge of the heart. Feeling can give knowledge no more than can excitement. As Prof. Bowen has well said, "Feeling is a state of mind consequent on the reception of some idea." That is, it does not give knowledge; it presupposes it. There must be knowledge by the head before there can be feeling with the heart. If you are even to feel pain in your finger, you must first know that it has been pricked. So long as you are unconscious of this you will feel no pain. You see the point. The religion of the heart, so far from being independent of the theology of the head, is impossible without it. Genuine religion can no more be creedless than pleasure or pain can be unconscious. Orthodoxy does not of itself insure piety; for the knowledge that your finger is being pricked will not cause pain, if your finger is callous: but without orthodoxy true piety is impossible.

Again, the head and the heart are not in opposition. They are not, as often represented, rival faculties. Strictly speaking, they are not even different faculties. Man is not a bunch of separate activities. He is an indivisible unit. His powers are but differing modes of one activity. Hence, for this reason, too, our faculties cannot be independent of each other. Stomach and lungs perform diverse functions, but the one depends on the other. An Apostle has written, "If one of our members suffer, all the members suffer with it." Once more you see the point. The religion of the heart and the theology of the head cannot be divorced. Unless the heart be disposed toward Christ, the head cannot, because it will not, discern the truth of Christ. As our Lord said, "It is only he who wills to obey God, whose heart is right toward Him, who shall know the doctrine whether it be of Him." On the other hand, zeal in Christ's cause will be strong and abiding in proportion as the faith from which it springs and by which it is nourished is in-

telligent. Zeal without knowledge is dangerous and short-lived. Hence, the destructive tendency of Broad Churchism is explained. It ought to be subversive of "the life hid with Christ in God" because the indifference to truth which it involves is itself a grievous sin, indeed, a direct insult to God; and how the penalty which it thus deserves is inflicted appears in this, that it inclines to ignore the intellect, which is one of the two indispensable factors in all right action and life. To do or to be right, one must at least know what is right. In this sense the intellectual element in conduct is even primary.

3. The argument is strengthened by what is often urged as an objection to it. It is claimed that while truth is thus the primary element in right conduct, it is not all truth that has reference to conduct; and that the truth to which Broad Churchism is indifferent is not truth of this practical kind. In a word, the doctrinal distinctions which it would ignore are too abstract to have any practical application. They do not suggest or enforce any duty or supply any motive. It will not follow from the fact, however, that these truths have thus no practical application, that they do not have either any practical relations. That the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles neither prompts nor indicates any special course of conduct. It would seem to be a truth absolutely without practical application. Yet it is quite evident that it has practical relations. It cannot be presented to the mind and its comprehension not depend on the disposition and affect the character. The unwilling schoolboy will grasp it slowly because he is unwilling, and his imperfect grasp of it will only increase his unwillingness. The scientist can see no importance in metaphysics because of his prejudice against it; and his repudiation of it both deepens his prejudice, contracts his sympathies, and even vitiates his science. But this is not the main consideration. The truths of our religion are never mere abstract propositions. Every one of the doctrines of Christianity has practical applications as well as practical relations. Every one of them both indicates duty and inspires to its performance. What is duty? The obligation arising out of the rule of right. What is right? Conformity to law. What is law? The demand on us springing out of God's nature. What is God's nature? That which He in Himself is. It must be, then, that as every truth concerning God's will for us has direct application to our lives, so every truth regarding what He is in Himself is not without at least relation to our obedience to His will. Because in Himself He is the norm and ground and rea-

son of the Christian life, it cannot but be that that life should depend on and, other things being equal, should be in proportion to the fullness and clearness of our knowledge of God. Hence it is that our Lord teaches us that "life eternal is to know God and Jesus Christ whom He has sent," and that John writes that "when Christ shall appear we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is." So practical is all religious truth that Christian life may be said to consist in the apprehension of it, and that this apprehension cannot be so complete as that life requires until God shall have been known in the perfect vision of His Son. Only then shall we discern all that we ought to be or be inspired as we must be to realize it.

4. The argument is confirmed by the history of the Church. Whenever we succeed in reaching the real sequence of cause and effect we find, that life has been according to doctrine; that devotion to the truth of Christ has issued in effective activity in His cause; and that indifference to the truth as it is in Him has resulted in misdirected effort and at last in loss of energy itself. Our limits, of course, forbid even the least elaboration of this proof. Let it suffice to remind you of the Huguenots of France, of the Dutch Republic, of the Covenanters of Scotland, of the English Puritans. Their uniquely grand characters were the expression of their uniquely grand belief. As another has written, "It was their faith in God's direct rule over all human spirits and all social relations which made them the strong men they were," and as Emerson says of them, "weighted them with the weight of the universe!" It was because from earliest childhood they were taught that God was the gracious but absolute Sovereign of all, how this was and what it meant, that they came to understand that, this being so, there was no room for despotism in Church or State; and it was this intelligent devotion to the most elaborate as well as Scriptural of creeds that the Holy Spirit used to make them the great champions of both religious and civil liberty. Can Broad Churchism point to any like influence? It has given birth to many pleasant-spoken because complaisant men; but did it ever produce a moral hero such as John Calvin, or Hugh Latimer, or John Knox, or Johannes à Lasco? Nor may it be replied that the organization and missionary activity, both at home and in foreign lands, of the Church of to-day, broad and lax though it is, breaks the force of this reference. These most admirable characteristics are not due to Broad Churchism; they are rather in spite of it. Though found in connection with it, they are not because of it.

They are not the fruit of what the Church is, but of what it was. A strong man who has been well nourished will work on for some time after his nourishment has been withdrawn; and that Broad Churchism is not feeding the activity of the Church as it was fed and needs still to be fed, appears in such symptoms as the marked decline in the number of candidates for the ministry, and especially in the loss of power on the part of the Church to maintain its individuality in the midst of the world.

5. That Broad Churchism, or the indifference to religious truth out of which it grows and which it fosters, is directly opposed to the Christian life—such is the plain teaching of the Word of God. Its testimony in this respect cannot now be even outlined. I may only remind you, that the all-embracing purpose of the Bible is to teach the truth as to God and man's relation to Him; that the great duty which it enjoins is to go into all the world and preach this most glorious of all truths to the whole creation; and that so far from many aspects of this truth being too abstract to have any bearing on conduct, "every Scripture," in addition to being "inspired of God," is said to be "profitable for teaching, for reproof, for correction, for instruction which is in righteousness: that the man of God may be complete, furnished completely unto every good work." So long, therefore, as even one fact or doctrine of the Bible remains unappropriated or misunderstood by anyone, just so long must his life fall short of what God requires. Otherwise, the conclusion is forced on us that God has inspired the unnecessary. No less practical importance than this does the Word of Him who is Himself "the truth" attach both to the most profound and to the least of its truths. Could there be a more entire condemnation of Broad Churchism?

It will follow, then, in the first place, that the great business of the minister of Christ is to preach the truth of Christ in all its length and breadth and height and depth. He is so to lodge it in the minds of the people that it will permeate, and will need only to be vitalized to determine, all their thinking and acting. This it has been promised that the Holy Spirit will do. He is to give the spiritual discernment which will enable us to perceive the relations and to make the applications of the truth to ourselves. Yet how commonly do we reverse this divine order! The enforcement of duty we regard as our great work, whereas it is the Holy Spirit's! The clear and systematic presentation of the facts and truths which make duty and in which the Christian life is rooted, this we leave undone; and, as might have been expected,

little is done. Up-to-date pastors, and modern evangelists, and practical Sunday-school teachers, may cry unceasingly, "Come to Jesus!" but they will cry in vain. Only the Holy Spirit can draw to Christ those who are "dead through trespasses and sins"; but being the Spirit of truth, He has not covenanted to draw save in connection with and by means of the truth. He will not open the blind eyes and quicken the dead hearts and make the lost see and feel Christ to be their only and sufficient Saviour, unless we do the part which He has assigned to us and in which He has promised to give us the help which we need; and that part is clearly to set forth whatever He has revealed in his Word as to who Christ is, as to what Christ is, as to why Christ is. After all, of what use will spiritual discernment be, if the spiritually enlightened man is to have no more truth to discern than much of the preaching and teaching of our day set before him? Brethren, we may not look for a revival of religion until there has been a revival of doctrinal instruction. True religion is impossible when Broad Churchism is weaning us from its only nourishment.

Finally, just because of the importance of doctrinal distinctions must they be presented popularly and in relation to life. It was so that the inspired teachers of the Bible always did. It has been thus that the greatest preachers of the ages have ever done. Nothing was more characteristic of our own lamented Dr. Purves than that he was wont, as was his and our Master and Exemplar, so to preach even "the deep things of God" that "the common people would hear him gladly." It is such preaching that is demanded, if Broad Churchism is to be discredited. But such preaching will drive it from the field. A doctrine like that of the absolute sovereignty of God in the bestowal of grace it will be felt to be worth while to maintain even our own denominational individuality to testify to, when once this doctrine shall again, as in the heroic days of the older Calvinism, come to be set forth generally not as a mere scholastic proposition, but as the most precious of truths because the most vital and blessed of facts. In view of the universal prevalence of Broad Churchism, such simple and practical preaching of "the whole counsel of God" is the supreme need of the hour.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

"THE MARROW OF MODERN DIVINITY" AND THE MARROW CONTROVERSY.

TO readers unacquainted with the Church history of Scotland the *Marrow of Modern Divinity* and the Marrow Controversy may convey little if any meaning. Yet they stand for much that is vital in the religious life of Scotland. The *Marrow*, though the work of an Englishman, has come to be regarded as a Scottish production; and while it may not have such a high place in our religious literature as Rutherford's *Letters*, Guthrie's *Christian's Great Interest* or Boston's *Fourfold State*, yet because of the influence that it exercised over such men as Fraser of Brea,* Boston,† the Erskines,‡ Whitefield,§ Hervey || and Chalmers,¶ apart altogether from the fact that it was the cause of one of the greatest controversies in the Scottish Church, it is worthy of the student's serious attention. It is now well-nigh two hundred years since the minister of Carnock launched on the troubled sea of ecclesiastical strife the

* "I was much helped by Luther . . . and Calvin's *Institutes*; something more by that book called the *Marrow of Modern Divinity*" (*Memoirs*).

† "I have been acquainted with that book eighteen or nineteen years and many times have admired the gracious conduct of Providence which brought it to my hand, having occasionally lighted upon it in a house of the parish where I was first settled as minister. As to any distinct uptakings of the doctrine of the Gospel I have, such as they are I owe them to that book" (*Works*, Vol. VII).

‡ "We do indeed own that we esteem it as a book whose principal aim is to debase self; to exalt our great Master and His everlasting righteousness and to rid marches between the law and the Gospel. We own we have been edified by it" (quoted in Brown's *Gospel Truth*).

§ Ebenezer Erskine in a letter to Whitefield says: "I am glad the *Marrow of Modern Divinity* has been helpful to you, as it has been to many" (quoted in Brown's *Gospel Truth*).

|| "It is a most valuable book; the doctrines it contains are the life of my soul and the joy of my heart. Might my tongue or pen be made instrumental to recommend and illustrate, to support and propagate such precious truths, I should bless the day wherein I was born" (letter to William Hogg from James Hervey).

¶ Dr. Chalmers' attention was first directed to the *Marrow* by Prof. Harry Rainy, of Glasgow University (father of Principal Rainy), and his opinion is thus recorded in his *Memoirs*: "I am reading the *Marrow* and derive from it much light and satisfaction. It is a masterly performance. . . . Finished the reading of the *Marrow*. I feel a growing delight in the fullness and sufficiency of Christ."

first Scottish edition of the *Marrow*. It came speaking of the things of peace, but its advent seemed only to add to the wild restlessness of theological thought. The angry voices have long since been hushed to silence, and we in these later days can approach the subject with that calmness that is so essential for unbiased judgment. A temporary interest was awakened in the *Marrow* by the publication of a new edition * two or three years ago. The work is edited by the Rev. Dr. MacCrie, of Ayr, and appears in a much more pleasing dress than formerly. One cannot help, however, giving expression to a feeling of disappointment that an editor so well equipped should have given us so little in his introduction. Not even a page is devoted to the Marrow literature, only a tantalizing footnote sending us to the pages of the *British and Foreign Evangelical Review*. The notes in the body of the work are few, but serve their purpose. The price of the book may have been to some extent accountable for these drawbacks by confining the printed matter to certain limits. One notable and interesting feature of this edition is the biographical notes in the Appendix on the men whose works are quoted in the *Marrow*. The text has been founded on a number of editions carefully collated; obvious errors of author and printer were corrected and the spelling modernized.

I. "THE MARROW OF MODERN DIVINITY."

This work, which caused so much controversy in Scotland, was first published in 1645, while the Westminster Assembly was sitting. It went forth to the world with the title: "*The Marrow of Modern Divinity; first part touching the Covenant of Works and the Covenant of Grace with their use and end, both in the time of the Old Testament and in the time of the New, clearly describing the way of eternal life by Jesus Christ.*" The book was published with the imprimatur of Joseph Caryl, known to students of Puritan theology by his voluminous commentary on Job, a work the reading of which might have severely taxed the patience of the patriarch himself. Caryl had been appointed by the Westminster Assembly to revise and approve theological works for the press, and in recommending this work to the reader he describes it as a "discourse so stored with many necessary and seasonable truths confirmed by Scripture and avowed by many approved writers." With this

* *The Marrow of Modern Divinity*; edited, with Introduction, Notes and an Appendix, Biographical and Bibliographical, by C. G. MacCrie, D.D. Glasgow: David Bryce & Son, 1902.

recommendation the little work went forth on its adventurous and stormy career.

The great purpose of the book was clearly to describe the way of eternal life, and with this end in view it sets out by showing the difference between the Law and the Gospel, and in doing so steers a middle course between Antinomianism and Neonomianism. According to its teaching the Gospel, strictly speaking, has no precepts and even those precepts which are commonly regarded as belonging to the Gospel are in reality the precepts of the Law. The first part of the book may be generally described as an exposition of the Federal Theology. The exposition is carried on in the form of a dialogue between Evangelista, a minister of the Gospel; Nomista, a Neonomian; Antinomista, an Antinomian, and Neophytus, a young Christian. The dialogue is conducted with a pleasing vivacity, though of course Evangelista is always victorious. He is strong in detecting the weak points of his opponents, and if Antinomista and Nomista continue still in their old ways it is not because their errors have not been pointed out to them. The book is largely made up of extracts from the writings of the Reformation and Puritan divines—Luther, Calvin, Beza, Bullinger, Peter Martyr, Thomas Goodwin, Lightfoot, Sibbes, Marshall and others. Hence its name, for it contained the marrow of these divines, who at the time of its publication were modern. That the book contains some unguarded expressions was candidly admitted by the Marrowmen themselves.* But it is to be borne in mind that some of these expressions are from the writings of Luther, who was not accustomed to measure his words when hurling his thunderbolts at popish error and legalism. The *Marrow* seems to have enjoyed no small popularity for in 1648 seven editions had been called for, and in 1690 a ninth edition was in circulation, in which the more extravagant expressions had undergone judicious pruning.

A second part was published in 1648, in which Nomologista takes the places of Nomista and Antinomista. Nomologista is a prattler of the law, and between himself and Evangelista the discourse drags somewhat heavily along, lacking in the point and vivacity of the first part. Its theme is a spiritual exposition of the Ten commandments. Like the first part, it has a recommendatory Preface † from the pen of Caryl.

* "I never recommend it in private," says E. Erskine, "to any person without telling them that there are unguarded expressions in it" (*Gospel Truth*, p. 125).

† "The marrow of the second bone," he says, "is like the first—sweet and good. The commandments of God are marrow to the saints, as well as the promises; and they shall never taste the marrow of the promise who distaste the

The *Marrow* of which the foregoing account has been given is said to have been the production of Edward Fisher, of Mickleton, in Gloucestershire. He entered Brazenose College, Oxford, in 1627, where he took his B.A. degree in 1630. Soon afterwards he was called home by his relatives who seem to have been in straitened circumstances. Wood mentions him in his *Athenæ Oxoniensis*.^{*} He is credited with being an accomplished scholar in Greek and Hebrew and a diligent student in ecclesiastical history. As to his early religious life, he tells us in his Preface to the *Marrow* that for twelve years he knew no other way to eternal life than to be sorry for his sins, to ask forgiveness and strive to fulfill the law and keep the commandments. He wrote a number of treatises, rare copies of which may be found in the British Museum and Bodleian Library. Among these the following are attributed to him: *An Appeal to the Conscience, as thou wilt answer it at the great and dreadful Day of Jesus Christ* (1644); *A Christian Caveat to old and new Sabbatarians* (1650); *An Answer to sixteen Queries, touching the Rise and Observation of Christmas*. His after career in life appears to have been somewhat checkered. Becoming involved in pecuniary difficulties, he is said to have retired to Wales and to have become a school-master at Caermarthen. Here he was discovered by his creditors, whereupon he fled to Ireland, where he died, but in what year is not known. There is no foundation for Principal Hadow's idle scoff that Fisher was an illiterate barber in London. The Edward Fisher of whom the foregoing brief account is given is the person accepted by most historians as the author of the *Marrow*, though there are others who claim the honor for another Edward Fisher who lived at the same time and who also wrote theological treatises. Be the author who he may, and whatever difference of opinion there may exist between the advocates of the two Fishers, all will admit the truth of Spurgeon's *jeu d'esprit*: "Fisher might well say, the lines have fallen to me in troubled waters."

II. THE MARROW CONTROVERSY.

If the career of the *Marrow* in England was without light or shadow, that cannot be said of it in Scotland. A mere accident (one is so ready to remark), the interest of a soldier in the little

commandments. This little treatise breaketh the bone, the hard part of the commandments, by a plain exposition, that so all even babes in Christ, yea such as are yet out of Christ, may suck out and feed upon the marrow by profitable meditations."

^{*} Vol. II, p. 198.

book, his carrying it home to Scotland, and his minister (the saintly Boston of Ettrick) taking it up out of curiosity during one of his pastoral visits and finding in it the solution of some difficulties that had hitherto stood in his way of proclaiming a full and free offer of the Gospel—these are the bare facts of the story, the predestined forerunners of one of the greatest controversies in Scottish ecclesiastical history. Boston's own account of the finding of the *Marrow*, an incident so seemingly trivial yet destined to give tone and color to the evangelical theology of Scotland to the present time, is of the deepest interest. About the year 1698, he tells us, he made the acquaintance of Rev. George Mair, Culross, who was colleague to Fraser of Brea. In his preaching Mair often spoke of being divorced from and dead to the law expressions which seemed to convey very little meaning to Boston. After his settlement at Simprin his thoughts were turned to these matters and some light seemed to dawn on his mind. Still there were a few difficulties that remained unsolved. It was while he was in this state of mind that he made an important discovery that was destined to be the long-sought-for solution to these difficulties and to exercise a mighty influence on his preaching. This discovery took place during one of his pastoral visits at Simprin. On leaving the house of one of his parishioners his eye lighted on two small books of divinity. His student instincts were aroused, and on taking them up he found them to be Saltmarsh's *Christ's Blood Flowing Freely to Sinners* and the first part of Fisher's *Marrow of Modern Divinity*. These had been brought home from England by the master of the house, who had been a soldier in the Civil War. Boston carefully read the books, but was dissatisfied with Saltmarsh, while on the other hand he was so delighted with Fisher that he purchased it from its owner and ever afterwards reckoned it as one of his treasures. This must have been some time about the year 1700. At any rate, he tells us, by the end of this year he had not only mastered its contents, but had begun to preach its doctrines. Nothing more was heard of the *Marrow* for the next eighteen years, but during all this time the simple country folks of Simprin were being fed on the rich and savory Marrow theology by their zealous and devoted pastor.* Its next appearance on the scene was to be the beginning of what is known as the Marrow Controversy.

* Hill Burton speaks of the *Marrow* as having "created that change of heart (in Boston) which it was the doctrine of his theological school to hold essential" (*Hist. of Scotland*, Vol. VIII, p. 400). The change of heart had come long before this under the preaching of the Rev. Henry Erskine, the godly father of two of

The Presbytery of Auchterarder (so famous in Scottish Church history), in its desire to put an effective check on legal preaching, had drawn up a proposition which it required all students of divinity applying for license to sign. The proposition was couched in the following words: "I believe that it is not sound and orthodox to teach that we forsake sin in order to our coming to Christ." This is what was afterwards known as the Auchterarder Creed. The wording no doubt easily lends itself to misconstruction,* but the evident intention of the Presbytery was to save the Church from that legal strain of preaching so dear to the heart of the Moderates, but so obnoxious to the spiritually minded members of the Church of Scotland. The validity of the Auchterarder Creed was soon to be put to the test. In 1717 a student, William Craig by name, presented himself for license, but refused to sign the Presbytery's proposition and in consequence was refused license. The matter came up before the General Assembly the following year, when the worthy fathers and brethren belonging to that school of frigid theology that goes by the name of Moderatism condemned the proposition as "unsound and detestable," and appointed a Committee on Purity of Worship, whose ostensible purpose was to keep pure the faith once delivered to the saints; but whose real aim was to keep a careful watch on the evangelical party.

The case was one in which Boston was deeply interested, for he was a strong supporter of the Auchterarder Creed. While the debate was proceeding he entered into conversation with the Rev. John Drummond of Crieff, explaining to him what he understood by the free offer of the Gospel. In the course of this conversation he made reference to the *Marrow of Modern Divinity* in such a way as to arouse Drummond's interest. Drummond made a diligent search for a copy of the book in the bookseller's shops in Edinburgh and was successful in his search. Ere he had finished reading it, it was passed on to the Rev. James Webster, one of the ablest evangelical ministers of his time, and from him to the Rev. James Hog, minister of Carnock, in Fife. Hog was so pleased with the book that he made up his mind to publish it. So in 1718 the first Scot-

Scotland's most renowned preachers. All the *Marrow* did for Boston was to clear away certain difficulties that stood in his way of giving a free and full offer of the Gospel. Boston, like Bunyan, may well say, "The Philistines do not understand me."

* "Never will you forsake sin evangelically," says Ebenezer Erskine, "till once Christ come to you and you to Him. When Christ comes into the temple He drives out all the buyers and sellers. Therefore let Him in and He will make the home clean." The first line of the well-known hymn, "Just as I am without one plea," is the Auchterarder Creed in poetic form.

tish edition of the *Marrow*, with a Preface by James Hog, saw the light. The work caused a great stir in Fifeshire and a war of pamphlets began. Hog replied to some of these in the following year in his *Vindication of the Doctrine of Grace*. But it was the attack of Principal Hadow of St. Andrew's that brought matters to a crisis. In April, 1719, in a sermon preached before the Synod of Fife, and afterwards published with the title "The Record of God and Duty of Faith Therein Required," he made a violent attack on the teaching of Marshall's *Gospel Mystery of Sanctification* and the *Marrow of Modern Divinity*. This was the beginning of that struggle in which the living orthodoxy of Scotland was to find itself pitted against the cold, formal orthodoxy of the Hadow school. The Committee on Purity of Worship thought it right to justify their existence by calling James Hog of Carnock, and his sympathizers, Messrs. Hamilton of Airth, Brisbane of Sterling and Warden of Gargunnock, before them. Hog was asked if he was the author of the Preface of the last edition of the *Marrow*. He replied in the affirmative, adding that the reading of the book had been blessed to many, notably Fraser of Brea, and he had to acknowledge for himself that he had received more light about some important concerns of the Gospel by perusal of the *Marrow* than by any other human writings that had come to his hands. The Committee, after an examination, gave in a report to the Assembly in which they charge the *Marrow* with teaching that assurance is of the essence of faith; that the atonement is universal; that holiness is not necessary to salvation, and that fear of punishment and hope of reward are not allowed to be motives of a believer's obedience. It is almost needless to say that the *Marrow* teaches no such doctrines as that assurance is of the essence of faith or that the atonement is universal, but the worthy fathers had such faith in their Committee that they proceeded to pass a heavy sentence on the book and all those who sympathized with its teaching. In the Assembly's Act, passed in 1720, ministers are strictly prohibited and discharged, either by preaching or printing, to recommend the *Marrow* or to say anything in its favor; they were further enjoined to warn and exhort their people in whose possession the book might be, or might at any time come, not to read or use the same. The terms of the Act were rigidly carried out by the Anti-Marrowmen, among whom may be mentioned Principal Hadow and Prof. Hamilton.*

* It is only just to Hamilton's memory to say that in after years he expressed satisfaction with the *Marrow* doctrine of Christ as a deed of gift and grant to mankind sinners (Boston's *Memoirs*, p. 420).

The sweeping condemnation of this Act gave a severe blow to the friends of evangelical truth in the Scottish Church, for in their estimation the Assembly had condemned a "bundle of sweet and pleasant Gospel truths." Boston and his two friends Wilson and Davidson brought a motion for the repeal of the Act before their own Presbytery. The Presbytery sent up the motion to the Synod of Merse and Teviotdale, but when the vote was taken the Marrow-men were hopelessly outvoted. Foiled in this, their first attempt, they agreed to write James Hog telling him of their ill success, while expressing the determination not to let the matter rest here. Accordingly Boston drew up a rough draft of a document which they purposed sending to the Assembly. This draft was sent to the brethren in Fife, and a meeting was appointed to be held in the house of William Wardrop, an apothecary in Edinburgh. At this meeting there were present James Kid, Queensferry; Ebenezer Erskine, Portmoak; Ralph Erskine and James Wardlaw, Dunfermline; William Wilson, Perth; James Bathgate, Orwell; Gabriel Wilson, Maxton; Henry Davidson, Galashiels; Thomas Boston, Ettrick. One readily recognizes in this list the names of men whose fame is in the Presbyterian churches the wide world over. This first meeting was devoted entirely to prayer, as became men entering on a momentous struggle. Later on other meetings were held at which the Act of Assembly anent the *Marrow* was carefully analyzed and discussed. After matured deliberations it was decided that a representation should be sent up to the Assembly, pointing out the serious injustice the Act had done to the cause of evangelical truth. The drawing up of this representation was committed to Ebenezer Erskine, with whom was lodged Boston's draft already referred to. At a meeting held in March Erskine presented his document, which on undergoing a revision was signed by all present. Messrs. Ebenezer Erskine, Wilson and Hog* were absent from this meeting, and Messrs. Hamilton, Brisbane and Muir, though invited, did not come, "which was to our great discouragement," says Boston. The next meeting was appointed to be held on the first night of the meeting of the Assembly.

On this occasion James Hog and a goodly number of the brethren who had come up to attend the Assembly were present. It had been the intention to devote the time to prayer, but it soon became evident that there were some present who were more inclined to dispute than pray. The two chief culprits were John Warden and

* "Mr. Hog's absence was thought expedient by some of ourselves because of his particular interest; he having writ the Preface to the *Marrow*" (Boston's *Memoirs*, p. 356).

Alexander Moncrieff.* These good men were dissatisfied with the Representation and suggested a number of alterations, to which the others would not agree. The whole night was spent in wrangling and wearisome disputings. At length those who were satisfied with the Representation signed the document and decided to send it up to the Assembly. There were twelve signatories, and from this time forth they were known as the Representers or facetiously as the Twelve Apostles by their opponents. The list † includes the following names: James Hog, Carnock; Thomas Boston, Ettrick, John Bonar, Torphichen; John Williamson, Inveresk; James Kid, Queensferry; Gabriel Wilson, Maxton; Ebenezer Erskine, Portmoak; Ralph Erskine and James Wardlaw, Dunfermline; Henry Davidson, Galashiels; James Bathgate, Orwell, and William Hunter, Lilliesleaf. To James Kid, "a man of singular boldness," was committed the task of presenting the Representation to the Committee on Bills and Overtures. In this Representation the Marrowmen express their grief at the severe blow the Assembly has given to evangelical truth in condemning as unsound (1) that the Father hath made in the Gospel a free and unlimited offer of Christ and of salvation to all men, by virtue of which every individual who hears the Gospel has warrant to take hold of the said offer and apply it to his own soul; (2) that an assured persuasion of the truth of God's promise in the Gospel, with respect to one's self in particular, is included in the very nature of saving faith; (3) that the believer's holiness is in no way the price or condition of his salvation; (4) that believers in yielding obedience to the law as a rule of life ought not to be influenced either by mercenary hopes of heaven or by slavish fears of hell; (5) that the believer is not in any way under the law as a covenant of works; (6) and that it is a just and Scriptural distinction which is made between the law as a covenant of works and the law as a rule of life in the hands of Christ.‡ It was decided by the Committee on Bills and Overtures that unless a conference was desired the Representation should be transmitted to the Assembly *quam primum*. Day after day, however, passed and the *quam primum* of the Assembly became a misnomer. At

* Afterwards one of the "Four Brethren" of the Secession.

† It is interesting to notice in this list the name of an ancestor of Horatius and Andrew Bonar. This was his first and last appearance among the Representers. This was also John Williamson's first appearance, but he was very useful afterwards, "being a man of clear head, ready wit and very forward" (Boston). Brown of Whitburn, in his *Gospel Truth*, gives short but interesting biographies of the Representers.

‡ As summarized in MacKerrow's *Hist. of the Secession Church*, Vol. I, p. 18.

length, owing to the indisposition of the High Commissioner, the Assembly was dissolved. The Commission of the General Assembly now took up the matter, and after various appearances before them the Representers were asked to answer twelve queries dealing with the controverted points. The answers to these queries were drawn up by Ebenezer Erskine and Gabriel Wilson.* They display remarkable acquaintance with theological literature, and whatever may be one's opinion of the Marrow theology he cannot help admiring the care exercised in and the deep religious tone that pervades these *Answers*. They came from men who were theologians and whose hearts beat true to the precious truths of the Gospel. In giving in their *Answers* the Representers take care to point out the unconstitutional nature of the Commission's procedure, and put in a caveat against their action being used as a precedent. These *Answers* were apparently never received by the Assembly. But in the following year (1722) the Representers were called before the Assembly to receive sentence. On 21st May, at three o'clock, they were to appear at the bar of the Assembly; but as that hour approached a terrific thunderstorm † burst over the city and sentence was delayed until later in the evening. At five o'clock the Representers were called to the bar, where they were admonished and rebuked, in the hope that the great lenity used towards them should make them more dutiful in the future. The Representers protested against this sentence, but as a protest is unconstitutional it was not accepted.‡ The sentence would in all probability have been heavier but for the earnest solicitations of the Government, which dreaded a breach in

* "The answers were, as I remember, begun by Mr. Ebenezer Erskine, but much extended and perfected by my friend Mr. Wilson; where his vast compass of reading with his great collection of books were of singular use and successfully employed" (Boston's *Memoirs*, p. 365). These Queries and Answers will be found in Brown's *Gospel Truth*.

† "I well remember," says Boston, "with what serenity of mind and comfort of heart I heard the thunder of that day, the most terrible thunderclap being just about three o'clock. It made impression on many, as Heaven's testimony against the deed they were about to do; though" (as he wisely remarks) "in this it is not for me to determine" (*Memoirs*, p. 365; vide also Wodrow's *Correspond.*, II, 652). This incident recalls Milton's sublime description of a more tragic event when the crushing sentence of heaven fell on the unhappy transgressors:

"Sky lowered, and muttering thunder, some sad drops
Wept at completion of the Mortal Sin."

‡ "A dissent can be given in only by those who were present when the judgment dissented from was pronounced, and no protest can be taken against a decision of the Assembly" (Cook's *Styles of Writs, etc.*, in the Church of Scotland, p. 304).

the Church when the country was threatened with invasion.* In this way the Church of Scotland let fall on her faithful sons the heavy sentence of her condemnation; and they on their part, conscious of their own integrity and the justness of their cause, accepted it as an honor. From this day onward they became marked men. Every effort was made to keep them from being transferred to more important charges, and license was refused to young men who had sympathies with the Marrow theology. The Synod of Fife was particularly active in this direction, and all its members were required to re-sign the Confession of Faith with a new clause, "in view of the recent decisions of the Assembly." Ralph Erskine held out for years, but at last in 1731 he consented to sign it, appending the word *allenarly* † to his signature. But if the Marrowmen suffered persecution from their brethren in the ministry, ‡ they were more than compensated by the sympathy of the most pious of the people and by the encouragement of the crowds that attended their preaching. The common people heard them gladly and drank in the pure waters of life.

III. THE MARROW THEOLOGY.

It would be tedious and perhaps unprofitable to enter into a full discussion of all the points raised by the Marrow Controversy, but there were two points raised in connection with faith and the atonement which were destined to play a very important part in Scottish and English theological discussions in the succeeding years, and these will now command our consideration.

1. The Nature of Saving Faith.—This is a subject that must always be of interest to lovers of evangelical truth. It was one of the important doctrines discussed at the Reformation, and it came up again for discussion during the Sandemanian Controversy. The Romish theologians held that faith was simply an *assensus* to divine truth, and therefore it has its seat in the intellect. The Reformers, while admitting that saving faith was an *assensus*, went further by maintaining that it also included *fiducia*. During this contro-

* "Had not this influence been exerted," says the elder MacCrie, "there is reason to believe that the sentence would have been more severe, and in that case the Secession would have taken place ten years earlier than it actually happened" (*Christian Instructor*, Vol. XXX, p. 286).

† "In Scots law *allenarly* is a restrictive term equivalent to 'only' or 'merely.' Ralph meant that his signature applied only to the Confession, but he did not say so at the time" (Prof. MacEwen in *The Erskines* in the Famous Scots Series).

‡ "We became strangers to our brethren and as aliens, and saw that our mothers had born us men of contention" (Boston's *Memoirs*).

versy another interesting question arose as to what was implied by this *fiducia*. The Romanists asserted that inasmuch as the Reformers were cut off from the infallible Church, they could have no certainty in the truths which they believed. This the Reformers denied, maintaining that by saving faith the believer had a certainty or assurance that he was saved. This certainty is the "infallible assurance" of the Westminster Confession, which it asserts "doth not so belong to the essence of faith but that a true believer may wait long and conflict with many difficulties before he is a partaker of it."* Dr. Cunningham discusses the doctrine of assurance in an article which appeared in the *British and Foreign Evangelical Review* † in a reply to Sir William Hamilton, who confidently asserted that this doctrine of personal assurance was a fundamental of the Reformation theology. This Dr. Cunningham denies but is constrained to admit, and in this he is followed by Dr. James Buchanan, ‡ that the great majority of the Reformers held that personal assurance was essential to the idea of saving faith. Dr. Cunningham criticises this view, pointing out that the Reformers went too far in reading their own individual experience into their theology. The Marrowmen were at one with the Reformers in holding that faith included *fiducia*, but when they came to define what was meant by *fiducia* they came into conflict with the dominant party in the Scottish Church. To the Marrowmen *fiducia* included assurance; not the complex or personal assurance of the Westminster Confession of Faith, which is not of the essence of faith, but that assurance which is in the direct act of faith. Dr. Cunningham classes the Marrowmen with the Reformers as holding the same doctrine of assurance; but the Marrowmen took particular pains to point out that they did not regard the assurance referred to in the Confession as entering into the essence of faith. Hence their distinction between the assurance of faith, or the direct act of faith (*actio fidei directa*), and the assurance of sense, or the reflex act of faith (*actio fidei reflexa*); the former is essential to faith, but not the latter. It is conceded, of course, that the Marrowmen quoted largely from the writings of the Reformers§ in support of

* Chap. XVIII, Sec. 3.

† Reprinted in *The Reformers and Theology of the Reformation*.

‡ *The Doctrine of Justification*, p. 377.

§ The definition of faith given in the Heidelberg Catechism which has been so justly admired has a decidedly Marrow ring about it. "It (faith) is not only a certain knowledge whereby I hold for truth all that God has revealed to us in His Word; but also a hearty trust which the Holy Ghost works in me by the Gospel, that not only to others, but to me also forgiveness of sins, everlasting righteousness and salvation are freely given by God merely of grace, only for the sake of Christ's merit" (Answer to Quest. 21).

their position, but in this matter they were careful to make a distinction where a great number of the Reformers made none. In rejecting the Reformers' doctrine on assurance, with whom he classes the Marrowmen, Dr. Cunningham makes the following statement: "The generality of modern divines and some of the Reformers held that *fiducia* was just trust or confidence in Christ's person, as distinguished from mere belief of the truth concerning Him and as involving some special application or appropriation to ourselves of the discoveries and provisions of the Gospel, but not directly and immediately any opinion or conviction as to our actual personal condition; while the generality of the Reformers and some modern divines, especially those known in Scotland as Marrowmen, have regarded it as comprehending this last element also, and have thus come to maintain that personal assurance is necessarily and directly included in the exercise of saving faith or belongs to its essence."* This is not the Marrow position, and to show that it is not, appeal need be only made to the Marrow literature to show that the Marrowmen held quite a different opinion. Evangelista, in the *Marrow of Modern Divinity*, after pointing out that believers are no longer under the law as a covenant of works, turns to Neophytus and addresses him thus: "Wherefore as Paul and Silas said to the jailer, so say I unto you, 'Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved,' that is, be verily persuaded in your heart that Jesus Christ is yours and that you shall have life and salvation by Him; that whatsoever Christ did for the redemption of mankind He did it for you" (Chap. II, Sec. 3). The Representatives in their answer to Query VIII define this assurance: "There is a full persuasion," they say, "by reflection, spiritual argumentation or inward sensation which we are far from holding to be of the essence of faith; but this last being mediate and collected by inference as we gather the cause from such signs and effects as give evidence of it; it is very different from that confidence or persuasion, by divines called the assurance of faith Further as to the difference between these two kinds of assurance; the assurance of faith has its object and foundation without the man, but that of sense has them within him." If this assurance of faith then is essential to saving faith, what becomes of the doubts of believers? These doubts the Marrowmen say may be and often are in the true believer; but they are not of this faith, which in its very nature and exercise is as opposite to them as light to darkness or the flesh to the spirit, which, though they be in the same person, are contrary

* *The Reformers and Theology of the Reformation*, p. 123.

the one to the other (Gal. v. 17). And therefore faith wrestles against them, though with varied success, it being so far overcome sometimes and brought under by the main force and superior strength of prevailing unbelief that the true faith cannot be more discerned than the fire when it is covered with ashes or the sun when wrapped up in thick clouds.* Perhaps the most lucid summary of the Marrow view of faith that we have is to be found in Dr. Colquhoun of Leith's *Treatise on Saving Faith*: "It may be remarked," he says, "that there is a very great difference between the assurance of faith and that assurance of sense which is one of the fruits of faith. The assurance of sense is a believer's assurance that he is already united to Christ, and is in a state of grace. The assurance of faith is as inseparable from faith as light is from the sun; but it is quite otherwise with the assurance of sense. A man cannot have faith without having assurance in it; but he may have faith and not have assurance of it. For, though the mind cannot but be conscious of its own act, yet whether that act have the peculiar properties and nature of saving faith cannot satisfactorily be known but by reflection. This assurance of sense or reflection, then, is not a believing in Christ; but it is a believing that we have believed in Him. It is not a direct act terminating on Him, but a reflex by which we are assured of the saving nature of that direct act. But, although the direct act may be without the reflex, yet the latter cannot be without the former. A man must begin to believe before he can begin to know that he has believed. . . . The assurance of faith is commonly not so strong nor sweet as the assurance of sense which is supported by evidences. By the former, a man trusts upon the warrant of the free offer and promise that Christ will do the part of a Saviour to him; by the latter, he believes upon the inward evidences of grace, that his faith is unfeigned and operative. By the one, he is assured of the truth of what God hath said to him; by the other, of the reality of what God hath wrought in him. By that he trusts he shall be pardoned and saved; but by this he is persuaded that he is pardoned and saved in part already. The object of the assurance of faith is Christ revealed and offered in the Word; the object of the assurance of sense is Christ formed and perceived in the heart. The former is the root and the latter is the fruit." Further extracts are unnecessary, but it must appear quite clear that the Marrowmen did not hold the doctrine that the assurance referred to in the Westminster Confession is of the essence of faith. It now only remains to make a

* *The Representatives' Answers to Query VIII.*

few brief remarks on the progress of the controversy since the days of the Marrowmen. The controversy passed into England, where the Marrow view found an able defender in James Hervey, the author of *Theron and Aspasio*. His view of faith was attacked by Robert Sandeman with great acuteness in his *Letters on Theron and Aspasio*. Sandeman held that faith was a "bare belief of the bare truth." He was ably answered by Wilson in his *Palamon's Creed Reviewed*, by Cudworth in his *Defence of Theron and Aspasio*, and by Andrew Fuller in his able *Strictures on Sandemanianism*. Sandeman's views were adopted by the Glasites, to which communion he belonged, and also by the old Scots Independents, who trace their history back to the year 1768.* They are now almost extinct, having only one congregation in Glasgow. The Bereans or Barclayites, another small sect, the followers of John Barclay, who was deposed by the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in 1773 while holding that the assurance of the Westminster Divines was of the essence of faith, rejected the Marrow position with scorn.† Barclay, who appears to have cultivated the art of invective to a high degree, gave an illustration of his skill by making the Marrowmen his targets. This body was afterwards absorbed by the Congregationalists. In America the Marrow view of faith as set forth by Hervey was attacked by Bellamy in his *Letters and Dialogues between Theron, Paulinus and Aspasio*, while the Rev. Prof. Anderson, D.D., in his *Scripture Doctrine of Appropriation*, ably defended it. The latter work is well worthy the student's perusal. Among the writings of recent divines who advocate the same view is to be mentioned Dr. Buchanan's *Doctrine of Justification*.

2. The Extent of the Atonement.—Intimately connected with the foregoing subject is the sinner's warrant to believe. In answer to the question what is that warrant, the Marrowmen replied that it was the Father's "deed of gift and grant of His Son to sinners of mankind." It was this mode of expression that laid them open to the charge of teaching the doctrine of a universal atonement, but in reality the real crucial point of the controversy was not so much the extent of the atonement as the effort on the part of the Marrowmen to solve the old problem of a universal call and a definite atonement. Never before, perhaps, in Scottish preaching was such stress laid on the free offer of the Gospel to every sinner of the human race. True, the predecessors of the Marrowmen in the

* Ross's *Hist. of Congregational Independency in Scotland*, p. 32.

† Barclay's *Assurance of Faith Vindicated* (Works, p. 185).

evangelical line, such as Rutherford, Traill and Binning, made it prominent in their preaching; but it was reserved for the Marrowmen to give this truth such an honored place that it has been a potent power in keeping Higher Calvinism* out of the Scottish pulpit. The question which the Marrowmen tried to solve is of as much interest to us as it was to them. Whether they were successful in solving it has been seriously questioned, but our interest for the time being lies in their attempt to do so.

In the *Marrow* Neophytus asks the momentous question: "But, sir, hath such an one as I warrant to believe in Christ?" Evangelista answers: "I beseech you consider that God the Father, as He is in His Son Jesus Christ, moved with nothing but His free love to mankind lost, hath made a deed of gift and grant unto them all, that whosoever of them shall believe in His Son shall not perish but have eternal life. And hence it was that Jesus Christ Himself said unto His disciples, 'Go and preach the Gospel to every creature under heaven,' that is, 'Go and tell every man without exception that here is good news for him: Christ is dead for him; and if he will take and accept His righteousness, he shall have Him.'"[†] These two expressions in italics were regarded by the Hadow party as teaching the doctrine of a universal atonement. This the Marrowmen denied. "This deed of gift and grant," says Boston in his *Notes on the Marrow*, "or authentic Gospel offer is expressed in so many words (John iii. 16), 'For God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish but have everlasting life.' Where the Gospel comes this grant is published and the ministerial offer made; and there is no exception of any of all mankind in the grant. If there was no ministerial offer of Christ which could be warrantably made to the party excepted, more than to the fallen angels: and without question the publishing and proclaiming of heaven's grant unto any by way of ministerial offer, presupposeth the grant in the first place to be made to them; otherwise it would be of no more value than the crier's offering of the King's pardon to one who is not comprehended in it. This is the good old way of discovering to sinners their warrant to believe in Christ; and it doth indeed bear the sufficiency of the sacrifice of Christ for all, and that Christ crucified is the ordinance of God for salvation unto all mankind in the use making of which only they can be saved; but not an universal atonement or

* In our country we speak of the hyper-Calvinism. Perhaps in America higher-Calvinism describes the same position.

† Chap. II, Sec. 12.

redemption."* To the same effect the Representers reply to the eighth query of the Commission. "By the deed of gift or grant we understand no more than the revelation of the divine will in the word, affording warrant to offer Christ to all and a warrant to all to receive; for although we believe the purchase and application of redemption to be peculiar to the elect, who were given to Christ by the Father in the counsel of peace; yet the warrant to receive Him is common to all." The other expression quoted in the *Marrow* which was found objectionable, "Go tell every man without exception that here is good news for him: *Christ is dead for him*," is taken from a work by Dr. Preston, an eminent tutor and popular preacher of his day. Boston explains the expression as follows: "Therefore he (Dr. Preston) saith not, 'Tell every man that Christ died for him, but tell every man that Christ is dead for him, *i.e.*, for him to come to believe on, a Saviour is provided for him; there is a crucified Christ for him, the ordinance of heaven for salvation, for lost mankind in the use making of which he may be saved.' . . . Thus what according to Dr. Preston and our author is to be told to every man is no more than what ministers of the Gospel have in commission from the great Master, 'Tell them which are bidden, Behold, I have prepared my dinner: my oxen and my fatlings are killed, and all things are ready: come unto the marriage' (Matt. xxii. 4). There is a crucified Saviour, with all saving benefits for them to come to, feed upon and partake of freely."† Boston is careful to point out in a note too long to be quoted here that Preston had no intention of teaching the doctrine of universal atonement, that in fact the whole drift of his book clearly proves that he believed in a definite atonement. Whatever objection may be found with the Marrowmen's mode of expression on this important subject, it is evident from their writings that they strongly held the doctrine of a definite atonement; and it could be as easily shown that while steering clear of Arminianism they managed to steer no less successfully past Amyraldianism. In fact, what has been described by Dr. Smeaton‡ as perhaps the best refutation to be found in English of Amyraldianism is in Adam Gib's *Display of the Secession Testimony*.§ Gib was a devoted follower of the Marrowmen, and one of the most courageous and intelligent defenders of their theology. It is to be candidly admitted, of course,

* Boston's *Works*, VII, 263.

† *Works*, Vol. VII, 264.

‡ Smeaton's *Our Lord's Doctrine of the Atonement*, 2d ed., p. 472.

§ Vol. II, pp. 131-190 and 273-298.

that in after years by a process of development the Marrow theology on this point drifted to what was known in the Scottish Secession churches as the Double Reference Theory of the Atonement and gave rise to the Atonement Controversy. In 1749 a work entitled *Justifying Faith* appeared. This work is usually attributed to Fraser of Brea. Its references to the Atonement were distinctly Amyraldian. The work was recommended by Mair, one of the ministers of the Antiburghers. He had not much of a following in his own Church, but in the Reformed Presbyterian Presbytery the new views gave rise to a bitter controversy that ended in the formation of a new Presbytery by Hall and two elders who favored these views. They published a defense of their position and the pamphlet was recommended by Mair. The General Associate Synod now passed an "Act concerning Arminian Errors," condemning these views. Mair objected to this Act, and after being repeatedly dealt with by the Synod he was deposed in 1757. It was in connection with this controversy that Adam Gib wrote his *Illustration* referred to above by Dr. Smeaton. The questions which gave rise to the Atonement Controversy scarcely come within the scope of this subject, but any one interested will find the matter fully discussed in Robertson's *History of the Atonement Controversy in the Secession Church*. But there is one case that came under review of the United Secession Synod in 1845 to which some reference must be made, in view of the fact that the views advocated by Profs. Balmer and Brown have been confused with the Marrow doctrine. Dr. Brown,* one of the most distinguished expository preachers Scotland ever had and at that time a professor in the United Secession Church, stood forth as the defender of his colleague Dr. Balmer. In his appearance before the Synod he declared that "in the sense of the great body of Calvinists that Christ died to remove legal obstacles in the way of human salvation by making perfect satisfaction for sin, I hold that he died for all men." Dr. Balmer, in a Preface to Polhill's *On the Extent of the Death of Christ*, says: "Twelve years ago the supreme court of the United Secession Church passed an Act condemning the doctrine of a universal atonement and forbidding the use of the phrase. But how great the change effected within the last two years! The doctrine of a general reference in the death of Christ has been officially recognized, such a reference as necessarily implies a universal atonement." The

* Father of John Brown, M.D., known to the world of letters by his beautiful *Horæ Subsecivæ*, including that touching dog story, *Rab and His Friends*. Prof. Brown referred to above published a number of useful commentaries on Romans, Galatians, Hebrews and I and II Peter.

whole subject may be studied at greater length in Robertson's *Atonement Controversy*—a painstaking and useful work. It is, however, misleading in what appears to us its unsuccessful attempt to father on the Marrowmen the views of Drs. Brown and Balmer. It is no doubt owing to Robertson's leading that Dr. A. A. Hodge, in his *Outlines of Theology* and also to a certain extent in his *Atonement*,* makes the views of the Marrowmen and the United Secession professors to coincide.

IV. THE MARROW LITERATURE.

This controversy called forth quite a voluminous literature. Some of it was of a merely ephemeral nature, but there were also works produced which by the ability displayed merit perusal even in these days of the boasted brighter light. Principal Hadow was the first to enter the lists after the publication of the *Marrow* by Hog with his sermon, *The Record of God and Duty of Faith therein required*. This sermon was published in 1719 and has been described as a creditable performance, though somewhat marred by imputations of rigidity and uncharitableness towards Hog. This was followed by his *Antinomianism of the Marrow Detected*. Brown of Whitburn asserts in his *Gospel Truth* that Prof. Dunlop in his account of Rev. W. Guthrie, of Fenwick, and in the Preface to the well-known *Collection of Confessions of Faith*, published *Strictures on the Marrow Doctrine*, but as far as is known he does not appear to have taken any part in the ecclesiastical proceedings against the Marrowmen. To the same side belong *The Snake in the Grass*; *The Observer*; *The Friendly Advice*; *An Essay in Gospel and Legal Preaching*.

In defense of the Marrow position there is Hog's *Conference betwixt Epaphroditus and Epaphras* and a *Letter to a Private Christian on Gospel Holiness*. Gabriel Wilson's *Letter to a Ruling Elder* is also a pamphlet worthy of notice in the same direction. In 1721 Boston's two friends, Gabriel Wilson and Henry Davidson, suggested that he should write notes on the *Marrow of Modern Divinity*. These notes were finished in the following spring, but owing to his respect for church authority they were not published until 1726.† They went forth to the world under the *nom de plume* of Philalethes Irenæus and had in view the confutation of Hadow's *Antinomianism of the Marrow Detected*. Boston's sermons, Christ the Saviour of the World; Christ the Gift of God to Sinners; the Mystery of Christ in the Form of a Servant, are also expositions of the Marrow

* Pages 417 (enlarged edition) and 352 respectively.

† *Memoirs*, p. 366. ▲

theology. Ralph Erskine in his sermons, *Law Death, Gospel Life; The Pregnant Promise; The Giving Love of God and Receiving Property of Faith; Christ the People's Covenant*, and Ebenezer Erskine's *Christ in the Believer's Arms; The Law of Faith going out of Mount Zion; The Assurance of Faith, and the Profitableness and Necessity of Good Works*, are all of the same trend of thought. Ralph Erskine's *Gospel Sonnets*, at one time so dear to the pious-minded of Scotland and her sons beyond the seas, is a book brimful with the sweet unction of the Marrow theology. Concerning him it might be said with truth what Fuller in his quaint way said about rhymers of his own day: "They were men whose piety was better than their poetry and they had drunk more of Jordan than Helicon." The following lines show how deeply Ralph Erskine "drank of Jordan":

"The gospel preacher then, with holy skill,
Must offer Christ to whosoever will,
To sinners of all sorts that can be named—
The blind, the lame, the poor, the halt, the maimed—
Not daring to restrict the extensive call,
But opening wide the net to catch them all.
No soul must be excluded that will come,
No right of access be confined to some.
Though none will come till conscious of the want,
Yet right to come they have by sovereign grant;
Such right to Christ, His promise and His grace,
That all are damned who hear and don't embrace.
So freely is the unbounded call dispensed,
We therein find even sinners unconvinced."

At this time there appeared a number of works by an anonymous writer which displayed remarkable ability. The first of these was *Dialogue First* on the Marrow Controversy, published in 1721. This was followed in 1722 by *Dialogue Second*. The speakers in these dialogues are Gamaliel, a defender of the Assembly Act; Paul, a defender of the Representation; Philologus, a private Christian, a violent advocate of the Assembly Act; Apelles, also a private Christian and zealous friend of the Representers; Rufus, a well-meaning Christian, attached to neither side; Gallio, a careless libertine, who uses these debates to ridicule all true religion. The next tract from the pen of this writer was *The Politick Disputant; Choice Instructions for Quashing a Stubborn Adversary*. The instructions are thirty in number and are after the style of Wither-
spoon's *Ecclesiastical Characteristics*. His first instruction is "Study carefully whatever methods may be most proper to raise your own reputation and sink your adversary's—no matter whether by making him ridiculous or odious and contemptible; but your

best course will be to carry on both designs at once." The part dealing with Principal Hadow's works is written in a serious strain. In 1723 the literature of the Controversy was further enriched by two other works from the same pen. The first volume, extending to 446 pages, is entitled *A Sober Enquiry into the Grounds of the Present Differences in the Church of Scotland, wherein the Matters under Debate are Fairly Stated; the Differences Adjusted, and Mr. Hadow's Detentions Considered and Weighed.* Deuteronomy xix. 16-19 is quoted on the title-page: "If a false witness rise up against any man . . . the judges shall make diligent inquisition; and behold, if the witness be a false witness, and hath testified falsely against his brother, then shall ye do unto him as he had thought to do unto his brother; so shalt thou put away the evil from among you." This is decidedly one of the ablest defenses of the Marrow theology; the book is now somewhat difficult to obtain, but may still be picked up at a second-hand bookseller's. The other work published during the above year is entitled *A Review of an Essay upon Gospel and Legal Preaching.* These works, though published anonymously, are now known to be from the pen of the Rev. Robert Riccaltoun,* of Hobkirk. He was one of the most remarkable men of his time. The above-mentioned works were written while he was a probationer.

Another noteworthy document in connection with this controversy is the Act passed by the Associate Synod in 1742, entitled "Act concerning the Doctrine of Grace." An abridgment of this Act will be found in Adam Gib's *Display of the Secession Testimony*, Vol. I. Two excellent treatises dealing with the subject of Saving Faith from the Marrow standpoint will be found in Bell's *Treatise on the Nature and Effects of Saving Faith* and Colquhoun's *View of Saving Faith*. Thomas Bell, the author of the above, was a minis-

* Robert Riccaltoun was born in 1691, and educated at the Grammar School of Jedburgh and the University of Edinburgh. His academic career was simply a matter of choice, as he had no plan for his future. But his religious character combined with talents of no ordinary degree so commended themselves to the Presbytery of Kelso that they urged him to accept license even though he had not gone through the divinity classes. He was licensed in 1717, and in 1725 he was presented to the parish of Hobkirk by the Presbytery of Jedburgh in the exercise of their right of the *jus devolutum*. In 1740 he wrote a poem entitled "A Winter's Day," which appeared in the May number of the *Gentleman's Magazine* for that year. It was this poem which suggested to James Thomson (to whom he had acted as tutor) his *Winter*, the first written of the *Seasons* (Bayne's *Life of Thomson*, p. 29, Famous Scots Series). His works were published in the years 1771-2 by his son in three volumes. Unfortunately they do not include the above-mentioned works, as they were only intended to include the works that had not hitherto been printed.

ter of some note in his day. He belonged to the Relief Church and was ultimately settled at Glasgow. Dr. Colquhoun was also a renowned Gospel preacher, and his work, while closely following Bell, is happier in expression and clearer in statement. The next work to be noticed is what the late Principal Cairns considered the best account of the Marrow Controversy to be found in a small compass—Brown of Whitburn's *Gospel Truth*. It is a compilation of the various documents in connection with the controversy, together with interesting and valuable extracts from the works of the Marrowmen, with short biographies of the most distinguished of them. The work is valuable as setting before us in a compact compass the Gospel as understood by the Marrowmen.

Dr. MacCrie, the biographer of Knox, took up the subject of the controversy and discussed it in a number of articles which appeared in the *Christian Instructor* for the years 1831-2. Unfortunately these articles were not finished, and one cannot help expressing regret that the whole subject did not come under the calm, judicial review of one of Scotland's greatest ecclesiastical historians. In the second volume of the *British and Foreign Evangelical Review* his son, the younger Dr. MacCrie, gave a historical account of the controversy; and in the same periodical for the year 1884 the Rev. Dr. MacCrie, of Ayr, has three articles dealing with the controversy and its literature, all of which are useful to the student. Along with these must be mentioned a noteworthy book whose contents are hidden behind a misleading title, viz., Agnew's *Theology of Consolation*. The author defines consolation (following John Brown of Haddington) to be "that refreshful pleasure of the soul which ariseth from the consideration of what God in Christ is to us, and of what He has done for and infallibly promised to us." The first part of the book is chiefly made up of extracts from the works of eminent divines—among whom the Marrowmen are largely represented—setting forth the theology of consolation. The second part of the book consists of a Dictionary of Writers, containing among others the names of mostly all who took part in the controversy. Short biographical notices, with references to works of interest written by the authors, make this part of the work invaluable. In books published within recent years reference may be made to Dr. MacEwan's *Studies Historical, Doctrinal and Biographical*, which contains a paper on the Marrow Controversy, and the *Religious Controversies of Scotland*, by the Rev. Henry F. Henderson, Dundee, which also has a chapter on the Marrowmen. And last, but not least, Dr. MacCrie's edition of the *Marrow* already referred to.

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D. BEATON.

IV.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCOTTISH THEOLOGY.

WHILE Theology has become to-day, more than ever before, a great international study and concern, it may yet be helpful, and will certainly be interesting and relevant, to confine attention now to Theology as manifested in that real, concrete, and distinctive entity, the Scottish nation. Theology, like philosophy, has always been affected by nationality—always will be so in its development. True, it must be clearly perceived and remembered that such an endeavor as I propose is apt to withdraw our view from the transcendent unity and universality of that which, on the philosophic side, is the philosopher's quest; and to obscure the one underlying Reality which, on the theologic aspect, unifies, supports, and binds into a World-Whole, for the theologian, the complex phenomena of the world and the varied materials of the history and psychology of religion. But this objection instantly vanishes when it is recollected that in both cases the scrutiny is made only that, from study of the endeavors of national thought, with the peculiar characteristics, varieties, excellences, and defects of such localized thought, we may come back to find more just, clear-sighted, and excellent ways of apprehending those transcendent unities and august universalities of which we have spoken. For we may certainly look on Scottish Theology as an organic growth within its own sphere or province, with national color and local peculiarities of development, and, having gained such precise view of it, we may then better relate it to the world-whole of theological thought. And indeed, amid the variations of Protestant theological thought, the Christian consciousness craves for such unifying view. Should we find in our Scottish Theology insular traditions waiting to be cast out, we shall be prepared to let them go; and should there be, in the very provincialism of our Scottish theological development, something of advantage to the world-whole of theological truth, we shall hold fast to that as most dear and good. The influences that have shaped the national character of our religious thought have been subtle and deep in kind, frequent in occurrence, and far back in time. But it is easy—as has too often been evidenced—

to overestimate the local or exclusively national influences that have gone to shape Scottish theological thought in the past. Yet the free evolution of religious belief, thought, and character in our national development, starting from the essential principles of the Reformed Theology as historic base, is what we must not only jealously preserve, but also endeavor to exhibit and express, however occult the springs and sources of such evolutionary growth may often be. There has often seemed to me to be a striking parallel between Scottish Philosophy and Scottish Theology in their respective national developments. Let me elaborate the parallel by an historical *aperçu*. Strictly taken, the term Scottish Philosophy refers to the school of Reid and those who followed him in the appeal to common sense or faith in our own nature and its fundamental deliverances, as against the pulverizing skepticism of Hume. But, more broadly taken, the term may carry us back along the line of distinctively Scottish thinkers until we come to Hutcheson, of "moral sense" fame. Professor of Moral Philosophy in Glasgow University he was for sixteen years from 1730. Farther back in our national philosophical development we have no need at present to go, unless perhaps to recall how much the revived interest in philosophical learning in Scotland was due to that inspiring figure, Andrew Melville, who had studied philosophy under Ramus, and became Principal of Glasgow University from 1574. Now, to say nothing of minor philosophers, the Scottish development after Hutcheson yielded three epoch-making thinkers—Hume, Reid, and Hamilton. These were followed by the acute-minded Ferrier, who was the beginning of the end of Scottish Philosophy. What I am concerned here and now to note is, that the Scottish Philosophy had its continuity thereafter broken by the inroads of Continental speculation upon the thought of our country during the second half of the nineteenth century. That is one fact. Another fact is that, national as was the development of the Scottish Philosophy, it was no exclusively national growth. The methods of Bacon, of Newton, and of Locke had, in the case of every one of its great representatives—Hutcheson, Hume, Reid, Stewart, Brown, and Hamilton—left an indelible impress upon its character; while Ferrier's development was so little of an exclusively national kind that he had to defend his philosophy against being thought no Scottish product at all. During the latter half of the nineteenth century, the philosophical thought of Germany freely flowed into the Scottish mind, Drs. Hutchison Stirling, and Edward Caird laying bare the secrets of Hegel and Kant. But

we have no concern to follow these two currents—the German and the Scottish—in the stream of our recent intellectual development any farther at present. I would remark, however, that I think the relations of our later and more idealistic developments to the realistic philosophy of McCosh and the Scottish thinkers might be more interestingly and suggestively set forth than has ever been done.

Turning now to Scottish Theology, I find that something analogous to what we have been considering has happened. The final outcome of the Scottish Reformation, on its more orthodox Protestant side, was Calvinism—far enough from an exclusively national product to begin with. The Calvinistic theology, whether chosen for that reason or not, did certainly seem to accord well with the religious and speculative genius of the Scottish people. The ruling idea, in the upbuilding of the Reformational theology, had been the priesthood of all believers. But in Scotland, as in England and the Netherlands, there appeared by the seventeenth century, in Calvinistic Puritanism, a dogmatism hardly behind that of dogmatic Lutheranism in its repression of the freedom of Christian men. Men like Henderson, Rutherford, and Gillespie were, in learning, piety, and power, such as never have been surpassed in the history of our Church. But Henderson was statesman rather than theologian. And Rutherford, greatest of Presbyterian scholastics, is now remembered only for his letters. The struggles, conflicts, secessions, and partisanship of the Scottish Church did not tend towards true and inspiring development on the basis of Reformed theology. The cleavage in the Church after the Revolution of 1688 does not seem to me to have been favorable to theological development either on the side of Moderatism or of what passed for Evangelicalism: if Evangelicalism too often lacked the learning and intellectual horizon for such theological progress, Moderatism seemed too frequently shorn of the spiritual fervor and profound religious experience which must ever accompany massive intellectual endowment, in order to effect great and fruitful theological achievement. There can hardly be a doubt that the balance of power held by Moderatism would have proved more favorable to freedom of theological thought, and independence of theological expression, had any great theological initiative been evidenced. But the treatment meted out to Dr. Macleod Campbell, so late as 1831, shows how little the initiatives of theological thinking were desired. Not that his work, or the broader and more eclectic thought of Erskine of Linlathen, was lost. Their

insistences on ethical inwardness, rather than the forensic externality then so common, meant a breaking up of the old dogmatic temper of Scottish Calvinism, and were the first heralds of the progressive spirit in our theology in the Victorian era. They voiced the spirit of those who had, as an English paper once put it, become "insurgent against the dismal Calvinistic decrees." The significance of their work lay in this, that they anticipated the more spiritual and expansive developments of later theology under German influences, just as, in philosophy, Ferrier anticipated the movements that should take place in philosophy under influences that likewise came from the Continent. Perhaps one ought to say that here the parallel ends, for our theology has really been less Germanized than our philosophy. The same system is still retained as base in theology. This is better, for assimilation, not transformation, is all that is desirable, even if more were possible. In every sphere of thought, and in every realm of inquiry, our own national and distinctive individuality should be strenuously maintained throughout the whole development, no matter how free the interactions of international thought. As we come nearer the middle of the nineteenth century we meet Carlyle, who had the merit to be the first to make German thought, in all its depth and richness, a living thing to this country. Of the subsequent influences of German thought, there seems no need to speak. But there does seem to be need to say that there is no greater absurdity than the notion that the Germanizing of our Theology is our need. Our need is, the living appropriation into our theological thought, as based on the essential principles of Reformed Theology, not only of all true, inspiring thought in Germany, but in the whole world of modern knowledge as it exists to-day. I confess to feeling sometimes appalled at the theological indifference and remissness of the Church in presence of the varied and enormous mass of unassimilated and unappropriated material in the great advancing development of Theology. I cannot find a single doctrine in the whole circle of cardinal truths which does not call for, and is not susceptible of, better articulation and worthier presentation in the body corporate of Christian doctrine. Of theology, no less than of philosophy, mechanical ways of thinking are the bane. Not the doctrines only call for new elaborations and concatenations, the fundamental principles even call for ampler justice to be done by their purification and rejuvenation on those sides or aspects where Ethics and Metaphysics and Sociology cry out for adjustment, appropriation, and advance. The rational defense of

Christian faith essayed in our modern Apologetics is far from having said its last word. Its prime task to-day is the rational defense of the Christian conception of God in the sphere of physical science, in the domain of psychic science, and in the realm of speculative thought. The greatness of these manifold tasks might well tax the strength, the intellectual and spiritual resources, the philosophical skill and theological genius of any man that was or is. But happily they are also tasks that yield endless and unspeakable inspirations to the true student and thinker.

Let me illustrate only a little what the times pressingly call for. I do so because I deeply feel that, however great may have been the virtues of the Reformed theology as a system, that system at many points fails, in the older modes of presentation, to appeal to thoughtful minds to-day. We can be absolutely loyal to essential principles of Reformed theology, while we do as the framers of that theology themselves claimed the right and asserted the duty to do, namely, form a theology out of our own needs, knowledge, times, and experience, as they did out of theirs. We honor these past masters of theology, but they lay no iron hand upon us to fetter the progress and freedom of our thought. We are, in fact, untrue to the principles of that theology if we do not go on unto perfection of theological conception and presentation. The face of theology must be towards the future. We seek a theology nobler, stronger, more generous, and independent than any the world has seen. Take, for example, the great objective Doctrine of God—of God in His Sovereignty—which loomed out so largely upon us in the Reformed theology. How great and how manifold are the completings, supplementings, perfectings to be effected here! To begin with, bare unrelieved sovereignty has often come down, like an awful nightmare, upon the thought of man. But theology, grown more deeply Christian, must show that with bare unrelieved sovereignty it has nothing to do: its God is one of Righteousness, Justice, Goodness, and Love—never bare and loveless Will. Strange that nothing like full justice has yet been done in modern theology to the sovereignty and absoluteness of God—so emphasized originally in Reformed theology—by adequate setting forth of that sovereignty; not on a mere monarchical basis, but as interpreted in terms of Fatherhood. I say “strange,” because—though it seems too often unknown or forgotten—Calvin had the high merit to be the first theologian for ages to give Fatherhood its rightful place in Christian experience. Pity therefore that he fell into the contradictoriness of absolute sovereignty as he

passed out from this spiritual sphere into a wider realm where for him sovereign Will was supreme. For there is no sovereignty that may be compared, in range and depth of compelling motive or in majesty of spiritual sway, with the sovereignty of Fatherhood, based on the self-impartation of Deity. Great advances lie open to theology here. The glory of God is man's great end—so spake the Calvinistic theology: it is our chief end still; only, the glory we seek is the glory of the Father. Worthy and endless sovereignty we still maintain for God, for we never dare degrade Him to any possible Arminian levels where He should be but means to His creatures' ends. The naked sovereignty of arbitrary Will in Deity, which has on till now proved troublesome to human thought, must be clearly seen to be what the Germans call an "overcome" standpoint—one that has long been, by every real theologian, thoroughly left behind. And how? By the full and clear apprehension of the fact that God as Absolute Will is not divorced from God as Absolute Reason—the significant apprehension of the fact that, in fundamental truth and reality, God as Spirit is the Absolute Reason. Verily, the old leaven of Almighty power only—of almightiness working in arbitrary caprice—must be purged out, as becomes a survival from philosophy of the Scholastic period. Of course, God is the unconditioned and all-conditioning Being, and as such His sovereignty is absolute. But that does not mean that His sovereignty is unregulated by law, for His sovereignty never can be other than ordered in perfect accordance with those eternal laws, principles, and ideals of goodness and perfection which are originally, underivedly, and everlastingly in Him. The laws and norms exist archetypally in Him, and are not imposed on Him from without. They do not condition God, but are eternal in Him. The absoluteness of God, on which Reformed Theology insisted with large and comprehensive power, is something which still calls for far more adequate elucidation and explication. It is here that philosophies of the Absolute, like that of Hegel, have helped us so greatly on the way to a philosophical theism. Of the Divine Fatherhood, of which we have spoken, there is an absoluteness to which small justice has been done in theology, even when it has passed, in treating of moral and spiritual relationships, into the characteristic sphere of God's self-expression. But, not to speak of that, the absoluteness of God in His self-revealing calls for more clear and explicit exhibition in our theological thought. This will keep us from the disastrous mistake of supposing theology proper, or true knowledge of God, to be ours merely by speculative

thinking. There is a never-to-be-forgotten absoluteness of the self-revealing Divinity which precedes our ratiocinated knowledge of Him. An absoluteness of Him, too, there is which will call for careful scrutiny of immanence theories, which sometimes seem in danger of giving the pendulum an extreme swing, to the neglect of the complemental and entirely compatible truth of transcendence. Once more, the absoluteness of God, in respect of the difficulties so often put forward by philosophy as to God's acting in space and time, is capable of more adequate representation. This is called for by the fact that not a few philosophers in our time do not appear to understand what a strictly philosophical rendering of the absolute involves in this connection. But in so doing we shall still allow God to remain the Absolute, and not suffer Him to dwindle to the place of first term in a finite chain of causes and effects: He will always be for us the Absolute Being, Who transcends the whole chain, and is the ultimate Ground of all finite power and being. 'Tis in communion with such a personal first principle—or, as the Germans say, *Urgrund*—the human spirit can alone rest. But here the philosophical objections, and the scientific difficulties also, as to Personality in God must be met and considered as second in vital importance to no other part of the theological foundation. Of God we predicate more than essence: personality is here the ultimate category. The conception of Divine Personality calls for clearing from anthropomorphic elements: it calls for showing of its compatibility with a spiritualistic monism. Suffice it now to say, nothing has yet been advanced from any quarter that need keep us from holding to Personality—stripped of its accidental limitations—in God. It were easy to find philosophers to-day, at home and abroad, who evince a truly wonderful and precise knowledge of what possibilities do not exist for Deity, when shorn of this, that, and the other human quality. But what wonder if the world remains unconvinced? I am ready to admit that, alike from the side of science and that of philosophy, it is harder than ever to retain the Personality of God. An infinite person is so apt to appear to ordinary philosophical usage a contradiction in terms, and the Infinite is so seldom distinguished with care from the All. The conception of an illimitably vast, continuous, interrelated universe, as that which the Infinite Personality must be able to fill and to form, is so unfamiliar to science that it is not always perceived how evolutionary science seems, in its teleological reference, to point to mind or personality in God. What is most essential is that we transcend a merely quantitative


way of apprehending personality, so that we be not kept from entering into its spiritual and ethical implications. The Unconditioned Being is wholly ethical in His nature, and we cannot rest in any Absolute whose metaphysical attributes are not in perfect keeping with His eternal moral essence. No disclaimer of impersonality could here be more complete than that of the newer Theism, for to it impersonal spirit were a contradiction in terms. But to return to the tasks of Theology. We have more to do than dispose of the difficulties raised by Naturalism and Agnosticism, Pantheism and Pessimism; we have the positive, constructive work of producing and presenting a purified and progressive Theism—indeed, of formulating, in our own way, a new and deeply needed system of what I prefer to call Theistic Idealism. I call our Theism idealistic, both because it traces matter, originatively, to spirit, and because it makes spirit or conscious experience that through which alone created matter is known by us. But our Idealism is theistic because, eschewing the merely abstract unity of pantheistic conception whereby finite things are treated simply as elements or parts within a whole, it preserves that relative separateness and distinctness of things which are especially manifest in the case of the external world and man's conscious spirit. I say "relative" separateness and distinctness, because the Theism we seek must retain the concept of parts mutually related within one vast whole. It must relate both the external world and man's spirit to the creative power or agency of God, which calls them into being and gives them direction. Through this larger, more fundamental Reality we find our way to unity, even the unity of a spiritual Monism, and escape the ensnaring meshes of the Dualism of mind and matter. This Monism is, of course, very different from that of the Spinozist or the present day Materialist, for it is the doctrine of the Infinite Spirit of God as the one underlying Reality. This Spirit, as a unitary Being, forms the ground and principle of all other being. This Eternal Spirit is also the possibility of the interactions between individual beings and things; in a metaphysical sense, is Soul and Substance of all things; but such Monism is, at the same time, ethical, that is to say, fully retentive of human freedom and responsibility. But Theistic Philosophy, as its possibilities open out to us, is a thing so great, so difficult, yet so inspiring, as never to have found perfect, full, and adequate expression on all the numerous sides of its comprehension. Such comprehension we hope to find the highest form of knowledge, as we take up all existing and developed phases and aspects into one

organic process or self-related system, and strive to comprehend them as so many vital elements of one vast totality. God, as real, indivisible, and sole essence, is the entire fullness of possible being, and He is the whole fullness of thought, its possibility, and its fulfillment. We shall need and welcome all the helps of philosophy, our greatest aid and fastest ally in this connection, for while faith may, by its own vital acts, implicitly free us from thraldoms of doubt, yet the overcoming of standpoints beset with difficulty will only be effected through philosophy making explicit for our thought what is contained in the spiritual consciousness. It is still true that Reason alone can heal the wounds of reason. The help of Philosophy is needed that Theology may attain and sustain its own theistic and Christian interpretation of the Universe—an interpretation which, as the highest of all, leaves Theology still the queen of the sciences. If in these tasks we have to examine such forms of thought as Positivism, Pantheism, Idealism, Deism, and Agnosticism, and to review such categories as being, substance, force, cause, finality, and *ens extra-mundatum*, it will be that we may find some interpretation adequate to explain all experience. But we do not mean to lose our religion in philosophy, which is not above religion, but only superior to defective and imperfect interpretations of religious experience. Philosophy yields us prime aid in validating for thought such experience. Indeed, the finest and the final Apologetic for Christianity to-day will just be a Philosophy of Religion in which not so many grounds or evidences shall be set forth, but a fundamental and universal ground of all these shall be exhibited as an organic first principle, related to which religion is seen to be an universal and necessary factor in the life of man, while Christianity appears in its natural place as the crown of all such religion. It can, of course, be objected to such philosophic procedure that it involves considerable assumptions, such as that a system which satisfies our highest wants must needs be adequate, and that the Universe, as science unfolds it, is regulated in its government with express regard to the needs of such transient beings as we are. But, if we are not to be doomed to intellectual chaos in our thinking, it is precisely to such a faith in the peerless worth of the moral and the spiritual that we are impelled—a worth of the spiritual so indefeasible and absolute that it becomes the most reasonable and necessary of all assumptions to hold that for the spiritual the Universe does and must exist. We are strengthened in making this assumption when we reflect that the universe is one vast coherent whole, and that as we are

idealistic enough to admit that Nature cannot even be conceived or known by us in perception but by the consciousness to which it is object, so also nature is relative to spirit in the original constitution of things. Indeed, nature is thus for us a really necessary groundwork for the manifestations of the spiritual. It is important to remember that it is just in this conjunction of nature and spirit that the possibilities of experience and knowledge spring up for us. Far more clearly than the immortal Kant, in his famous transcendental proof from the possibility of experience, has Goethe spoken on the subject when he has said that "everything" which we call "discovery, in the higher sense of the word, is the serious exercise and activity of an original feeling for truth, which, after a long course of silent cultivation, suddenly flashes out into fruitful knowledge. It is a revelation working from within on the outer world, and it lets a man feel that he is made in the image of God. It is a synthesis of World and Mind, giving the most blessed assurance of eternal harmony." But this, I say, is just the synthesis of Theism with which, as the result of many converging lines of argument, we are so deeply concerned—a synthesis in which we look out upon the world as the intelligible work of a supreme and rational Being, and within upon ourselves as made after His likeness, with many capabilities of understanding the world so made. The whole philosophy of religion has for its business the incalculably important work of obviating the difficulties that beset the theistic hypothesis, as an hypothesis whereby we are not only saved from unreason and despair, but which is forced upon us by the whole nature of experience, not to speak of processes of cogent reasoning. The pure and worthy anthropocosmic Theism which we seek is one which combines the Aryan conception of God as Ground of the world of nature with the Semitic stress on a God who is Lord over nature and Father of spirits. The ultimate rationale of the world is only to be found in theistic evolution, wherein the presence of a spiritual agency renders explicable the order of the organic world, the continuous character of the result of growth amid variation, and other phenomena which no other hypothesis has been able to explain. So also upon the metaphysical side. If personality is that which gives to man his unity as an unanalyzed self or individual consciousness—if, as persons, we remain identical in midst of change and so are potentially infinite as we abolish externality and subdue the world unto ourselves—we can see how the difficulties that surround the conception of an Infinite Person begin to vanish, and how personality is, in truth,

the only real form of infinitude known to us. Our recent philosophy of Theism has been finding the beginnings of such personality in the ontological proof of perfect Being; it has gathered strength for its conclusion in the apparent cosmological craving for will as the originative force or power; it has gained confirmation from the intelligence that marks the teleological reasoning; and it has reached the highest seal of self-existent personality in the evidences of man's mind and of moral law. Those illogical and absurd types of modern Agnosticism which would prevent the possibility of such rational theistic faith being established, may well be reckoned as the deadliest foes to religion and deserving of severe and timely theological chastening. But if pure Agnosticism be impossible, and a positive world-conception must be found in the Christian idea of God, then is made evident the need for our Apologetic treatment of all questions where faith in God meets, or conflicts with, the problems of science and of philosophy. It is because religion is an attitude towards the transcendent that, as such, it must have for its interpretation a philosophy. This, of course, does not mean that religion is to be subordinated to philosophy—far from it; but it does mean that the knowledge and philosophy of religion must have place in that knowledge which, in its entirety, constitutes philosophy. In very truth, such rational interpretation of religion is one of the greatest aims of philosophy. If you look over the vast reaches of the history of human thought, you will find that everywhere religion has been the schoolmaster to lead men to philosophy, and that the great philosophic minds have, with amazing frequency, begun their interest in ultimate problems as these were presented by religion, whence they passed, under pressure of the needs of the logical understanding, to philosophy. It should be remembered that, while the Biblical theologian renders us the great service of making clear the teachings of religion, it is the philosophical theologian who saves for us the bases of religion itself—makes religion possible, credible, rational, inevitable. In all the vexatious issues that may or can arise between religion and science, philosophy holds for us the important place of being final court of appeal. Then one or other will be found to have been mechanical and lop-sided. But, I will here ask, if philosophy teaches us to view the world in whole as unitary being or spiritual organism, why should we not freely give ourselves up to some sort of spiritual monism, in keeping with our faith in one God, Who is over all and in all, Who gives law and final purpose to all? It needs to be said to-day that there is profound and abiding necessity

for a metaphysical background in theology. Metaphysics has its own peculiar light to shed on the basal problems of theology, while theology remains the touchstone and support of any thoroughgoing metaphysic. It should be clear that never without the metaphysical presuppositions so involved can we arrive at any real Philosophy of Religion: we should stop short at a merely inductive treatment of the factual materials. What I have now been advancing amounts to this, that, while perfectly loyal to the broad and simple bases of faith laid in our Reformed theology, our Scottish Theology of to-day must instantly and intently pursue the rearing thereupon of an Apologetic structure which shall be thoroughly modern, and free of the one-sidedness which at one time has made theology eschew the varied culture of its own time, and at another has rendered it too pliant before partial and particular theories of its own age. Christianity has not only inexhaustible youth and vitality, but, in virtue of its imperishable life, has complete power of retrieval and perpetual capacity for new adjustments. Before the science of to-day, such an up-to-date and essentially modern Apologetic will accord welcome to all the scientist holds of intrinsic value and indubitable truth. For it is well aware that Theology, as the reflex of Christian thought and experience, must not only welcome the modifying impact of the sciences, but should, as the science of the sciences, itself lead the van of intellectual progress. Before the philosophy of to-day, our Apologetic will extend to the philosopher the amplest freedom to work out his harmonization of religious tenets with those ultimate conceptions of reality, and those final judgments of value, with which he is wont to deal. It will afford free play to the emotional element raised into prominence by Schleiermacher, the intellectualistic elements brought into relief by Hegel, and the ethical element emphasized by Ritschl, for it knows that our theological faith is the resultant of life—life impelled by man's highest reason, under the varied influences and vastly numerous experiences that shape and sum our faith, on its subjective side. But the Apologetic that shall so take account of the science and philosophy, the art and social ideals and organization, of modern life will obviously be a greater, more impressive, more vital structure than has ever been reared, or indeed than may ever be perfectly realized; but it is the ever-present, ever-advancing ideal that must be kept before us, and can by no possibility be relinquished. How else is Christian faith going to prove its claim to absoluteness and finality, before the agnosticisms, the irreligions, and the non-Christian



systems of the time, but by such a rich, manifold, and progressive actualization of its own ideal of the coming Kingdom of God—a kingdom to be realized, to the utmost of present possibility and capacity, in the thought and life of that redeemed society which forms the Church of the Living God?

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V.

SCHWENCKFELD'S PARTICIPATION IN THE EUCCHARISTIC CONTROVERSY OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY.*

FIRST ARTICLE.

THE eucharistic controversies of the Reformation, like the related Christological controversies of the ancient Church, present, on the whole, a disheartening picture; one in which the harsh uncharitableness, not to say the violent hatred, among brethren professing devotion to a common Lord is too seldom relieved by examples of heroic fidelity to religious convictions, combined with the conciliatory spirit of Christian love. In each case the conflict was followed by momentous and in part disastrous consequences in the spheres both of constructive theologizing and of ecclesiastical and political life. In each case, however, the issues involved must be said, when their full significance is realized, to have been worth the arduous attempt made to settle them.

* Schwenckfeld's works have never been published in full. Four folio volumes which appeared shortly after his death contain his most important literary remains. They bear the following titles: (1) *Epistolar Des Edlen von Gott hochbegnadeten theuwren Manns Caspar Schwenckfeldts von Ossing, seliger gedächtnis, Christliche Lehrhafte Missiven oder Sendbrieff, die er in zeit seines Lebens vom XXV. Jare bis auff das LV. geschrieben, etc., etc. Der Erste Theil.* 1566. Pp. XXVII, 880. (2) *Epistolar des Edlen von Gott hochbegnadeten Herren Caspar Schwenckfeldts von Ossing, Christliche leerhafte Sendbrieffe und schrifften die er in Zeit seines lebens vom XXV. Jare an biss auff das LXI. geschrieben, etc. Der Ander Theil in vier Bücher unterscheiden.* 1570. Pp. 146 and 678. (The pages of this volume bear the caption, *Sendbrieff von der Bepstischen Leere und Glauben.* It is the first of four books that were to have contained his correspondence in regard to the four great parties in the Church of his day, the Romanists, the Lutherans, the Zwinglians, and the Anabaptists. But the third and fourth books or volumes never appeared.) (3) *Das zweite Buch des andern theils des Epistolars. Darinn Herren Caspar Schwenckfeldts Sendbrieffe begriffen, die er auf der Lutherischen Glauben, Leere, Sacrament und Kirchen, zum theil an Lutherische, zum theil sonst an gutherzige Personen geschrieben.* 1570. Pp. 1022. (4) *Der Erste Theil Der Christlichen Orthodoxischen Bücher und schrifften des Edlen, theuren Caspar Schwenckfeldts vom Hauss Ossing, etc., etc.* 1564. Pp. 974. (The other parts of this series also never appeared.) These four volumes are cited in the following by the symbols A, B, C, D, respectively. The numerous smaller volumes containing material in regard to the eucharistic controversy are cited by the titles of the separate treatises or letters found in them.

The Lord's Supper had, of course, been an important subject of controversy in the Middle Ages.* But it was reserved for the evangelical spirit of the sixteenth century not only to undermine the dogma of transubstantiation sanctioned by the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, but also to bring into clearer prominence many a hitherto neglected factor of the problem concerning the sacramental feast. The issue was far from being merely liturgical.† The contest was so long and bitter just because it was rightly understood that the most precious treasures of the rediscovered Gospel were at stake. The mere statement of the controverted points led thinking men to connect their views of the Supper with the deepest verities of their faith. It lay in the nature of the case, therefore, that sooner or later nearly every dogmatic problem of the day would be related to the question which, above all others, was beginning to divide the Protestants.

In ascertaining the nature and value of the contribution made by any one of the reformers to the doctrine of the Lord's Supper it is necessary, therefore, to consider his views both from the standpoint of the fundamental principles of his system of thought and in the light of his historical surroundings. For to none of the contestants did the eucharistic question appear as an end in itself, nor could any one of them attempt the solution of the problem without coming into conflict with various classes of opponents.

To these considerations special weight ought to be given in the case of Caspar Schwenckfeld.‡ For on the one hand he belongs to that class of theological writers who have had the misfortune of being seriously misunderstood because persistently

* Loofs, however, in his article, "Abendmahl," in Hauck's *Realencyklopädie*, I, p. 65, is unduly anxious to maintain that, barring Carlstadt's theory, the "positive thoughts of the Reformation period" concerning the eucharist are "not new." The context, to be sure, restricts this generalization to more moderate bounds. Certainly so far as Schwenckfeld, for example, is concerned, Loofs' statement can be applied only to the finally accepted symbolic doctrines of the Supper. Cf. Goetz, *Die Abendmahlsfrage in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, p. 75, n. 2.

† It is interesting to observe, however, as Harnack reminds us (*Dogmengeschichte*, III³, pp. 746, 762), that it is possible in a sense to construe Luther's whole reformation as a "reformation of the public worship." Rome had made the mass the very centre of her church service, and the work of the reformers in its negative but at the same time its most direct bearings was an attack in the name of subjective religion upon the citadel of the Romish liturgy.

‡ The spelling of the name is by no means uniform. Kriebel, *The Schwenckfelders in Pennsylvania*, p. 1, n. 1, cites thirteen variations, and others might be added. Schneider gives some valid reasons in favor of the consonantal combination *ck* and a final *d* instead of *dt* or only *t*. See his tract, *Ueber den geschichtlichen Verlauf der Reformation in Liegnitz*, etc., Abt. 1, p. 27, n. 10.

branded as "mystics."* It is of course to be admitted that his religious life revealed itself more in the language of strong and deep feeling than in any clearly articulated system of dialectics. It is likewise true, as Dörner† reminds us, that it must have been easy for his contemporaries to represent his ideas as "only a perverse lot of the most wondrous idiosyncrasies." Moreover, he shows many points of contact and signs of kinship with some of the extreme spiritualistic fanatics. But for this very reason it is necessary to cast aside all prejudices and to lay hold of the inner connections, if such can be found, among these alleged fantastic and heterogeneous elements. Great credit is here due to Erbkam,‡ whose treatment of Schwenckfeld is still, on the whole, the best; and to Baur,§ who with his usual critical acumen saw the possibility and the need of doing Schwenckfeld a needed service by bringing out more clearly the hidden speculative elements of his system.|| These and other writers have accustomed students of Schwenckfeld to the double conviction, not only that his views have a coherence that makes them worthy of investigation, but that of all the dissenting thinkers of the German Reformation he is the most

* That the epithet in some sense may properly be applied to Schwenckfeld it would be idle to deny. But what after all is mysticism? Inge, in his Bampton Lectures (1899) on *Christian Mysticism*, ventures the assertion (p. 1): "No word in our language—not even 'Socialism'—has been employed more loosely than 'Mysticism,'" and in the Appendix he cites and criticises some twenty-six attempts by men of all schools of thought to define the term. With what propriety we may speak of Schwenckfeld as a mystic will, we hope, become thoroughly clear as we proceed. For the present it may be most advantageous to content ourselves with the statement that the word may as a matter of fact have a good as well as a bad sense.

† *Lehre von der Person Christi*, p. 624.

‡ *Geschichte der protestantischen Sekten*, pp. 357–475.

§ *Die christliche Lehre von der Versöhnung in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung* (1838); *Die christl. Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit*, etc. (1843); *Zur Geschichte der prot. Mystik*, in *Theol. Jahrbücher* (1848).

|| Baur of course had no intention of converting Schwenckfeld the mystic into Schwenckfeld the rationalist, but the transformation, easy enough in itself and doubtless most congenial to a mind like Baur's, may be said, in spite of the retention of the word "mysticism," to have been fairly accomplished. After all it is only a matter of taking Schwenckfeld's temperature at different times, now catching him in the warmth of a fervent piety and now finding him on the chilly heights of some abstract speculation. But though Baur (*Theologische Jahrbücher*, 1848, p. 527) professes to be able to distinguish the "speculative content of the ideas from the peculiar form in which they have found expression," he can scarcely be acquitted of the charge of reading into Schwenckfeld some of his own ideas as to how the reformer might have avoided apparent or real contradictions. Dörner (*l.c.*, p. 625) gives a truer judgment: "Doch kann auch nicht behauptet werden, dass er sich stets gleich blieb oder dass nicht unlösliche Widersprüche in seinem System liegen."

systematic.* Whatever estimate we may form of his "mysticism," we shall expect to discover in him at least somewhat more of logic and speculative strength than the traditional prejudices permitted some of the earlier historical writers to find.†

Not only, however, does the alleged mystical character of Schwenckfeld's theologizing necessitate our bringing his doctrine of the Supper into the closest possible relation to his whole system, but it is likewise more than ordinarily important, on the other hand, to interpret such views as his in the light of the historical situation in which he found himself. This is so not only because of the unusually extensive connections which he had with the most diverse parties in the Church,‡ but more particularly because every mystical movement in history is necessarily colored by the specific forms of religious deadness against which it rises to utter its protest.

Fortunately Schwenckfeld informs us with admirable fullness concerning his relations to his contemporaries.§ Born about 1490,|| of an ancient and aristocratic family in Ossig, near Lüben, in Silesia, reared a strict Catholic, educated at Liegnitz, Cologne, Frankfort-on-the-Oder, and at other but unknown institutions, serving about twelve years at the courts of several Silesian princes, this deeply religious young nobleman became one of the first in

* Comp. Ficker, *Handschriften des sechzehnten Jahrhunderts*, Kleine Ausgabe, Tafel 27, p. 75: "Er ist unter den religiösen Subjectivisten der Systematiker: sein mystischer Spiritualismus ist mit einem dogmatischen System verbunden, welches seine Ueberzeugungen geschlossener wirken lässt."

† See, e.g., Planck's capricious statement (*Geschichte der Entstehung . . . unseres protestantischen Lehrbegriffs*, Vol. V, Th. 1, p. 184): "Diess war wenigstens im Ganzen die Wendung, welche die Ideen Schwenckfelds genommen, oder diess war ungefähr die Form, in welcher sich seine Phantasie alles, was dabei für die Vernunft undenkbar war, denkbar gemacht hatte. Es ist leicht möglich, dass sie sich zu Zeiten in seinem Kopf auf eine etwas verschiedene Art zusammenfügten, denn Vorstellungen, die keinen vernünftigen Zusammenhang zulassen, sind der mannigfaltigsten Zusammensetzung fähig."

‡ In this fact lies the chief justification for Keller's assertion (*Die Reformation und die älteren Reformparteien*, p. 463): "Es wäre von der höchsten Wichtigkeit, die umfangreiche und interessante Correspondenz Schwenckfelds ans Licht zu ziehen; man würde überraschende Resultate daraus gewinnen."

§ But his works present only meagre details as to his early life. Hoffmann's account, *Caspar Schwenckfelds Leben und Lehren*, I, extending to only 1524 and constituting the first of six parts of what may become an adequate biography, draws largely from other important sources. Keim and Gerbert present the leading facts concerning Schwenckfeld's career in southern Germany. Hamje, *Zur Biographie Kaspars von Schwenckfeld*, 1882, is minute but brief, extending to 1539. Arnold, Salig, Planck, Döllinger, Erbkam, etc., give only the salient biographical data.

|| Neither the date of his birth (1489 or 1490) nor that of his death (1561 or 1562) has as yet been fixed.

that section of Germany to embrace the evangelical cause.* Compelled in 1521 by reason of an affection of the ear to return to private life, he became a diligent student of the Scriptures.† He kept in touch with the leaders of the new movement, making several trips to Wittenberg and exchanging letters with Luther himself. Devoted heart and soul to the task of establishing the Reformation in Silesia, he secured in 1523 the able coöperation of a former notary and canon, Valentine Krautwald.

But irreconcilable differences soon arose between Schwenckfeld and the Wittenbergers, resulting in 1527 in a complete and irremediable rupture. It is therefore worth while ascertaining, at the very outset, the logic of this event, the real turning-point in his career as a reformer.

He had prided himself upon being an ardent disciple of Luther,‡ and though from the beginning he could not entirely agree with him,§ he never forgot the incalculable service the great reformer had rendered to the cause of religion.|| The force of sacred convictions, however, proved stronger than this sense of gratitude, deepened though it was by a peculiar reverence for his

* The exact date of his conversion cannot be fixed. Hoffmann, p. 10, is inclined to put it as early as 1517; Möller is at least safe in declaring that by 1519 Schwenckfeld had been won to the Lutheran cause (*Kirchengeschichte*, III, p. 444).

† Greek and Hebrew he seems to have acquired considerably later, certainly not before 1528. Cf. Erbkam, *l.c.*, p. 363, n. 1. Hase is clearly in error, however, when he declares (*Kirchengeschichte*, III, 1, p. 300): "Noch in seinem 64. Jahre lernte er Griechisch, um mit eigenen Augen zuzusehen, was Christus geredet habe." Letters and treatises written long before this evince a considerable knowledge of the Greek Testament and the Fathers.

‡ C 300d (anno 1531): "Ich habe mich der Lutherischen Lehre erkundet und seines Evangelii gebraucht mit möglichem Fleiss acht Jahre." Cf. C. 574c: "Denn ich habe, ohne Ruhm zu reden, in Doctor Luthers Büchern wohl so viel als Ihr studiert und (wollt mir's verzeihen) vielleicht ehe Ihr das *a, b, c* gelernt viel seiner Schriften mit möglichem Fleiss hinten und vorn gelesen, auch mit Gebet nach der Regel Pauli *omnia probate* fleissig erforscht und bewäret."

§ B 193b: "dass ich mit ihrem Evangelio nicht stimme, auch von Anfang nie gänzlich gestimmt habe."

|| Nothing more beautifully reveals Schwenckfeld's nobility of character than the oft-repeated expressions of his grateful appreciation of Luther's world-historical importance, even after the latter had coined the vulgar nickname "Stenckfeld" and in other ways outdone himself in vituperative abuse. See especially C 499 sq., 599d, D 4, 5, 6, 526, and C 701d, where he informs Luther under date of October 12, 1543: "Denn ob ich wohl nicht in allen Puncten euch kann unterschreiben, noch mit euch stimmen, so erkenne ich doch, dass ich euch nach Gott und der Wahrheit alle Ehre, Liebe, und Güte schuldig, weil ich eures Dienstes anfänglich mitgenossen, so wohl als ich Gott den Herrn für euch nach meinem armen Vermögen zu bitten noch nicht habe unterlassen." Cf. C 745b, 690d.

spiritual father. Schwenckfeld perceived that his whole conception of Christianity differed so radically from Luther's that there was no possibility of a substantial agreement.* The common representation, not sufficiently modified even by Erbkam and Hahn that the divergencies of opinion related primarily and chiefly to the eucharistic controversy opened by Carlstadt in 1524 fails, as Baur has pointed out,† to look at the facts from the right angle. The causes of the break must be distinguished from its mere occasion. Prior to all questions about the nature of the Lord's presence in the sacramental ordinance or about the constitution of his person is the consideration of his very purpose or mission in the world. Nothing less than the whole problem of the nature of salvation—the question how the sinful soul may be reunited with God—was Schwenckfeld's basal concern. He could not accept Luther's explanation of the Supper, but this inability was only indicative of, and conditioned by, his inability to accept without safeguarding modifications the doctrine which his chief opponent came to regard as the article of a standing or falling Church, justification by faith alone. Implied in this, as we shall see, was a generically different view as to the Word, the Sacraments, and the Church, and likewise as to the nature of the process of salvation itself.

Schwenckfeld, we repeat, was governed at the outset by thoroughly practical considerations. He wanted the new presentation of the gospel to bring forth, in the lives of his fellow-men, an abundant fruit unto holiness. He was deeply grieved by some of those epigrammatic but easily misunderstood half-truths with which Luther so often sought to help his own and his partisans' faith. He feared, and his experience more and more justified his fears, that Luther's gospel was becoming popular at the expense, to some extent, of

* The influence on Schwenckfeld of the mystical Tauler and the *German Theology* only widened the gulf. Schwenckfeld (C 596a) speaks with admiration, though not with unconditional approval, of his teacher Tauler. The fact is that Schwenckfeld forsook Luther for Tauler, whereas Luther, in opposition to the fanatical excesses of some of the spiritualists, felt it necessary more and more to recede from Tauler and to check the subjective tendencies he had himself championed in the opening days of the Reformation. Even before the disturbances at Wittenberg, however, Luther's mysticism began to decline. It must be said to have reached its summit as early as 1518 or 1519. Cf. Hering, *Die Mystik Luthers*, etc., p. 292 sq.

† *Theol. Jahrb.*, 1848, pp. 504–506; cf. also his *Lehre von der Versöhnung*, p. 462. For whatever fault may be found with Baur's one-sided emphasis on the speculative elements in Schwenckfeld at the expense of the strictly practical, that is of the religious and moral as distinguished from the theological or philosophic interests that dominated the reformer, there can be no doubt that in the main his strictures upon Hahn and Erbkam are borne out by the facts.

sound morality.* He deplored the lack of good works, the absence of strict discipline, the interference of the avaricious princes in the affairs of the Church, and the manifestly false security of many professed Christians the chief article of whose creed was that their organization was the only one worthy of comparison with that of the Apostles. The Lutherans are often characterized, along with the Romanists, as Antichrist, because, according to him, they have no spiritual discernment, but mistake the letter for the spirit, a historical for a vital faith in Christ.†

The real nature and extent of the differences will become more apparent as we proceed. Enough has been said to give point to the present contention that the divergencies on the eucharistic question were after all only symptomatic of those deeper differences that concerned the very essence of the faith.‡

Unable as Schwenckfeld was to identify himself with the Lutheran movement, he had become too thorough a Protestant to find it possible to reënter the Roman Church. He is well aware, indeed, that his works were at times better received by the Romanists than by the Lutherans,§ and in 1528 he even declares that if only

* This does not mean, as the charge so often but falsely brought against Luther's gospel maintains, that he furnished no adequate basis or motive for ethical conduct. On the contrary, no one of the reformers better understood either the need or the method of supplying morality with the motive power of a deep religious faith. But his words not seldom seemed to mock his principles, and unfortunately his devoted followers were apt to swear by the caricature of their leader rather than by his real self. Cf. Harnack, *Dogmengeschichte*, III², p. 784, n. 1, and Seeberg, *Dogmengeschichte*, II, p. 244, n. 1.

† This charge has of course ever been a familiar expedient in the hands of spiritualistic heretics. For a well-selected list of passages from Schwenckfeld's works concerning the undeniable ethical deficiencies of the German Reformation, see Döllinger, *Die Reformation*, I, pp. 257-280. The testimony of other writers, there given, shows by contrast Schwenckfeld's fairness and moderation. Luther himself was as severe as any of the other censors (p. 295 sqq.).

‡ See, e.g., the *Erklärung ellicher streitiger Artikel beim Missbrauch des Evangelii*, etc., in D 375 sqq., where no one of the five "abused" articles explicitly refers to the eucharist. Cf. also C, pp. 1009-1012, where in parallel columns Schwenckfeld compares and contrasts twelve cardinal articles of his faith with those of the Lutherans, only two of the points dealing directly with the Supper and a third indirectly. The high Lutheran Kurtz (*Kirchengeschichte*, 9. Aufl., 2. B., p. 150) therefore fails to do justice to Schwenckfeld when he declares: "Was Schwenckfeld an der luth. Reformation so sehr zuwider, war nichts anders als ihre feste biblisch-kirchliche Objectivität." Rather was it primarily the externalism of Luther's movement that provoked his opposition and caused his deeply spiritual nature to develop a radically different conception of Christianity. To be sure, Schwenckfeld could not grasp Luther in his entirety, nor even do justice to his doctrine of justification. On the other hand, it ought not to be forgotten that Luther's words were peculiarly liable to misinterpretation.

§ B 460ab.

he could have freedom of conscience he would rather join the former than the latter.* But the logic of his situation kept him true to Protestantism. He rejected the hierarchy, the priesthood, the mass, the confessional, and the ceremonialism of the Romish Church, as well as all her dogmas that clashed with his distinctive peculiarities. If the Lutherans made too much of the letter of Scripture to the neglect of its spirit, the Romanists made too much of meritorious works to the disparagement of genuine faith. Rome gave too much scope to the mere traditions of men. In fine, he was bound as a real Protestant to oppose Roman Catholicism.

Between Romanism and Lutheranism Schwenckfeld sought to establish the "Reformation of the Middle Way." He declares: "There are now in general two leading parties that misuse the Gospel of Christ, inasmuch as the one departs in many particulars to the left, and the other to the right, from the only straight and true way of the Lord. The first party is that of the papacy, that despises the Gospel of Christ with his saving ministry, and will not perceive the salutary grace of God that has been manifested nor the clearer light of revealed truth, but abides and perseveres, in doctrine and life, in its old errors."† "The other party consists of those whom God has in these days granted a gracious light, in which they to a certain extent perceive what is right and Christian, but who by no means live up to this light, although they wish to be regarded as evangelical; indeed, they make the Gospel minister to their pride, greed, lust, and ambition, to their crimes and misdeeds, to serve as a defense for their sinful living. These, much as they pretend to be better and more evangelical than others, are rather a dishonor, disgrace, and mocking-stock to the evangelical truth and name, while they live unevangelically, without the fear of God and without regard for man, in spite of all their praise for the Gospel."‡

In many important respects, however, Schwenckfeld must be conceived not as a mediator between Romanism and Lutheranism, but as the spokesman of a more advanced reform movement. He often speaks of the Anabaptists as a third party in the Church of his day, and it cannot be doubted that there was an inner kinship between him and them. He was in unmistakable sympathy with their disciplinary zeal. He had come under the influence of

* C 645d.

† D 356d.

‡ D 360a. Cf. also p. 710c, on the right mean between the papacy and Lutheranism, and C 655d.

their spiritualistic individualism, and heartily shared their tendency to make light of the sacraments. He early counseled the abolition of infant baptism, or at least the reduction of the sacrament to a mere "ecclesiastical baptism," to be later reinforced by the true baptism of the Spirit. During his many wanderings in southern Germany he preferred to labor in fields that had been visited by Anabaptists. So closely related, in fact, are the subjective tendencies of Schwenckfeld and these more radical leaders that he has been regarded by some as a real adherent of this party.*

But he cannot justly be classified with the Anabaptists. He wanted toleration for them,† but this was only in keeping with his advanced ideas concerning the freedom of conscience in matters of religion.‡ He did, to be sure, confess: "The Anabaptists are for this reason more to my liking, because they concern themselves somewhat more than many of the learned for the divine truth."§ But he declares explicitly that he is no adherent of this sect,|| and that he will never become one.¶ It is a fact, moreover, that the Anabaptists themselves rejected his views and persecuted him.** He, on the other hand, was opposed to their pitiable legalism, their ecclesiastical externalism and exclusiveness, and their lack of "spiritual knowledge."††

Schwenckfeld commonly speaks, in the last place, of a fourth Christian Church or sect of his day, the Zwinglians. From their mediating position between the Romanists and Lutherans on the one hand and the Anabaptists on the other, one might suppose that the persecuted nobleman would have found some way of coming to terms with this party. But here too the differences concerning the eucharist were only of secondary importance.

At first, to be sure, the mediators of southern Germany, especially

* Keller, *e.g.*, says: "obwohl die ganze Welt wusste, dass Schwenckfeld im Grunde ein Wiedertäufer war." See *Die Reformation*, etc., p. 463.

† A 98, and compare the Latin letter to Bucer published by Schneider, *Ueber den geschichtlichen Verlauf der Reformation in Liegnitz*, etc., Abt. I, Beilage III, p. 37.

‡ See, *e.g.*, A 78 sq., 869 sq., 874 sqq. It is in view of such strong assertions that Dr. Hartranft, *Prospectus concerning the Corpus Schwenckfeldianorum*, 1884, speaks of Schwenckfeld as the man "who of all the leaders of the Reformation penetrated furthest into the spirit of religious liberty, who asserted its principles with unequivocal faithfulness and unflinching courage."

§ C 307b.

|| Cf. D 375, 16a, A 490a.

¶ B 155c.

** C 1012 and D 371 sqq.

†† A 513, 801-808.

Bucer, Capito, and Zell of Strassburg, cordially received him.* In 1524 Ecolampadius of Basel even ventured, in his contest with the Wittenbergers, to publish, without the author's consent or knowledge, a letter of Schwenckfeld's that contained some characteristic anti-Lutheran views. Zwingli afterwards did the same with Schwenckfeld's first treatise—it was a letter to some Strassburg friends—on the Lord's Supper. But however much the Silesian might have in common with the Swiss as against Luther, there was no possibility of agreeing in any positive view of the eucharist. Schwenckfeld, moreover, took as much offense at Zwingli's as at Luther's doctrine of predestination.† In fact the antagonisms here, as in the case of the Romanists, Lutherans, and Anabaptists, involved the basal elements of the Christian faith.‡

In no one of the four chief branches of the divided Church, therefore, could Schwenckfeld feel at home. "Why should any one be surprised," he inquires, "if I or any other simple-minded man should now concern himself about the Christian Church and try to find where it is, inasmuch as among the four leading Churches one openly condemns the others? The papal Church condemns the Lutheran, the Lutheran condemns the Zwinglian, the Zwinglian persecutes the Anabaptists, and the Anabaptists condemn all others. But inasmuch as Christ is not divided, and his Spirit is a spirit of concord and not of dissension, He cannot, it is manifest, be ruling in all at the same time."§ It would be doing Schwenckfeld a grave injustice, therefore, to attribute to him any vain desire to found a new sect.|| He repeatedly avers that he has no pleasure in being regarded as the head of the "Schwenckfelders." It was loyalty to his convictions, as he understood the truths of revelation, that compelled him to maintain this four-cornered contest. Attacked and persecuted by all the great parties, he defended himself by means of an astonishing literary activity. Having left Silesia late in 1528 or early in 1529, in order not to be a source of trouble to his friend and patron, the Duke of Liegnitz, he spent the

* Gerbert, *Geschichte der Strassburger Sectenbewegung zur Zeit der Reformation*, 1889, is especially to be consulted on Schwenckfeld's relations to these men. See p. 135 for Capito's favorable judgment of the Silesian as late as 1534.

† He called it a *dogma Platonicum* and a *jatum Stoicum*; D 418ab, cf. 407a, 415 sq.

‡ Schwenckfeld seldom names Calvin, and doubtless he knew little of his distinctive doctrines. Their views in many particulars, as we shall have occasion to observe, present striking resemblances. But the presuppositions, it is needless to add, are irreconcilably different.

§ A 95cd.

|| C 571b.

rest of his life in southern Germany, roaming from city to city, gathering his followers in quiet conventicles, answering the many letters of inquiry addressed to him, gaining special influence among the nobles and the lowly, and inspiring all with his own spirit of toleration, courage, and sincerity.

Such, in broad outline, is the historical situation in which Schwenckfeld developed and sought to popularize his peculiar conception of the rediscovered Gospel. Unable to identify himself with any of the leading movements of religious thought, he was nevertheless deeply influenced by them all. His spiritualistic tendencies were everywhere colored, as was inevitable, by the theological formulas of the age. His characteristic opinions are the product of his peculiar "mysticism," influenced by the types of thought in the four chief branches of the Church as known to him, Romanism, Lutheranism, Zwinglianism, and Anabaptism.

It is our purpose, therefore, to examine his views from the precise angle from which this historical situation constantly compelled him to set them forth, from the standpoint of the eucharistic controversy.

It will be most advantageous to begin with Schwenckfeld's conception of the sacraments in general. This will introduce us to the presuppositions of his whole system of thought, and enable us to estimate aright his positive contribution to the many-sided discussion of the Supper.

Our author's language concerning the nature of the sacraments is not devoid of that carelessness as to terminology which renders so many of his statements difficult of interpretation. At first sight, indeed, it might appear that, at least so far as "the means of grace" are concerned, there is little room for doubt as to his precise meaning. The many misrepresentations of his views, however, clearly prove that the matter is not so simple as a casual reading might lead one to suppose. Occasional utterances, taken apart from their context, have been made to support the extreme assertion that he deprived the sacraments of all objective content, efficacy, and worth whatsoever. On the other hand, there are statements which would not be out of place in any fair exposition of the Reformed or even the Lutheran doctrine of the means of grace. Manifestly we must, if possible, find a logical mean between such apparently contradictory views.

In the first place, therefore, full justice must be done to Schwenckfeld's unequivocal opposition to the term *Gnadenmittel*. Only a few of the numberless passages can be cited. "In fine, the doc-

trine of means is an old sophistical doctrine, by which the hearts are turned away from Christ in heaven down toward the creatures,* in order there to find grace."† "We on the contrary affirm that all who seek salvation through creaturely means or external things, no matter what they may be called, and not exclusively through the sole mediator, the man Jesus Christ, are false teachers and lead away from Christ, who is the only way, the door, means and mediator, through whom we draw nigh unto God."‡ "Christ will give us himself through the Holy Spirit, not through bodily means or men, but through himself, in order that we by daily eating in faith his flesh and blood may have fellowship with him and become partakers of his nature and essence."§ "God must himself, apart from all external means, through Christ move the soul, speak to it, work in it, if we are to have any experience of salvation and eternal life."|| "Just as the Head is the Saviour of the whole body, so he [*i.e.*, any reader of Ephesians 5] will soon find that here no bodily, external means or instrument can intervene as little as between the vine and its branches."¶ Again, we are told "that the Eternal and Almighty God, whom nothing can resist, does not work through means or instruments like a cobbler or tailor, but he acts freely and effects our salvation through himself, in Christ His Son, although he also uses the service of the creatures to the praise of his grace and for the good of man; but he is not bound thereto."**

Schwenckfeld's application of these basal principles to the sacrament of the Supper resulted, as is well known, in his dispensing altogether with the observance of this ordinance. The fierce disputes about the eucharist that prevailed even among the seven factions of the Lutherans themselves,†† and in general the attention, one-sided and excessive as he thought, that was paid to external rites, led the reformer to counsel his followers to abstain, for the time being, from all participation in this act of worship.‡‡

Schwenckfeld's depreciatory views and practice concerning the Supper have their close parallel, as might be expected, in his teach-

* For Schwenckfeld's peculiar idea of creaturehood, see below.

† C 486d, 487.

‡ C 507c.

§ A 868d.

|| A 768b.

¶ A 866c.

** A 424c; cf. C 86b, 482c, 486d, 507c, 532b, 997b, 1005b.

†† C 259d.

‡‡ For his self-justification in this so-called *Stillstand*, see such passages as A 736 sq., 761, B 225c, C 274b, 640d, 895a, 983a.

ings concerning baptism. We have already seen that in common with the Swiss radicals he rejected the baptism of children.* But even in the case of adults there may be no necessity, either of means or of precept, for this sacrament. It all depends, as we shall find, upon the far-reaching distinction between the "inner" and the "outer" transaction, between the "baptism by the Spirit" and the "baptism by water." Whether Schwenckfeld's view of this rite is a "high" or a "low" one will depend, manifestly, upon which of the two aspects of the sacrament he has in mind.† For the present it may suffice to say that the above statements about the utter uselessness of external means of grace, in the ordinary sense of the term, apply as much to the one sacrament as to the other.

Again, Schwenckfeld's theory of the Church is likewise influenced by this fundamental dualism between the inner realities of religion and their external signs. It cannot be denied that he lacked all interest in ecclesiastical organizations. The fact that he was the real founder of conventicles among the dissenters of the German Reformation is no refutation of this assertion. His followers have, moreover, maintained their independent existence to this day. But these facts cannot be traced to any teaching of his as to the need or utility of a corporate church life. On the contrary, as Gerbert remarks: "Schwenckfeld lacked every tendency toward ecclesiasticism; in fact, he entered into a decided opposition to the Protestantism that was shaping itself into Churches."‡ His spiritualism shared in this respect the defects of all genuine mysticism: the benefits of communal life for the individual are not duly appreciated. With no talent for administration and no desire for the separate organization of his adherents, he was content, for the sake of the peace of Christendom, to work quietly on a small scale, and to trust to the power of his teachings for the defeat of his better marshaled foes. With his opposition to all external ecclesiasticism,

* C 288-293 gives thirty reasons against pedobaptism. But this issue was not a burning one for him. He declares: "Mir ist auch für meine Person gar Nichts am Kindertauf gelegen; man taufe oder taufe nicht, so lass ich's dabei bleiben, wollte lieber dass dieser Artikel noch zur Zeit geschwiegen würde" (C 286d).

† It may here by way of anticipation be admitted, therefore, that Schwenckfeld in his use of the term "sacrament" often employs an undistributed middle. He professes to adopt Augustin's definition (*In Joann.*, 80 : 3)—"*accedit verbum ad elementum et fit sacramentum etiam ipsum tanquam verbum visibile*"—but ere long either the *elementum* or the *verbum* is spiritualized: the former becomes the Holy Ghost or the latter the Eternal Word.

‡ *L.c.*, p. 135; cf. p. 170.

he was only partially successful in realizing the importance of the Church as a factor in the salvation of the world.*

But we must go even farther. The Scriptures themselves seem to be endangered. The Pauline antithesis between the letter and the spirit is applied in a manner which at least gives color to the charge that Schwenckfeld rejected the normative authority of the Bible. Certainly, if only his most radical assertions were considered, there would be little to differentiate him from the most fanatical of the extremists. There is no end to the criticism of the *Buchstäbler* who, in mastering only the letter of Scripture, fail to discern its real, spiritual content. *Schriftgelehrte* and *Gottesgelehrte* are generally separated by precisely the whole diameter in a given sphere of speculation. In endless variety through all his numerous works runs this polemic against the alleged deification of the letter of Scripture by all four of the great Church parties. The external word is not the real Word. The preached Gospel is not the true Evangel, the genuine Mysterium. The Scriptures are not to be identified out of hand with the Word of God.†

It is plain that we have here fallen upon a fundamental line of thought whose ramifications we may expect to encounter at every step of our progress. We have in fact begun to lay bare the very heart of Schwenckfeld's gospel. As in many another theological system, so also in his, the Word and sacraments are indissolubly linked together. To ascertain the true nature of his theory of the sacraments, therefore, we are bound to examine his views concerning the Word of God. But the identification of the Word with the Son at once raises the larger question, What did he think of Christ?

Schwenckfeld reveals himself as a genuine disciple of the Reformation by his clear grasp of the central importance in Christianity of the Redeemer's person and work.‡ As some of the passages

* Meanwhile, however, his admitted partial success may serve to remind us that his subjectivism was not of that extreme kind that cut itself loose absolutely from the historic past. Here too, in other words, we may expect to find a more satisfactory aspect of his doctrine of the Church than that commonly ascribed to him and necessitated, it would seem, by some of his own statements.

† The passages on these points are literally innumerable. They disprove the thesis of Loofs (*Dogmengeschichte*², p. 373) about the "damals nirgends angefochtene Gleichsetzung von hl. Schrift und Wort Gottes." Cf. Harnack, *Dogmeng.*, III³, p. 791.

‡ There was, to be sure, a latent tendency to make more of the "person" than of the "work," that is, to permit the objective atonement of the historic Jesus unduly to recede from view behind the incarnation considered as the great redemptive fact. This was, moreover, a logical necessity in his system. At the same time it must be said that the tendency was in part overcome by the reformer's conscientious study of the Biblical basis of justification by faith. It is an inac-

already cited will have made clear, Christ is regarded as the only possible mediator between man and God.* No saints can share this relationship with him.† In the Biblical phrase "through Christ" the very preposition promotes his jealous regard for the honor of the Son as an absolutely divine Saviour.‡ No theologian, in fact, has ever more strongly recognized both the supernatural and the Christocentric character of Christianity.§ Hence the numberless reminders that to know Christ aright is life's chief duty.|| The whole Gospel is conceived as a fourfold revelation of the promises and prophecies concerning Christ, of their actual fulfillment, of his glorification, and of our participation in him.¶ Firmly and squarely, therefore, Schwenckfeld took his stand upon the ultimate and comprehensive basis of the Reformation, the principle that salvation flows not from man but from God through Christ. What then constitutes the essential difference between him and his diverse antagonists? The answer is found in his characteristic doctrine of the spiritualistic mediatorship of Christ, which affected the whole range of his thought and fixed a gulf between him and his opponents on all questions pertaining to the Scriptures, the Church and the Sacraments. We therefore proceed, in the light of this central fact, to take a second survey of these related subjects, reproducing as faithfully as possible the polemic bearings of his system.

First in the order of thought, as also in the order of importance, is the antinomy between the Scriptures and the Word of God. And on this, as on most of the other issues, the chief opposition was directed against the party from whom he had learned most, the Lutherans.

Luther had rediscovered the Christian religion by rediscovering the central truth of the Gospel, the revelation of God's grace in

curate representation of the case, therefore, when Hodge declares (*Systematic Theology*, I, p. 83): "He said that we are justified not by what Christ has done for us, but by what He has done within us." How much is made of the Saviour's mission in his estate of humiliation will be shown later. Meanwhile it is to be conceded that the essence of Schwenckfeld's Christianity is to be found in his altogether unique doctrine of the deification of Christ's flesh. What this principle logically implied is one thing; what modification he gave it in practice is quite another.

* See also A 47ab, 547b, 583 sqq., 767.

† D 102, 290.

‡ D 292, cf. 339b.

§ See e.g., A 327 sq., 725c, D 287, 595, 647, 655, 698.

|| A 239, 631, 644 sq., 664, 907 sqq. See the treatise (D 77-91), *Ermahnung zur wahren und seligmachenden Erkenntnis Christi*.

¶ A 860-865.

Jesus Christ. Deeply influenced by the German mystics—they were, of course, the legitimate representatives of vital piety in those days, in opposition to that official system of scholastic theology, mediæval asceticism and sensuous ecclesiasticism that had all but converted religion into a flat moralism—he none the less was saved from all ecstatic excesses by the safeguards of a profoundly ethical spirit that never failed to ground the assurance of its pardon, the joy of its salvation, upon the objectively revealed truth of God, and therefore upon the historic work of Christ. His pearl of greatest price was his faith, the assurance, based upon the Scriptures, that he by the merit of Christ was standing in the favor of God. But in the light of his personal experience, and especially under pressure from the Romanists, his enemies on the right wing, Luther was now led to criticise and indeed to subvert the traditional theory of the magical *ex opere operato* efficacy of the sacraments. In fact the very existence of these rites, regarded in any proper sense of the term as means of grace, was endangered. Reduced in number from seven to two (or three),* they furthermore became mere external signs of the one true sacrament, the Word.† Gauged by his principle, “faith constitutes the power of the sacrament,” their value is seen to be reduced practically to nothing.‡

But Luther in those first days of heroic defense and aggression went much farther. It is well known with what boldness and scorn of logical consequences he could apply the criterion of his own religious experience to the books of the New Testament, namely, whether or not they made Christ their chief concern.§ He did not hesitate, therefore, to lay threatening hands upon the letter of Scripture, whenever it seemed impossible to bring the text into harmony with the facts of his own religious life. The very term “Word of God” had not from the first that fixed content and

* See the treatise, *De Captivitate Babylonica*, which is not only epoch-making in the history of the sacraments in general, but also fundamental to Luther's development of the doctrine of the Supper in particular.

† Cf. Thimme, *Entwicklung und Bedeutung der Sakramentslehre Luthers*, in the *Neue Kirchliche Zeitschrift*, 1901, p. 754. On the general subject of Luther's doctrine of the sacraments consult also Kahn, *Die Lehre vom Abendmahl*, Göbel, in *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, 1843, 2. H., pp. 333 sqq., and the histories of doctrine, especially Seeberg.

‡ Cf. his *Unterricht an die Beichtkinder* (anno 1521): “Das göttliche Wort, in der Bulle verdammt, ist mehr denn alle Dinge, welches die Seele nicht mag entbehren, mag aber wohl des Sacraments entbehren; so wird dich der rechte Bischof Christus selber speisen, geistlich, mit demselben Sacrament. Lass dir nicht seltsam sein, ob du dasselbe Jahr nicht zum Sacrament gehest” (St. Louis Ed., Vol. XIX, col. 812).

§ Literally “drive Christ” (“Christum treiben”); Preface to the *Ep. of James*.

value which it later acquired. He had freely employed the Augustinian distinction between the "inner" and the "outer" Word.* It is idle to speculate as to what he might have done with this formula had it not, in the hands of the fanatics, imperiled his whole achievement. The fact remains, however, that not only in his critical remarks on the New Testament books, but in many an occasional utterance as well, he countenanced the separation, so dear to the mystic's heart, between the Scriptures and the Word of God, between the "outer" and the "inner" Word.†

It was with such aspects of Luther's original teachings that Schwenckfeld was in perfect accord.‡ In this sense he interpreted the immediate past. "Thus our *doctores* in the beginning taught the true view of the Word of God and his divine ordinance, and built upon the one solid foundation, namely, upon the eternal living Word Christ which is with the Father. They accordingly taught that faith and eternal salvation are not bound to any external word or work nor given through any external means, but, as God's work, gift, and pure grace, they come without means from God and the Holy Spirit through Jesus Christ, who as the head flows into them as the members of his body."§ And for this very reason Schwenckfeld frequently expresses his disapproval of the reactionary tendency that took hold of Luther about the year 1522. "Thereafter, however, when they began to quarrel so much and give their carnal desires so much scope in the things of God; after the controversy on the sacrament of the body and blood of Christ had arisen, . . . they inverted the true order in the work of God, in the spread of his Word, and in man's justification, and in this and many other respects they held and taught views contrary to their former doctrine and books, so palpably indeed that one could fairly lay hands on the discrepancy."||

That Luther's view of the Word and sacraments did in fact

* It ought at once to be added, however, that Luther soon succeeded in establishing a definite and fixed relation between the two: the former is, to all intents and purposes, bound to the latter.

† Cf. Schenkel, *Das Wesen des Protestantismus*, I, 130; Harnack, *Dogmeng.*, III², 771 sq.; Loofs, *Dogmeng.*, p. 373.

‡ It would be instructive to carry out in detail the resemblances—often enough, of course, they are merely verbal and superficial—between Schwenckfeld and Luther before the outbreak of the Wittenberg disturbances. Cf. Hase (*Kirchengeschichte*, III, 1, p. 300): "Er hielt eine Richtung fest, das innere Geisteschristenthum, die früher auch in Luther eine Macht war."

§ C 339cd.

|| *L.c.*, p. 340c.

suffer a retrogressive transformation cannot be denied.* We cannot go into the details of this reaction. Only a few of the more striking passages may be cited in order that we may the better understand Schwenckfeld's polemic.† "God deals with us in two ways: externally through the oral word and through bodily signs (baptism and the eucharist). Inwardly he deals with us through the Holy Spirit and faith together with other gifts; but always in due order and measure, so that the external things shall and must precede, and the internal things come after and through the external ones; in such wise, that he has determined to give the internal things to no one save through the external things; for he will give no one the Spirit or faith without the external word and sign which he has appointed for that purpose."‡ Very characteristic is his assertion: "God lets the Word of the Gospel go forth and the seed fall into the hearts of men. Where the seed is lodged in the heart, there is the Holy Spirit to regenerate; there is produced another man, other thoughts, other words and works."§ How much importance is at times attached to the *verbum vocale* may be seen in the following statement: "The fingers which baptized me are not the fingers of a man but of the Holy Spirit, and the mouth and word of the preacher which I heard are not his but the word and sermon of the Holy Spirit."||

* Thimme, *l.c.*, p. 876, is inclined to think that the differences between the earlier and the later Luther on the subject of the sacraments have been unduly emphasized as against the confessedly common and permanent elements. After all, it is a question of having an adequate standard of measurement. To a man of Schwenckfeld's type the differences, even as Thimme represents them, would necessarily appear to constitute a lamentable relapse toward Rome. That Reformed theologians will in this matter agree with Harnack's severe criticism of Luther goes without saying. Harnack, *Dogmeng.*, IIP, 792 *sqq.*

† Otto, *Die Anschauungen vom heiligen Geiste bei Luther* (Göttingen, 1898), has an excellent section on the relation of the Word and Spirit in Luther.

‡ *Luthers Werke*, St. Louis Ed., XX, col. 202. The Augsburg Confession gave classical expression to this view (Schaff, *Creeds*, III, p. 10): "Nam per Verbum et Sacramenta, tanquam per instrumenta, donatur Spiritus Sanctus, qui fidem efficit, ubi et quando visum est Deo, in iis, qui audiunt Evangelium." Luther himself in the *Schmalcald Articles* maintained (Hase, *Libri Symbolici*, P. Secunda, Artt. Smalc., VIII, 3): "Et in his, quæ vocale et externum verbum concernunt, constanter tenendum est, Deum nemini Spiritum vel gratiam suam largiri, n'si per verbum et cum verbo externo et præcedente, ut ita præmuniamus nos adversus Enthusiastas, id est, spiritus, qui jactitant, se ante verbum et sine verbo spiritum habere, et adeo Scripturam sive vocale verbum judicant, flectunt et reflectunt pro libito." He went so far as to say (*ibid.*, VIII, 9): "Et nullus Propheta, sive Elias sive Eliseus, Spiritum sine decalogo sive verbo vocali accepit."

§ St. Louis Ed., IX, col. 1163.

|| This and many other equally remarkable passages may be found in Otto, *l.c.*

But it is needless to multiply the evidences: in the genuinely Lutheran conception the Spirit is bound to the Word and the sacraments, and these contain in themselves the supernatural grace which produces saving effects in the believing heart.* More and more the visible sign had been magnified until, in alleged conformity with the commandment of God, the external sacrament is identified as a *verbum visibile* with the Word, and this in turn is made the real manifestation of God's grace.

Against this conception of Christianity, in which he rightly divined a retrogression toward Rome, Schwenckfeld opposed first of all a generically different theory of the Word. The distinction between the "inner" and the "outer" Word assumes a basal importance. The following passage contains the heart of the matter: "The Word, therefore, when the servants of the Spirit preach or teach, is of two kinds, but with a marked difference in the transactions: one which is of God and itself God, which also richly lives and works in the servant's heart; that is the inner Word, and is in reality nothing other than Christ in the Holy Spirit. It is inwardly revealed and heard by the new man with the believing ears of the heart. The other, which serves this inner Word with voice, sound and expression, is called the oral or external Word, and this is heard with carnal ears, even those of the natural man, and is written and read in letters. But he who has read or heard only that and not also the inner Word has not heard the Gospel of Christ, the Gospel of grace, nor has he received or understood it."† Corresponding, then, to the inner and the outer Word are two kinds of hearing, two kinds of faith, two kinds of knowledge of Christ, two kinds of Biblical exegesis: that of the letter and that of the Spirit. The prime requisite is a spiritual apprehension of the Gospel, *i.e.*, of Christ the Word.

But of what account, then, are the Scriptures? That they are in no case to be regarded as "means of grace," in the ordinary sense of the term, we have already seen. But Schwenckfeld's repugnance to the term *Gnadenmittel* must not mislead us into supposing that he took the position of the extreme radicals on this question.

* The adjective "believing" is of course all-important in the Lutheran statement. Schwenckfeld indulged in much unwarranted criticism of his opponents because of his misapprehension of the nature of their "faith."

† A 767ab; see the whole letter, pp. 764-780. Cf. D 241, 330, 361, 563, 630bc, 887a, and the tract *Vom Unterschiede des Worts des Geistes und Buchstabens*. This dualism concerning the Word colors the whole work of Schwenckfeld. It is based, as we shall find, upon a philosophic dualism between God and the creature world.

We must do justice, in turn, to what we may regard as the higher elements of his view.

The Bible, it is clearly recognized, comes from God.* It is inspired by the Holy Spirit.† In numberless passages Schwenckfeld seeks to clear himself from the charge that he is a despiser of the sacred oracles. He repudiates the calumny of his enemy Flacius Illyricus, who charged him with teaching that "faith is not according to the Holy Scripture, but the Holy Scripture must be directly conformed to faith."‡ The Scriptures should be faithfully read and diligently preached.§ Catechetical instruction in them ought to be revived.|| Picture books dealing with Biblical events ought to be printed for the special benefit of children.¶

But still weightier considerations must be brought forward. Schwenckfeld unequivocally asserts the normative and binding authority of the Scriptures. To be sure the contrary, as has been noted, seems at times to be the case. None the less the Bible was his last court of appeal. On all the controverted points of the age he went directly to the Scriptures.** With him as with his opponents the final question was simply the exegetical one.†† He never presumes to place his Christian consciousness in a position of higher authority than that of the written Word.‡‡ He ex-

* A 441, D 545a.

† D 868b.

‡ C 464b; cf. D 545, 868.

§ C 486: "Und am ersten dass Philippi [Melanchthons] Beschuldigung nicht wahr ist, dass ich das Hören, Lesen, Betrachten des geschriebenen oder mündlichen Evangelii verwerfe oder sage, dass Gott nicht dabei (wenn's im Glauben geschieht) mit Gnaden wirke." The following is decisive on the question of preaching the Word (B 162c): "Der Predigt halben wünscht er, dass nicht allein in den Kirchen, sondern auch in Häusern, auf den Märkten und Dächern, zu Wasser und Land, der Name Jesu Christi recht bekannt werde, ja dass in der ganzen Welt das Evangelium Jesu Christi und der Reichtum seiner Gnaden verkündigt, ausgebreitet, und gepredigt werde."

|| B 368d, 373d.

¶ B 380; see also the whole tract, *Ein kurzer Bericht von der Weise des Catechismi*, by Val. Krautwald.

** Cf. A 28d: "Also muss man auch bald wenn einem ein streitiger Punkt wird vorgeworfen, zur Bibel laufen, das Vorderste und das Hinterste (und nicht allein den blossen Spruch) dabei wohl besichtigen, bedenken, und ansehen, so wird man es oft viel anders finden als es sich mancher lässt einbilden." Cf. C 77d.

†† His works abound in expositions of Biblical passages. His exegesis is, to be sure, influenced by the allegorical tendencies of the time, but it fairly attains the average level of sobriety and moderation. And however difficult it may be for us to harmonize some of his extreme utterances as to the inner and outer Word, the fact must never be lost sight of that after all he gets his "theology" from the same book as his opponents.

‡‡ It is manifestly a perversion when Kurtz (*Kirchengeschichte*, 9. Aufl., II, p. 150) declares "he elevated over the external Word of God in the Scriptures the inner Word of the Spirit of God in man."

pressly denies that he wished to have Scripture conformed to his faith, rather than have his faith conformed to the Scriptures. To be sure he often speaks slightly of the humanistic culture of his day. But the secret of his attitude toward the Bible is to be found in his conviction that the book was being radically misunderstood by his opponents because of their lack of true faith. *Philosophia, Frau Hulda, Vernunft, Dialectica, Rhetorica, and Grammatica* were wresting the Scriptures to the Church's destruction.* The prime requisite, therefore, is to be taught of God.† To this end the Spirit must illuminate and sanctify the reader's mind. For the oral Word is not enough.‡ Preaching may reach the ear without touching the heart.§ The external Word is not a mediator of salvation,|| but when rightly, *i.e.*, spiritually understood, it is a source of the real knowledge of Christ, which is the one thing needful. One passage may serve to give the contents of many: "Accordingly the Gospel of Christ is also spoken of, preached, written, and understood in such a double manner (although before God there is only one Gospel, just as there is only one Christ), namely, according to the letter and according to the Spirit. At one time the Scripture speaks of the Gospel according to the external service; at another, according to the inner mystery and divine essence; or according to history and according to the power of God. The Gospel according to history, or according to the [external] service, and outside of us, is the discourse or outward sermon concerning Christ, given or heard by the servant or preacher, without the coöperation of the Holy Spirit, only in the letter, and grasped by human reason and with practice and diligence fastened in the memory, without any renewing or fructifying of the heart. This is not as yet the true Gospel, indeed scarcely a picture, copy, shadow, or evidence of the true living Gospel of

* Of the many passages dealing with his distrust of reason, see *e.g.*, A 234cd, 257, 438, 515, 828, B 294, 446, C 117, 252, 728, C 1016, D 159, 874.

† See the treatise, *Vom Unterschied der Schriftgelehrten und Gottesgelehrten; was auch Schriftgelehrte und Gottesgelehrte heissen*. Schenkel, *Das Wesen, etc.*, III, 98, not inaptly declares: "Gelehrte und Verkehrte sind ihm sinnverwandt."

‡ B 349c, C 235b, 535c.

§ C 487 *sq.* shows how Luther himself had admitted this, but later with his adherents had relapsed from this position.

|| A 765. This however does not mean, as Dr. Hodge (*Syst. Theology*, I, 82) interprets Schwenckfeld's view of the Bible, that "the Scriptures are not, even instrumentally, the source of the divine life." Logically indeed Schwenckfeld was bound to come to this conclusion. But it was characteristic of him to shrink from the extremes to which the strict logic of his system would have driven him. The ordinary doctrinal phrases can never with justice be applied to him. His thought is cast in a different mould.

Christ, no matter how skillful, learned, and eloquent the preacher may be. Therefore the Gospel of Christ, to speak strictly, is nothing other than the joyful, comforting good news of redemption and eternal salvation, which the angel of the great council, Jesus Christ, brings through the Holy Spirit to an afflicted heart, which he first punishes for sin, and calls to repentance, and to which he then proclaims the divine peace purchased by his blood," etc.*

But of course the decisive question is not whether the "external Word" needs the accompaniment of the "inner Word" or not, but rather whether or not the latter may dispense with the former. Schwenckfeld's opponents, it is plain from his defensive attitude, accused him of rejecting the Scriptures. But it is equally clear that his assertion of the need of a spiritual understanding of the Word neither exhausts the *à priori* possibilities of the case nor constitutes a complete statement of the actual facts. The specific question must be answered, Is there any spiritual knowledge possible apart from the written Word?

The resemblance in this particular between Schwenckfeld and the Quakers is too obvious not to have been a subject for frequent comment. Barclay,† indeed, maintains that the teaching of Schwenckfeld and Fox was identical on three important points: first as to the "Inward Light, Life and Word"; secondly as to "Immediate Revelation"; and lastly as to the inability of any external bodily act to convey a spiritual reality to the soul. But neither is there any historical connection traceable between Schwenckfeld and the Friends, nor can there be said to be anything more than a general correspondence and similarity between their ideas; both represent more or less extreme reactions against ecclesiasticism, sacerdotalism, and sacramentarianism. As against the orthodox Quakers, Schwenckfeld taught a peculiar Christology which gives his whole system a different complexion; and as against the heterodox Quakers he held a far more moderate position concerning the nature, purpose and extent of the Inner Light. Now and then, indeed, he uses the language of the most radical spiritualists. Especially does this seem to be the case when statements are divorced from their contexts. The following is a characteristic negation: "It is here evident, therefore, that the true saving knowledge of God the Father and His Son Jesus Christ comes from no other source than a gracious divine revelation. . . . That is, that the Son of God, Christ, can be rightly

* D 331b. Cf. A 687-689.

† *The Inner Life of the Religious Societies of the Commonwealth*, p. 237 sqq.

known neither through human reason, nor through Scripture, nor out of any external thing."* It is well known, moreover, how strenuously he insisted that his unique interpretation of the words "this is my body" was due to special revelation.† This was one of the specific charges brought against him by Capito and Blaurer during his sojourn in southern Germany.‡ But what after all is his doctrine of "revelation"? The context of the passage last quoted is too important to leave unnoticed: "That is, that the Son of God, Christ, can be rightly known neither through human reason, nor through Scripture, nor out of any external thing, although the Holy Scriptures and the created things bear witness to him."§ In fact the "light" so highly prized is naught but what the Apostle Paul prays may be given his Ephesian readers, "the spirit of wisdom and revelation" in the knowledge of Christ.|| "That is what the Lord Christ means by hearing and learning the Word of the Father and coming to Christ, and as he says, 'they shall all be taught of God.' This some incorrectly refer to the Scriptures; they dislike also the word revelation, regarding it indeed as a dream, a fancy, a fanatical excess, although in very truth it is the living doctrine of God from His Spirit in the believing heart."¶ The revelation of spiritual truth, therefore, comes not from the natural man's interpretation of the Scriptures but only from the real Word Christ himself, through his Spirit operating now with and now without the letter of the Scriptures or any external thing. Thus was left open, to be sure, a way of retreating, if need were, to the extremes of mere subjectivism. But the practical issues of the day made him retain a strong hold upon the sacred text: the spiritual as distinguished from the literal interpretation of the Scriptures is the heart and core of his doctrine concerning "revelations" to the individual Christian. He was opposed to Luther's idea that the Spirit never operates savingly except through the Word, and that the *verbum* itself is *illustrans*, i.e., that the Scriptures contain within themselves a supernatural and divine power, so that their efficacy is independent of the special accompaniment of the Spirit.** But that he did not quite reproduce the

* A 427d.

† More generally the term used is "Offenbarung"; but occasionally we find "gnädige Heimsuchung."

‡ See Heyd's article, "Blaurer, Schnepf, Schwenckfeld," in the *Tübinger Zeitschrift für Theologie*, 1838, H. 4, pp. 29, 35.

§ A 427d.

|| A 428a.

¶ A 428a.

** Hering, *Die Mystik Luthers*, p. 45, correctly expresses Luther's view as follows: "Das Grundthema seiner Schriftauslegung: das Wort ist Geist, ist von dem Zusatz begleitet zu denken, dass Geist im Wort ist."

views of the great body of Christians of all ages, but allowed himself to reveal a bias, logically indeed not without warrant in the position of his chief opponents, yet practically objectionable, against the letter of Scripture, is due not only to the polemic interest that dominated his work but also and primarily to the necessities of his system of thought. Wherever the practical problems of his situation claim his chief attention, however, the decisive authority of the Bible is freely conceded. "Thus do we conclude our admonition concerning the true and spiritual knowledge of Christ, which also is the sole criterion (*basis et norma*) by which to know and judge all manner of doctrines, opinions, errors and sects. Nor do we know any better or more convenient way for the promotion, reformation or improvement of the Christian religion and doctrine than the true knowledge of Christ, which must be secured, not only out of Scripture but rather out of the gracious gift of the Father's revelation, *yet in such wise that it will always agree or harmonize with the testimony of Scripture.*"* The Spirit therefore works when and where and how he pleases. But the Scriptures are his product, and therefore furnish a faithful criterion for ascertaining and estimating all his revealing activities. When rightly used they simply point to Christ.† They recede in importance behind the manifestations of the subjective religious life produced by the immediate operation of the Spirit upon the heart. But Schwenckfeld, in spite of his strong dislike of the term *Gnadenmittel*, still concedes the serviceableness of the Scriptures in pointing the enlightened reader to the real Word of God, the Son himself. The blessings of the Gospel are communicated by the Spirit operating without means upon the heart: the Scriptures are no mediators of salvation. But none the less, when rightly interpreted, the inspired documents fulfill to all intents and purposes the function of means of grace in any but the strictly Lutheran acceptation of the term. "For although God the Almighty himself teaches his disciples inwardly through Christ in the Holy Spirit the pure divine truth, he has nevertheless appointed for them external teachers and learning also, such as servants of the Word of God, preachers, teachers, expositors of the Holy Scriptures, etc., whom God the Lord calls, sends, and through his Spirit urges to promote his divine doings among his people, whose service he also

* "Doch so dass es alle Wege mit der Schrift Zeugnis stimme oder übereintrage" (D 62b).

† D 868cd (in margin): "Die heilige Schrift weiset von sich und über sich zum Arzt Christo, der allein Gesundheit und Leben giebt." "Die H. Schrift zeugt vom Arzte und der Kraft seiner Arznei, sie ists aber nicht selbst." Cf. C 1010.

blesse, in order that it may serve in the grace of God for the edification of Christians in Christ and their soul's salvation."*

The same unstable equilibrium is to be seen in Schwenckfeld's attitude toward the Church as an institution for the furtherance of the religious life. We have seen how little regard or capacity he had for organization, how his strongly anti-ecclesiastical spirit voiced itself in declarations which, followed to their logical conclusion, would leave no place whatever for the external Church. Against this very charge of abolishing the ministerial office and the public worship of the sanctuary he had frequently to defend himself.† It is plain, however, that the criticism is only to a certain extent justifiable. He himself sets forth his position as follows: "I object to no one's hearing sermons as opportunity offers; nor do I (as the Baptists do) bind the conscience in this matter as if it were sin; nor do I advise the endurance of exile. I therefore in these days of dispersion let every one abide in his freedom."‡ Here, as in the doctrine of the Word, Schwenckfeld distinguished between the internal and the external Church.§ The latter, the true Church of God, is made up of the company of the real believers. Their head is Christ. He rules and builds them up.|| Their salvation is not bound to any external means or institution as an indispensable condition for its bestowal.¶ But on the other hand there are not wanting indications that Schwenckfeld was unwilling to go the whole length of the Anabaptist idealization of the historic Church. Even liturgical ceremonies have a helpful mission, pro-

* D 893d.

† Melancthon, under date of October 18, 1535, wrote as follows to Frecht: "De Schwenckfeldio et Franco, Chronicorum scriptore, placet mihi iudicium tuum. Nam et ego utrumque severe coercendum esse iudico, etsi Schwenckfeldium stultum magis quam improbum esse arbitror; sed tamen hypocrisis apud vulgus nocet et habet hoc [hic], ut ex Ecolampadio audire memini, nullam ecclesiæ formam, hoc est, nulla ministeria probat . . . Ego vero omnes, qui in nostris ecclesiis de ministeriis publicis parum honorifice sentiunt dignos odio esse censeo" (*Corpus Ref.*, ed. Bretschneider, II, col. 955).

‡ C 894c.

§ "Nun ist das Wörtlein Kirche *equivocum*, das ist, dass man von der Kirche so wohl als vom Glauben oder Gläubigen auf zweierlei Weise pflegt zu reden: einmal nach dem Grunde der Wahrheit wie es vor Gott damit steht, wie die Kirche aus Christo in seinem Reiche wird erbaut und vereinigt, wie er sie regiert und erhält im Reiche der Gnaden . . . Zum andern mal redet man von der Kirche Christi nach ihrer Versammlung im Dienste der Apostel und anderer Diener des heiligen Geistes welche von Christo dem Himmelkönig, seinem Volke zu dienen, und in der Erbauung seines Leibes Handreichung zu thun bestellt werden." B 654bd; cf. D 10-15, *Von der christlichen Kirche*.

|| A 870b, 97a.

¶ It is interesting to note that Schwenckfeld taught that there were undoubtedly Christians even among the Turks of that day. A 782 sq.

vided only that no trust be placed in them.* Preaching is therefore of cardinal importance, even if it is not to be identified with the power of Christ, but only to be regarded as pointing toward Him and thereby serving Him.† Even pictures, if not worshiped, may be used with advantage.‡

It must, of course, be admitted that Schwenckfeld had not a sufficiently clear and consistent view as to the need of ecclesiastical organization. He could, in perfect harmony with his rigoristic and puritanic requirements, have insisted upon a fair degree of organization under leaders of his own choosing. Few, however, will fail to approve his views so far as their criticism of the historical situation is concerned.§ He could not, with his rich spiritual experience, rest content with a Cæsaro-papal ecclesiasticism which seemed to endanger the whole Protestant cause, which in large measure destroyed the new-born spirit of religious freedom by permitting the use of the sword even in matters of such subordinate importance as the observance of ceremonial rites.|| He left the existing Churches not from choice but from necessity: they did not in any satisfactory measure embody his ideals. But to organize his followers according to his own principles he had neither the wish nor the ability. And thus his theory of the Church reached no advanced stage of development. His views oscillated between an apparently absolute denial of the need and advantage of an external institution and the generous recognition of the mission of the *de*

* A 846c: "Also möchte ich auch von Ceremonien sagen welche äusserlicher Gottesdienst oder Kirchenübungen heissen, deren viel nur wohl und nützlich mögen gebraucht werden. Ich achte es auch nicht dafür, dass irgend ein Christ so vermessen sein kann, dass er alle Ceremonien (ob man wohl kein Vertrauen drein setzen noch die Seligkeit drin soll suchen) ohne Unterschied wolle verwerfen. Sonst würde er das Predigtamt, und was in der Kirche äusserlich gehandelt wird, auch müssen verwerfen." Cf. A 700a, 791b.

† C 997bc.

‡ A 846a.

§ See the impartial judgment of Erbkam, *Geschichte der prot. Sekten*, p. 435 sq.

|| B 655d: "Deshalb denn die Definition und Beschreibung der Kirchen, wie sie in der Confession [sc. Augustana] gestellt . . . billig sollte gebessert werden; damit wir Gott den Herrn und seine Werke nicht abermals an uns unnütze Knechte noch an den Papst und Bischof aufs Neue zwingen, heften oder anbinden, sondern den Gang der Gnaden Christi und seines Geistes Lehramt, der die Herzen lehret und geistet wo er will, desgleichen die Erbauung des Leibes Christi überall frei im Geiste und unangebunden stehen lassen. Wie den auch die hl. Christliche Kirche nicht als eine andere Polizei an dies oder jenes Land eingezäunt, weder an Rom, Wittenberg, Zürich, Genf, Mähren, noch anderswo, weder an Zeit, Personen, noch an etwas Äusserliches, ja weder an Prediger, Predigt, oder Sacrament gebunden, sondern mit ihren Gliedern allenthalben durch die ganze Welt, wo gläubige Christen sind, ist ausgebreitet." On the functions of magistrates concerning the Church, see A 79 sqq., 401 sqq., *et passim*. Cf. also Schenkel, *Das Wesen des Prot.*, III, 382-386.

facto organizations, provided only they inculcated a spiritual knowledge of the Head of the Church.*

This survey of Schwenckfeld's doctrine of the Word and the Church will help us to secure a just estimate of his view of the purpose of the sacraments. We are prepared to find his fundamental dualism asserting itself also in this branch of his system. "For to a complete sacrament two things are necessary, an inner and spiritual element and an outer, bodily element."† The sacraments, therefore, are profound mysteries, and not merely external ceremonies.‡ They are more than the mere addition of the outer Word to the given elements.§ The prime requisite here too, therefore, is precisely that which has been so often emphasized, the "judgment of the spiritual man," the correct interpretation of the Scriptures. It is this lack of spiritual insight that is the cause of all error concerning the sacraments.|| For this very reason the eucharist should continually be discussed, upon the Biblical basis, in order that the true view may be obtained.¶ More must be made, in any event, of the spiritual significance of the ordinances.** The failure of his opponents to do this convicts them of being the real despisers of the sacraments.†† On the other hand, he strongly protests against the justice of this charge so frequently made against him.‡‡ It is not with the sacraments, but with the misuse of them, that he finds fault. It was his conviction that the Church was misinterpreting these sacred rites that led him to advocate the *Stillstand* in the case of the Supper, and the corresponding custom of substituting for sacramental baptism only a consecratory

* See the (LVI) *Fragen von der christlichen Kirche*, which are really so many attacks upon the worldly ecclesiasticism of the day, and so many defenses of his own position between the Romanist and Anabaptist extremes.

† B, Part I, p. 140d.

‡ A, p. XIId. Cf. B, Part I, p. 85cd: "Drum wenn man von Sacramenten Christi und seiner christlichen Kirche redet, so redet man vornehmlich von einem Geheimnis und göttlich offenbarten Handel, darin die christgläubige Seele ist und wird gereinigt, erleuchtet, wiedergeboren und von Sünden abgewaschen, durch das Bad des Wassers im Worte, als im Sacrament der Taufe; oder darinnen sie wird gespeiset, getränkt, und gesättigt mit dem Leib und Blut J. Christi, dadurch sie wird im göttlichen Leben erhalten und darinnen immer ferner aufwachsen, als im Sacrament des Nachtmals."

§ Cf. A 505a, 855c.

|| B, Part I, 101b.

¶ A 342d, 393a-c.

** A 492c.

†† A, pp. Xd, XIa.

‡‡ D 15d: "Von den heiligen Sacramenten . . . glaube ich alles was die heilige Schrift sagt und wie sie vom Herrn Christo gelehrt und für die christgläubigen eingesetzt, auch von lieben Aposteln und der christlichen Kirche nach dem Befehl des Herrn sind gebraucht worden und noch in der versammelten Gemeinde Gottes also gebraucht und verstanden sollen werden." Cf. D 21 sq., 544, 973, C 283b, 687d, 730d, B 104c, A 331, 394, etc.

prayer. He takes his stand once more upon the sole mediatorship of Christ.*

The general principles just mentioned we find exemplified in the statements concerning baptism. The outer rite must be carefully distinguished from the inner reality. "But we must remember that in the complete sacrament of the baptism of Christ two things are present, namely, an external and an internal one; the elemental water and the water of divine grace which purifies the conscience."† The external water cannot cleanse. "Let them know in the first place that the washing away of sins does not belong to the external baptism. Then let them be assured that no external thing, washing or water, can reach or remove sin. In the third place, they do not permit Christ in himself and by himself to be a perfect Saviour. It is therefore a grave wrong to the work of Christ and his Spirit if one ascribes or concedes to the water or other created things in the work of salvation something that belongs to Christ alone."‡

The primary and essential element in baptism, therefore, is the inner grace, the bestowal of which is absolutely independent of the

* C 448d: "Das ihr begehret zu wissen, wie ihr es richten sollt, dass Nichts äusserliches das Herz erreiche, das sollt ihr richten auf den Handel unserer Gerech- und Seligwerdung, nämlich das Herz zu bekehren, zu reinigen und erneuern, denn wer vermag solches denn allein Gott und Christus im heiligen Geiste? Das fleischliche Herz wird wohl oft durch äusserliche Dinge bewegt zu Freuden und Traurigkeit; es wird aber drum durch äusserliche Dinge nicht selig noch umgekehrt. Christus ist der Erneuerer des Herzen; er allein vermag die Sünde draus zu nehmen und seine Gnade darein zu geben." Cf. A 597 sqq., 780, C 480c, 619, D 440, 468ab, 738. For extended discussions of what he regarded as an unwarranted emphasis upon the "external" sacraments, see C 1015-1021, and especially the first two letters in Part I of B (pp. 10-146), *Vom Grund und Ursach des Irrtums und Spans im Artikel vom Sacrament des Herrn Nachtmals and Vom Verstande, Gebrauch, und Würdigkeit der Sacramente Christi*. The *Bekennnis und Rechenschaft von den Hauptpuncten des christlichen Glaubens* (D pp. 1-62) is a précis of his whole system.

† A 195bc.

‡ A 32cd. Cf. A 378cd, 497cd, C 397, 438b, 520a, and many other passages in all of the folios. To be sure Luther had taken pains to bring the word of commandment (Matt. xxviii. 19) into connection with the water of baptism: "Wasser thut's freilich nicht, sondern das Wort Gottes so mit und bei dem Wasser ist und der Glaube so solchem Worte Gottes im Wasser trauet; denn ohne Wort Gottes ist das Wasser schlecht Wasser und keine Taufe" (*Der kleine Catechismus*, Part IV, in Schaff's *Creeds*, III, p. 86). None the less, especially in the matter of infant baptism, Luther reopened the way for the magical efficiency of the *ex opere operato* theory of the sacrament. The consecrated water itself, in fact, possessed a divine potency. It was heavenly, holy, *durchgöttet*. Cf. Schenkel, *l.c.*, I, 448 sq.; Thimme, *l.c.*, 898; Hering, *l.c.*, p. 287 sq., and Harnack, *Dogmeng.* III³, 792.

external rite.* The blood of Christ is the only sprinkling that removes the defilements of sin,† or rather—the reason for this characteristic emphasis upon the unity and totality of Christ's person will appear later—Christ himself is the bath of regeneration.‡

Precisely so does the right understanding of the eucharist necessitate a sharp distinction between the outer signs and the inner realities, between the external and the internal sacrament. The parallelism in this respect between the Supper and Baptism is complete. "As I have hitherto spoken of two kinds of water in the Christian sacrament of baptism, so I find in the complete sacramental transaction of the Lord's Supper two different kinds of bread, or food, and drink: namely, a spiritual, divine, heavenly bread, food, and drink, which is the body of Christ given for us and his sacred blood shed for the forgiveness of sins; and a bodily and sacramental bread and drink, which the Lord Jesus before his departure commanded his disciples to break, to eat, and to drink, in remembrance of Him."§ The former is then identified, as will have been anticipated, with Christ the Son; it is the bread which is the Lord. The latter is only the "bread of the Lord." Once more, therefore, the whole question turns upon the correct, that is the "spiritual," understanding of the Scriptures. Once more Schwenckfeld can refute the charge that he makes light of the New Testament sacraments. "In the same way I request, wish, and desire that the holy sacrament of the body and blood of Christ be observed by the believing Christians according to the institution, intention, and will of the Lord, with a right understanding, knowledge, and faith, also with a due examination and with the due accompaniments, in a Christian, devout, and reverent manner, and that it be not misused to condemnation through ignorance and superstition. Whether this means rejecting the service of the Word of God and despising the holy sacrament . . . because I distinguish between these things and the Word which is spirit and

* Cf. Schwenckfeld's remarks about the possibility and the need of an oft-repeated "spiritual feet washing." "Die Füße der Christgläubigen werden immer gewaschen mit dem reinen Wasser, das ohne Unterlass von dem Leibe Christi fließt" (A 209d). Again (C 207a), "Warum treiben sie"—he is speaking of the Lutherans—"nicht auch so fest aufs Füßwaschen? welches der Herr eben so wohl als das Werk ihm nachzuthun hat befohlen: 'So ich euer Meister und Herr euch die Füße gewaschen,' " etc. That is, if the Lutherans take this ceremony spiritually, why should not the sacraments also be so understood?

† A 13d, D 147, 285b.

‡ A 31cd: cf. B, Part I, 121d.

§ D 18ab.

life, I will now submit to the Christian Church, your grace, and all pious Christians."*

But of course the really decisive question as to Schwenckfeld's conception of the purpose of the sacraments is still to be raised. His theoretical distinction, amounting in practice, as we have seen, to a virtual separation between the outer transaction and the inner reality in the Supper, satisfied neither the Romanists and Lutherans on the one hand nor the Zwinglians and Anabaptists on the other. Indeed, much of the persecuted man's literary activity was due to his desire to remove the misapprehensions concerning his views under which he was sure his opponents were laboring. But in spite of his efforts in this direction, it is still to be regretted that the inner nexus of his sacramentarianism has not been more clearly set forth. For this obviously is the crux of the whole problem: are these outer and inner circles of reality truly concentric, or do they lie in such remote planes that all possibility of a causal connection between them is cut off? Does this fundamental dualism result in an absolutely unmediated juxtaposition of altogether disparate elements? Is there at the most only a possible simultaneity between the external and the internal transactions? What sort of balance must be struck between Schwenckfeld's assertion that the sacraments are serviceable, yet are not means of grace? Is he thoroughly consistent with himself in denying the propriety of the term *Gnadenmittel* in any and every sense?

How much injustice in this regard has sometimes been done to the reformer will appear from our answer to these questions. It is difficult to present his views with perfect accuracy and fairness in any other than his own words. What he was bound by rigid self-consistency to say is one thing; what he actually said in conformity with his philosophic and theological presuppositions, on the one hand, and under the influence of the conditions of his situation, on the other, is quite another thing.

The external rites—on at least this point there can be no doubt—are signs and symbols of the inner reality, of the truth, the essence, the *res* or *materia* of the sacraments. This fact, it may be assumed, has become plain in the course of the discussion. There are those indeed who regard this statement as the only proper because the perfectly exhaustive one.† There can be no doubt that it is the

* D 545a.

† For example, Hahn, *Schwenckfeldii Sententia*, etc., p. 60, n. 1: "Itaque sacramentis externis Schwenckfeldius putavit non nisi adumbrari res divinas, quas Christus omnibus fidem habentibus quovis tempore distribuit."

mould into which Schwenckfeld most frequently cast his reflections on the teleology of the sacraments. With what sharpness of vision he grasped this aspect of the problem will appear from a citation of several of the most important deliverances. "All external things are only representations which portray or point and lead to the eternal divine truth which is dispensed through the custodian of the holy blessings, through Jesus Christ in the Holy Spirit. God is therefore not concerned about external things, but about that which is represented to the believer by means of the external thing and which is distributed through Christ in the Holy Spirit."* Again, "the sacraments are indeed spiritual or, if the term be rightly understood, holy, sacramental signs, because they point to holy, spiritual things and signify them. But they cannot impart them, since they have no spiritual, divine power in themselves."† One of the clearest statements on this phase of the subject is the following: "All external things, the sacrament and other things, were instituted by Christ for our sakes, in order that his great benefits and his work in the believing heart may be known and remembered, and that the great riches of the grace of God which he has caused to be manifested to all men in Christ may be known, praised, and magnified in all the world."‡

The external rite, therefore, has at least the function of directing the thought of the participants to Christ, the sole source of saving grace. But is there beyond this any necessary sequence between the outward ceremonial and the bestowal of an inner sacramental blessing?

It is plain that some of the quotations just made leave absolutely no room for an affirmative answer to this question. The unequivocal declarations about the sole mediatorship of Christ must be allowed to retain their force undiminished. That anything in the way of a magical efficiency of the *Gnadenmittel* was to him an unspeakable absurdity; that salvation can, as a matter of fact, be conferred without any means whatsoever by an immediate operation of the Spirit upon the heart; that the blessings conveyed, according to the theories of his opponents, by the sacraments may be daily granted even to those who do not attend to the outward rites; and that the main current of Schwenckfeld's thought tends to sweep away from the sphere of grace every sensuous, external or "creaturely" object,—these propositions may be regarded as established theses. But we must not prejudge the case by sup

* A 201d.

† A 749d; cf. A 789c.

‡ C 580d.

posing that he has reduced his views to a perfectly consistent, unitary system. Granted, for instance, that the Spirit never works through external things: it might still be asked, whether or not he ever works *in* them or *with* them? There can be no doubt that Schwenckfeld, in his strong desire to defend himself against his adversaries by trying to conserve the objective or theological content of the sacraments, did at times approach the Reformed doctrine of the means of grace in the narrowest and strictest sense of the term. The evidence, to be sure, is not abundant. The language used expresses rather the feeling of a conservative disposition than the settled conviction of a severely logical mind. The principle is fairly established, however, that the blessings of salvation are actually bestowed in the right use of the sacraments. "This requires the right understanding and use of the sacraments of Christ, that is the knowledge of Christ according to the Spirit and the dispensation of the mysteries of God in the believing soul, it being the special office of the Holy Spirit to distribute the blessings acquired by Christ unto all believers in the use of his sacraments (*beim Brauche seiner Sacramente*), likewise before and without the use of them."* To be sure, even here the place of emphasis in the sentence is reserved for the thought that the sacraments are by no means necessary. Likewise characteristic is the difference in the prepositions in the phrases "*durch* Christum" and "*beim Brauche seiner Sacramente*." But the manifest coördination of the two methods of bestowing grace, that "with the use of the sacraments" and that "before or without them," shows that in some real sense external things may mediate grace. In another passage we have not only the preposition *bei* but also *in* used. "But if it is said that such grace comes through the external thing, or that the external thing adds something in the form of an instrument, or that the grace cannot be poured in or given without the external thing, or that it must follow the latter, this is all palpable error. For, in short, the grace of God without and in the external thing (*ohne und beim Äusserlichen*) alone effects salvation, *in* both the sacraments and other spiritual transactions."† When, therefore, the sacrament is truly used, it "brings grace along with itself."‡

* B, Part I, 85b.

† B, Part I, 97d.

‡ "Dass aber die Sacramente Christi, wo sie recht verstanden und gebraucht werden, *Gnade mit sich bringen* ist wohl aus dem Exempel abzunehmen, so man bedenkt, wenn ein Christgläubiger in der christlichen Kirche wird getauft und ihm alle Wohlthat Christi wird vorgehalten werden, dass er sich ganz und gar Gotte aufopfert," etc. *Ibid.*; cf. B 15d, where it is said that the consecrated bread "ought to serve the mystery of feeding upon the body and blood of Christ."

These citations, then, must be taken as an authentic commentary on the numerous passages in Schwenckfeld that protest against the *Gnadenmittel*. The common representation, that he taught "a plan of salvation without the means of grace,"* must be understood in the light of the fact that the sacraments when rightly used may and really do convey grace.† Whether or not they may be called "means of grace" will depend, therefore, upon whose definition of the term we employ. Romanists and Lutherans will alike answer in the negative.‡ But in a sense approximating that of the Reformed Church, Schwenckfeld may fairly be said, in spite of his protests, to have "means of grace." His theory of the Supper, as will appear when we discuss the question of the mode of Christ's presence, is distinctively higher than that of Zwingli.§ There is,

* So, e.g., Weiser, in his article on "Casper Schwenckfeld and the Schwenckfeldians," in the *Mercersburg Review*, July, 1870, p. 150.

† The common representation is, of course, essentially correct, inasmuch as it summarizes the content and also the spirit of the great bulk of passages dealing with the subject. But by an occasional inconsistency Schwenckfeld permitted himself to speak, as we have seen, in terms that compromised the rigor of his system with affection for the time-honored institutions of the Church. His presuppositions forbade his making the sacraments means of grace; but the contentions of his adversaries on the right as well as his dissatisfaction with the fanatics on the left, above all the overmastering force of the same words that held Luther captive—the *hoc est corpus meum*—made him sacrifice something of his logic, or, to use more customary but less intelligible language, his "mystical feeling," against external ecclesiasticism.

The practical question concerning the use of the sacraments has of late become acute in the history of the American Schwenckfelders. The younger and more progressive ministers especially are inclined to put a lax construction upon Schwenckfeld's polemic against the "external" rite: they admit that the exigencies of debate betrayed him into ill-balanced assertions, but they are likewise strong in their insistence that according to him the sacraments when rightly used are "means of grace."

‡ Döllinger, *Die Reformation*, I, 239 sq., declares that external baptism according to Schwenckfeld was only an outer reminder and confession of the inwardly received grace; and that the external Supper is only a picture of the inward eating. Kurtz (*Kirchengeschichte*, 9. Aufl., II, p. 150) says Schwenckfeld's doctrine of the Supper is mere symbolism, a charge which the reformer times without number explicitly denied.

§ Zwingli's statements on the eucharistic controversy present, as is well known, marked contrasts. When governed by polemic zeal against the Romanists and Lutherans he seems to deny that the Supper is in any sense a means of grace. Cf. his *Fidei Ratio*, in Niemeyer's *Collectio Confessionum*, p. 24: "Credo, imo scio omnia sacramenta tam abesse ut gratia conferant, ut ne adferant quidem aut dispensent." The positive thought he most emphasizes is that the Supper is "nihil aliud quam commemoratio, qua ii, qui se Christi morte et sanguine firmiter credunt patri reconciliatos esse, hanc vitalem mortem annunciant, hoc est, laudant, gratulantur, et prædicant" (*De vera et falsa Religione, Opera*, ed. Schuler and Schulthess, III, p. 263). But it must be remembered that he at times taught that Christ is truly present in the Supper, and that his body is truly eaten by the believing heart. See below.

in fact, so close a resemblance to the Calvinistic doctrine that, with all allowance for essential differences, the term "means of grace" may be applied with almost as much propriety in the one case as in the other. Schwenckfeld and Calvin, in carrying beyond the limits of the Lutheran movement the basal distinction between Romanism and Protestantism, that pertaining to the way in which the soul's relation to God is mediated,* emphasized the possibility and reality of the direct operation of God upon the religious subject. They furthermore agreed in making the whole Christ the *res* or *materia* of the sacrament, and in making the work of the Spirit a distinguishing feature of their doctrine of the "means of grace," thus aiming to do justice to the objective content of the sacraments as taught by Romanist and Lutheran and the subjective aspects championed by the Zwinglians. Above all, in their spiritual view of the whole process of salvation, in which the sacraments conveyed no unique grace not otherwise obtainable, faith was emphasized as the indispensable condition for securing a dialectic and causal connection between the outer transaction and the inner effect. To be sure, Calvin succeeded in obtaining a far more satisfactory because intimate nexus between the spiritual and the corporeal, the divine and the human elements of the sacramental act, and it was especially his clear recognition of the sealing character of the ordinance that gave his views so speedy and complete a victory not only over those of his theological kinsman Zwingli, but also over those extremists like Schwenckfeld who belonged to a more remotely related spiritualistic school.†

We are bound, therefore, to ascertain more exactly the nature of Schwenckfeld's conception of faith. For it is obvious that it was by this bridge that he sought to span the chasm that lay be-

* Cf. Baur, *Die Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit*, III, 254.

† Schwenckfeld never attained, and from his premises, as will appear, never could attain, the high vantage-ground from which Calvin could regard the sacraments as seals of the new covenant. Lutheran writers, indeed, are wont to say that Calvin himself was not warranted by his presuppositions in taking so "high" a view of baptism and the eucharist. See, e.g., Kahnis, *Die Lehre vom Abendmahl*, p. 407 sq., and cf. Schenkel, *l.c.*, I, 429 sq. The latter, however, admits that Calvin has given the best solution of the sacramental problem (*ibid.*, and cf. p. XIX). But Schwenckfeld, as we shall find, was prevented by his conception of faith and his theory of the deification of the flesh of Christ, from securing any adequate view either of the work of the Spirit in the application of grace or of faith as the instrument of salvation.

At times, to be sure, attempts were made to vindicate a sealing character for the sacraments. See the Catechism of the Schwenckfelder Werner in Arnold, *Kirchen- und Ketzerhistorie* (1740), Vol. I, Th. II, B. XVI, cap. XX, p. 853. But all such attempts really exceed the logical warrant of the premises of the system.

tween his desire to preserve the objective content of the sacraments and his determination to hold fast to what he regarded as the deepest essence of Protestantism, the sole mediatorship of Christ operating directly, that is without the use of any creaturely objects, upon the believer's heart. It is only by securing an adequate grasp of his doctrine of faith that we shall succeed in doing justice to his otherwise altogether anomalous position between the Romanists and Lutherans on the one hand and the Zwinglians and Anabaptists on the other. Only so can we realize how, in his eagerness to preserve the choicest treasures of the new evangelical faith, he took so extreme a position against Rome that he found it impossible, save by an occasional felicitous inconsistency of thought, to regard the sacraments as anything more, in the actual life of the Church, than symbols or means of representing spiritual realities to the physical senses. Only so can we understand the logic of his oft-repeated statement that the external rites must follow, and not precede, the internal transactions.* Only so can we ascertain both the strength and the weakness of his sacramentarianism and estimate aright his contribution to the eucharistic controversy.

But we shall reserve the exposition of this and the related topics for the next number of this REVIEW.

* See e.g., A 513c, B 601b.

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FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

VI.

REVIEWS OF
RECENT LITERATURE.

I.—APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY.

THE UNIVERSAL ELEMENTS OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION; An Attempt to Interpret Contemporary Religious Conditions. The Cole Lectures for 1905, Delivered before Vanderbilt University. By CHARLES CUTHBERT HALL, D.D., LL.D., President of the Union Theological Seminary. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 8vo; pp. 309.

In these six lectures we have an essay in the difficult work of estimating and interpreting the present day religious forces and conditions and tendencies in the Christian world. It were no mean task simply to name these, to trace them to their origin and to describe their inherent characteristics. But it is a more ambitious effort to interpret them all, requiring not only some knowledge of their natural history and spiritual significance, but also somewhat of the insight of the sage and the foresight of the seer in order to prognosticate the issue. The lecturer is duly mindful of the magnitude and delicacy of his undertaking and carefully refrains from any tone of oracular dogmatism in all that he says. He insists that he is only the interpreter and not the defender, although the warmth of his language not unfrequently gives evidence of the sympathetic advocate and earnest apologist.

Dr. Hall's tacit assumption is that Christendom is now in a state of transition. The institutional *status quo* continues, but to one who looks carefully out upon the field it appears that "many elements of an order regarded for generations as unchangeable are in process of change" (p. 15). Throughout these lectures one is able to perceive, in the lecturer's view of things, the influence of his recent visit to India and of his study of the problems of Oriental thought and life. The first lecture is upon "The Church and the Christianization of the World." Dr. Hall regards the work of missions thus far, having been conducted under denominational auspices and largely tinged with the sectarian spirit, as only preliminary and preparatory. Sectarian missions are to world evangelization what John the Baptist was to Christ. The present era of sectarian propagandism in the East is to give way to that of which it is but the scaffolding, namely, the era of interdenominational movements. Sectarianism is a distinct evil now, though it once may have been a good. Indeed, the history of the Church has only been that of successive reinterpretations of an idea, which idea in absolute perfection existed only in the mind of Christ. One of the tendencies of to-day is to deny that Christ ever organized or contemplated a Church. Paul guarded against the two evils of sectarian activities and theological departures, and thus was "the Great Churchman" who planted the seed which contained the germs of the Catholic movement of later times. The trend to-day is toward a homogeneous Church on non-sectarian lines. Dr. Hall thinks laymen are leading the

ministry in this and kindred movements, but signs are not wanting that in such matters the most conservative and obstinately obstructive elements are to be found among the laymen. One would conclude from these lectures that this longing for a great comprehensive Church is a very vague and indefinite thing; it does not contemplate ecclesiastical uniformity or ecclesiastical standards of orthodoxy, old or new. Creeds and confessions not only always have been inadequate, but from their nature they must be so.

Upon inquiry into the content of the common essence of this great Church, the irreducible minimum, Dr. Hall says that there is a very strong tendency to reduce it to the words of Jesus as we have them in the three synoptic Gospels. By way of accounting for this tendency to non-metaphysical empiricism in religious thought, he names, first, the resistance of a philosophical scholastic theology; secondly, the resistance of an apostolical theology through its identification with that ponderous scholastic theology; and thirdly, the growth of the historical method in Biblical Study. However, with this tendency Dr. Hall does not hesitate to declare himself wholly out of sympathy. He argues nobly and strongly that the distinguishing dynamic of apostolic Christianity was not only its faith in Christ, but [also its faith concerning Christ. A Christianity without a true Christology is dead. He does not fall in with that theological spirit, of which he thinks McLeod Campbell was the forerunner, making the Incarnation primary and the Atonement a category wholly subordinate to it. According to this, which Dr. Hall correctly designates as one of the most characteristic signs of the times, the Atonement was for the sake of the Incarnation, and not the Incarnation for the sake of the Atonement. The modern mind is scared away from the metaphysics of the Atonement; but, we may ask, is the metaphysics of the Incarnation any less terrifying? The lecturer's position here is very gratifying to the evangelical reader; and though he would differ from Dr. Denney in putting the highest note of Christianity upon the resurrection, rather than upon the death of Christ, yet he believes that the regrettable extreme is beginning to correct itself and he quotes Harnack as saying, "Whatever may have happened at the grave, one thing is certain: this grave is the birthplace of the indestructible belief that death is vanquished, that there is life eternal."* The converging lines which centre in Christ just now are those of reaction from substitutes for Christ in thought and life, of reaction from a pantheistic nature-worship and of a scientific study of religion. We do not see as clearly as Dr. Hall seems to the strength and relevancy of these considerations to the point in hand.

Dr. Hall's lecture on "The Constructive Office of Biblical Criticism" is to us very unsatisfactory. It may be that he regarded the scope of his lecture as limited because the theme had been narrowed to the constructive aspects of Biblical Criticism; but, even so, the general line of thought covered in his course called for a pretty full treatment of Biblical Criticism as a factor in contemporary Christianity. That that criticism has a destructive effect, if not a destructive "office," is a very patent and important fact, and yet it is a fact which Dr. Hall seems hardly to have caught sight of. He virtually identifies the implications of modern Biblical Criticism with the postulates of Protestant Christianity when he says, "Biblical Criticism implies the obligation to permit nothing to stand between the inquiring spirit of man and the Word of God" (p. 211). That is a remark which leaves a good many things unsaid; much that is said is true, but certainly Dr. Hall knows that the misuse or abuse of this discipline of Biblical Criticism has wrought such negative results as to call for a word of caution in the fair appraisal of the religious conditions of the time. He correctly traces the philosophical spirit of this Criticism to its English source in Coleridge's *Aids to Reflection and Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit*, and after a vigorous champion-

* Page 181. Quoted from Harnack's *What is Christianity?* (Eng. trans. p. 162).

ship of the warrant, the spirit and the methods of Biblical Criticism, breaks forth in an eloquent glorification of it which is unaffected by any special reference to the desupernaturalizing animus which too often actuates it, or to the disastrous consequences to evangelical faith which have too often been produced by it. We have no quarrel whatever with Biblical Criticism, but we must say that such an indiscriminate defense of it might tend to weaken the confidence of one who does not know the author's spirit in either his competency or his fairness.

The closing lecture on "The Larger Church of Christ" gathers up the results of what has already gone before. Here it is not so much the interpreter as the champion who speaks. In this larger Church the sectarian spirit, worn out and cast aside, will give way to the Brotherhood of Man. This brotherhood in the truth, the enlarged conception of the missionary function, the diviner estimate of the meaning and value of the world, and a truer understanding of the immanence of God and the universal activity of the Holy Spirit—these are in large measure due to the critical movements of the time and are the hallmarks of the Larger Church which is to come. Jerusalem with its racial exclusiveness, Constantinople with its standards of orthodoxy, Rome with its imperial symbols of power, and Geneva with its appeal to the intellectual in man—all these have had their day, but something larger and better is to take their place. It is this larger Church of Human Brotherhood for the meeting and greeting of which the West needs three things, namely: the chastening of the Anglo-Saxon spirit, the realization of the Democracy of Nations, and a deeper respect for Oriental national aims and religious aspirations (p. 305). These lectures are able, thoughtful and suggestive. The line which distinguishes between the views of the lecturer and the signs of the *Zeitgeist* which he is presenting is not easily traced, nor need we care to trace it; for his self-imposed task was not that of giving his own *credenda* but only his conception of what the present situation is. We believe that he has faithfully and truly designated some of the dominating factors of the present moment, though there is large room for latitude in "interpreting" them. Doubtless, there is going on in an important way in the world of Christian thought and action at the present time a realignment of forces and a readjustment of methods. We believe that much of this change spells progress. We seriously doubt the readiness of the Oriental world to throw off the check as well as the help of the Western "sectarian" Churches. By no means all missionaries agree with Dr. Hall on this subject, and certainly the history of the Church of Christ in Japan is not entirely reassuring. It is greatly to be feared that this creedless, structureless, non-ecclesiastical *omnium gatherum* in the East would fall an easy prey to grasping native politicians on one side, or to a thinly veneered paganism on another, or to an imposing and attractive state-churchism on another.

We believe that Protestantism, substantially unchanged, is here to stay, and that the Bible, substantially unchanged, is to be its imperishable safeguard and possession. We believe that while our little systems may have their day, any Church so large as to disregard standards of distinctively Christian belief, and to group together men under the vague and misty and meaningless symbols of Human Brotherhood, will be simply no Church at all. We believe that individualistic faith in Jesus Christ, as Atoning Saviour and Living Lord, is to have its rerudescence among the manifold reactions from the crystallized institutionalism, the devitalized confessionalism and the earth-begotten traditionalism which may haunt and harass the Church of Christ which is yet to be. We believe that there is a self-styled cosmopolitanism which is easily misled by the false notion that it is catching the many-sided spirit of the historic Christ, but which will find its truest and highest realization in bringing Christ and the World into vital touch with each other, and that in doing this—our greatest work—much that Dr. Hall sees coming may come, and much more never will.

Trenton, N. J.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

HAECKEL'S MONISM FALSE; An Examination of *The Riddle of the Universe, The Wonders of Life, The Confession of Faith of a Man of Science*, by Prof. Haeckel: Together with *Haeckel's Critics Answered*, by Joseph McCabe. By FRANK BALLARD, M.A., B.D., B.Sc., F.R.M.S., etc., Author of *The Miracles of Unbelief, Clarion Fallacies, Which Bible to Read, The Mission of Christianity, Reasonable Orthodoxy*, etc. London: Charles H. Kelley. 8vo; pp. xvi, 605. Price, 5s. net.

This is a splendid work of negative apologetics: negative, in that it is not so much constructive in form as rather a rebuttal and reply to the leading positions of Haeckel; apologetics, in that it is a fine defense of some of the great truths which lie at the foundation of Christianity. The author is not unknown. His former works have prepared the reader for a brilliant and thorough handling of any foe that may cross his path or engage his valor. He has the requisites for such a work as this: he has the argumentative temperament and he has the competent scholarship. Either were impotent without the other. That Mr. Ballard has the former is evident on every page. Plainly he likes nothing better than such a fight, wherein he who fights for victory fights for truth. He is not one whit afraid of his antagonist. He often turns the *ad hominem* with striking effect. He sees every breach in the armor of his foe, and he makes for it with cunning strength and with unerring aim. And his scholarly qualifications for such a bout are shown in his wonderfully wide acquaintance with philosophy and science, and his virile grasp and easy handling of all the great questions in dispute. Possibly not a few may doubt the call for such a book as this. We believe their doubt is not well founded. Haeckel is brilliant; his views are plausible; his books have been circulated and read to an amazing extent, perhaps more widely in Great Britain than in America. His translator and disciple is a very keen and gifted man. He was formerly a Roman Catholic priest and professor, the Very Reverend Father Antony, O.S.F., at St. Antony's, Forest Gate; but he is now Mr. Joseph McCabe, who tells the story of his transformation in his *From Rome to Rationalism*. His apostasy is another illustration of the soundness of the hard-and-fast alternative, "Rome or nothing;" and accordingly when McCabe left Rome he landed in the pit with Haeckel; and his book, *Haeckel's Critics Answered*, is classed with those of his master by Mr. Ballard in this bit of apologetic work.

It would be no easy task to write such a thorough and comprehensive review of this book as its merits call for. For it does not profess to stand alone; its very purpose and reason for being is to expose the weakness of certain other books. The success of the effort will, of course, be variously judged by various critics, each judging from his own point of view. Certainly it shows the thought and style of Haeckel to be vain, dogmatic and often unsupported, while Mr. McCabe is seen to be altogether too proud in boasting of both Haeckel's modesty and of his own. Haeckel has an easy and magisterial way of dismissing as ignorant or obsolete all who do not agree with Haeckel. It is amusing to be shown how a writer who is himself a septuagenarian accounts for the change of philosophical principles which is found in such men as Wundt, Kant, Virchow, and Du Bois Reymond by the fact that "with old age there comes a gradual decay of the brain, just as happens in all other organs." Of course, the change in each case where it betokens advancing senility is from agreement to opposition to Haeckel's Monism. Haeckel applies this same explanation to Newton, who, he says, "passed the last thirty-four years of his life in the obscure labyrinth of mystic dreams and theistic superstition"; and to the suggestion that senile declension must be reckoned with in accounting for this, Mr. Ballard is able to say that "when Newton was past Haeckel's own age he performed the mathematical feat of solving the special problem which Leibnitz had concocted for the express purpose of confounding

English mathematicians" (p. 303). Haeckel accounts for Romanes' *Thoughts on Religion*, in like manner, by what he calls one of "those psychological metamorphoses"; whereupon Canon Gore nails his words as "a malignant slander," and Dr. Burden Sanderson says, "Up to the end he preserved not only his mental vigor, but the keenest interest in his scientific pursuits" (pp. 28, 29). With this sort of argument Mr. Ballard is altogether at home; not that he uses it for himself, but that he knows how to meet it and how to handle it. Haeckel's omniscience is overawing and his oracular-like dogmatism silences any other than a brave and courageous challenge. For example, he says in his *Confession*, "If any antiquated school of purely speculative psychology still continues to uphold this irrational dogma (*i.e.*, human immortality), the fact can only be regarded as a deplorable anachronism" (p. 318); and in his *Wonders*, "We now know that the light of the flame is a sum of electric vibrations of the ether, and the soul a sum of plasma-movements in the ganglion cells. As compared with this scientific conception, the doctrine of immortality of scholastic psychology has about the same value as the materialistic conceptions of the Red Indian about a future life in Schiller's Nadowessian death-song" (p. 318). When Haeckel is discussing the origin and nature of life, he cuts the knot by announcing that "there is nothing in life to know." Mr. McCabe has so far learned from his master as to be able to make announcement of this striking discovery: "God has shrunk into an intangible cosmic principle" (p. 319); and, once more, for the sake of showing how modest is the writer, who is constantly complaining of the offensive personalities and unwarranted audacities of his foes, we may quote this time from the *Riddle*: "Monistic cosmology proved, on the basis of the law of substance, that there is no personal God; comparative and genetic psychology showed that there cannot be an immortal soul; and monistic physiology proved the futility of the assumption of free will. Finally, the science of evolution made it clear that the same eternal iron laws that rule in the inorganic world are valid too in the organic and moral world" (p. 570). Is it any wonder that Mr. Ballard is led to say that Haeckel's contentions "deserve to be termed bellicose bombast rather than systematic philosophy"?

But whoever would know the strength of the defense must read this book for himself. It is enough to say that, for any one who has been influenced by the writings of this Haeckelian school of Monism, or for any one who cares to inform himself more thoroughly concerning its characteristic positions or concerning the soundness and strength of the answer which true science and Christian philosophy can furnish, this sturdy volume would be invaluable. Simply as a contribution to controversial literature, it is delicious reading. As a vindication of the integrity of Evangelical Christianity, not unscathed and yet unchanged and unharmed by these doughty assailants, it is superb; and as, incidentally, a correct setting forth of those things which should be defended as essential and those things which may be surrendered as negligible, it is in the main, viewed on the broad common field of philosophical presupposition, of scientific support and of apologetical outlook, entirely satisfactory.

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HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

THE WORLD AS INTENTION. A Contribution to Teleology. By L. P. GRATACAP, Curator of American Museum of Natural History, New York. New York: Eaton & Mains; Cincinnati: Jennings & Graham. 8vo; pp. ix, 346. \$1.25 net.

This monograph is an able and abstract essay designed to support the thesis that the World, the Bible, Conduct and Creed, and the Church each stands for an Intention which is as yet partially and imperfectly realized, but which is on the slow way of progress to its final fulfillment. As Prolegomena, we have

extended treatises upon "The Supernatural" and upon "The Ordinates of Revelation." In the discussion of these "Ordinates" is developed what we should call the most striking thought in the book. As a question of form, we should say that the author made a mistake in introducing his discussion of this subject with an illustration which is so intricate and technical that to most minds it will poorly serve his purpose to illustrate. This is the illustration: "The ordinates of a point are those distances upon two lines at right angles to each other, from which lines produced until they intersect determine the position of the point in a plane" (pp. 53, 54). The truth which the author intends to illustrate by this is that the ordinates of revelation are need and desire. "On what we shall term the *anthropistic* side, need determines its own revelation and desire its own; on what we call the *theopistic* side, need and desire do the same. But when in *anthropism* need is strong, desire subordinate, in *theopism* need is subordinate and desire is strong; *vice versa*, when in *anthropism* desire is strong, need subordinate, in *theopism* desire is subordinate and need is strong" (p. 56). Accordingly, from man's standpoint, the Old Testament revelation was necessary and the New Testament revelation was desirable; while from God's standpoint, *vice versa*, the Old Testament revelation was desirable and the New Testament revelation was necessary. This is a suggestive seed-thought, and while the idea may not stand on all fours, it has enough in it to commend itself for thoughtful consideration.

The author's psychological study of "Intention" is sane and thorough, and his application of the principles of it to the Divine Mind is in the interest of a modernly interpreted teleology. We feel very strongly that he goes too far with such views as those of Mr. J. S. Mill in magnifying the crudities and cruelties of nature, and with what he calls "the new view" in magnifying the errors of Scripture—"its dilemmas of doctrine, perplexities of statement, probable inaccuracies and mystical explanations of facts." Of course, the greater the distance between what is and what is to be, the larger the field for the display of this element of Intention and of its gradual realization; and when any writer is so completely possessed by any one idea as this writer is with that of "Intention," he will be very likely to yield to the temptation to subordinate too much to that one favorite and comprehensive category.

Trenton, N. J.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

OUTLINES OF CHRISTIAN APOLOGETICS. For Use in Lectures. By HERMANN SCHULTZ, Ph.D. Authorized Translation from the Second Enlarged Edition (1902), by ALFRED BULL NICHOLS, Professor of German in Simmons College. 8vo; pp. xi, 328. New York: The Macmillan Company; London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1905. Catalogue price, \$1.75.

The title of this book is intended to be, and to a certain degree is, indicative of its nature. It is only an outline, a syllabus, of the author's* lectures. It "makes no other claim than that of a sketch that aims neither at giving the material exhaustively and independently nor at developing fully the reasons for the conclusions reached." It is, however, a much fuller outline than, for example, Prof. H. B. Smith's *Apologetics* and it is presented with much more regard to literary form. Indeed, Prof. Smith's work was neither revised nor prepared by himself, being simply drawn up by others from his notes and briefs; whereas Dr. Schultz has made his own outline and has himself revised and enlarged it. The result is that while it is so condensed as not to be easy reading, it is seldom obscure; and it would seem to be quite possible for any competent teacher of apologetics to read between its lines and thus to supply to his pupils

* Lately deceased.

what was in the author's mind. The term "Christian" is not so significant. In connection with apologetics it has come to have a fixed meaning. We have been accustomed to regard it as defining apologetics as the science of the proofs (1) of the necessity and consequent reality of the supernatural; (2) of the manifestation of the supernatural in history in the person and work of Christ as evidenced by miracles of act, of word, and of life; and (3) of the Bible as the supernatural and infallible record of this revelation. Until quite recently this has been the recognized content of Christian apologetics. It is not too much to say that it is its historic meaning. Dr. Schultz, however—and we are bound to admit that there are now many who agree with him in this—would state the contents of apologetics quite differently. "Its task is (1) to understand the nature and claims of religion; (2) to comprehend the historical phenomena of religion; (3) to exhibit the nature and perfection of Christianity." That is, whereas the old apologetics began with the Supernatural and the proof of his necessary existence; this new apologetics begins with so natural a phenomenon as religion and the explanation of its reasonableness: whereas the old apologetics proceeded to establish the intervention in nature of the Supernatural as witnessed by miracles, prophecy and Christian experience; the new apologetics goes on to the history and comparison of the various religions as so many developments of man's nature: and whereas the old apologetics would conclude by handing to us in the Bible the infallible record of the supernatural revelation of salvation which God has given to us in Christianity, and in it alone; the new apologetics would prove Christianity to be "the perfect religion," not by bringing out the truth as well as the unique saving power of its facts and doctrines, but by emphasizing the religious helpfulness of the personality of Christ, quite apart from the question whether or not he was and taught as the Scriptures, which he said "testify of" him, affirm. That the difference between these two kinds of apologetics is as wide as that between day and night is submitted. The difference is not only with regard to the method of proof; it is specially with regard to the object of proof. While both hold to God and to his creation and control of nature, the old apologetics would vindicate, on grounds of evidence, a religion which God has himself communicated to man from heaven; whereas the new apologetics, on grounds of feeling, would commend Christianity as the best religion which God has evolved out of human nature and by means of human nature.

Even more misleading is it to apply the term apologetics to such a work as this. Apologetics refers always to vindication. Our author has written to "establish Christianity's claim to be, for our age as for others, the perfect embodiment of religion over against those who dispute its permanent significance." This, however, it is absurd for him to attempt; and it is so for the following reasons:

1. He denies both the need and the value of rational evidence in the sphere of religion. "God," we are told, "cannot be an object of knowledge, but only of faith" (p. 101); and "the 'theology' of the Church of the disciples has as little decisive significance for our faith as do the results of the study of the life of Jesus" (p. 225). "The miracle of revelation, that God through the historical Jesus enters into intercourse with the hearts of men, condemning and approving, has simply nothing to do with the historicity of the external marvels related of Jesus, or with the question of what relation they bear to the course of nature and its law" (p. 67). Indeed, "we believe, not because of, but in spite of, the miracle" (p. 55). "For religion springs from a sense of the divine life, not from theoretic knowledge; and in order to overcome the obstacles to religion, that have their ground in sin, there is needed the rousing of right feelings, not the communication of a higher knowledge" (p. 47). "A great part of the peculiar power and joy of religion depends on the fact that a scientific proof of its truth is impossible" (p. 82). This position, however, is open to two fatal objections:

a. It is based on a false psychology. It presupposes that what are called man's different natures can operate in independence of each other. Hence, the religious and the theoretic spheres can be kept apart, and so a doctrine can have high religious value even though it have no foundation in objective fact. But the truth is that man's natures do not operate independently. They are not even themselves separate. Man has but one nature. His spiritual being is one and indivisible. It does not have even different powers. Its so-called faculties are but so many functions of one power, and these functions invariably involve each other. Intellect and will, for example, cannot be divorced; and, as Bowen has said, "feeling is a state of mind consequent on the reception of an idea." Hence, religion cannot be simply a matter of "right feelings." If "right feelings" are to be aroused, a "higher knowledge" must be communicated. In a word, that religion might be what our author affirms that it is, man would have to be other than he is.

b. The view taken of religious judgments, or judgments of value, is utterly destructive of their value. That religious judgments are peculiar and have an important place is not to be denied. Religion is animated by a practical motive. Hence, it does prize truth according to its effect on the heart and character. Further, religious judgments include an element of ethical decision. It is he "who wills to do the will of God who knows the doctrine" (John iii. 17). Finally, only the spiritually minded man can appreciate spiritual truth; for it "is spiritually judged" (1 Cor. ii. 14). In these ways at least religious judgment does differ from pure intellectual or theoretic judgment. The element of value does enter into the former, and more even than elsewhere the head does depend on the heart. As Dr. Schultz well says, "Apologetics can by itself neither convert nor save. God alone can arouse within us the faith that makes us righteous and alive" (p. 2). "No man can say that Jesus is Lord but in the Holy Spirit" (1 Col. xii. 3). All this, however, implies that the judgment of value rests on a theoretic judgment, and not *vice versa*. The spiritual helpfulness of a doctrine is conditioned on its truth to fact; its truth as a doctrine is not proved by its apparent helpfulness. The deity of Christ is a precious doctrine because it is the true interpretation of a real fact; and it would lose all its helpfulness, if his body were still lying dead in a Syrian grave. In a word, saving faith is much more than and essentially different from historical faith; but it is not independent of it. The latter is the condition of the former. It is true that "he who refuses to go beyond the boundaries of sense experience and of logic can gain no assurance of religious truths" (p. 3), but it is just as true that neither can he who in the sphere of religion insists on denying the validity of sense experience and of logic. The human spirit is not built in segments; and truth, though of diverse kinds, is always true.

2. Our author's position leaves him no infallible standard by which to establish the perfection of Christianity. He can no longer appeal to the Bible as infallible, and he does not claim to do so. He rejects the external evidences of miracle and prophecy, on which Christ fell back as attesting the divinity of his commission and that of his apostles, and therefore as guaranteeing the infallibility of their message. He prefers to go back to Christ himself. In him he learns both what Christ is and what man needs; and thus he is in a position, as he supposes, to develop his argument for the perfection of Christianity from its nature and adaptations. But how does he know what Christ is save as he can refer to what he did; and how can he know surely what Christ did unless he has an infallible record? And how can he, blinded and perverted as he is by sin, discern what he himself and men generally really need, and so determine the unique helpfulness of Christ and his religion, unless he has both a "teacher sent from God" to instruct him and an infallible record of his instructions? In a word, deny "the external marvels related of Jesus, and on the ground of which

he called on men to believe on him" (St. John xiv. 11), and you have nothing left certainly but a Christ of your own conception and an ethical standard of your own imagination. This should be the condemnation of the kind of apologetics of which Dr. Schultz's book is probably as good an example as we have. If we prefer Albrecht Ritschl, with his non-rational and non-historical makeshift for Christianity, we shall, of course, dote on our author; but if we prefer the apologetics of him who is himself "the Truth," we shall regard the work under review as no better than a travesty.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

THE FINALITY OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION. By GEORGE BURMAN FOSTER, Professor of the Philosophy of Religion. The Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago, Second Series. Volume XVI. Svo; pp. xiii, 518. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1906. Price, net, \$4.00; post-paid, \$4.22.

The material of this book was first given by Prof. Foster in two courses of lectures before the Harvard Summer School of Theology in 1902 and 1903. In response to numerous and most earnest solicitations it has been entirely worked over, put into its present elaborate form, issued as one of the volumes "in commemoration of the completion of the first ten years of the existence of the University of Chicago," and introduced to the public with the prediction, "by a high authority who has read the proof-sheets," that it will prove to be "the most important religious book of the generation"—that it will "occupy in theology a position analogous to that of Kant's *Critique* in philosophy."

The task of this pretentious volume, to quote its own words, is: "First, to disengage our eternal values from their supernaturalistic shell; to conquer the exemption of the self, grown conscious of its rights, from the tyranny of history; to make room for freedom and development as against the absolutism of ecclesiastical positivism. Secondly, since the modern world escaped the thralldom of the old static absolute but to become a victim of the fleeting and empty relativities of naturalism, it becomes us to wage war upon this new front also. If the old was being without becoming, the new is becoming without being, true being. Disengaging becoming from naturalism, we find the possibility of truth and goodness through becoming—the possibility of personality in which there is an eternal and absolute moment. Thus the principle of development, disengaged from its naturalistic construction, and the principle of personality are complementary; personality being end and not means, development being means and not end. In other words, supernaturalism excludes development—the element of truth in naturalism; naturalism excludes eternal values—the element of truth in supernaturalism; science requires the former, religion the latter. We can have eternal values without supernaturalism, and development without naturalism. But can we have eternal values and development, the relative cause of evolution and the absolute worth of personality? In this light our problem is plain: Does the idea of development, the golden mean between supernaturalism, which absolutizes a given form of the manifestation of Christianity, and naturalism, which denies absolute values in principle, constitute an *a priori* impossibility to the definite significance of Jesus in history, and to Weinell's striking phrase, 'After Jesus, it is his religion or none'?" In a word, the reviewer would add, Can we hold to development as a universal law, as science requires us to do, and yet regard Christianity as "the perfect, the consummate, the ultimate religion"? That is, can "the two ideas of development and finality be synthesized"?

In order to answer this question the author proceeds to inquire, What is "the essence of Christianity"? for clearly it is of this only that finality could be predicated. This, however, brings up "the problem of method." How are we to

know what Christianity is? We may not ask the Church as infallible, as the Romanist does; neither may we ask the Bible as inspired, as the Protestant does; nor yet may we ask the New Testament, as "setting forth the historical beginning of the Christian religion," as Wendt and his school do; nor even may we ask "the primitive gospel" and seek its kernel in "the religiosity of the present," as Harnack does. But what, after all, is that for which we are looking? What do we mean by "the essence of Christianity"? It is "the organizing and productive principle of the fullness of that phenomenon of life which we call Christianity." It "is 'a life,' and not merely dogma, or cult, or institution"; and the "determination" of this life "is, at all events, an historical task." Just here, however, is the problem. What constitutes the historical method? It is, first of all, descriptive. "It seeks to restore the complex of phenomena by the genius and skill of the constructive imagination." But when it has done this it becomes explanatory. It seeks the causes of what it has described, and in doing this it does and must rule out all "miraculous supernaturalism." These two processes, however, will not give us the essence of Christianity, indispensable though they are in our search for it. The reason is that the Christian religion is not only "an historical magnitude." "It entered into the history of humanity at a definite time, and has undergone historical unfolding and development since that time"; but, like all religion, it is intensely personal. "Now only persons can understand and interpret persons; and what person is great enough to understand and interpret Jesus?" Hence, "the impartial determination of the essence of Christianity is impossible." The personal equation is bound to enter in. That is, in this case, "determination of essence is *construction* of essence." The essence of Christianity "is not simply a datum to be received, but a reality to be created ever anew." "You simply take from the life of Jesus what you can use in your own spiritual household; and what you can use you call 'the essence,' the 'essentials.'" "Once personal, man must be free, free lord even of the essence of the Christian religion." Indeed, "the historian's exposition of Jesus will ever remain subordinate to the worth of Jesus as evinced in his practical effectiveness in the lives of his confessors." "It is not that the historical narratives are not of such a nature as to produce historical-science certainty, though that is true. It is that nowhere is historical-science certainty a cause of which religious certainty is the effect."

The author then proceeds, by means of the historical method, to get as close as he can to the historical Jesus. In this investigation he is, as he says, "wholly dependent upon a century of fine scientific work on the synoptic problem, in which he has had no part." The net result of this work has been given in Prof. Wernle's book, *Die Quellen des Lebens Jesu*; and it is from this book and from Prof. Bousset's *Was wissen wir von Jesus?* that Prof. Foster draws. "Both writers," to quote Prof. Johnson's recent admirable review of these volumes, "lead us through a comparison of the fourth Gospel with the Synoptics, and of the Synoptics with one another, to the conclusion that none of the Gospels is to be accepted as an historical document. The ultimate reason for rejection is not the lateness of date, for Wernle assigns the first three Gospels to the years 70 to 90 A.D. It is the conviction, in the case of both writers, that the Gospels give us, not the facts of the life of Jesus, but what the Church had come to believe about his life; and with both the faith of the Church is a distorting medium, so obscuring the truth as to make any consistent picture of the life or even of the teaching of Jesus impossible." As Wernle says, "We lose what for centuries has belonged to the fixed portrait of Jesus." As our author himself adds, "On the basis of the earliest or oldest sources, we can write no biography, no so-called life of Jesus." "In all the points where the faith of the primitive community itself is in movement and flux we have the greatest difficulty in laying hold of Jesus himself. These points are: Christology, pictures of the future,

belief in miracles, attitude to the law and to the nation." As to other things, however, and these the main things, it is different. "From the fullness of his parables and sayings, and from the numerous memorabilia of the moment, Jesus speaks to us as clearly and definitely as if he were our contemporary." "The closer we get to Jesus in the tradition, the more does everything dogmatic and theological recede. We see a man who through his clear word helps us rightly to understand ourselves, the world, above all else God; and who goes with us, in the extremities and conflicts of the present, as a most faithful friend and leader upon whom we may confidently rely."

In his closing chapter our author tries to be constructive. Having shown that in most respects we cannot tell what the real Jesus was, he proceeds to set forth what the real Jesus is. He is not what the real Jesus was. The latter participated in the theoretical and erroneous views of his day as to nature, as to spirits, as to the kingdom of God, as to the Messiah, as to the redemptive character of his death. His moral precepts, too, were temporary and local. With all this, however, we have nothing to do. It is the spirit and not the teaching of Jesus that we can use, and that, consequently, abides. We shall always need heroism, and in no other way can we get it so well as "by brooding over the heroic days of the Master." We shall always need impulse, and the example of Jesus will ever "supply dynamic and whisper his great 'Excelsior.' " "We shall always need faith; and while the *form* of his faith in God, the God-idea, may be changed, the *content* will hardly be surpassed." The finality of the Christian religion, therefore, would seem to amount to this, that the demand for a spirit like that which Jesus would appear to have had can never be outgrown. It must always be inspiring to all who would know God and eternal life.

So full an outline has been given of this, "the most important religious book of the generation," because it itself is its own sufficient refutation. Its positions are so radical and so absurd that simply to state what they are is the best argument against them. Nevertheless, as no outline can ever do justice to the whole subject, the following, among many other special criticisms that might be offered, may be useful to concentrate attention on some of the more significant characteristics of this alleged epoch-making book:

1. Though its material has been worked over, it itself is unfinished. Only the briefest table of contents precedes it, and no index of any kind follows it. Hence, it is most difficult to locate any item that may be needed; and this difficulty is increased by the redundancy, prolixity and frequent obscurity of the style. In a word, these chapters are still lectures: they have the limitations without the advantages of spoken discourse.

2. They are further blemished by inaccuracy of statement. But two examples may be given. One is the view of the Canon attributed to Orthodoxy. This is (p. 77) that "the Spirit witnesses to the immediate divinity of the Bible as a whole." Such, however, is not the doctrine. It never was the doctrine. "The fathers of the Reformed Churches, as little as we, sought to determine the Canon," the Bible as a whole, "which is a matter of history, on the basis of the *testimonium Spiritus sancti*, which is a matter of experience." On the latter basis they determined not the Canon but the Word of God, not the Bible as a whole but the divinity of what had been otherwise proved to be the Bible. "They treated the Scriptures as a unit because the Scriptures are a unitary apostolic book," as is proved by the testimony (not the authority, as Prof. Foster claims) of the early Church; and they then pronounced this book the Word of God because the Holy Spirit witnessed in their hearts to its truths. The other example is what is alleged to be Christianity's conception of the miracle. Thus we are told (p. 123) that "miracle is a supernatural affair occurring in *contradiction* to natural laws, through whose temporary abrogation alone it is possible,"

No such conception, however, of the miracle is held by any intelligent theologian. A miracle contradicts natural law no more than the throwing of a ball into the air contradicts gravitation. Neither does it imply its temporary abrogation. On the contrary, the miracle presupposes the continued activity of natural law. It is on the basis of natural law that the new and supernatural force to which the miracle is due operates. These and other examples that could easily be cited suggest that our author has studied the critics rather than the teachers of Christianity. Unless this were so, he could scarcely misrepresent what the veriest tyro in theology understands.

3. The volume under discussion is even more misleading than we have just seen it to be inaccurate and unfinished. What it assumes to discuss and to establish is the Finality of the Christian Religion. By the Christian Religion, however, it does not mean what always has been meant by the Christian Religion, and what is still meant by that term by almost all except our author. What has been regarded as Christianity, the system of doctrine interpretative of the redemptive acts of God, and the life consequent upon the appropriation of this doctrine—this is not Christianity. This is what must be rejected, if we are to see what Christianity is. The question, then, is not, as we at first supposed, whether the cross is to continue unto the end of time "the wisdom and the power of God unto salvation"; it is whether so much of the Jesuslike disposition as is found to be helpful and inspiring under the stress of modern life will abide so. Now, perhaps this is the true form of the question. But if it is, ought it to be expressed in the terms of the other form? Would it be right to attempt to prove the existence of a man, when really what you meant was the existence of his corpse?

4. The argument is unphilosophical and needs only to be pushed to its conclusion to be seen to be absurd.

a. This is true of the criticism of the sources of the Gospels. Why Wernle and Bousset should admit so much as they do is not clear. The latter wrote against Kalthoff's contention that no such person as Jesus ever existed, yet the only difference between them is that Kalthoff is consistent and Bousset is not. There is no reason why "the faith of the Church" should not be the foe of historical science as regards the natural elements of the Gospels as much as regards the supernatural, except that Bousset's theory will not tolerate the supernatural. That is to say, the criticism in question is purely subjective. It amounts to this: What you do not like in the narrative cannot be true. Moreover, why should the faith of the Church be the foe of historical science more than are the ruling ideas of any given age? We are aware that this is admitted, and that the principle is adopted that Jesus is true only in so far as he goes beyond his age and is new. If, however, this be granted, it amounts simply to the destruction of history, and indeed of truth altogether. If only the new be the true, then there is no abiding truth; for what is new to-day becomes old to-morrow. Then this being so, finality is inconceivable, and the distinction of the epoch-making volume under review is its absurdity.

b. It is not otherwise as regards the psychology on which our author's argument is based. This is the independence of will and intellect, of character and belief, of personality and opinions. "What is the dogmatic Jesus—critically corroded with each new world view—as compared with the human Jesus; what is Paul's theology as compared with Paul's person; what verses of the Psalms as compared with Psalmists; what messianic predictions as compared with prophets; what many narratives as compared with their narrators; what opinions as compared with history!" (p. 405). This sounds well, but what does it amount to? Would Jesus have been the same man that he was, if he had not come from heaven to do the will of his Father in the redemption of the world? Surely such a mission and the consciousness of such a mission could not but have influenced most

powerfully his character. They must have made him the personality that he was. The soul is one and indivisible. "As a man thinketh in his heart so is he." Nor is it otherwise if we regard these beliefs and opinions, these "dogmatic corrosions," as mere errors of the age. Could Jesus believe so much error and not be affected by it? Could he be at once a false Messiah and the ideal man? Could he have been the most maudlin of intellects and yet the noblest of characters? The question has only to be asked to be felt to be preposterous.

c. It is the same in the case of Prof. Foster's view of the relation of truth to spiritual life. According to him, the latter would seem to be quite independent of the former. We may reject the teachings of Christ and yet share the life of Christ. To be detached from his precepts may even be the condition of being bound to his person (p. 458). "We can be like his character only by being unlike his conduct" (p. 465). We need not, therefore, worry because historical criticism has destroyed our knowledge of the deeds and of most of the teaching of Jesus. It is precisely in this ignorance that we may hope to be inspired by his heroism, filled with his energy, animated by his faith in God and love for man. In a word, it is just because we know so little concerning him that his life can become ours and can flower forth in doctrines which, though the reverse of what Jesus taught, will still represent what Jesus really was. That is to say, our author, because truth is not the cause of the Christlike life, jumps to the conclusion that it has nothing to do with the Christlike life. Because orthodoxy never yet made a Christian, he infers that orthodoxy is the great hindrance to Christianity. Is not this, however, to confuse the cause of a thing and the condition of that cause's operation, and to argue that because the latter cannot make the thing in question, therefore it could be made much better without it? Food is never the cause of physical life. Consequently, physical life will not be what it should be until we dispense with food. Such is the logic of this epoch-making work. Perhaps it is in this altogether new logic that we have the reason why it is expected that this book will be epoch-making.

d. Of the same sort is our author's teaching as to ethical standards. He admits such. He speaks of "the morally necessary" (p. 464). He affirms the dependence of morality on religion. "Upon the religious crisis follows the moral. It is only misguided superficiality to suppose that the fate of the moral can be lastingly separated from that of the religious. The hope of some lovers of our kind, that Christian morals may abide in the moral consciousness after the Christian faith in God has perished there, is as pathetic as it is sincere" (p. 248). But if we deny the supernaturalness of Christ, how can even his faith in God (allowing that Prof. Foster's position, that the Christ of the Gospels is about as unreal as Santa Claus (p. 434), left us any ground for supposing that we knew what that faith was) become "morally necessary" for us? Of us, one with us, no more sinless than we are, how may he make himself or be made by others a law for us? A standard to be such must emanate from one who belongs to a category above us. Hence the subjectivism which is the principle and the characteristic and the crowning absurdity of this whole argument. The authority of the words of Christ comes not from them but from us. They are morally necessary "only in case they mirror the morally necessary for us and in our situation." You and I are to be the judges. We are to make our own standard. This is the great lesson of Jesus. "He fought the error that we must first know God and understand his commandments in order to know the good" (p. 471). Could there be a more sweeping denial of his fundamental assertion of the dependence of morality on religion? It comes down to this, therefore, that that only is morally necessary for a man which he happens to think to be so, and because he happens to think so. Each one of us is the law and the authority unto himself. Of what does this remind us but of the days of the Judges of

Israel, of the anarchy and savagery which then prevailed, when and because "every man did that which was right in his own eyes"?

5. Yet, as "the wrath of man" always does, so even this unfinished, inaccurate, misleading, unphilosophical discussion will "praise" God. It will do so in its clear and uncompromising refutation of naturalism. It is that system which would "explain everything by nothing" (p. 213). "Science itself, which, modernity asserts, requires naturalism, is rendered impossible by naturalism" (p. 255). Again, it will support the truth by its strong testimony to the "empirical inexplicability of Jesus" (p. 267). "This may as well be conceded"; and this admission is significant just because the Jesus spoken of is, as we have seen, but the wreck, if not the caricature, of the person and character whom we recognize by that dear name. Once more, it will help the cause of orthodox Christianity by its frank testimony to the scripturalness of its distinctive positions. Thus, while we are told that "no real theory of inspiration was elaborated till Protestant orthodoxy," still, it is repeated that "the historical basis of the theory is the Biblical view of the prophetic inspiredness," and that "all the time the presupposition is the formal divine authority of 'Word of Bible'" (p. 65). The doctrine that God is our father in the highest sense only by his election and adoption of us in Christ is more than suggested as the teaching of the Gospels (p. 490). The dogmatic system which they represent Christ as holding is clearly that of the straightest Calvinism. Of course, our Gospels attribute to him much that he never said or believed; and, of course, too, he said and believed many things which our enlightened age has come to see to be false and pernicious. For example, to apply the ethical precepts of Jesus to modern life would mean "the downfall of modern culture." "They show no interest for the morally necessary forms of modern life" (p. 407). Still, it is a good thing to be told, by one who does not accept the New Testament as from God, that the orthodox interpretation of it is correct as an interpretation. Even if it be not competent testimony, it should be of all testimony the most unbiased.

The last and greatest service, however, of the volume under review will be its exhibition of the logical results of the thinking of Sabatier and his school. By making Christian doctrine the product rather than the necessary condition of Christian life they have hoodwinked our age. They have almost made the very elect believe that the essence of Christian life is to mean well. Prof. Foster's brutal presentation of the doctrines which have resulted from such a conception of the Christian life is fitted, as is nothing else, to call a halt, and to convince even the careless that to mean well one must think rightly, to enter into the life of Christ one must know the truth as it is in Christ. If this book should prove epoch-making in any sense, this is the sense in which it will be so.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

WHY IS CHRISTIANITY TRUE? *Christian Evidences.* By E. Y. MULLINS, D.D., LL.D., President of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, Louisville, Ky. 8vo; pp. xx, 450. Chicago: Christian Culture Press. 1905. Price, \$1.50.

It is refreshing to turn from such apologetic works as have just been reviewed, and as constitute so much of the apologetic literature of our day, to this modest volume by the distinguished President of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. Dr. Mullins is well read in his subject. If he is most at home in British and American literature, he is sufficiently familiar with German and French rationalism and criticism to fall into no inaccuracy in stating their positions. He is positive rather than negative in his aim. His delight is not so much in the discussion of particular objections to Christianity as in the construction of an argument so convincing that when once it is appreciated all

opposing theories, simply because they are opposing, must be felt to be absurd. Still less has he come under the sway of the concessive spirit. He is not one of the many who "surrender so much that their productions seem to be books on Christian evidences with Christianity left out." He "believes strongly that it is a mistake to exclude any of the essential elements from the defense of Christianity, in the interest of some alleged intellectual necessity of the times." "The parts of Revelation are joined together not mechanically but organically. One piece cannot be taken away as a sample, like an ornament from a cabinet, without injury to the whole." It is just because it is only a partial Gospel that is commonly defended that the charge of inconsistency is so often and so truly brought against it. His method, too, is comprehensive. He would present all the leading arguments for Christianity and in all their forms, and in view of the limitations of space he has succeeded remarkably. It follows, of course, that his style is terse, exact, simple. Every word evidences care. In the best sense, the work is a finished product. This is so specially as regards the supplement. Here we have a full list of the books referred to in the several chapters with the references—a most valuable bibliography, "constructed on the principle of indicating to the general reader such works as are not too difficult to obtain, and which will enable him to pursue his studies of the subjects of the various chapters at greater length when desired—," a full and exact "Index of Names and Subjects, and an Index to Scripture Texts." A singularly clear analysis of the chapters in the "Table of Contents" enables one before reading the book and at a glance to get a correct idea of its drift. In view of all this, it is unfortunate that the proof-reading has been careless. At the top of page 104 and on pages 150 and 151 will be found examples of this.

President Mullins' purpose is "to show that the preponderance of evidence from the facts is overwhelmingly in favor of the view that the ground of all things is a Person, and that that person has spoken to mankind in and through Jesus Christ. There are four classes of facts for which this is the only adequate and satisfactory hypothesis. The first class of facts is presented in physical nature, the second in the New Testament revelation, the third in religious experience, and the fourth in Christian history."

To particularize the strong points in this argument would not be easy; for there are no weak ones. It may, however, not be amiss to call attention to the whole of Part I. This, though almost excessively brief, is wonderfully clear and satisfactory. With a better outline of Theism the reviewer is not familiar. Very strong also is the chapter on The Meaning of the Synoptic Picture of Jesus. We are shown conclusively that the supernatural Christ is the only hypothesis that will account adequately for the unity and consistency of the picture. Very happy, too, is the treatment of miracles. The emphasis is transferred from them as interruptions of the physical order, which, of course, they are admitted to be, to their harmony with the moral order, which many overlook. We see that, Christ being what He was, it would have been a miracle or wonder had the natural order not been transcended by Him and His disciples. It would have been preternatural had the Supernatural himself never wrought the supernatural. Hence, while it is true that Christ commends to us the miracles, they are so congruous with his person and claims as further and powerfully to confirm these. Perhaps the most striking, as it is the most original part, of the volume is the argument from Christian experience. Its data are given. It is analyzed. Its evidence is presented and verified. Christ's necessary relation to it is set forth and proved. All this is done in the light of the writings of such psychologists as James, Starbuck, *et id omne genus*. It is clearly shown that not by the "idealistic Christ of Tolstoi, nor by the historical Christ of Ritschl, nor by the Christ of recent psychology, but only by a Christ who is present in the person and power

of his Spirit can the miracles of Christian experience be explained." And so we come, lastly, to the argument from the facts of history. Here the best feature, and it is one of the best in the book, is the reason given for the unique success of Christianity. We do not remember to have seen it exactly so stated before, but we do not believe that it could be more accurately set forth. "Christianity, as distinct from other religions, represents the divine initiative in salvation. In other faiths man seeks God. In this God seeks man. The incarnation of God in Christ is a reversal of the world movement in religion." Hence its triumph. It is from above; they are from beneath.

We recall but two sentences that we should like to see changed in the second edition that ought to be demanded. One is on page 136, and is, "The facts of the Christian religion are not dependent on critical theories as to origin." The other is on page 299, and is, "He who has known Christ's power in his own life is convinced, whatever may be true as to date and authorship of the books of the Bible." Does not this savor too much of Ritschlianism to represent at all President Mullins? Facts are not made facts by their explanation, and we believe in Christ as our Saviour before we inquire as to the date and authorship of the Gospels. Nevertheless, does not the question whether a fact is a fact depend on the explanation given of it? And if such critical theories could be established as would justify Kalthoff's contention that there never was a Jesus, could what we call Christian experience be either Christian or real? In a word, while we often believe without logic, could we continue to believe against logic?

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

COMPARATIVE RELIGION: Its Genesis and Growth. By LOUIS HENRY JORDAN, B.D. (Edin.), Late Special Lecturer in Comparative Religion at the University of Chicago. With an Introduction by Principal FAIRBAIRN, D.D., LL.D., D.Litt. 8vo; pp. xix, 668. New York. Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons. 1905. Price, \$3.50 net.

"The title of this book explains at once its purpose and its scope. It embodies an attempt to give the reader a condensed yet comprehensive view of the origin, progress, and aim of the science of Comparative Religion." It is to be followed by two other volumes: one on *Comparative Religion, Its Principles and Problems*; the other on *Comparative Religion, Its Opportunity and Outlook*. This work, therefore, is not a treatise in Comparative Religion, but on Comparative Religion. "In the light of my own difficulties as a beginner," the author writes, "I have sought to produce a Handbook which would prove serviceable for serious study, or for merely occasional and general reference."

In carrying out this most praiseworthy purpose, Mr. Jordan has evidently been most diligent. As Principal Fairbairn says in his Introduction, "He has made many sacrifices for the work which he now gives to the world. He has for years sundered many friendships, surrendered his pastoral ties, wandered and dwelt in lands remote from his delightful Canadian home, that he might with a freer and more unfettered mind pursue the studies which have taken shape in this book. He has not only steeped himself in the literature of his subject, but he has also visited the great Universities, English, Continental or American, where he could by the help, whether of the library or the living voice, acquaint himself with what had been and was being thought and accomplished in the field which he has cultivated with such remarkable pains."

The skill with which our author has arranged for us the results of this research is as admirable as has been his industry. "Technical language has been avoided, while all foreign terms likely to present difficulty have been translated. Copious references to authorities have, of course, invariably been given; but these indispensable aids to the exact scholar, while sufficiently numerous to stimulate and

direct the inquirer's interest, have not been unduly multiplied. Several Charts which speak directly to the eye, and a series of Notes which will especially appeal to those who have been attracted to Comparative Religion by something more than a passing curiosity, have been furnished in an ample Appendix. In addition to a selection of relevant 'Literature' prefixed to each chapter, a carefully compiled Bibliography has been supplied, together with two valuable Indices; of which the earlier one will be found to contain, in compact and alphabetical form, various items of information which are constantly in demand, but which are often entirely inaccessible when they chance to be most required." In a word, all the information which one entering on the study of Comparative Religion would need for his guidance is given by Mr. Jordan, and in such form that it can be turned up instantly. We wish that for every one, even of the older sciences, so full and so convenient a Handbook might be provided.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

THE IMMANENCE OF GOD. By BORDEN P. BOWNE, Professor of Philosophy in Boston University. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Company; Cambridge: The Riverside Press. 1905. Pp. 153.

In this little volume Prof. Bowne seeks to point out the harmony of science and the Christian religion by his conception of the Immanence of God, which conception he applies to nature, history, the Bible and religion, in four successive chapters. His motive is to disclose what he terms "the great heresy of popular thought respecting religion." This heresy is "the undivineness of the natural and the unnaturalness of the divine." This error, he says, has its root in "a deistic and mechanical philosophy." On the one hand, this philosophy produces a bald naturalism which banishes God from the universe and gives us a "self-sufficient mechanical nature;" and on the other hand, it gives rise to a false supernaturalism which sees God only in that which is marvellous and contrary to nature. Prof. Bowne wishes to substitute for these false ideas the conception of "a supernatural natural" or "a natural which forever depends on the divine will and purpose; and a natural supernatural, that is, a divine causality which proceeds according to orderly methods in the realization of its aims." In other words, according to Prof. Bowne, everything is natural when viewed from the standpoint of its mode of occurrence, and everything is supernatural when viewed from the standpoint of its ultimate origin in the divine causality and its continued dependence upon God.

There is much that is useful in this little book in its emphasis on the immanence of God against a mechanical and deistic conception of God's relation to the world. But we think that there is very much of error mingled with the truth. It is well to emphasize God's providential control over all things; but when all the supernaturalism that is allowed is the truth that everything ultimately depends upon God, and when no room is left for any direct supernaturalism in the *mode* of the divine activities—in short, when we regard everything as supernatural from one standpoint, and natural from another point of view—then we have already ruled out the supernatural as it appears in the Christianity of the New Testament writers. Of course, Prof. Bowne will not admit this. In fact, one chapter is devoted to a vindication of the Bible and Christianity from his standpoint. But at this point there is much confusion in his book. The man who, besides admitting the immanence of God and having an adequate view of the mode of the Divine Providence, also admits that God's activities are not all summed up under the head of His providential control, but admits that the strictly supernatural also occurs in the mode of the divine activities—this man is represented by Prof. Bowne as thinking of nature as a mere background or setting for continuous prodigies and of history as the sphere of the chaotic and arbitrary, as denying all the human

element in the Bible as well as all God's providential activities which have entered into the production of Scripture, as holding to a dictation theory of inspiration, and finally as finding true religious experience in extraordinary and chaotic states of mind; so that Prof. Bowne feels called upon to remind his reader that "opium, ether and chloroform are no key to the kingdom of heaven," and adds that not "the narcotized, but the pure in heart are to see God." Thus it will be seen that in his polemic against what he calls "false supernaturalism" Prof. Bowne has confused the believer in the pure supernaturalism of the Scripture account of Christianity with a mechanical theologian of his own making, and then has held the latter up to ridicule. It scarcely need be said that this is no argument against the kind of supernaturalism which finds room for the immediate efficiency of God and the direct intrusion of His power into the phenomenal sphere, while at the same time rejecting the mechanical deism against which Prof. Bowne's polemic is directed. On the other hand, the author's position which subsumes all the modes of the divine activity under the category of the natural, using the term supernatural simply to denote the dependence of all things ultimately upon God, falls far short of the pure supernaturalism of the Scriptures, and leaves no basis for the claim of Christianity to be the *only* supernatural religion.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

II.—EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY.

KURZGEFASSTER KOMMENTAR ZU DEN HEILIGEN SCHRIFTEN ALTEN UND NEUEN TESTAMENTES, SOWIE ZU DEN APOKRYPHEN. DIE GENESIS ÜBERSETZT UND AUSGELEGT. VON D. DR. HERMANN L. STRACK, a. o. Professor der Theologie zu Berlin. Zweite, neubearbeitete Auflage. München: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung Oskar Beck. 1905. 16mo; S. xii, 180. Geheftet, 3 M. 50 pf.; in Leinwand geb., 4 M. 50 pf.

Prof. Strack's conservative attitude on questions relating to the Old Testament is well known. He accepts the analysis of the Hexateuch into five documents, JEPHD; but he contends that these hypothetical documents are essentially authentic in their narrative. They proceed from different pens, indeed; they are written with different purposes in view, by men of different temperaments and literary gifts and with different interests in life; and accordingly there are differences in the style and diction of the narratives, and different incidents or, when the events are the same, different particulars find record. But the accounts are not contradictory. Prof. Strack is pursuing the ordinary practice of modern historians in dealing with the sources of history. It is the accepted canon of modern historical criticism to discern harmony in the midst of diversity; to recognize the different aspects of an event in the several descriptions of it left by different men, and to adjust and combine them in a complete picture; to gather the fragments of history from various sources and construct the full story of the event. Yet this method is in utter contrast, and a rebuke, to the mode of dealing with these hypothetical documents of the Pentateuch as Biblical criticism is commonly carried on on both sides of the Atlantic.

The book before us is part of a comprehensive work on the first four books of the Old Testament by the same author and planned on the same lines, in Strack and Zöckler's *Kurzgefasster Kommentar*. In this revised edition interest centres mainly in the contributions of the author to the solution of the problems peculiar to the book of Genesis, particularly in regard to primitive history and the personality of the patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and Joseph. On both these subjects the new edition has been enriched. The author has reviewed the material offered by the Assyriologists with the soberness of cautious scholarship, lifting up a voice of warning regarding even the identification of Hammurabi

with Amraphel. In wholesome contrast with a bevy of writers on primitive history, he penetrates beneath the legendary to the historical. Compare, for example, the statement concerning En-me-dur-an-ki on page 24. The full evidence in the case is not always presented. It is frequently possible to strengthen his argument; for instance: (1) By pointing out the fact that the first chapter of Genesis is reflected in the first tablet of the Assyrian Creation Series and not in the Marduk section, as is so often carelessly assumed from superficial resemblances. The Marduk section is a sun myth. The first tablet is introductory; and in it the chronological order is recorded in which the gods came into existence. If for these divinities there be substituted the natural objects which the divine names signify, a chronological account is rendered, like that in Genesis, of the physical development of the universe (*Genesis and Semitic Tradition*, p. 10ff.; *Presbyterian and Reformed Review*, 1895, p. 746ff.). (2) By reinforcing his argument for the "days" in the first chapter of Genesis by a reference to the peculiarity of the Hebrew enumeration, in which the days are not made definite by the definite article, and to the first tablet of the Creation Series, according to which a long period of time elapsed between the successive appearance of the gods, i.e., of the natural objects they represent. (3) By pointing out that not the seventh day only, but each recurring seventh portion of time, whether day, month or year, was consecrated.

Prof. Strack defends both the historical character of Israel's patriarchal narratives and the personality of the patriarchs. The historicity of the narrative is, of course, fundamental, but the question of the personality of the patriarchs may be separated for the nonce and considered apart. To the argument that the names are tribal, which is drawn from the longevity assigned to the patriarchs—175 years to Abraham, 180 to Isaac, 147 to Jacob, and 110 to Joseph (though Joseph's life is not extraordinary in its length, being frequently paralleled in modern times)—the author had already replied. Prof. Strack believes, as others have believed, that their great length of life may be explained, or at least brought within our comprehension, by certain facts. (1) The personal piety of these men and the simplicity of their mode of life. (2) Sin and anxiety work physical injury. The balance between the vital forces of man in his pristine innocency and the destructive forces of care and sin in man in his fallen state was reached gradually. The longevity of the patriarchs is "the after glow of Eden's glory."

The positive argument for the personal individuality of the patriarchs, separated from the general proof of the historicity of the narrative, consists of three particulars. (1) According to our Lord, Abraham was a man, an ancestor of the Jews and a hero of the faith. For example, Matt. viii. 11, "many shall come . . . and sit down with Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, in the kingdom"; and also Matt. xxii. 31, 32; Luke xvi. 22; John viii. 51-59. Like Prof. Briggs (in *The Presbyterian Review* for 1883, pp. 77-81), Prof. Strack contends that Jesus did not pronounce on the question of the authorship of the Pentateuch, but did positively teach the historical character of the pentateuchal narrative. (2) The prophets allude to the patriarchs as individual men. For instance, Isa. xxix. 22; Jer. xxxiii. 26; Ezek. xxxiii. 24; Deutero-Isa. xli. 8 and li. 2; Hos. xii. 3, 4; Amos vii. 9. (3) The prominence of the personal element in the narratives. In genealogical registers, indeed, tribes and families are often spoken of as individuals; but the line of demarcation between a genealogy and a circumstantial narrative is recognizable. And in regard to the patriarchal history, the interpretation is exceedingly artificial which seeks to explain the whole record as a story about a race or tribe, yet written as though it concerned the experiences of several individuals. Prof. Strack exemplifies the truth of his conviction that "scientific work and faith in the God of miracles and prophecy are compatible with each other."

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

DER SABBAT IM ALTEN TESTAMENT UND IM ALTJÜDISCHEN RELIGIÖSEN ABERGLAUBEN. Von Lic. theol. FRIEDRICH BOHN, Hilfsprediger am Bethlehemstift, Ludwigslust. Gütersloh: Druck und Verlag von C. Bertelsmann. 1905. Pp. 97.

The main purport of this treatise is to compare the analogies of the Sabbath, outside of the sphere of special revelation and the post-revelation Judaistic development of the Sabbath, with the Old Testament law and Old Testament observance of this sacred day. The author at the outset establishes the fact that the Old Testament references to the Sabbath move along large lines and are practically the same throughout. He takes strong ground against the Wellhausenian construction, which would artificially make out a development even here, and finds it symptomatic of the fundamental fault of the Wellhausenian method in general: "The objection that must be made to this historical method is that it goes too far in unnaturally generalizing what is only a peculiar subjective mode of representation in the several documents, and applying this to the development of the institution in the life of the people and in the popular conception" (p. 10).

The writer's own standpoint is that of belief in a primeval revelation and a revelation in the patriarchal period, although he does not quite seem to have the courage to say that the Sabbath was instituted by God at creation (p. 49), but contents himself with pointing out how in the statement of Gen. ii. 3, the two important theological principles of the close conjunction of God's life and that of man, and of the sharp distinction between creation and further development, are laid down (p. 52). Instead of from evolutionistic constructionism, he expects progress in the field of Old Testament science from the study of the Assyrio-Babylonian inscriptions and of the Rabbinical literature. This, however, does not lead him to rashly posit a direct historic connection between the Assyrian Sabatu and the Assyrian "seventh-days" of the month Elul on the one hand and the Old Testament Sabbath on the other. Besides reminding the reader that the "seventh-days" have as yet been established for the month Elul only, which as an intercalary month may have had this peculiar feature to itself, he carefully points out the difference between this Assyrian institution and the Sabbath of Israel. The former applied to certain classes, the latter to the whole people. In Assyria we meet with detailed concrete prohibitions of a superstitious character, in Israel with the large suspension of all work. In Assyria all religious activities were interrupted, in Israel religious activities were intensified on the Sabbath. The day was bound to the phases of the moon in Assyria, in Israel it was independent of these. And the most important difference of all, these days were *dies infausti* in Assyria, in which by quietism and self-effacement man sought to appease the Deity; in the Old Testament the Sabbath is a day of joy and of fellowship with God. It should be remembered, however, that in regard to some of these points Assyriologists differ among themselves. Most interesting is that part of the treatise in which the author shows how the Rabbinical development of later Judaism more and more assimilated the Sabbath to the superstitions of paganism, by introducing into its observance the principles of quietism and asceticism, and that to a remarkable extent this development bears the identical features that meet us in the religious calendars of Assyria, Egypt and other nations. To be sure, even in the midst of this retrograde movement the inherent force of the revelation-truth regarding the Sabbath continued to assert itself, as may be seen from this, that the Talmudic regulations tend in some respects to modify the rigor of extreme quietism. Thus until the very end the contact and comparison of the Old Testament institution with human superstition bears eloquent witness to the superiority and divine origin of the former.

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

THE MESSAGES OF THE BIBLE: THE MESSAGES OF THE APOCALYPTICAL WRITERS
The Books of Daniel and Revelation and Some Uncanonical Apocalypses,
with Historical Introductions and a Free Rendering in Paraphrase. By
FRANK CHAMBERLAIN PORTER, Ph.D., D.D., Winkley Professor of Biblical
Theology in Yale University. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905.
Pp. xxii, 367.

The professed purpose of Dr. Porter is "to make historical methods and results in this region familiar to a somewhat wider circle of readers and students of the Bible." He proceeds on the theory, widely entertained, that "the writer of Daniel . . . wrote in the age of Antiochus" Epiphanes (p. 27), perhaps working up "traditions running actually far back" (pp. 30, 103).

The work is a popularization of recent theories regarding the Book of Daniel. It does not seem to us to be impartial, either in its criticism or its interpretation. The historical character of the Book of Daniel has not been established or destroyed by investigation, but is still in debate. Archæology has, indeed, cleared up many matters that half a century ago were obscure; but archæology is not yet able to speak the final word. The candid mind frankly acknowledges these facts. But in this book the debatable questions and enigmatical passages are levied upon and claimed as errors in history. The author should know and frankly declare that Daniel i. 1, far from containing a chronological error, is abundantly justified by the different methods of dating in vogue among the scribes. In the Book of Daniel the usual Babylonian method is followed, and the accession year of a king is reckoned by itself and the succeeding civil year is treated as the first regnal year; whereas Jeremiah and Palestinian writers of his day generally numbered the accession year of Nebuchadnezzar his first year. And this difference in regard to dating goes far to show that the writer of the Book of Daniel did not depend upon the older Hebrew Scriptures for his knowledge of history, as Prof. Porter frequently assumes, but had reliable sources of information of his own. Again, the four kingdoms are understood to be the Babylonian, the Median, the Persian and the Grecian. This exposition has many advocates. But to maintain it, it is necessary to interpret the second and third kingdoms contrary to the usage of the Book of Daniel itself, which repeatedly speaks of the Medes and Persians as one (v. 28; vi. 8; and especially viii. 20). Capital is, indeed, commonly made out of the reference to a little horn in the prophecy of the seventh chapter and again in the eighth chapter. In the latter instance there is a general agreement among expositors that Antiochus Epiphanes is intended; and advocates of the theory that the Median and Persian kingdoms are distinct world-empires in the thought of the prophet urge that the little horn of the seventh chapter must also denote Antiochus, leaving out of consideration the fact that "horn" is the standing symbol for king and kingdom, and that the horn is described as little, not necessarily because referring to the same person, who in fact was not little, but because in each vision a horn is seen in the act of sprouting and, hence, is at first little. This interpretation of the four kingdoms ignores the fact also that the Roman power had already appeared in the time of Antiochus Epiphanes and shown its supremacy over the Syrian monarchy at Magnesia, and that it is actually within the horizon of the writer of the Book of Daniel (xi. 18, 30). Impartial investigation, we think, would acknowledge these facts and allow them due weight. The date of the book is, of course, not determined thereby, but its scope and purpose are. Nor would the judicial mind accept with confidence results which depend upon the free invention of history to support a theory. The interpreters who expound the prophecy regarding the ten horns in the seventh chapter as kings of Syria are forced to sin in this respect, and there are many transgressors among the commentators on the prophecy of the seventy weeks and in connection with the references to the evenings-mornings, times and days.

Biblical scholarship is concerned to know the literary character and the purpose of the Book of Daniel. Enough is already known to justify the belief that the result of scholarly investigation, whatever it be, will find its place naturally in the doctrine of Holy Scripture. The Book of Daniel certainly contains an apocalypse. The mysteries of the past, present and future are unveiled, and God's plan in history is disclosed. The question before Biblical scholars is at what point in the unfolding of the plan of God the author lived. Was he a contemporary of Cyrus the Persian, looking backward over the reign of Nebuchadnezzar and forward over kingdoms yet to arise; or did he live still later, in the time of Antiochus Epiphanes for instance, and have a longer retrospect but likewise a prospect, a view to the horizon where the kingdom of heaven should dawn? This problem is not to be solved by a citation of Greek and Persian words from the book, nor even by the assertion of historical blunders, although the proof of error or accuracy in the narrative has importance as a factor in determining the classification of the book and its date and author. There are two prior and fundamental questions. Is the Aramaic section the restoration of a mutilated Hebrew text, as has been mooted, borrowed from an Aramaic translation and filling a lacuna? If it is, no argument is afforded by the diction for the date of the original composition. Especially has the text been edited and interpolated? If chapter eleven, for example, contains additions to the original text, it was probably at first, when it left the hands of its author, a prophecy sketching in outline and with fewest particulars the struggles and triumphs of the kingdom of God. On the other hand, if the text of the eleventh chapter is immaculate, its date must be discussed largely in the light of the analogy of prophecy, in comparison, for example, with the Book of Isaiah. Not until these great questions have been settled can a satisfactory conclusion be reached regarding the nature and intention of the Book of Daniel. Investigation cannot, of course, tarry for the settlement of the text and the explanation of the use of the two languages. It must deal with each matter, even with isolated and unrelated matters, as soon as the means for their elucidation exists, and thereby it advances toward the end and has been advancing. But it never forgets the tentative character of its work, and that the conclusion of the whole matter must wait for the settlement of these questions.

In his treatment of the Book of Revelation the author is under the domination of the views expressed by Prof. Gunkel in his *Schöpfung und Chaos*. After a minute examination of the argument of Prof. Gunkel, and a careful investigation of the archaeological evidence adduced, real and fictitious, we became convinced that his views lack a substantial foundation (*Presbyterian and Reformed Review*, 1895, pp. 745-753). Furthermore, Prof. Porter seeks an historical counterpart for the minutiae of the sublime pictures in the Revelation, and he consequently entertains and expresses a low estimate of the work of Dr. Milligan, who thinks that the Apocalypse describes church history in its principles rather than in concrete details. We confess to a preference for Dr. Milligan's broader view. On this interpretation the Revelation of St. John the Divine is simple, intelligible and effective.

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

BABYLONISCHES IM NEUEN TESTAMENT. VON DR. ALFRED JEREMIAS, Pfarrer der Lutherkirche zu Leipzig. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung. 1905. 8vo, pp. 132.

Nobody has given himself with more diligence to the ascertainment of the gains which students of the Christian Scriptures may hope to reap from the new Babylonian learning than Dr. Alfred Jeremias. Standing between the Assyriologists who know no theology and the theologians who know no Assyriology, he has diligently sought to mediate between the new learning and the old faith. Like

Prof. Cheyne, when speaking of Prof. Hugo Winckler, Dr. Jeremias is unwilling that "the deficient interest in religion and excessive self-reliance" of the leaders in the new "school of comparative religion" should prevent our learning from them whenever they really have something to teach. And that they have much to teach, he has no manner of doubt. Indeed, if he would not permit the Zimmers and Delitzsches and Cheynes to interpret the entirety of Christianity as but the latest reworking of the Babylonian myths, he is yet not only prepared to allow but ready to contend for a large influence of the Babylonian mythology in moulding the modes of conception and the forms of expression in which the religion of revelation has been enshrined. In his view, the mythological conception of the universe which had been framed by the Babylonians, and the philosophy of history which was based on it, had become, in one form or another, the foundation stone of the whole speculative thought of the Orient; and as they enshrined not merely many truths of natural religion, but also a certain measure of presage, on the basis of natural religion, of the course of the divine government of the world, they lent themselves not unkindly to the use of the vehicles of revelation in their endeavor to present the religion of revelation in human forms. In a series of recent works Dr. Jeremias has been seeking to illustrate this thesis with respect to the Old Testament; in the present booklet he turns also to the New and places by the side of his *Das Alte Testament im Lichte des Alten Orients* a *Babylonisches im Neuen Testament*, which simply carries forward into the later books the principles of interpretation already attempted for the earlier. That Dr. Jeremias is over-enthusiastic in his estimate of the value of the Babylonian mythology as an organon of interpretation of the Biblical deposit, it does not seem to us that it requires an Assyriologist to discover. There is much that he suggests with more or less confidence which seems far-fetched; and an attentive reading of the present booklet has left upon our mind an impression that the gain that is to come to us from the new learning for a better understanding of the text of the New Testament is unexpectedly small. A phrase here and there may have a new light thrown upon it; a clearer sense is given us of the essentially Oriental nature of the popular background of confused conceptions upon which the New Testament revelation is thrown up; a deeper conviction is conveyed to us of the futility of the varied attempts which have been made to explain the supernatural accompaniments of the Revelation of God in Christ out of the natural conditions in the midst of which it was communicated to men. Beyond this, there is little or nothing that has been suggested which materially illuminates the page of Scripture.

Dr. Jeremias begins the pamphlet before us by explaining his point of view as over against the "comparative-religion school," which would fain look upon Christianity as simply a syncretistic religion, the end-term (so far) of a long natural development; and which would deny to Christianity, therefore, all absoluteness and finality. He looks upon Christianity as something unique and absolute, to which not merely relative but absolute perfection is to be ascribed; as offering in Jesus Christ that communion with God which was vainly sought in nature by other religions. He does not therefore, however, suppose that a study of the history of religion in the world has no value to us as Christians; we may, on the contrary, he thinks, be helped by such a study to a deeper comprehension of Christianity. And that for two reasons: (1) The revelation of God which found its completion in our Saviour Jesus Christ was humanly mediated. It found points of connection on all sides with what existed about it, and set forth its truths by means of the media of expression which the actual world in the midst of which it appeared supplied. The New Testament books, just as truly as those of the Old Testament, came into being under the influence of the culture of the old Orient, and we must allow for the reflection of this culture in the form in which they present their truths if we would truly gather out from them the kernel of their message to us. (2)

This actual world into which God's revelation in Christ entered was no God-forsaken world. God has never deserted the world, but was leading the "nations" also steadily up to the Revelation in Christ. As λόγος σπερματικός, He was the principle of all their thinking on divine things, and we must not be surprised to find that the nature-worship of the heathen contained shadow-pictures of the truth. In Christianity there has come to realization what the worship of the "initiates" strove after and never could quite attain to.

It is clear that these principles amount in effect merely to the recognition on the one side that men must speak and think, too, in the forms accessible to them, so that all their conceptions and modes of expression are colored by their culture-forms; and on the other, that Jesus Christ is the "desired of all nations" as well as the promised Redeemer of God's people, so that all the deeper yearnings of sin-stricken humanity find their satisfaction in Him no less than the definite predictions of the Prophets. There seems little room for difference here except in the way in which these general judgments are applied for the actual explanation of the New Testament. They may be so applied that all that is distinctive of Christianity is pronounced merely a human mode of conceiving the fundamental doctrines of natural religion—inevitable to men of the time in which Christianity arose, heirs as they were of the old Oriental culture-forms which dominated the thought of the then world. An effort so to apply them may be read, as well as elsewhere, in Dr. Cheyne's little book, called *Bible Problems*. It is not so that Dr. Jeremias, we are happy to say, applies them, despite what we must regard as the exaggerated use he is inclined to make of the Babylonian mythology as an instrument of interpretation. He protests continually, that to him Christianity is a supernatural religion; and that the supernatural facts which lie at its basis in the New Testament records of its origin really happened; and that the supernatural power it has brought into the world really energizes in the souls of men to their salvation. "The contention which has of late been made," he remarks, "according to which the Christology and eschatology of the Christian Church are to be explained on the basis of a syncretism of the Gospel of Jesus with the mythology of the old religions, rests on the mistake which supposes that by a criticism of the form it has explained the religious realities which have been brought to expression in it" (p. 46). Indeed, he seems at times to protest almost too much, leaving a suspicion in the mind of the reader that the writer does not feel quite sure that the suggestions he makes of the influence of the Babylonian ideas upon the fabric of the New Testament will appear to all perfectly compatible with the divine origin of the facts, teachings, customs recorded. At all events, however, Dr. Jeremias leaves no room for doubt that he wishes to preserve intact the entire Christian tradition as historically authenticated fact and divinely taught doctrine. And that being understood, the rest is a matter of detail, about which men may reason commodiously.

The two things Dr. Jeremias has set out to show are, it will be remembered, that there are forms of conception and expression to be found in the New Testament records which are ultimately derived from the old Babylonian mythology; and that there are traceable in the New Testament record indications of the Divine purpose to meet in Christianity the needs of the human heart which were given expression in the old Babylonian mythology. Illustrations of the former of these two phenomena he finds most richly in the figurative language of the Apocalypse; and it appears likely not only that an expression here and there may be best explained by the assumption of a coloring derived ultimately from the traditions of Babylonian culture, but that occasionally a whole scene—like that say in the fourth and fifth chapters of the Apocalypse—may find a richer meaning from the suggestions of such reminiscences. Our attention is attracted most strongly, however, to the second phenomenon. What Dr. Jeremias urges here is not merely that "there appears in Christianity the realization of 'all that God

spoke unto the fathers by the prophets by divers portions and in divers manners," but also that "what to the heathen was their deepest desire and longing, and was hidden by them, as precious treasure, under the sheath of their myths, became fact and truth through Him who without myth can say, 'Lo, I make all things new,' " (p. 12). A good illustration of what is intended may be supplied by Dr. Jeremias' discussion of "the history of our Lord's birth in Matthew." It has been customary to explain Matthew's Gospel as ordered with a view (among other things) to setting forth Jesus as the Messiah promised to God's people. Dr. Jeremias thinks we may see in it also a purpose to set forth Jesus as the Great Redeemer-King, the expectation of whom, on the foundation of the cycle of the returning sun, had passed into the mythology of the peoples. "The author of the history of the childhood of Jesus in Matt. i. *sq.*, also," he remarks, "knew the old Oriental myth of the Redeemer-King. The whole Gospel is permeated with the purpose of portraying Jesus as the King. In the beginnings of the life of Jesus the author shows how the history builds schemata, how the occurrences that accompanied the advent of the Redeemer-King correspond continually, trait by trait, not merely with what the prophets have predicted, but with what the myths of the East have foreboded" (pp. 46, 47). Instances in point he finds in the genealogical register, which he supposes to have the "tendency" to show that with the birth of this King the new "world-year" has begun—supported as it is by other indications that now a dividing of the world-ages has arrived (Matt. x. 35, xi. 11); in the star of the Magi and their gifts; in the persecution of the Child and His flight to Egypt; in the angel greeting; and in the very Virgin-birth itself. These things he supposes not (as others of more rationalistic tendencies suppose) to have been (unconsciously) invented by the myth-taught people, but to have been (consciously) selected by the writer for record, in order to commend Jesus to the myth-loving people as the reality hidden in the mythical constructions. Dr. Jeremias is express and iterant that the occurrences recorded by Matthew were real occurrences; it is only Matthew's selection of just these occurrences for record that is under discussion. His contention is that the history sets forth "as reality what the myth of the ancients had forboded as the fulfillment of the hope of humanity" (p. 49). There is something, indeed, one step deeper than this. He suggests not merely that these things are recorded by the author of the first Gospel to meet the presage of the myth; but, as we have seen, even that in some sense they happened for the same end. "I trust," writes Dr. Jeremias, "I shall not be misunderstood. That the Christian tradition of the Virgin-birth was a product of the Oriental myth we deny absolutely on the ground of the standpoint which has been explained. Here, too, the Oriental myth supplies the shadow of a religious reality which came to manifestation when 'the fullness of the time was come' " (p. 48).

It certainly is an attractive idea that in the ordering of the circumstances of His gift to the world of a Redeemer from sin, the good Lord should have reached down to those who were, however fumblingly, feeling after Him, if haply they might find Him, and should have smoothed the pathway for their feet. Something like this seems in any event to have occurred when He led the astrologers of the East to the infant Jesus by a star which guided them to His presence. May we believe that this incident was but typical of the whole course of the Divine dealing with the peoples; and that in bringing the Redeemer of the world into the earth He took care so to present Him to the contemplation of men that they should see in Him the real Redeemer-King for whom they had been hoping—the "Saviour" whom the founder of every new Oriental dynasty had vainly proclaimed himself to be; whom, latest of all, Augustus was being declared to be at that very moment—the Saviour of man, who had brought peace at last to earth? There certainly seems to be no reason why something like this should not be the case; and this

would carry with it the recognition that even the Virgin-birth may well have had this as one of the (subsidiary) ends it served in the economy of the Divine salvation, that it should mark out to the seekers after redemption among the nations this Child as the real Redeemer-King of whom all their fathers had spoken and upon whom all their hopes had been built. The real questions which confront us with a book like Dr. Jeremias' in our hand do not concern this question of principle, but rather certain questions of fact: whether a sound or plausible case has been made out by him for the actual ordering of Providence which is assumed and for the indications of it in the New Testament record which are suggested; and whether in his attempt to make out this case Dr. Jeremias has restrained himself in all his suggestions within the limits set by it, or may not have in some instances gone far enough afield to raise the question whether, in case his contentions be allowed, something more than what he pleads for may not seem to follow. We prefer not to attempt a categorical response to these questions, but to leave the matter with the simple acknowledgment that we have our doubts.

The reader may, perhaps, expect a brief formal description of the contents of Dr. Jeremias' booklet before we close. After an Introduction in which he explains the standpoint of his investigation, he presents his material in ten chapters. The earlier of these are fundamental; the later deal more with details. In the first he seeks to uncover traces of the great "calendar-myth of the dying and conquering Year-God." These he seeks in turn in the figurative language of the Apocalypse, in the mocking of the suffering Jesus, and in the parable of the dying seed-corn. This chapter closes with an Appendix on the seven planets in the Apocalypse. The second chapter deals with the manifestation of the Redeemer-King, and the third seeks to discover traces of these myths in the "Birth-history of Jesus in Matthew." In the fourth a Babylonian origin is suggested for the idea of heavenly correspondents to earthly things, as exhibited, for example, in the case of "the holy things" in the Epistle to the Hebrews. The fifth treats of "The Book of Life," and the sixth of "The Water, Bread and Stone of Life," all of which are pronounced Babylonian conceptions. The "Angels" are the subject of the eighth chapter; and that of the ninth is "The Twelve Apostles and the Zodiac, the Four Evangelists and the four corners of the earth"—on the face of it an overstrained parallel. Finally, in the tenth chapter a long series of "Oriental Glosses on particular passages in the New Testament" are given, naturally of very varied character. Probably Dr. Jeremias has called attention to most of the matters in which the influence of Babylonian conceptions in the New Testament can be plausibly suggested. It was well to have attention directed to them: and it is possible that even after their sifting something of importance may remain. But sifting is obviously necessary: and it is just as obvious that there is much that is suggested which after the sifting will not remain.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

CHRISTIANITY IN TALMUD AND MIDRASH. By R. TRAVERS HERFORD, B.A.
London: Williams & Norgate. 1903. Pp. x, 449. 18s. net.

This book presents a careful collection and a minute discussion of all the references in Talmud and Midrash to Jesus and to the heresy designated by these Jewish writings as Minuth. The contents are ordered as follows: In the introduction the author renders a more than usually lucid account of what is comprised in the voluminous bodies called Talmud and Midrash and of how other collections stand related to these, an account for which many a reader who, not being a Jewish scholar, has lost his way in the confusing terminology as frequently given, will be grateful to him. The first division is made up of the passages

collected from the Rabbinical literature: A. Passages relating to Jesus; B. Passages relating to Minim, Minuth. Under the latter head the subdivisions are: 1. Descriptions and definitions of Minim and Minuth; 2. Polemical encounters between Jesus and Minim; 3. Polemical allusions to Minim, Minuth; 4. Miscellaneous passages referring to Minim. The second division deals with the general results obtained by induction from the collected data and deals again separately with the Jesus-tradition and the Minim. In the division containing the passages the author proceeds very methodically, giving each time a careful translation, to which he appends a commentary and a discussion of the chronology of the Rabbinical authorities on whose names the tradition is given. (At the close of the book all these passages are printed in the original.) The comments will to many a reader give the first inkling of what the text means, so obscure and enigmatical is the latter in many places. The author exhibits great skill in expounding it, although occasionally he himself is compelled to own that he does not understand the meaning of a given passage. On the whole, however, the reader who would expect the subject to be dry and uninteresting will be agreeably disappointed. There is a peculiar quaintness and naïveté in these conceits of the Jewish Rabbis which gives them a certain charm; especially their interpretations of Old Testament passages in the interest of meeting the heretical exegesis of the Minim are remarkable for their Rabbinical flavor. As regards the concrete results from the point of view of an increase of our knowledge of the life of Jesus and the early history of Christianity, it must be confessed, and the author himself confesses, that these are immaterial. We learn nothing new from these Jewish traditions that we did not know from the Gospels. In no case, as the author himself tells us, is there ground to correct the Gospel account by the help of the Talmud; it is the Gospel account rather which throws light upon the Talmudic tradition (p. 82). In many cases it is evident that we have to deal not with genuine Jewish tradition come down independently of the Gospel tradition or the written Gospels, but simply with a Jewish version or perversion of knowledge obtained from the Christian sources themselves. Perhaps, the most extreme wing of New Testament critics, who have in all seriousness begun to doubt whether Jesus was an historical character, can learn from the Talmudic accounts about Jeshu ben Pan̄tiri, Jeshu ha-Nōtzri and Ben Stada that Jesus really existed (p. 359). Whether genuine Jewish tradition lies at the basis of the statement that Jesus was born out of wedlock, so that we should have here a Jewish version of the fact of the supernatural birth of the Saviour, is not easy to tell. The peculiar representation that Jesus' mother was "Miriam, the dresser of women's hair" (Miriam Magaddela Nashaia), which seems to be an echo of Miriam Magdalaah, i.e., Mary Magdalene, is not decisive, since this might just as well have been derived from historic reminiscence as from confused knowledge of Gospel tradition. Taking the facts as a whole, it is astounding how little impression the great figure of Jesus seems to have made upon the legal tradition of Judaism. Not even the central fact of his having laid claim to Messiahship has been remembered. So confused is the account that his death is located at Lūd, instead of at Jerusalem, and attributed to stoning. The question might be put whether, in view of these meagre results, the amount of labor spent upon this part of the work seems justified. Still, even though the results are small and negative, it is of some value to have thoroughly canvassed the subject and established the facts once for all. It should be added that, according to a note on page 35, the author professes to have done no more in the section relating to Jesus, than to rearrange the material and modify some of the conclusions of Laible's work, *Jesus Christus im Talmud* (1871).

Of a more substantial and positive character are the discussion of the passages relating to Minim and Minuth and the conclusions drawn from this in the second

division of the book. As to the name Min, Herford is of the opinion that it can be explained from the common Hebrew word Min, denoting kind, species (cfr. "sect," "hairetis"), but that through the similarity between its synonym Zan ("kind") and Zanah, "to commit whoredom," Min obtained the connotation of one who commits religious adultery. The Minim are not heretics in general, but a peculiar kind of heretics coördinated with other kinds. They are as a rule Jews by birth, and their specific difference seems to be that they are false at heart and do not necessarily proclaim their apostasy, because they continue to mingle with the Jews in their religion. The author reaches the conclusion that in most cases the Minim of the Talmud are Jewish Christians. In this he takes issue with Friedländer, who in a series of writings has advocated the view that the Minim are mostly Gnostics, and built on the references to them the theory that there was Gnosticism among the Jews of a præ-Christian date. Herford adduces many convincing reasons for reducing the extravagant claims of Friedländer, and exposes in not a few points the inexcusable carelessness of the latter's method of argumentation. He shows that what is said about the belief of the Minim in "the two powers" cannot relate to the Gnostic Demiurge and the highest God, because these two powers are associated in the creation of the world, in which the Supreme God of the Gnostics had no share, and that therefore there must be a reference in these "two powers" to the Christian association of Jesus as divine with the Father. Still, it remains somewhat doubtful in our mind whether our author has not run into the opposite extreme to Friedländer's contention, by hardly allowing any place at all for the Gnostics among the Minim. In his recent work, *Die religiösen Bewegungen innerhalb des Judenthums im Zeitalter Jesu* (1905), Friedländer emphatically repudiates the view imputed to him, as if all Minim were without exception Jewish Gnostics. Some reserve may also be in place with reference to the peculiar form in which Herford carries out his hypothesis of the Jewish-Christian character of the Minim. He thinks that the references to "the two powers" presuppose a knowledge of the Christology of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and makes this Epistle mark a crisis in the history of Jewish Christianity, viz., the definite separation of the Jewish Christians from the synagogue, by which they became Minim. The question of the nationality of those to whom the Epistle is addressed is still *sub judice*, and in simply taking for granted that the first readers were Jewish Christians in Palestine the author gives the impression of dealing too easily with a difficult problem simply because it fits in with his hypothesis. But apart from this, we believe that the whole tenor of the Epistle is against the view that the readers were now first awaking to the consciousness of their religious distinctness from Judaism. Nor is it necessary to account for the Talmudic references to the Christian Christology and other points by assuming knowledge of this one particular writing of the New Testament. We certainly may believe that in the time spoken of there were Jewish Christians in Palestine who believed in the divinity of Jesus.

A slip is the statement on page 106 that James the brother of Jesus was put to death 44 A.D.

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

BIBLISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT. In Verbindung mit der Redaktion der "Biblischen Studien" herausgegeben von Dr. JOH. GÖTTSCHEG, Professor an der Universität München, und Dr. JOS. SICKENBERGER, Professor an der Universität Würzburg. Dritter Jahrgang. Freiburg im Breisgau: Herdersche Verlagshandlung. 1905. St. Louis, Mo.: 17 South Broadway. Quarterly. Price, \$3.50.

This periodical, published by Roman Catholic scholars, has during the past year fully maintained its previous high character both for learning and conserva-

tism. A glance at the contents and the perusal of a few articles will convince the unprejudiced reader that the Romanist position does not *de facto* render participation in the work of modern Biblical scholarship impossible. The repertoire here offered us is most varied in its character; philological articles alternate with historical and exegetical ones, such as that of Prof. Bardenhewer on the Annunciation to Mary, in which the recent attacks upon the historicity of the Virgin-birth are ably criticised, a subject since more extensively treated by the same author in Heft 5 of Vol. 10 of the *Biblische Studien*. All the articles give evidence of a thorough acquaintance with the work of modern Biblical scholarship and of, what is often missed in Protestant periodicals of the same grade, full appreciation of its theological and religious trend. A very valuable feature is the Bibliography at the close of each number, which includes not only books but also the periodical literature, and, instead of giving mere titles, orients the reader at once by briefly stating the content, scope and conclusions of each book or article. This Bibliography, in point of view of completeness and instructiveness, ranks with the best. Protestant workers in the field of Biblical learning, especially of the conservative corps, cannot afford to ignore the *Biblische Zeitschrift* or the work of these Catholic scholars in general. That there is reason to think they sometimes do so, appears from the following sentence, taken from the bibliographical note on Zahn's Commentary on Galatians: "We hope that this excellent commentary will not be ignored by Catholic theologians, in the same way as it (Zahn's Commentary) ignores the Catholic literature."

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

III.—HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.

A. H. FRANCKES BRIEFE AN DEN GRAFEN HEINRICH XXIV J. L. REUSS ZU KÖSTRITZ UND SEINE GEMAHLIN ELEONORE AUS DEN JAHREN 1704 BIS 1727. Herausgegeben von Dr. BERTHOLD SCHMIDT und Lic. theol. OTTO MEUSEL. Leipzig, 1905. Svo; pp. iv, 170. Price, 3 Marks.

This collection of ninety-eight letters by Francke to Count Henry XXIV of Reuss and his wife, together with a number of related documents, is of considerable interest and value as a contribution to our knowledge of the early history of Pietism. It had been surmised over a decade ago that success would sooner or later attend a diligent search for epistolary evidence of the intimate relations known to have existed between Prof. Francke and the reigning house of Reuss. In the year 1903, accordingly, two bundles of documents were found in the archives of Köstritz, one labeled "Original letters of the sainted Prof. Francke, written for the most part *ad Illustrissimum XXIV*," but containing also hints for the replies by the Count, as well as other notices, all of the year 1714; and the other consisting chiefly of autograph letters of Francke to the same Count and his wife, but containing also letters to and from other persons.

The present volume is devoted primarily to the letters written by Francke. The "Introduction" gives the necessary information concerning the leading personages named in the correspondence, especially the deeply pious and the enthusiastically pietistic prince himself, while the voluminous notes throw all possible light upon the biographical and historical problems raised by these new documents. The editorial work has been done with great thoroughness. On the whole, the letters tell us more about the prince and his influential labors in behalf of Pietism than of the character of their author. It is, indeed, a pleasing revelation here given us of a singularly devout, benevolent and broad-minded ruler. The letters also clearly show how speedily Pietism became a

dominant force in the highest social circles, and with what skillful diplomacy Francke furthered his cause.

Among the supplementary documents there is a most interesting one containing the plan for the establishment of the *Seminarium Ministerii Ecclesiastici* and the *Seminarium Eligantioris Litteraturæ* at Halle.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

THE ENGLAND AND HOLLAND OF THE PILGRIMS. By the late HENRY MARTYN DEXTER, D.D., LL.D., and his Son, MORTON DEXTER. Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1905. 8vo; pp. xii, 673. Price, \$3.50.

Most of the contents of this work, we are told in the Preface, were collected by the late Dr. Henry M. Dexter. "To this task he devoted much of his time for many years. Of Pilgrim descent and born almost within sight of Plymouth Rock, he desired to give to the world a more complete record than any which had been written of the religious and ecclesiastical movements in England that made the Pilgrims what they were, and of their emigration to Holland and their life there before they came to America. But he died in 1890, leaving his chosen task unaccomplished."

With the zeal of a dutiful love, however, as well as with consummate ability, a second generation of the Dexter family has carried to a fitting completion the noble undertaking begun so many decades ago by the greatest authority of the time in all matters pertaining to the history of Congregationalism. The chief credit for the book as it lies before us is due to the late author's son, Morton Dexter. He rewrote the first five chapters left him by his father in the crude form of a provisional draft, and edited the sixth and concluding chapter, contributed by Prof. Franklin B. Dexter, of Yale University.

The work is one that confers an unwonted honor upon American historiography. A vast literature has been minutely explored; archæological evidence of all sorts has been laboriously gathered in English and Dutch cities; a wealth of information pertaining to the economic, political, educational, social and religious life in the England and Holland of the Pilgrims is admirably distributed through the exceedingly valuable notes and made to give color and character to the comprehensive picture of the text: the most painstaking research is happily combined with critical acumen, judicial composure and fairness, and a very satisfactory degree of artistic skill in the presentation of the facts and the development of the theme. Here and there, it must be confessed, the pages are burdened with too affluent a material, and even without the extenuating circumstances usually found in his embarrassingly rich contributions, the style sometimes becomes rather heavy: animation and attractiveness are sacrificed to accuracy and thoroughness. In some portions of the volume, moreover, the writer's interest is so exclusively archæological and in others so one-sidedly biographical that the reader is tempted to question the propriety of phrasing the title in such big terms. We cheerfully confess that new light has been thrown into many a dark nook and corner of English Reformation history; but the emphasis might with greater advantage, we think, have been placed somewhat less strongly upon the merely archæological items of the story, interestingly as these are presented, and far more heavily upon those spiritual forces which after all, in the case of the Puritan development as in all other periods of history, are of primary and fundamental importance. But, taken as a whole, the book is the best treatment we have of the rise and early stages of Puritanism. The press-work is in keeping with the unusual excellencies of the author's achievement in this volume.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

IV.—SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

THE USE OF THE SCRIPTURES IN THEOLOGY. The Nathaniel William Taylor Lectures for 1905. Given before the Divinity School of Yale University. By WILLIAM NEWTON CLARKE, D.D., Professor of Christian Theology in Colgate University. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1906. Pp. 170.

This latest book by Dr. Clarke, as the title tells us, contains the Taylor lectures for 1905, which were delivered before the Divinity School of Yale University.

The motive of these lectures is to vindicate a distinction between a "Christian element" in the Scriptures and a "non-Christian element," and thus to relieve Christian theology from the Scriptures as an external and infallible authority in religious knowledge, and to enable the Christian theologian to take a freer attitude toward the Bible than he could take if he accepted the Church's doctrine of the authority of Scripture.

There are four lectures. The first lecture discusses the "problem," and "shows how the wrong using of the Scriptures has wrought harm to Theology." By a wrong use Dr. Clarke means a use which submits to the Scriptures as an external authority in matters of religious knowledge; which use, we may remark in passing, was just the use our Lord and His Apostles made of the Old Testament. Dr. Clarke, however, maintains that such a use of the Scriptures is wrong, and moreover brings with it grievous burdens, such as the high doctrine of Inspiration, the necessity of making the Bible agree with itself, "the proof-text method" in theology, and a certain dependence on the results of historical criticism.

Before we turn to the second lecture, in which the author seeks to announce a principle which will relieve Christian Theology from these burdens, we must stop for a moment to call attention to certain questions which will inevitably arise in the mind of every careful reader of this first lecture.

To begin with, there is a certain amount of confusion of statement which is liable to mislead. Thus Dr. Clarke asks (p. 10) whether the Bible is "an equal book, to be received as teaching truth in all its parts." A few pages farther on, in discussing the above question, he makes the assertion that "for the purposes of theology the Scriptures are not of equal value throughout." Does any Christian theologian suppose that they are? Does anyone suppose that the books of Kings and Chronicles are as valuable to theology as the Gospel of John? But this is quite another matter from the question whether the Bible is to be received "as teaching truth in all its parts." We would do Dr. Clarke injustice, however, were we to suppose that he is guilty of a confusion of thought as well as of statement. For it becomes abundantly evident, as one reads on, that the statement that the Scriptures are not of equal value for theology rests upon the author's idea that they are not all equally true. In fact, he believes that much that is erroneous is mingled with the truth which they contain.

Still another matter calls for remark before we consider the author's position. He speaks of a "popular religious" view of the Bible as opposed to a "scholarly view." The former is the view that the Scriptures are absolutely authoritative in religious knowledge, because of the high doctrine of the divine influences which have entered into their production; the latter or "scholarly view" is that view which is able to discriminate between the true and the false in the Scriptures. Now this characterization of these two views of the Bible is quite misleading. It is quite true that the doctrine of the authority and infallibility of Scripture may be called a popular view in the sense that it is the view which the plain man has of his Bible. And the reason why he looks at his Bible in this way is because this so-called "popular religious" view is writ large upon the pages of his New Testament as the view which Christ and His Apostles held, and also because the

plain man goes to his Bible without any *a priori* assumptions which would necessitate his going through the Scripture with the purpose of eliminating parts of it. Moreover, it is also quite true that a host of modern scholars, while forced to admit that this high view of Scripture was the view of Christ and His Apostles, have, nevertheless, felt themselves compelled to give up this view. But Dr. Clarke's statement leaves on one the impression that, in speaking of a "popular religious" view and a "scholarly" view of Scripture, he means to imply that the former rests upon sentiment and tradition, and the latter upon evidence. If this is what is meant, then the statement is not only misleading but is also false. The evidence for the high view of Scripture is the evidence that Christ and His Apostles are trustworthy as teachers of doctrine, and this evidence is the evidence which indicates Christianity as a supernatural religion. This being the case, it is putting it somewhat mildly to say that the burden of proof rests upon the so-called "scholarly" view of Scripture. Dr. Clarke, however, is not one of those whose exegesis is so scientific, objective, and untrammelled that he is willing to admit that the "high" view of Scripture is the view of Christ and His Apostles, while rejecting it himself. For he tells us (p. 25) that no such claim is made by the Scripture writers, and that there is no proof of this view. This is a remarkable statement, and in making it Dr. Clarke sets himself in opposition to the results of the best scientific exegesis of modern times, whether it be rationalistic or evangelical; for it is quite generally admitted by the best modern exegesis, whether the exegete be of those who follow our Lord and His Apostles as doctrinal guides or of those who do not, that this high doctrine of Scripture was that held by our Lord and His Apostles.

We should like, if the limits of this notice permitted, to show that the Church's doctrine of the inspiration and authority of the Scriptures by no means necessitates the "proof-text method" in theology. Dr. Clarke thinks that it does, but we do not think that he has succeeded in showing that this is so. We should like also to discuss the question whether one who occupies Dr. Clarke's position is really independent to any degree of the results of historical criticism. But the limits of this notice compel us to pass on to the "principle" by which the true is to be separated from the false in Scripture.

This question is taken up in the second lecture which discusses "The Principle, or how theology in using the Scriptures must be loyal to the one great distinction that is found within them." This principle, briefly, is that "the Christian element in the Scriptures is the indispensable and formative element in Christian theology, and is the only element in the Scriptures which Christian theology is either required or permitted to receive as contributing to its substance." We quite agree with Dr. Clarke when he says (p. 55) that this principle calls for some defining. We ask with him, "Where in the Bible is the Christian element to be found?" "How much does it include?" "How is it to be distinguished and identified?" These questions Dr. Clarke admits are difficult ones, but he says that they can be answered. The Christian element in the Scriptures, he tells us, cannot be identified with the New Testament, or with the record of Christ's life, or even with the words of Jesus. These would be too external and too "local" tests. The test of what is Christian is internal, and is formulated by Dr. Clarke as follows (p. 56): "That is Christian which enters into or accords with the view of divine realities which Jesus Christ revealed." But how are we to determine what does thus accord, and what is therefore Christian? Dr. Clarke tells us that the Christian element is determined by a revelation of God which is a "power," "a life," "inspiring" us, "transforming" us. It is a "revelation in life, conveyed through experience." Dr. Clarke does not mean that this Christian experience or Christian consciousness is the source of Christian theology. It is that which enables us to pick out the Christian element, and to separate it from

the non-Christian element in the Scriptures. But this is a purely subjective standard for religious truth. It is a mistake to suppose that the teaching of Christ is thus made the standard. The norm of truth is rather a vague and indefinite view of God and spiritual things which is sifted out from our Lord's teaching after it has been put through the alembic of the Christian life and the Christian consciousness. And since there is no such thing as Christian consciousness in the abstract, it must of course be the consciousness of each individual who theologizes, whether it be Dr. Clarke or Pfleiderer or Harnack, to cite but a few examples.

That the Scriptures, including the teaching of Christ, are thus subjected to the Christian consciousness by Dr. Clarke can be seen from his statements. It is not by sifting out Christ's words and seeking to interpret them; he tells us rather that it is by a "spiritual vision," where "deep calls unto deep," that we are to discern what in the Bible is Christian. This, we repeat, is pure subjectivism and gives no objective standard of truth at all. Dr. Clarke, however, foresees that this objection will be made, and meets it simply by a flat denial and the affirmation that in this way alone can we get a true standard. He says (p. 73): "As to the removal of the objective standard of Christianity, I deny that our principle leaves us without such a standard. I affirm that by it alone can we obtain a true one. When we say that Christianity is a body of truth discerned by the powers that are given us for discernment of truth, have we not set forth a standard?" The obvious reply to this question is that of course we thus have a standard, but that it is a purely subjective one. And the assumption which underlies Dr. Clarke's statement shows that his standard is purely subjective. For he continues in the immediate context: "I am assuming, indeed, that we believe in the reality of large spiritual truth, discernible by human powers divinely influenced." By this Dr. Clarke evidently means, not that spiritual illumination enables us to understand the Scriptures, but that it is by spiritual illumination that we are to separate the true from the false in the Scriptures. But this, we repeat, is to subject and subordinate the Scriptures to the illuminated Christian consciousness. And this, we add, is to trust to a light that is not unmingled with darkness. Is there any reason in Scripture or out of Scripture to suppose that spiritual illumination removes all at once the noetic effects of sin? Is there any reason for hope that the spiritual blindness of the natural man is removed all at once by regeneration? We for our part can entertain no such hope, and we are forced to the conclusion that this "principle" of Dr. Clarke is after all a purely subjective and arbitrary one which will enable each Christian to select from the Bible, and even from the teaching of Jesus, just what pleases him. It is by a similar principle that Sabatier has fixed on the altruism in our Lord's teaching and named it Christianity, or made Christianity to consist in it. It is by similar "principles" that we have the Christianity of Pfleiderer or of Harnack, as contrasted with the Christianity of the New Testament. And if Dr. Clarke's Christianity contains more of the Gospel than does that of Sabatier or Pfleiderer or Harnack, it is in spite of his "principle" of using the Scriptures, and not because of it.

Having thus seen the nature of this "principle," perhaps we may dispense with following Dr. Clarke as he traces the results of its application. This he does in lectures three and four, which show respectively the negative and positive results for Christian theology of the application of this principle of using the Scriptures.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

V.—PRACTICAL THEOLOGY.

THE GARDEN OF NUTS. Mystical Expositions, with an Essay on Christian Mysticism. By the REV. W. ROBERTSON NICOLL, M.A., LL.D. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1905. Small 8vo; pp. x, 232.

This little volume contains a lecture delivered at the Glasgow Summer School of Theology in 1905 on Christian Mysticism, followed by perhaps a dozen brief expositions, reprinted from the *British Weekly*. Dr. Nicoll takes kindly to the mystical mood and maintains that Vaughn's *Hours with the Mystics*, while ahead of its time, was wholly inadequate as an exposition of Mysticism, and that Dr. Inge's book, though that of an able scholar, is too much devoted to the dogmatic side and is almost undisguisedly hostile in tone and spirit. Dr. Nicoll likes the theological comprehensiveness of Christian Mysticism, and illustrates its merits in this respect at some length in connection with the doctrines of the Atonement and of Scripture. "The mystic knows every Christian doctrine is profounder than it seems, that the mystery grows as the light grows, and that only in the heart and vision of God is there ultimate repose" (p. 52). The brief papers which follow are beautiful in form and delightfully devotional in spirit. They proceed on the broad presumption "that every delineation of the righteous is in the end a picture of the Lord Jesus Christ, and of him alone" (p. 111); and so, instead of eliminating the messianic element from the Old Testament, he sees it everywhere.

Trenton.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

THE WORK OF PREACHING. A Book for the Classroom and Study. By ARTHUR HOYT, D.D., Professor of Homiletics and Sociology in the Auburn Theological Seminary. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1905. Pp. viii, 355. Price, \$1.50.

In this volume, dedicated to the men of his classes, "who have helped to make teaching an increasing privilege and joy," the Auburn Professor of Homiletics has furnished a very useful and altogether admirable treatise on the "Work of Preaching." He has everywhere sought to be practical and helpful, adapting the few basal laws of oral and written discourse to the peculiar needs of the twentieth century pulpit. The maximum of individual liberty is guaranteed to every preacher, and the suggestions that crowd every page are marked by simplicity, candor and sanity. Dr. Hoyt rides no homiletic hobbies, but pleads, in several cases even against Phelps, for greater freedom of method in the pulpit. He has happily succeeded in enlivening even his most didactic paragraphs with striking illustrations, humorous comment, and appropriate testimonials from the great masters of the art of preaching, especially those of the last century in England and America. The style is fresh, epigrammatic, vigorous, and withal convincing with the force of plain common sense. Disclaiming all attempts at an original or even thorough discussion of homiletics as a science, but trying above all to teach men how to tell the gospel message to twentieth century hearers, whose confidence in the utility of the average sermon as a means of grace is likely to stand in a somewhat ominous relation to their profound insensibility to the sinfulness of their sin, Dr. Hoyt has said many excellent things that cannot but interest seminary students and also "busy men in the ministry, helping them to measure their work, and to renew their ideal of preaching and their faith in its power."

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

THE GIST OF THE SERMON. An Old Message for Young Men. By REV. HERBERT C. ALLEMAN. Philadelphia: Lutheran Publication Society. Svo, pp. 230.

This is a charming little book on the lessons of Ecclesiastes. It is as full of good things as an egg is full of meat. The comments presented on the various theories of life propounded by the inspired author are fresh and forceful, and the wealth of literary allusions, as well as the apt citations of striking illustrations from history and contemporary life, indicates on every page a fine culture. The literary quality of the work deserves special mention. It possesses distinction of style—we think we are not praising too highly. It is very readable. The reader's attention is held to the very end. The average friend of the Bible, we suspect, will want to read every page after he has read the first paragraph. The author modestly states in the preface that the work is "based on the ground-plan of *The Quest of the Chief Good*, by Rev. Samuel Cox, D.D., the great English exegete"; but clearly enough of the author's own study and style are in evidence to forbid regarding his voice as an echo of another's message. The book is timely in view of the pessimistic spirit of our day. It is an excellent little study, and it cannot fail to prove suggestive and spiritually helpful to every thoughtful and open-hearted reader.

Cranford, N. J.

GEORGE FRANCIS GREENE.

CHRISTIANITY AND PATRIOTISM. With Pertinent Extracts from Other Essays. By COUNT LEO TOLSTOY. Translated by PAUL BORGER and Others. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co. 1905. Paper covered. Pp. 98.

The chief of the essays which compose this little volume are "Christianity and Patriotism"; "Answer to the Riddle of Life" (translated by Ernest H. Crosby), and "Views on the Russo-Japanese War." Tolstoy probably impresses the average American thinker as having a decided strain of *queerness*; but he is undoubtedly one of the most remarkable men living, and we can recall no man on earth who in so large a sense may be said to have, in the name of Christianity, a message for the nations, for humanity. He is an extremist in his declaration of the doctrine of non-resistance; but the leaders of thought in Christian lands will do well to heed his words concerning the sinfulness of war, and to mark how easily and nobly he pricks the bubble of Chauvinism. We wish that every clergyman and especially every school-teacher in America would read the chapter which gives the title to this book.

Cranford, N. J.

GEORGE FRANCIS GREENE.

THE WESTMINSTER TEACHER TRAINING COURSE. Second Year. A Series of Forty Lessons, Designed for Use in Teacher Training Classes. Edited by J. R. MILLER, D.D. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. 1905. Pp. vi, 115.

A neatly printed, paper-covered manual for use in teachers' classes in Presbyterian Sunday-schools. There are parts devoted to the study of the books of the New Testament; Church history; Christian doctrine; the work of soul-winning; Presbyterian church government and the Boards, and Christian service in the Sunday-school. Each of these parts is written by an expert. We have here milk for pedagogical babes in the Church, if the expression is permissible; but it is condensed milk, and of good quality. It would be well if every Presbyterian Sunday-school teacher were to possess a copy of the manual and master every paragraph of it.

Cranford, N. J.

GEORGE FRANCIS GREENE.

THE INSPIRATION OF OUR FAITH. Sermons. By JOHN WATSON, D.D. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1905. 8vo, pp. 359.

A characteristic volume of twenty-nine sermons by the brilliant author of *Beside the Bonnie Brier Bush*. In literary quality and in spiritual feeling these sermons are of a very high order, and they will be welcomed by a large number who count themselves admirers of their distinguished author. There is one quality of Dr. Watson that reminds us of Bushnell: the suggestive and happy phrasing of his titles, e.g., "Jesus' Criticism of Emotion," "The Passion of God," "Worldliness a Frame of Mind," etc. But here the parallel ends; for while Dr. Watson has a lightness of touch that Bushnell lacked, the stream of his thought is not so deep—he lacks the originality of our great American divine. Dr. Watson seems to hate logic as an instrument of Biblical scholarship, and he loves to approach the treasure-house of Scripture with the feeling and method of the poet; but we sometimes wish he had sat for a year or two at the feet of Charles Hodge, who saw no inconsistency between the logic of correct thinking and the heart of a rich devotion. Sometimes we feel that our author approaches the border-line of error too closely for our comfort, as in his sermon on "Jesus' Appreciation of Morality," based on the text, "Then Jesus beholding him loved him." The idea is that Jesus loved the man because of the good that was in him. We quote: "When Jesus considered this young man's life the Master loved him, and He did not love what was not good." Are we to understand, then, that the Father of the Prodigal loved his son because of the latter's goodness; and in the light of the teaching that "God commendeth his love toward us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us," are we to hold that intrinsic moral excellence in man is the basis of God's grace? Probably Dr. Watson would not have his words carry this implication; but now and again in his brilliant sentences, as here, we seem to detect at least the suggestion of a false note.

Cranford, N. J.

GEORGE FRANCIS GREENE.

CHRISTUS LIBERATOR. An Outline Study of Africa. By ELLEN C. PARSONS, M.A. Introduction by SIR HARRY H. JOHNSTON, K.C.B. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1905. 8vo, pp. 309.

This is the fifth volume of the series issued by the Central Committee of the Women's Boards on the United Study of Missions. To cover in manuals of 300 pages the civilization, religion and missions of such countries as India and China was a difficult task, but that seems easy compared with Miss Parsons' brave venture of compassing vast and diversified Africa in a like space. One wonders what method of omission or compression the author will adopt in the making of the little volume that must be at once a comprehensive text-book and sufficiently readable to interest. The Introduction upon the Geography, Races and History of Africa by Sir Harry H. Thompson and the body of the book by Miss Parsons are in marked contrast. The former, who has been allowed more than his share of the pages, contributes a thoroughly scientific and most valuable treatise; but it is dry and profitable only through careful study with a better map than the poor affair the book provides. The latter does not give a scientifically constructed narrative of missions. Having thoroughly mastered the many-sided subject for herself, she gives the reader in a rapid survey the impression, the salient and typical incidents, and especially acquaintanceship with the notable personages of Africa's history, missions and native Church. The book is alive with missionary spirit.

The writer's point of view is expressed in the title, *Christus Liberator*. It is Africa in bondage to ignorance, superstition, fear, greed and political ambitions; and in process of redemption from all these by the Christ through varied instru-

mentalities, but especially through missions. The writer displays the optimism of faith. The book may not prove entirely satisfactory as a text-book; it is sure to be a valuable contribution to the awakening of a broad, comprehensive and sympathetic view of Africa and its woes, and of missions as a heroic and ever more promising deliverance from them. A well-made Table of Societies, Bibliography and Index are appended.

Princeton.

PAUL MARTIN.

MANUAL FOR COMMUNICANTS' CLASSES. Prepared by Direction of the General Assembly by J. R. MILLER. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath-school Work. 1905. 12mo, pp. 42. 10 cts.

The *Manual* owes its origin to the conviction, general to the ministry, that those uniting with the Church should do so more intelligently than is the wont, and that a single conference of a few minutes with the Pastor and Session is not sufficient for the necessary instruction. The wholesome custom of holding communicants' classes is growing and should be encouraged. The well-known author of books of devotion and practical religion is peculiarly fitted to supply the outline of the matter to be considered in such classes. For the training needed is spiritual and practical—not the formal mastery of so much Scripture, Catechism or Creed as the condition of admission to the communion. The six lessons have for their subjects: What Christ is to us; What it is to be a Christian; Helps—means of grace; Why unite with the Church? Duties of a Church Member; The Lord's Supper. The treatment is simple, Scriptural and sympathetic. Where classes are precluded the booklet will prove suggestive to ministers in dealing with candidates, and is very suitable to put into the hands of candidates themselves.

Princeton.

PAUL MARTIN.

BREAD AND SALT FROM THE WORD OF GOD. In Sixteen Sermons by THEODOR ZAHN, Theol.D., Hon. Litt.D. (Cambridge), Professor of Theology in the University of Erlangen. Translated by C. S. BURN and A. E. BURN, D.D. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1905. 8vo; pp. 306.

These sermons are selected from those preached during a long service as University preacher, and so are typical of the honored German New Testament scholar, teacher and author who preached them. In form, at least, they bear the characteristics which distinguish the German from the English and American pulpits. The sermons are almost uniformly introduced by an allusion to the day of the Church year upon which they are delivered; and if the text or theme is not chosen in association with the day, it is in some way brought into connection with it. The claim is often made that adherence to a Church year serves to secure attention to a wider range of truth than is likely to be presented by those pulpits which leave the choosing of the theme to the personal inclination of the preacher. The examination of this volume confirms the impression made by frequent attendance upon Church services in Germany, that this is not the case—that, indeed, it tends to narrow the range of truth presented. The sermons are also typically German in the simplicity of their structure, and in their lack of illustration and of reference to the concrete in Bible narrative and life which makes them seem slow and heavy to the more vivacious and practical American. On the other hand, they are typical of the German sermon also in their steadfast purpose to present the central, fundamental doctrines of faith. In hearing a certain type of modern German preaching one cannot escape the apprehension that the unvaried presentation of the general aspects of faith is the result of uncertainty as to particulars of revelation and doctrine. This is not the case with the preach-

ing of Dr. Zahn. He emphasizes repeatedly his full acceptance of Scripture. But in that Scripture Jesus Christ is to him the centre and soul of all. In choosing the sermons for publication he has, consciously or unconsciously, selected those which present Him as the centre and heart of Christian truth; and his constant effort is to bring his hearers, as sinners, into vital relation with Him who is the divine Saviour and Lord.

Princeton.

PAUL MARTIN.

BACK TO BETHLEHEM. Modern Problems in the Light of the Old Faith. By JOHN WILEY, Ph.D. New York: Eaton & Mains. 1905. 8vo, pp. 286.

The author displays an easy familiarity with literature, science, history and philology, and makes allusions thereto with a poetic grace that give his paragraphs the interest of surprise and suggestiveness. This wide culture and observation is utilized in the presentation of modern themes and questions in philosophy, ethics and religion, with the purpose of showing that Jesus, and the truth as it is in Him, are their solution. Some of his chapter headings are: The Survival of the Fittest, Environment, Militarism, The Evolution of the Book. The theological attitude is in general evangelical, with a strong antipathy to Calvinism, and is at times decidedly progressive. But these are essays, not theological treatises or even sermons, and judged as such they have value in the direction of their title. A lack of proper relevancy and coördination in the interesting material so readily gathered to hand detracts from the discussions, and tends to render the single sentence and the paragraphs more interesting than the chapters as a whole.

Princeton.

PAUL MARTIN.

GIVEN TO GOD. A Memento of the Day of Baptism. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. 1905. Pp. 15. 25 cts.

A finely printed booklet in white and gilt, containing an Order for the Administration of Baptism to Infants, a Certificate of Baptism, appropriate quotations and a Register for the friends present at the baptismal service. The order is that given in the Report to the General Assembly of 1905 of the Committee on Forms and Services, who have made John Knox's Book of Common Order the basis of their arrangement.

Princeton.

PAUL MARTIN.

SABBATH LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES. By R. C. WYLIE, D.D. With an Introduction by the Rev. S. F. SCOVEL, D.D. 8vo; pp. viii, 240. Pittsburgh, Pa.: Office of The National Reform Association, 209 Ninth St. 1905.

This book is "a compilation and analysis of the Sabbath laws in the United States." "It has been carefully and even laboriously prepared, with diligent comparisons of legal texts and discriminating choice of the most important material in the various decisions and situations." Temperate and judicious criticism of the different kinds of Sabbath legislation directs the attention of the reader to what is most worthy of consideration or most in need of amendment, while still allowing the laws to speak for themselves. Two admirable chapters are added on "The Fivefold Basis for Sabbath Laws" and on "The Ultimate Ground of Sabbath Laws." The book closes with an Index which enables one to turn at once to any law, decision or discussion in the volume.

We cannot congratulate the author too heartily on his work. As Dr. Scovel remarks, "it is unique and without precedent in its comprehensiveness." As the reviewer would add, the care and judgment with which it has been prepared

leave nothing to be desired. The "map showing the character of the Sabbath laws in the United States" is specially valuable. From this we learn, that two States and one Territory, California, Idaho and Arizona, have no Sabbath laws; that twenty-three others have "laws weakened by numerous exceptions," among these States being the home of Puritanism, Massachusetts; and that twenty-three more have very "strong laws," in this class being found even Utah and the Dakotas. The conclusions reached by Dr. Wylie are most significant. Only a few of them can be stated:

1. "The character of our Sabbath laws is better than many people have thought."

2. "Modern tendencies are not all away from the Sabbath of the Bible; some States have recently improved their laws, and some of the recent judicial opinions are among the best."

6. "The civil courts can generally be relied upon to maintain the law; some of the best things said in defense of the Sabbath have been said by the courts."

9. "Both State and United States Courts have gone beyond the provisions of any written Constitution in maintaining Sabbath laws; this is especially the case in declaring that the law rests upon divine authority."

10. "The Constitutions of the several States and the Constitution of the United States should be so amended as to set forth the fact of divine authority, and not leave it for the courts alone to proclaim it. The courts need a Constitutional warrant for so doing."

11. "The Sabbath question makes it clear that a separation of Church and State does not mean a separation of religion and State."

13. "Our free government would be impossible without our Christian civilization; our civilization is produced and perpetuated by the Christian religion; the Christian religion cannot exist without the Christian Church; the Christian Church would languish and die without assemblies for public worship; assemblies for worship are impossible without a day of rest; a day of rest needs the protection of statute law; the statute law should rest on a Constitutional provision; the Constitutional provision should rest upon and acknowledge the authority of God."

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIALISM. By WASHINGTON GLADDEN. New York: Eaton & Mains. 12mo, pp. 244. \$1.00.

Dr. Gladden declares in his prefatory note that this book has much to say about Christianity and something about Socialism. The reviewer has the impression that the reverse is true. The book is made up of five lectures given before the students of Drew Theological Seminary. The first is upon the "Sermon on the Mount as the Basis of Social Reconstruction." The lecturer lays the supreme emphasis upon the individual. "The wise preacher always preaches to individuals. There is no such thing as a corporate mind, that he knows anything about or can intelligently address." The basis of the relation of men is not economic but social. God is the Father of all men, and the chief relationship of man is not to things but to his brother man. With this as fundamental, Dr. Gladden discusses "Labor Wars," "The Program of Socialism" and "The True Socialism" in the three following lectures. He lays down the proposition that because man has conceived his fundamental relation as economic, we have today a condition of warfare in the economic world. Trusts are organized to crush the labor unions, and labor unions are organized to master the trusts. How this brings evil we all know. The author declares both organizations legitimate and necessary. But both must come with a different spirit than that of gaining *things*, if the real purpose of organization be accomplished. The triumph of

either would be ruinous. The program of the ordinary Socialistic agitator is untenable. There must be a combination of Individualism and Socialism in the best society. "The spirit of true Socialism is manifest in the habit of regarding our work, whatever it may be, as a social function." Toward this ideal the body of Socialists are moving. By this great principle every man must determine both the line and the method of his lifework. "The great thing to be done is not to reconstruct the social machinery, but, as a wise man has expressed it, 'to socialize the individual.'" Thus the lecturer ends where he began, in laying chief stress upon man as the unit of improved social life.

The last lecture is but loosely connected with the rest of the book. It is chiefly a recount of recent gains and setbacks in municipal reform, with the thought under it all that the citizen must bear the blame for failures as well claim credit for the gains. On the whole, the book commands high respect for its clear presentation and its courageous moral tone. It faces facts without wincing and offers sincerely a solution for the hard problems of the world—the only solution that will ever be a success—the regeneration of the individual. But it goes a step farther than many preachers of the same gospel dare to go. It would be well if more theological students could hear such a presentation of the problems they must face as pastors. The declining power of the Church among the common people would be less lamented if more pastors had the courage and energy of Dr. Gladden in facing and grappling with the same sort of problems which have called out prophets of righteousness in every age of the world.

Princeton.

W. B. SHEDDAN.

THOUGHTS FOR THE KING'S CHILDREN. By A. PERCIVAL HODGSON. New York: Eaton & Mains. 16mo, pp. 221. 75 cents.

The author here presents a number of brief sermons to children. He says that he gets the children to come to church by the use of these sermonettes. He must have exceptional children. They have our sympathy. Evidently they know all about the stories of the Bible; for in this collection of scraps no use is made of Biblical literature except as a source for mottoes for the sermons. But the preacher thinks the Bible is a remarkable book. In the opening sentence of the first sermon he says that it is the first book "to be printed." A few lines farther on he says that nine-tenths of the people read the Bible. Probably both these statements were news to his young auditors; certainly they are to some of the rest of us. In speaking of the 119th Psalm he says that it has twenty-six parts, which is a revelation to students of either the English or Hebrew Bible. Most of us find only twenty-two. Again, we read that two mites equal a farthing, "which is in our money one-fourth of a penny"—a fact no American banker has ever discovered. But light is thrown on psychology here too; for we are told that "Good children find God much nearer than the clouds." Then this preacher to children also sets new models in English before them. He speaks of a telescope mounted "so it will turn round easy;" while a boy is met who "received an accident," and a peacock, on the tongue of this new master in language, becomes "a gentleman bird" as distinguished from the hen, which must of course be a lady bird. But enough. The chief value of this book is to show "how not to do it." It is a crying shame that this mass of incorrect statements, bad grammar, tangled paragraphs and vapid nonsense should be inflicted upon the children under the excuse of preaching to them.

Princeton.

W. B. SHEDDAN.

CHRIST AND MEN: By D. J. BURRELL, D.D., 12mo, pp. 288. New York and Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Co. Price, \$1.20.

This book is made up of a series of sermons on important truths conveyed in the conversations of Jesus. The purpose of the author has been to make these

truths as clear and convincing as possible to the average man. He has been called to task by a learned critic for his air of "cocksureness"; and the point, in our judgment, is well taken. So far as he has doubts or misgivings, he scrupulously keeps them to himself. He seems to be of Goethe's mind: "Do not tell me your doubts; I have enough of my own. If you believe anything, tell me that." The world is overburdened with ifs and perhapses; it needs the positive teaching of Christ. His conversations ring with verities. It is safe for a preacher to lean hard on His authority; and there is no danger of oversureness so long as he can speak on this wise, "Remember the word of the Lord Jesus, how he said unto you."

New York.

D. J. BURRELL.

REAL SALVATION AND WHOLE-HEARTED SERVICE. By R. A. TORREY. 8vo, pp. 267. New York, Chicago, Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Co. London and Edinburgh, 1905.

Direct, logical, pointedly illustrated and breathing intense earnestness, these sermons cannot fail to arrest the attention of even the spiritually indifferent reader, and are likely to do so for his soul's good.

The book is especially valuable to those who would lead others to the Christ whom they have found.

Newport.

RICHARD ARNOLD GREENE.

THE EYE FOR SPIRITUAL THINGS. AND OTHER SERMONS. By HENRY MELVILLE GWATKIN, M.A., D.D., Dixie Professor of Ecclesiastical History and Fellow of Emmanuel College, Cambridge; also Gifford Lecturer, Edinburgh. New York: Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons. Cloth, 261 pages. Price, \$1.50 net.

These sermons are a model of concise, clear English, graceful expression, thoughtfulness and distinctness of aim. The writer evinces the broadest culture, together with the "spiritual insight" which is the theme of the first sermon. The author reveals a possibly unnecessary desire to avoid the suspicion of "orthodoxy," and expresses the conventional fear of the dread spectre of "conservative theology." He suggests reason as the seat of authority in religion. He indicates a moral theory of the atonement, and decisively declares that punishment is not to be eternal. On the other hand, he stands boldly for the deity and the resurrection of Christ; for the necessity of faith and of repentance; for the resurrection of the body and the immortality of the soul. In the sermon on "The Prophecy of Caiaphas" there is a striking statement of the existing unity of the Christian Church; in the sermon "Christ is God" there is a clear declaration of the divinity of our Lord; while the doctrine of the resurrection is ably defended in the sermons on I Cor. xv. 23, and Luke xx. 38. The exact position of the writer is definitely suggested in his prefatory note: "These are scattered words on many subjects, but their central thought is this: Christ our Saviour came to destroy nothing at all, save the works of the devil. The knowledge of God is not to be earned by sacrificing reason to feeling or feeling to reason, by ascetic observance or orthodox belief; it is given freely to all who profess this with all the force of heart and soul and mind. Further, the only power that can bring feeling, thought and will into harmonious action is the personal influence of Christ, which St. Paul sums up in faith. From that personal influence all holy desires, all good resolutions and all just works do proceed, though the doers be those who never heard His Name; and to its transfiguring power, if it be rightly received, no limit can be set even in this life."

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

LITERARY ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE BIBLE: THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO ST. MARK AND THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS. Edited by the Rev. JAMES MOFFATT, D.D. New York: A. C. Armstrong & Son. Pages 104, 131.

These minute and tasteful little volumes are designed, as their title indicates, to throw light upon the Scriptures by extracts from the field of general literature; yet they are also intended to show the use made by masters of literature of the texts suggested for treatment. The writer sets forth this aim in the introduction to each of the volumes. "I have set down passages of verse and prose in which some text of this book of the Bible has been used or applied in what appears to be a forcible or notable manner. . . . In the second place, I have admitted passages which develop aptly and freshly, not the words, but the idea of the Bible verse. It is hoped that both classes of illustrations may prove interesting to the ordinary reader by enlarging the association and eliciting the significance of the Bible." The authors quoted cover a remarkably wide range, from Shakespeare, Tennyson and Browning to Walt Whitman and Maxim Gorky. The passages of the Scripture to which reference is made are usually very brief, often no longer than a mere phrase, generally consisting of a single verse. They are arranged in their Biblical order. The quotations are in no case trite or commonplace. Some of them are striking and illuminating. While these books will be of interest to the average reader, they will prove of special help to preachers and teachers. These two volumes are part of a larger series which also includes the Book of Ecclesiastes, the Book of Daniel, the Gospel of St. Luke, the Epistle to the Romans, and the Book of Revelation.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

THE CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT IN ITS RELATION TO THE NEW LIFE IN JAPAN. Published for the Standing Committee of Coöperating Christian Missions. Tokyo: Methodist Publishing House. Paper, 267 pages.

THE UNION MOVEMENT AMONG THE CHURCHES. By the Rev. G. W. FULTON, of the American Presbyterian Mission. Tokyo: Methodist Publishing House. Paper, 80 pages.

These two volumes, the latter of which appears in the form of a supplement, are full of interest in suggesting the great progress which has been made and the success which attends the Union Movement among the Christians of Japan. It becomes more and more evident that the denominational differences which separate Christians in America and in England are being removed or disregarded by those who are laboring in the "foreign field." While it is true that Christian missions have been criticised because of the different societies which were at times represented on the field, the time for such criticism has surely passed by and we are apparently facing a new condition, in which comity and coöperation will increasingly prevail.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

THE PRESBYTERIAN CHRISTIAN ENDEAVOR MANUAL, 1906. By J. R. MILLER and AMOS R. WELLS. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press.

This brief pocket manual has already been of great service to our young people during the opening months of the present year. It is to be most cordially commended to every member of the Young People's Societies of our churches. It is admirably arranged and carefully prepared. Under the general topic for each week are suggested "Bible Lessons for Daily Reading"; then follow "Bible Hints," in which reference is made to special verses, which are illustrated to throw light upon the main theme. Then follow "Suggestive Thoughts,"

which are brief and pithy sayings by the editors. A few "Illustrations" are then introduced, and then "A Cluster of Quotations"; and last of all in connection with each topic is a paragraph of "Practical Suggestions for Christian Endeavor Work," which are intended particularly for new members, for chairmen of committees, and for officers of the societies. Special attention should also be called to the "Christian Study Course" which is outlined at the close of the *Manual*, and which suggests the admirable list of subjects and text-books prepared by the General Assembly's Permanent Committee on Young People's Societies.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF ENGLAND. Report of the Foreign Missions in China, Formosa, The Straits Settlements and India. 1905. Paper, 87 pages.

This report to the Synod gives a vivid and carefully prepared summary of the great work which has been accomplished during another year by the Presbyterian Church of England in the fields specified. The book is well illustrated and provided with numerous maps. It indicates a hopeful and aggressive spirit in missionary service.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

VI.—GENERAL LITERATURE.

LITERATURE: ITS PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS. By THEODORE W. HUNT, Ph.D., Litt.D. 1 vol., xxiv, 403. New York and London: Funk & Wagnals. 1906.

Prof. Hunt divides his volume into two parts, the first treating of the Definition, Principles and Relations of Literature; the second being devoted mainly to an analysis of the various types and forms of literary expression. The discussion as a whole is notable for its penetration, the scope of its acquaintance with the body of literature and the general sanity of its judgments. The topics of the first part are more general than are those of the second, and will not, perhaps, have the same interest for the general reader. The author devotes himself in the first chapter to a statement of the principles which should determine the point of view, method and spirit of literary production and criticism. He then goes on to review the various definitions that have been proposed, reaching as the outcome the following: "Literature is the written expression of thought, through the imagination, feelings and taste, in such untechnical form as to make it intelligible and interesting to the general mind." In the two following chapters the method and scope of literature are discussed, the author advocating the application in literature of the method of scientific induction. Prof. Hunt then enters the field of relations, dealing in successive chapters with such topics as Literature and Philosophy, Literature and Politics, Ethics, Language, the Arts and Literature and Life. This section closes with a chapter on The Mission of Literature. The treatment of the problems here displays the author's well-known scholarship and acumen. The relations involved are handled with rare good judgment and in a philosophical spirit. One of the delicate topics with which the discussion deals in this section is that of the place and function of the ethical judgment in literature. The author quotes approvingly the demand of Vinet, that "the poet be true and do not interest himself in vice," a demand that might very easily be misapplied, since we cannot prohibit the producer of literature from interesting himself in any real phase of human experience. There is a tendency in some quarters to overwork the ethical judgment in literature, as, for instance, when all literature is required to be not

only pure in spirit but also in the matter of its representation. Thus Plato for moral and pedagogical reasons advocated such an expurgation of Homer as would, if carried out, have reduced the Iliad to a sort of Hellenic prototype of Tupper's *Proverbial Philosophy*. I do not understand that Prof. Hunt has the least sympathy with such a position. His controversy with the maxim, "Art for Art's sake," is only with the extreme claim that literature as art has nothing whatever to do with ethics. This may be true in a sense, but the writer of literature is a man or a woman who as such is amenable to moral law, and thus the moral judgment imposes itself, not as a constructive principle, but as a regulative principle upon his work. In its spirit and ideals literature should be pure and moral. This I understand to be Prof. Hunt's contention, and with such a plea I apprehend most men would agree. In this connection also we note as timely the author's arraignment of the literature of the present for its widespread indifference to high ideals and aims, so many of our literary producers preferring to use the "muck-rake" when by looking up they might catch a vision of the stars.

In the second part of the volume Prof. Hunt analyzes for us the different types and forms of literature. This is a rich field and the reader is repaid with the treasures of an extensive and accurate scholarship and the reflection of years. The author is no literary dogmatist but recognizes the many open questions in literature, and his treatment of them is sane and rational. The issue which Matthew Arnold raised between Hebraism and Hellenism in literature is impartially handled, and we are glad to be assured by so competent authority that there is a plenty of literature lying outside of both these charmed circles. Those who are not ambitious to be either Jews or Greeks will be glad to know that Hebraism and Hellenism combined do not quite exhaust the whole Divine patrimony.

In his final chapter Prof. Hunt makes an eloquent plea in behalf of a larger place for English in our courses of liberal study. His contention is not in the narrow spirit of mere partisanship, nor does he take up the ancient quarrel between the modern languages and the Latin and Greek. He concedes the value of the ancient classics and only pleads that English shall hold a coördinate place with these, as an instrument of discipline and culture. In closing the writer wishes to express his high personal appreciation of Prof. Hunt's book. It is full of strong meat and is itself good literature. It bears an interesting and valuable message to the general reader as well as to the specialist. Its sane and wholesome judgments on a variety of topics ought to be very helpful in keeping the student from wandering into the byways or falling into the pitfalls that beset his path.

Princeton.

ALEXANDER T. ORMOND.

ESSAYS IN APPLICATION. By HENRY VAN DYKE. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 12mo, pp. 282.

In this book Dr. Van Dyke essays to apply his philosophy to a number of problems. He warns us that we are not to expect a complete scheme of either philosophy or faith within the compass of the dozen discussions of various current conditions, all expressed in the mellifluous manner of this modern master of English. They range over a wide field, but centre about books, education and social questions. The least notable is the essay on "Publicomania," which strikes a distinctly lower note than the rest of the volume. The highest point of the book is the essay on "The Heritage of American Ideals," with "The Ruling Class in a Democracy" and "The Powers that Be" crowding close upon it. In his initial essay Dr. Van Dyke declares himself a meliorist; but evidently a meliorist does not believe that a republic grows in power because of the evils of boss rule and the corruption inherent in the spoils system. The same is true in the discussion

of "The Church in the City" and "Property and Theft." Here the essayist's meliorism permits him to declare that the church "may well have a soup-kitchen, if it is needed; but the church ought never to be a soup-kitchen." And again: "A city church will not run long on the momentum of the past, nor survive many years on a reputation. It must succeed or die." In the argument against property being theft, Dr. Van Dyke concerns himself largely with the Biblical view of property. His conclusion is that "Christianity requires two things from every man: first, to acquire his property by just and righteous means; and, second, to look not only on his own things but also on the things of others." Some of us would wish that the author had essayed to apply this concretely to modern conditions of life. In the "Flood of Books" and the "School of Life" our professor finds himself on his familiar ground. He declares that the itch to write is not confined to any class or time, and that the longing for a publisher is a symptom of the same malady which affected the writer of Ecclesiastes and led him to rush into public with a somewhat famous plaint about books. In the closing essay, "The School of Life," one is touched by the lofty idealism which makes all life a school, a discipline, for the things just beyond. Taken as a whole, the book seems hardly up to the mark of Dr. Van Dyke's best work, yet abounding in cheering, uplifting, hopeful thoughts, in a literary setting as exquisite and graceful as our great master Irving himself could have used.

Princeton.

W. B. SHEDDAN.

THE DIVINE TRAGEDY. A Drama of the Christ. By PEYTON HARRISON HOGE. New York, Chicago, Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1905. 8vo, pp. 146.

Experience has taught us to look upon a modern extended religious poem askance, especially if its title is ambitious. The book in hand was received for review with expression of regret, but its first pages awakened a presentiment that the regret might not be justified, and the poem once begun was read eagerly to the close. The author, who is a Presbyterian pastor at Louisville, Ky., has our congratulations upon his work, and we will be glad if we may do something to widen the circle of those who will find pleasure and profit in the reading of it.

The theme is the story of the Christ from the opening of the last, fateful week to the ascension. In the Foreword the author asks to be permitted to forestall a certain class of criticism by saying that neither from the title or the form would he be understood to aspire to a place among the poets. His ambition is the more modest yet higher aim to tell in the most vivid and practical form, for men living in the world to-day, the story of Jesus of Nazareth in its culminating scenes. Having called attention to our increased knowledge of Jesus' environment embodied in scholarly treatises and *Lives of Christ*, it is added: "But it seemed to the writer that it might be possible to take a further step, and by the careful study of the Gospel material in the light of these treatises, and by a personal and loving familiarity with the Land and City of our Lord's life and labor, to project the Gospel narratives upon their historic background, in an imaginary reconstruction of the scenes that culminated in the Tragedy of Calvary. This suggests and requires the dramatic form—not, of course, with any view to representation upon the stage, but as the only form that eliminates discussion and preaching—that reduces description to its simplest and, at the same time, to its most definite terms, and that presents the characters of the story to speak and act in their own proper persons."

The performance exceeds the promise of the Foreword. The settings for the successive scenes, based upon accurate archæological study, give in a few words vivid pictures of the localities. The chronology receives careful attention. The usual dating is occasionally departed from, as in the assigning of the feast in the

house of Simon (John xii. 1) to the evening following the Sabbath, and passages from earlier narratives are used in the construction of the imagined conversations. On the other hand, scholarly care is exhibited in the sequence of the events of the trial, crucifixion and subsequent appearances. The portrayal of the Paschal meal observed with the proscribed liturgy, the unfolding of the events and the exhibition of the motives in the Trial and the Crucifixion are especially well done. The blank verse is smooth and rhythmical, and it is a matter of constant surprise that the versification has not necessitated the slightest change from the wording of the Gospels. The imaginary passages are finely conceived and answer accurately the spirit of the historical occasions to which they are ascribed. The treatment is uniformly dignified and most reverent, and the book is laid down with a consciousness of a clearer vision, a fuller valuation and a deeper love of the Christ who gave himself for us on the cross.

Princeton.

PAUL MARTIN.

THE UPTON LETTERS. By T. B. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1905. Svo, pp. 335.

These letters, dated in 1904 from Upton, England, are addressed by an English schoolmaster to an invalid friend in Madeira. It is possible that they are more carefully prepared essays cast in the form of letters; but they have the verisimilitude of real correspondence with names disguised, and we accept them as such. They were published, at the suggestion of the recipient, after his death. "Their interest arises from the time, the circumstance, the occasion that gave them birth, from the books read and criticised, the educational problems discussed; and thus they form a species of comment on a certain aspect of modern life." It is refreshing to know that in this hurried, materialistic age such private letters, ignoring trivialities, dealing with the deeper aspects of life and work, giving expression to thought upon things usually seen only superficially, and yet without pedantry and in a genial vein, are still written. They are an exposition of real culture. The schoolmaster is in love with his vocation, and what he has to say about the psychology and religion of boys and of the treatment and preaching best fitted to meet their needs is with the authority of one who knows whereof he speaks. The volume is commended as at once recreative and instructive.

Princeton.

PAUL MARTIN.

THE DIVINE MAN. A New Epic. By JOSEPH WARE. Mechanicsburg, Ohio. The True Light Publishing Co. 1905. Svo, pp. 278.

"The theme of this poem is progressive creation and the coronation of the highest life in man." The argument is founded on the narrative of the Transfiguration; and in a supposititious conversation Moses, Elijah and the Apostles review all events from the dawn of creation, through the life of our Lord, to the final triumph of redemptive Love. The author's imagination takes the widest flights, soaring to the most distant worlds. He feels himself conscious of a special call and inspiration for this work, and hopes for much from it as the basis of universal religious unity.

Princeton.

PAUL MARTIN.

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THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

No. 4—October, 1906.

I.

HAS SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION DISTURBED THE BASIS OF RATIONAL FAITH?

THE path of the wise man is a midway between extremes. Solomon thus described it and urged men not to turn from it to the right or to the left. Aristotle so described it; his moral rule was to choose the golden mean and follow it till a habit of virtue was formed. Copernicus, the founder of modern astronomy, when dying said: "I ask not for the mercy which Paul received, nor for the forgiveness shown Peter, but only for the compassion granted the dying thief—that is my desire." He wished these words carved on his tomb, but his enthusiastic disciples held the epitaph should run: *Terræ motor solis calique stator*.

In him science and religion met in harmony, as in Newton, Kepler, Bacon and the great men who ushered in modern thought and life. But it is hard for their disciples, in a wider field of observation, when knowledge has grown from more to more, and when proud philosophy turns every rainbow of mystery into drops of rain and rays of light, to be equally reverent toward God and true toward themselves.

German thinkers often speak of a threefold consciousness, which includes self-consciousness, the consciousness of the world without, and the consciousness of God, in whom the world subsists and in whom we live and move and have our being. Lotze, the most comprehensive philosopher since Hegel, teaches that the only bond uniting the results of science and the needs of man's soul is found

in God, who is the source of all law, the eternal cause, the mind and will in the universe, and the personal moral ruler to whom man is accountable. If now any of these elements be left out of consideration—if the philosopher study invisible things till he lose his hold on the visible world; if the theologian study God to the exclusion of matter and force and man's relation to the organic life about him; or if the scientist so fix his eyes upon nature that they cannot rise to nature's God, and so dwell upon dead matter and blind force that he loses all sense of the soul of the universe and the spirituality which underlies its reality—the result must be only a partial view of truth, and a one-sided apprehension of that wisdom which speaks equally in the temple of the universe and in the sanctuary of the human heart. Man's many-sided nature corresponds to the many-sided manifestations of the Divine; and when our attention is limited to one avenue of approach into the secrets of the universe and its Maker, the unemployed parts of our nature become weakened, suffer from atrophy, teach little themselves and destroy the proper perspective of the truth acquired by the still active powers.

The case of Darwin is well known, who through exclusive attention to physical science lost the power to enjoy poetry, general literature and humanitarian studies. The late Senator Hoar illustrates, on the other hand, the better balanced nature, which unto old age kept mind and heart and consciousness open and hospitable to every truth or impulse or vision from God or man or earth or sea. The inscription on his tomb is an extract from one of his addresses and is as follows:

"I have no faith in fatalism, in destiny, in blind force. I believe in God, the living God. I believe in the American people, a brave and free people, who do not bow the neck or bend the knee to any other, and who desire no other to bow the neck or bend the knee to them. I believe that a republic is better than an empire. I believe, finally, whatever clouds may darken the horizon, that the world is growing better, that to-day is better than yesterday, and that to-morrow will be better than to-day."

It is well-nigh impossible to overestimate the value of modern science and its multitudinous application to every department of life. The fields of chemistry, physics, electricity, biology, anthropology, physiology, medicine and sanitation are bearing harvests of benefits such as heaven never smiled upon and earth never rejoiced over before. The health of man and beast has improved; certain diseases are largely exterminated; the death rate has diminished, and the comfort and well-being of humanity vastly increased by means of science.

The late Prof. Hitchcock, of Amherst College, described our world as a great salon of pictures and a vast whispering gallery, in which everything seen in the light and heard in the atmosphere is still preserved. On the rays of light which fled forth from the death of Abel, or flight of David, or coronation of Bruce, or landing of the Pilgrims these pictures have gone out, speeding away many miles a second; but we might suppose our observer still able to overtake them and see all the events that went on under the sun. In like manner the voice movements of Isaiah and Paul, of Cicero and Luther might still be found pulsating in the constant atmosphere that surrounds us.

Hardly less wonderful than these speculations of the last generation are the actual discoveries of inventors and scientists in our times. The thunderbolt, which was the voice of God to the Hebrew and the spear of Jupiter to the Roman, has become the servant of man, and works in our mines, draws our loads, writes our messages, and illumines our homes and streets. Where shall the limit be set to the possibilities of man's unlocking the treasure house of the world? It does not seem unthinkable that some wireless telegraphy along ether paths through interstellar spaces might enable us to speak to inhabitants of other worlds. Even the throne of God, the company of angels and the spirits of just men made perfect seem almost in actual communication with devout men who use the forces and wisdom implanted in nature as a further way to reach into heaven.

These very marvels, however, which science unfolds frequently narrow the vision of the student, and by absorbing his attention in what is seen and handled lead him to ignore or overlook the spiritual side of nature. Strictly speaking the work of the scientist is limited to a study of the physical world, to matter and the forces which work through it. When he finds a principle of law, order, intelligence building crystals, framing and coloring flowers, fashioning animals, and man himself, he naturally describes it in terms of physics—he calls it a *nisus formativus*, a *Bildungstrieb*, a creative impulse in nature. Instead of recognizing a personal power and will behind the visible world, he is inclined to endow matter with the qualities necessary to produce all that is. This is no new problem. The study of the world is one thing; the study of its origin is quite another thing. The first pursuit belongs preëminently to science; the second inquiry pertains especially to philosophy and theology.

These two fields of research have been distinguished for 2,500 years. As far back as the Eleatic and Ionic schools of Greek phil-

osophy, as far back as Platonists and materialists like Lucretius, all the philosophical and scientific differences that now divide men have been familiar to scholars. The point of conflict is usually where the two spheres meet, where science attempts to go beyond her realm and explain the origin of the universe, and where philosophy seeks to impose its *à priori* considerations upon the investigations and results of physicists. It is the familiar controversy between science and religion—between what we know and what we believe. Goethe called this the endless debate of humanity, and he was both a great scientist and a great philosophic poet. He said: "The peculiar, unique and deepest theme of the history of the world and man, to which all others are subordinated, remains the conflict between unbelief and faith." The very fact that this controversy ever goes on shows that truth abides in both religion and science; else this had become a dead issue. Only living ideas survive the strain of ages; the dead do not debate. Both the world and all that therein is and God in His absolute fullness are necessary to meet the hunger of man's intellectual inquiries and the thirst of his moral nature. The Bible recognizes the rights of both nature and grace, of science and religion. Grapes do not grow from thorns, nor figs from thistles. A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit. We cannot serve God and mammon. For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of man. Yet whosoever shall call on the name of the Lord shall be saved.

In the long debate between religion and science various attempts at harmony have been made. One of the earliest was to rationalize theology and mythology. Greek scholars did this, explaining Apollo with his golden arrows as the sun, and his sister Diana with silver arrows as the moon. Another solution was sought in an allegorical interpretation of sacred books. By this means Homer was made to teach current philosophy. Jewish teachers, such as Philo, in like manner found Platonism in the Old Testament. And Christian scholars, following Origen, got rid of discrepancies and other difficulties in the Bible by a threefold sense, literal, spiritual and mystical.

Bishop Butler's famous work, *The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature*, showed that objections against the character of God drawn from the Old Testament were equally valid against the God of the universe. He is just as cruel now in cyclone and pestilence as He was at the Red Sea or in the slaughter of the Canaanites. But this explanation still left God's revelation and man's apprehension of it open for discussion.

Does God speak through holy men and in the world about us, or is it but the dreams of pious souls and the fancy of the poets that create divine oracles? Can the finite mind apprehend the infinite God, or is our relation to Him but a matter of personal opinion and moral assurance? When Greek philosophy sank into skepticism, the Neo-Platonists sought to save God and religion by the doctrine of ecstasy. Through fasting and meditation the devout inquirer was caught up and, like a drop in the ocean, was for a brief moment sharer of the Divine nature, so that he knew from actual participation that God is, and that He is a wise and loving Being. This thought passed into Christian circles and helped produce the mystic piety of the Middle Ages. It recurs in Quakers and some other Christians still.

In our days this seeking after God finds various ways of approach, all of which are more or less influenced by the atmosphere of modern science, which has spread everywhere the idea of the reign of law. This is a world of order, of mathematical principles, of vast systematic structure, in which the most beautiful growth and development everywhere appear. Hence religion moves now more than ever before in the lines of natural law, of comparative religion, of human history, of ascent from man's moral convictions to religious certainty, of psychological analysis of the experience of faith, of the life and teachings of Jesus and His first followers, studied historically, of the corroborating experience of the Church in all ages, and of the specially enlightened conscience of every man who uses the Word of God and prayer, the indispensable conditions of all religious assurance.

The science of our times also, with which religion as thus outlined is supposed to come in conflict, is constantly modifying its positions and, like religion, seeking to reach right relations to all that is. So rapid have been some of these changes that men speak of "the scientific revolution" of the past ten years. A friend of mine, a Professor of Chemistry, two years ago asked for leave of absence: he wanted a full year of leisure to catch up with the new thought in his own department. From a review of a book by R. K. Duncan called the *New Knowledge*,* I glean the following:†

"It is difficult for anyone who completed his scientific training some ten years ago to realize the change that has been worked during the interval. If he take up an odd number of a scientific publication, the bewildering statements he finds there recorded as com-

* Hodder & Stoughton, 1905.

† *London Daily News*, July 3, 1905.

monplace facts seem to suggest that the magazine must have been issued from Bedlam or, perhaps, been dropped by some passing meteor which had strayed from another universe.

"Ten years ago the general principles of science appeared to have crystallized into a definite and permanent shape. There were the atoms, the raw material of the world, hard, unbreakable and indestructible; the transmutation of the elements was a wild, impossible dream. The law of the conservation of energy involved in ridicule all ideas of perpetual motion; Maxwell's 'Sorting Demon' was merely an instance of aberrant scientific imagination. If anyone asked of the past he was told the exact date, within a few thousand years, when life first became possible on earth. If he inquired of the future he was informed with equal precision how many centuries the race of man had yet to run.

"The universe resembled a clock wound up long ago, and the works were steadily running down. Heat was gradually being dissipated, and while the total amount of energy remained the same, its capacity for doing work was steadily decreasing. The beginning of the universe, so far as man was concerned, was but yesterday, while to-morrow inevitably brought the end. Up to and beyond the farthest stars the second law of thermodynamics ruled supreme.

"But at the present time not a single one of these theories can be maintained unaltered. Atoms, so far from being indivisible, are made up of innumerable parts, while the transmutation of the elements has become an observed fact. Maxwell's 'Sorting Demon' is busy at work, and though we cannot at present command his services, 'to say that matter is not, to some extent, being created and destroyed to-day would be to run the risk of profound error.' While as for the comparison of the universe with a clock whose works are steadily running down, we are being driven to admit that it possesses the power of winding itself up anew. Some of the stars are becoming colder, but others are becoming hotter.

"The author commences with a succinct account of scientific notions as they prevailed before the discovery of radio-activity, with its incessant storm of corpuscles, had played havoc with the old theories. The facts that under certain conditions the atmosphere could become a conductor of electricity, that an electroscope could be discharged, and that the direction of discharge was under control, led to the conclusion that the discharge must be the work of some particles of matter. It was found possible to measure these tiny bodies by an elaborate method described in the present volume.

The result was amazing; they were found to be a thousand times smaller than the atom. If an atom were magnified to the size of St. Paul's Cathedral, a cricket ball would represent, on the same scale, the size of one of these particles. These particles, or corpuscles, as they were named, are given off under certain conditions by all matter.

"Then, to crown all, came the discovery of radium. Hitherto these effects had only been produced with the help of electricity; now a solid body was found which gave out the same rays or streams of corpuscles, and that without cessation or apparent loss of weight. An instrument invented by Sir William Crookes enables an observer to watch this bombardment of tiny bodies:

" 'The appearance is that of a swamp full of fireflies, or the scintillating stars on a clear night. And when one remembers that these flashes of light are caused by a rain of projectiles, each impact being marked by a flash of light, just as sparks fly off from iron when it is struck by a hammer, and, moreover, that this rain of projectiles is incessant, day in and day out, year in and year out, the wonder becomes most impressive that the radium should not dissipate itself by this continuous projection of matter.'

"But this radio-activity, though preëminently a property of radium, is not confined to radium. It exists everywhere, though in minute degree. 'Freshly fallen rain and snow are radio-active. Air bubbled through Cambridge tap-water emits rays. Everywhere over the earth there seems to arise an emission of rays.'

"But what is the source of all this amazing energy? No chemical reaction can explain it. 'We find that the heat evolved by the radium emanation is over three million five hundred thousand times greater than that let loose by any known chemical reaction.'

"The explanation is given by the hypothesis of the disintegration or breaking up of the atom. Within the atom, small though it be, there is stored up an almost inconceivable amount of energy. This energy is let loose by the breaking up of the complex atom into simple forms.

"Prof. Thomson, as the result of his calculations, concludes that a grain of hydrogen has within it energy sufficient to lift a million tons through a height considerably exceeding one hundred yards; and that since the amount of energy is proportional to the number of corpuscles comprising the atom of the element, the energy of the other elements, such as sulphur, iron or lead, must enormously exceed that amount.

"But what becomes of the products of the disintegration? Here

we have to revive the dreams of the old alchemists, and see going on before our eyes the transmutation of matter. There is good evidence to show that radium is being converted into the simpler element helium, while radium itself is conceivably only a disintegration product of the more complex atom of uranium. Could man discover the key to this process—and there is no reason why he should not do so—he would find ready to hand an inexhaustible supply of energy that would render the steam engine a thing of the past, and he would possess the power of fashioning and transforming the elements according to his own will.

“In this disintegration of the atom lies the secret of the sun’s heat. We need no longer content ourselves with those niggardly millions of years allowed by the physicist for the past duration of life on the earth. We may readily accept those more gorgeous demands made by the geologist and the evolutionist. The same is true for the future; the earth is yet in the early exuberance of youth, and not, as we have hitherto been taught, tottering on the verge of an unhonorable old age. But the whole truth has not yet been told. We have evidence that while the more complex atom is breaking up, the simpler atom is building itself up into more complex forms, thereby storing up new supplies of energy, so that we can see no end to this unending process, and may well say with the author:

“ ‘Now that we know, or think we know, of this infinite treasure-house of inter-elemental energy lying latent for the hand of future man to use, it is neither difficult nor fanatical to believe that beings who are now latent in our thoughts and hidden in our loins shall stand upon this earth as one stands upon a footstool, and shall laugh and reach out their hands amidst the stars.’ ” So far the reviewer and his author. But besides the chemical and physical discoveries described so graphically by Mr. Duncan, similar new views are appearing in the second great realm of nature, the world of organisms. New theories of atoms and electrons are heard of; so we are having a new light in the domain of animate matter, of cells and germs and development of living things. Prof. George H. Darwin, son of the famous Charles Darwin, in his address last year as President of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, laid stress upon two points of great importance: first, that the general principle of evolution now holds its place firmly as a permanent addition to modes of thought; and second, that the explanation of the process of evolution is still very inadequate, his father’s theory of natural selection forming only a part of the explanation. He calls all such efforts still “evolutionary speculation.”

Hardly any one of them, he says, was all true and many were not all false. Darwinism as an explanation of evolution is receiving much criticism from scientific men. Dr. Dennert, a physicist, writes: "The best proof of my often repeated statement that Darwinism is on the wane appears in the fact that since Darwin's day many other attempts have been made to explain the origin of species." He refers to Wagner, Nägeli, Wigand and others. In 1888, Eimer, Professor of Zoology in Tübingen, published a work on the origin of species, opposing his Darwinian teacher Weismann, and insisting that Darwin's two principles of natural selection and survival of the fittest alone could never produce a new species. They could only separate from one another species already extant. He enlarged these views in a work on the *Orthogenesis of Butterflies*, published in 1897. In other words, the theory of evolution does not depend upon Darwinism, and may be held on grounds familiar to scholars before Darwin appeared, and quite aside from his main contentions. But the scientific world is under a great debt of gratitude to the eminent English scientist who did so much to bring order into the chaos of material and organic forms.

Beyond the theory of descent and evolution, which in general is accepted now by most men, there lies another question, which is of prime importance for the philosopher and theologian; that is the origin of the life which appears in protoplasm, cell and fish and bird and beast and man. What have science and religion to say to this? Darwin himself did not try to solve this problem. He believed in God as Creator. He wisely felt that it lay outside of the field of pure science. His son, a Professor of Astronomy, is of the same opinion and in his presidential address said: "The mystery of life remains as impenetrable as ever, and in his evolutionary speculations the biologist does not attempt to explain life itself." The great German physiologist, Du Bois-Reymond, stated this view still more strongly. In an address before the Prussian Academy of Science (1876) he declared the evolution of life was a rational process, but of its origin we know nothing and never will know, *ignoramus et ignorabimus*. His great colleague Virchow held the same position. He did not think Darwin's view proven; no missing link was found between one species and another, much less between apes and man; and the source of life, he held, belonged to what he called transcendentalism. Haeckel and the preacher walked equally by faith in exploring this mystery, and both are drawn by an irresistible impulse toward it. It really does not belong to the problem of science which studies the world as it is, and the method

by which it grew from lowest potential forms into its present developed condition.

But in this process there appear everywhere forces acting intelligently, using means to ends, and building up out of dark, inorganic, chemical elements vital organisms, self-conscious and beautiful. What is this intelligence to be called and what was its source? The reply of religion is: "In the beginning God." In the beginning there was the Word of God, by whom the worlds were made and through whom all things subsist.

As observed already, many men of science call themselves, as Huxley did, agnostics respecting the source of life and all things; but many others, of whom Haeckel is an extreme representative, seek to find in matter or force or both the origin of what now appears. It is almost impossible to follow the order of nature's working—in chemistry with its crystallization, in the order of the heavenly bodies, and especially in living organisms—without describing the process in terms of mind. The universe is rational and works with means toward ends. Hence the question is forced upon us: Is this order the result of an ever-present mind, God immanent in His works; or can the explanation be found in the world itself? The Christian, the theist, and many men of science accept the working of God; while not a few students of nature think matter, force, and their laws produce all things. They seek to reduce the teleological view of the world to a purely causal relation, reduce psychical aims to physical forces, and all organic functions to inorganic principles; finally to identify these inorganic principles with chemical and in the last resort with mechanical movements. The universe made itself, it evolved its own forces, provided itself with material, and without the intervention of any other agent made itself what it now is. Otto calls this *Darwinismus Vulgaris*, and says it is "theoretically worthless, but practically of great attractiveness and propagating power."* It rules out God and all spiritual direction in the evolution of material forms.

Pfenningsdorf asserts that this "naturalistic natural science can be considered at an end," though it still prevails in wide circles of the populace. "Development without aim is as unthinkable as movement without direction," and mechanical evolution of unthinking matter is a self-contradictory idea; hence great philosophical evolutionists, such as Lotze, Wundt, Paulsen, Von Hartmann, Romanes, the historian Lange and the botanist Reinke reject the materialistic attempt to eliminate aim and goal from nature.

* *Theologische Rundschau*, 1902, S. 483; 1903, S. 229.

Evolution is moving from monism toward dualism. Paulsen says Haeckel belongs already to a dead generation, and calls his theory an example of incredible frivolity in the treatment of serious problems; while Wundt declares this "naturalistic conception of nature" a fundamental error in a world which shows everywhere the presence of universal will and mind. We conclude, then, that there is nothing in materialistic science that should disturb the basis of rational faith. It is true the new chemistry to which we have referred looks toward a monistic view of all things. It is called "the periodic system," and as presented by Ramsey, Himstedt, Thomson and others is very attractive.

Chemical elements are found to fall into eight groups which have like attitudes toward heat, light and electricity, while one group passes over into another in a certain order, as 1, 2, 3, etc. For example four elements in one group have the same mutual and mathematical relations that four in another group have. Accordingly the thought has arisen that all these elements, gold, copper, carbon, oxygen, etc., may be but forms of one primal element, as mediæval alchemists thought. If that were so the universe is but a varied manifestation of one ultimate element of matter or force or both, which forms the meeting place of all that is. But all this is still only speculation. The proof of its truth has not yet been found, and the chemistry of practice still works under the law of the constancy of chemical elements. Gold bonds have not fallen in the market through fear of copper taking their place. Ramsey thought that radium might possibly produce helium, but declared he had no proof of it. It is not known yet that radium itself is an element. Ramsey closed his paper announcing what he had discovered with the words: "*Ce que je sais, je le sais fort mal, ce que j'ignore, j'ignore parfaitement.*" But despite this scientific modesty some popular writers have not hesitated to declare that now we know all things proceed from radium. Meyer went on to teach that because radium has strong electrical qualities all elements consist of electrons, and that the various chemical elements are but different groupings of these electrons. In that case all things are a product of chemical action. In that case, too, there would be little room or need for Darwin's theory of descent; for everybody knows that plant and animal organisms are built out of chemical elements. But this speculation still leaves the question unanswered: How did it come to pass that these electrons, flying round in infinitely small relations, grouped themselves into plants and animals and men and stars and sun? Where did the mind come from that led

these revolving electrons to start out to build and fashion all the glories of the rational universe? How could electron ever think of anything different from electron? How could it cease to be electron and connect itself with other different forms to produce the differentiation which we see everywhere? To hold this view we must bring in another element, a non-electron, to begin this new departure, this differentiation; and that means that the origin of the universe rested upon two elements, not one—force and matter, mind and matter, God and matter, as we may decide. And as a matter of fact, this second factor is quietly taken for granted in monistic attempts to explain the origin of things; for no amount of one primary force or element could begin the constant process of change which formed and still forms the universe. For example, Herbert Spencer's monism rests upon this "absolute being," which is for him a material unity; but when he comes to man, who is on one side body and on the other mind, he is forced to admit that his theory, making mental phenomena and nerve sensations but the inner and outer sides of one and the same event, is only a hypothesis. In like manner his theory that matter and motion are but qualities of absolute being is also unproven, if not contradictory. Besides his absolute was the unknown, a speculative ideal abstraction.

We seem, then, to be shut up to two positions: first, that God is beyond and in the physical universe; and second, that the physical universe as known to science is governed and permeated by law and order. To reject the one is to destroy religion; to reject the other is to make science impossible. Place must be found for both; because man as a devotional and intellectual being cannot develop wisely and well unless in right relation to God and the universe. Sir Oliver Lodge says* there is an extreme of materialism, where "religion is a practical religion of human nature and earthly service, its God a glorified humanity, and its immortality merely racial"; and there is another extreme of spiritualism or puritanism whose "God is a high and holy personality far removed from the struggles and trials of this mortal life." "Between these," he continues, "stands the religion which we know as Christianity, which aims at being a comprehensive and inclusive scheme capable of embracing the essential elements of both the older systems," worshiping the Most High God and loving and serving man at his lowest, "rejecting the idea of any ultimate conflict between matter and spirit, and when they appear to conflict giving supremacy to the spiritual." He holds that science can bring no objection to the dual nature of man, and says

* "Christianity and Science," in *Hibbert Journal*, 1906, p. 315.

the "Incarnation" in Jesus is in harmony with the great truth that neither mind nor force can act save through a material instrument.

Every religion rests upon two things: man speaking to God in prayer, and God speaking to man in some form of revelation. If science by its presuppositions or inferences makes the heavens deaf to the cry of the human heart, and man dumb like a sheep before his Maker, then religion will die. But, as the heathen sage declared, "man is an animal that prays," and no science can long stifle the worship which like a fountain wells up in his soul. The irreligious man has never been found, while the unscientific man is abundant. "The man of nature without religion belongs as much to the domain of myth as the primitive man who had no language does";* hence no science recently formed which makes religion impossible can live; and any anti-supernatural method of thought that rejects a living, present, governing God shows its inadequacy by finding no place and no explanation for so universally manifested a fact as religion, which far from being a product of development, as some evolutionists hold, underlies the culture of all races in all ages. It is a living force as much as gravity or light, and must root in a reality as it inheres in God. This power of religion has a meaning only on the supposition that there is a personal God over the world as well as an immanent God within the universe. Conscience within demands the one, as the starry heavens above proclaim the other. It was this sense of the equal force of moral and scientific convictions that led the great Darwinist, Romanes, through correspondence with the missionary Gulick, himself an eminent naturalist, to return to his Christian faith. He found that the Christian world with all its forces, works, activity, and long-developed organisms involved Christ, His wonderful Person, life and work, on the same ground of sound reason as the world of matter with its laws and activities called for the theories of science.

How nature and the supernatural meet and coöperate we may not be able to say. Perhaps, as Jean Paul Richter said, it is true that "miracles upon earth are nature in heaven." We may not insist in these days of scientific thought upon some ancient conception of the miraculous; but we must hold that God is so free in His own universe and within the laws which He has ordained that He can do His will for the good of them that call upon Him in truth.

The mathematician Kurd Lassowitz, of Gotha, writes (in an essay called *Wirklichkeiten*, 1903, and a lecture, *Religion und Natur-*

* Schrieder, *Die Religion des Afrik. Volkes*, 1891, S. 4.

wissenschaft, 1904): "He for whom it is a moral necessity to believe in the physical reality of miracles, that his faith in the religious order may not be destroyed, need not see in miracles violations of the order of nature, but may regard them as an original arrangement of God, in consequence of which each miraculous event took place under natural law just at the time when it was to teach its lesson to the hearts of men." "This is no contradiction," he says, "with natural science, but only with a naturalistic theory of the universe, which will not admit that this inviolable system of what is, itself presupposes an original order, of which we know nothing. A contradiction would take place," he adds, "if the event were opposed to law, that is took place under suspension of a universal law; but in that case it would also have no religious value, for it would destroy our confidence in the fundamental order of the world, and consequently in God." That is, our present world, which science explores, came forth from an unknown world of divine thought and purpose of which science knows nothing; and in which God by preëstablished harmony could cause any event to happen under His system of law. Besides this consideration, the religious man cannot avoid the conviction that as we can do wonderful things in science, art, invention, by using the forces and laws of nature, God could do things infinitely more wonderful by the use of these same principles, which are an expression of His plan in the universe. This is especially true of the moral miracles wrought by the spirit of God within the soul of man. Here where love of God, love of man, conscience, reverence, adoration, the throbbing power of an endless life and prayer for daily guidance are found, every devout spirit is conscious of the presence of God. Here appears a certainty concerning God which is not a matter of reflection, but of immediate feeling. Of nothing has man such an immediate certainty as of God, because denial of this certainty is a contradiction of the native testimony of the soul; it is a confusion of man's spirit. That God can reveal His will to receptive, devout men is testified to by all prophets and sages, wise men and poets, philosophers and missionaries. To assert the contrary and hold that science precluded this revelation to man, would shock Isaiah and David, Paul and Peter, Socrates and Plato, Marcus Aurelius and Proclus, Luther and Calvin, Shakespeare and Milton, Bacon and Newton; it would cut the nerve of poetry, quench the fire of philosophy, sweep sacred literature off the earth, and undermine that Christian foundation upon which all European and American civilization and science rest. But no such extreme position will be taken. While

many scientific men follow a materialistic conception of nature, there are indications of a drift in scientific thought towards more conservative positions.

Religion is growing in power within the wider circles of literature and life. Few scientific men regard it either as dead or unworthy to live. They rather take it for granted that it will continue to be a power, and are concerned the more with its proper relation to the results of science. Christianity has passed through most merciless criticism by students of the Bible, comparative religion, psychology, history, philosophy and science; and it still lives, still labors, and is sending more preachers of the Gospel into heathen lands than ever before. Its living power cannot be denied. It may be regarded as more or less an illusion, more or less mixed with untenable views; but its value is none the less recognized, and the splendid support it gives to thought, virtue and human character increasingly admitted and admired. From the frost and cold of scientific intellectualism not a few men turn toward the warmth of religion. From the brutality of natural law, natural selection, and battles of tooth and claw looking toward the survival of the fittest, men look with satisfaction toward thoughts of God as a Father who cares for every sparrow that falls to the ground. Even Haeckel feels the need of religious appearances and has just formed a "Monistic Union," in coöperation with a clergyman, to present his materialism as philosophy and worship.

There is a recoil from the right of might, and growing sympathy with weakness and those who are oppressed. A German Liberal recently said: "We seek again to gain an idea for which it is worth while to make sacrifices and endure hardships." The heroic factor is more recognized in religion; and conscience, calling toward the cross, is sometimes thought of as the voice of God. Martyrs to science and philanthropy, who fall in medical, sanitary and social research that others may live, illustrate beautifully this religion of service for man. The Bible recognizes both the reign of law and the revelation of God. And the man of science is gradually coming toward the same wide view. It is not religion or science, God or nature; it is both. Sir Oliver Lodge, the eminent scientist, in his last work, *Life and Matter*, shows that soul and body, God and the universe are indispensable to a true explanation of man and the world. Without God the universe is an insoluble mystery; and any generation which becomes scientific by losing the sense of God becomes self-centred and barren. Goethe said: "All epochs in which unbelief, whatever form it takes, attains its sad victory dis-

appear from the mind of posterity, because no man wants to burden himself gaining knowledge of what was unfruitful." This is true of our age in a measure; for theories of evolution have been extended to take in history, philosophy and religion, making them all but products of nature and its laws, to the exclusion largely of the providence of God and the moral responsibility of man. Formerly men made history; now we are told historical environment makes men. Formerly character grew in the conflict of daily life; now it is spoken of as a product of heredity. Formerly conscience was the voice of God; now it is, in the view of Spencer, a growth out of bodily sufferings. Formerly religion was a revelation from God to the soul of man; now it is often traced to dreams, ghosts, totemism and the fearful fancies of man. We cannot now discuss these theories; we can but ask in passing why it is that man everywhere created a religion, and why he cannot avoid prayer, faith in God, and a sense of responsibility to Him? But it is certain that as this materialistic, evolutionary view of life spreads there will come with it a fatalism and loss of hope and reverence which will leave humanity again in the darkness and despair of heathen seekers after God. It puts us on a lower plane than Cicero, who said: "We are wise in this, that we regard nature as divine and obey her as God."

Men like Haeckel have lost moral tone as they gave themselves exclusively to materialistic science. His book, *The Riddle of the Universe*, has circulated in 170,000 copies in Germany, showing how widespread is unbelief in that land; but Prof. Paulsen, of Berlin, calls it a disgrace to German scholarship, for its perversions and dishonesty; and many other scholars are recoiling from all sympathy with such a circle of thought. There is a growing belief in a personal God and in the importance of religion as related to Him. There is also a narrowing of the circle in which materialistic science has claimed atheistic victories. In the first place not a few scientists, such as Du Bois-Reymond, Virchow, Romanes and Lodge, recognize that the origin of the universe lies beyond the power of science to solve. A second indication is seen in the fact that the Kant-Laplace theory of the origin of the solar system, by whirling of masses of nebulous matter till rings flew off and became the worlds we see, can no longer be defended by any scientist.* The star dust supposed to extend from the sun to Neptune could not go so far at the temperature required without being lost in the planetary spaces. It would take a gas sphere of this vast size 3,181 years to

* *Neue Kirch. Zeitschrift*, 1905, S. 957.

revolve, while our earth, one of its rings swung out of this slow revolution, goes round in 365 days. Then such a gas sphere extending to Neptune would be hundreds of degrees below zero in temperature; hence the supposed fire mist is impossible. Other strong reasons also are urged against this physical origin of our planetary system.

In a third field, that of life and its organic forms, there is a growing conservatism. The question of the origin of life, which may be called the burning question of science in our generation, is, as we have seen, as far as ever from any solution which leaves out God. Two things seem now abundantly clear: first, that the boundaries between the inorganic and organic world cannot be clearly fixed; but, second, that there is a fundamental distinction between them which no discoveries and comparisons have been able to remove.

Until the seventeenth century all men believed in the spontaneous generation of life from God through inorganic matter. It was modern science with microscope and exact method that showed grubs did not grow in cheese or worms originate within the bodies of animals. It was Harvey (1658) who declared *omne vivum ex ovo*. Finally the controversy between Pasteur and Pouchet (1858), and the investigations of the French Academy, proved spontaneous generation groundless. So anti-religious a man as Karl Vogt, the geologist, wrote (1879): "All investigations of recent years prove beyond a doubt that the observations on which the theory of spontaneous generation rested are utterly incorrect and indeed false. The truth is, as far as we know, we find nowhere the origin of an organism taking place in any other way than through parents." Huxley proved the same thing against Bastian, and in spite of Haeckel's assertions the same is still true. It is the feeling that unless life is a natural product God must be recognized as its author which impels some scientists to take Haeckel's position. For example, Nägeli says: "To deny spontaneous generation is to proclaim the miraculous at this point of the development theories." But such a position really begs the question. The development of organisms belongs to science; but their origin is still hidden and seems to belong to another realm than physical investigation.

Virchow says: "Whoever is determined to know where the source of life is to be sought has only the choice between the dogma of creation and the dogma of spontaneous generation." And a more recent writer remarks: "Certainly if anything can show the untenable position of naturalism, it is the question respecting the origin of life and the sad attempts made to bolster up the theory

of spontaneous generation.'* We are still left on the ground of the Genesis account—God and the waters produced the fish; God and the earth produced the animals, each after his kind; and God and His Spirit produced man in the Divine image, but with bodily nature like the other creatures about him.

In a fourth department of research, also, that of the origin of species, there is now greater conservatism. All scientific men accept evolution, but they are greatly divided upon how it took place. How can natural selection explain the appearance of a new species side by side with the old? Paleontology sheds no light upon the problem, for these new species appear suddenly side by side with the old and with no stepping stone between. Then species do not appear in geological formations in the order required by the theory of their evolutionary origin. Later forms of organisms appear at times in earlier strata of the earth, and primitive forms in later strata. And the question, What brought any species to the period of change? is not answered yet. In this state of uncertainty the scientist Driesch says: "We know absolutely nothing about the way the transmutation of species takes place" (1905).

Our space will permit us to refer only to one more line of research, in which science speaks less confidently than a few years ago: that is the history of man himself. He did not proceed necessarily from a condition of barbarism through long ages into a state of civilization. Theory may look that way; but facts do not support it as much as could be desired. Down below the Beduin of Mesopotamia, the Arab of Syria, the Fellaheen of Egypt is found a high civilization 5,000 years old. The degradation of man seems more remarkable than his development upward; and the fact that children of barbarous negroes in Africa and of outcast races in India have in a generation attained equal scholastic rank with families of Europeans, shows that the lowest human being now is cycles away from the monkey-man of our hypothesis.

All early mankind shared this primitive culture, as Trombetti has shown in his essay (1904), awarded the prize by the Academy of Science, which proved that all languages of the earth grew out of one original speech. And, what is equally remarkable, this ancient culture of one speech expressed itself in religion as well as in civilization. This primeval language had all needful religious words: "In the beginning God." As soon as man knew himself he knew his Maker. Homer's words, πάντες δὲ θεῶν χατέουσ' ἄνθρωποι, Melanchthon called the most impressive utterance in the great Epic poems. The

* *Neue Kirchl. Ztft.*, 1894, S. 843.

famous saying of Augustine, "*Fecisti nos ad Te et inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in Te,*" is quoted so often because it is felt to be so true.

The Christian religion is a fact of experience, and as a fact can be tested and valued scientifically. The history of the Gospel is a lengthening defense of its truthfulness. It has met the needs of all races and peoples and tribes of men. There is no objection of science or philosophy, culture or opposing religion which our times present that Christianity did not encounter in the wisdom of Greece and Rome and Egypt. Its first great conflict was in the second century, when it came in contact with an evolutionary system of philosophy called gnosticism; and its severest struggle, as in our day, was to preserve itself from being absorbed in a system of speculation which included creation, the universe, the problem of evil and salvation as stages in a cosmical process. The crucial question then as now was, How can a Christian be a man of *πίστις* and at the same time recognize the rights of *γνώσις*? Prof. Gruner, a scientist of Bern, has just raised the same question; and I will close this paper by translating a part of his lecture on that subject. He writes in an essay entitled "How is it possible that a Scientist can be a Christian?"

"Christianity rests not only upon historical facts, but presents itself as an actual fact of experience. It bears its own fruits also in our day and wishes to be judged by these fruits. It thus takes equal rank with certain branches of natural science—it occupies the ground of experience, observation and experiment. It challenges the examination of its operations, proclaims ever louder and clearer that it is a powerful factor both in the life of the individual and in that of humanity at large, a factor whose influence can be ascertained with just as much certainty as the working of electricity, chemical affinity, or organic life in protoplasm; in a word, it is a factor whose reality can be tested by scientific methods. There is little need to refer to these universally recognized facts, though the modern man often forgets that our European culture, especially our scientific culture, is an attainment of nations who put themselves ever under the influence of Christianity. The modern man also often forgets that the higher moral views, which are still universally recognized in our lands of civilization, are the fruits of Christian ethics, and that even the most extreme atheists of our time are indebted for their morality to the influence of that Christian standard of life which is still very powerful among us.

"But stronger than this general influence is the effect of Chris-

tianity upon the individual man; for it is the very nature of Christianity to reach the individual, and here it has wrought its unmistakable victories. The man who does not intentionally close his eyes to these things cannot overlook them. But if he will look a little into the thrilling history of Protestant missions, or study a little the life of his own people and observe the results of home and city missions, he will become aware of things that border on the miraculous. He will see men of black, brown and yellow races, drawn out of the mire of barbarism, joyfully dying as martyrs for Him who saved them. Or, he will see deeper sunken individuals of the white race, devoted to destruction by drink and the horrors of sensuality, transformed into noble, moral characters. Or, what may be still more marvelous, he will see men endowed with lofty natures, intellectual and æsthetic, pass through an inner crisis, in which they freely surrender intellectualism and æstheticism for the sake of a loftier ideal. He will see how, filled with the love of their Lord, they devote their powers, their time to the service of their fellow-men, of the poor and despised. And elsewhere he will see in the hovels of the poor or the chamber of the suffering men broken physically or mentally, who yet bear their sufferings with inward peace, through faith in Him whose love for them is beyond all doubt. Such facts exist and demand the attention of every man who is ready to give time to their consideration.

“Still deeper goes the proof which every Christian has in the sanctuary of his own soul. Here is found a chain of experiences which is for him more sure and certain than the events of everyday life. It is the constant experience of the presence and power of the ever-living Jesus, the experience of freedom from the burden of guilt which presses so heavily and so inevitably upon every moral thinking man; it is those revelations of a Divine leading in our life, which show that our everyday existence is not ruled by blind chance, but by a will that knows the end it seeks; it is the wonder-working living forces that impart to weak Christians unexpected moral power. Further, it is those answers to prayer, so real that the man knows that prayer is much more than a subjective elevation of feeling; for in prayer man comes in contact with the eternal source of all world events, with God, and may therefore even help determine the will of God—of course not in the way of common ignorant caprice, but on the basis of the Divine plan, on the basis of definite laws which make possible such an influence from men upon God. In our age of empiricism no man will venture to deny these facts. There they are. They are at the disposal of every man, and he is

at perfect liberty to submit them to the most exact psychological, statistical and experimental methods of testing.''

In this brief article we have been able to touch only the fringes of a vast subject; but surely this cursory survey has been sufficient to show that scientific investigation has not disturbed the sure foundation of rational faith.

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II.

SCHWENCKFELD'S PARTICIPATION IN THE EUCCHARISTIC CONTROVERSY OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY.

(CONCLUSION.)*

IT becomes necessary, therefore, to introduce that larger circle of thought that lies behind and everywhere colors the more superficial considerations thus far presented: to understand his view of faith we have to examine the philosophic presuppositions upon which he based not only his idea of the purpose of the sacraments but his whole conception of the nature of redemption. Concerned as he was for the rights of subjective religion, finding as he did in the spiritual knowledge of his Redeemer the only way unto eternal life, how did he conceive of the nexus of faith by which the soul is brought into contact with the supernatural source of grace in the real or inward sacrament? By the necessity of the case his conception of faith is influenced by his conception of Christ, and his Christology in turn is inseparably linked with his doctrine of the Supper. For him, as for all the participants in the eucharistic controversy, there were in reality two closely related and decisive questions: (1) What is the mode of the Lord's presence in the Supper? and (2) What benefits does faith receive through or, as Schwenckfeld would prefer to say, in the use of the sacrament?†

The philosophic dualism underlying Schwenckfeld's system and revealing itself in his Christology posits a twofold activity on the

*The first half of this discussion appeared in *THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW*, July, 1906, pp. 352-386. The four folio volumes constituting the chief sources are cited under the symbols A, B, C and D; cf. the bibliographical note, *ibid.*, p. 352.

†It was natural for the editor(s) of the fol. D to close the volume with Schwenckfeld's two doctrinal summaries, often separately published, *Ein Kurzes Summarium von C. Schwenckfelds Glauben und Bekenntnis von Christo dem Sohne Gottes* and his *Kurzes Bekenntnis vom Hl. Sacrament des Herrn Christi Nachtmals*. On the necessary and close connection between the Supper and the nature of Christ's person, cf. also D 30b, 82d, A 727 *sqq.* and the many passages in which he shows the relations of these views in the erroneous teachings of his opponents.

part of God, that of creation and that of regeneration.* The sharpest distinction is preserved between nature and grace. "The work of creation brings with it the presence of the power, might and strength of God, with which God creates, fills and preserves all things through his right hand, through his Word Christ. . . . Such presence is honorable to God, shows his majesty, power, knowledge and government, that he is a Lord of all things, but it is not specially comforting or salutary to the creatures."† In contrast with this creative activity, which reveals only the presence of power, is the regenerating or gracious activity by which man becomes a partaker of the divine essence: "the other work of God is the work of recreation, which God has exercised especially in the sphere of human life through his right hand, that is through Christ, upon the basis of the first work, and which he still exercises and dispenses in the Holy Spirit. And it brings with itself *præsentiam gratiæ* (that is the presence of grace) with which God is nigh unto all those who call upon him . . . and through which God's right hand in the Holy Spirit cleanses, remakes and regenerates man, in order that God may live and abide in him, being apprehended by faith, and that man may become a partaker of his divine nature and essence; 2 Pet. 1, Heb. 3. Such presence is honorable to God, shows his mercy, friendliness and great love, and is salutary to the creature, a powerful comfort unto eternal life."‡ Redemption is in fact nothing but a deliverance both from the dominion of sin and—what is really fundamental—from the very estate of creaturehood.§ But how, then, must he be constituted who is to effect so genuinely physical or substantial a transformation as that required to make the sinful creature a participant in the divine life and essence? If the Mediator is to succeed in bringing man into harmony with God, in spite of the fact that creature and Creator are further removed from each other than heaven and earth,

* Baur (*Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit*), Dorner (*Lehre von der Person Christi*), Hahn (*Sententia*) and Erbkam (*Geschichte der prot. Sekten*) have clearly apprehended and more or less fully discussed the nature and importance of this far-reaching distinction. The reader is referred to these works for a more adequate treatment than we can here give of this aspect of the subject.

† See the whole section in *Sendbrief* VI, entitled *Von zweierlei Werk und Gegenwartigkeit Gottes* (C pp. 104–106).

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

§ It is Hahn's special merit to have established this point. See his dissertation, pp. 8, 21, 49 n. 3, 51 *sqq.* Hahn, however, underestimates the services rendered by Dorner and Baur in proving the central importance of the distinction between "Schöpfung" and "Wiederschöpfung." Cf. Baur, *Theol. Jahrb.*, 1848, pp. 512, 524, *et passim*.

wherein lies the capacity of the God-man to accomplish this unique task? Obviously the traditional Anselmic view of the personal union between God and man in Jesus Christ is not adequate to the terms of Schwenckfeld's problem. For if, as we are told, sin pertains to the very status of creaturehood, it is of course essential that the Saviour should in no sense be a creature—not even, Schwenckfeld insists, according to his human nature.* But, on the other hand, it is equally necessary that the Saviour should be truly man, that he should take upon himself the essence of our human nature. How, then, are the two requirements—that of perfect deity and that of perfect humanity apart from all creaturehood—to be realized in a single and unitary personality?

Schwenckfeld's answer is highly ingenious, but necessarily unsatisfactory; the primary dualism of his system, the very terms in which the problem is stated, preclude any solution. Christ, we are told, was conceived by the Holy Ghost, and by reason of this supernatural generation he is said to belong to the order not of "created" but of "begotten" or "re-created" beings.† He is therefore truly divine, the Son of God, according to the very essence of his being. But he was at the same time born of the Virgin Mary;‡ from her he received his material, substantial body.§ He is,

* The passages against the "Creaturisten"—those who held that the word "creature" is applicable to Christ in any sense whatsoever—are innumerable. Schwenckfeld's contention, when once his philosophic dualism was taken seriously, had to influence his whole conception of the person of Christ and of the way of salvation. See, e.g., C 806b, 809d, 814a, 823c.

† "Wiederschöpfung," "Zeugen," "regeneratio" and "filiatio" are all practically synonymous. They denote a supernatural communication of grace, in other words of the divine essence itself, and may therefore be predicated of the sinless Christ's humanity as well as of the redeemed. It is needless to add that these terms have no reference to the eternal generation of the Son as the Second Person of the Trinity: the point of contact between the Redeemer and his people is to be sought not in the Mediator's divinity but in his non-creaturely humanity. We have here a characteristic specimen of Schwenckfeld's attempt to theologize on a strictly biblical basis; but into the familiar words of Scripture an entirely new content is poured.

‡ More accurately—though the preposition "aus" is frequent enough—Christ was born "in her and of her," but "out of God" (B 281c, and in the margin).

§ It is not the whole truth, therefore, when Hodge (*Syst. Theol.*, I, 82) declares: "His body and soul were formed out of the substance of God," and that, according to Schwenckfeld, Christ did not have "any material body or blood." Schwenckfeld had no sympathy with the views of Valentinus or Melchior Hoffmann (see D 426, B 163d, A 291, D 79d). He taught that Christ did have a real, material body in his humiliation, and that he even now, in his glorified or "deified" humanity, has flesh and bones. Cf. D 125d: "Ich glaube und bekenne dass Christus Jesus auch noch heute und ewig ein wahrer, ganzer Mensch mit Leib, Fleisch, Blut und Gebein ist in himmlischer Klarheit in einem unbegreiflichen

therefore, God and man in one. But why is he not then a creature? The response is a double one: first, that the term "creature" denotes merely origin, whereas "man" or "humanity" or "flesh" denotes essence,* and secondly, that our Lord besides having a divine Father had also a specially sanctified mother, a virgin upon whom had been bestowed the gift—the supernatural, the characteristically spiritual-substantial gift—of faith.† But, as Dörner has pointed out,‡ this is simply to transfer the problem from the constitution of Christ to that of his mother. The solution cannot do full justice to his humanity.§ He is, after all, *sui generis* not simply as to his personality as a whole, but even according to his human nature alone. His flesh has a different origin and different capacities from our own. His flesh from the first is what, according to

Lichte und Wesen." Rather is it the case, then, that Christ had a species of double corporeity—one bodily principle which owed its capacity for glorification and progressive "deification" to the fact that it was essentially divine, and a second bodily principle which was essentially human, derived from the earthly elements of his mother's constitution. Cf. D 1, 21, 98, 498, and the many passages that set forth the nature of the "Gottwerdung" of the humanity.

* Creature is not "ein Wort oder eigentlicher Namen des Selbstandes oder der Natur des Menschen . . . so es doch viel mehr ein Zunamen ist, dadurch allein des Menschen Herkommen angezeigt und die Ankunft des alten Menschen wird bedeutet" (D 125b). And in the margin: "Creatura non est nomen substantiæ rei, sed appellatio rei accidens, sicut nativitas, sicut filiatio, generatio, etc. Ein Mensch sein sagt von einem Wesen; Creatur vom Herkommen des Wesens." At times, however, Schwenckfeld seems to depart from the path of strict consistency. Thus in D 254 he says: "Nach aller Schrift Zeugnis werden allein zweierlei Wesen aller Dinge befunden: ein göttlich und himmlisch, welches allein Gott und seinem Sohne Christus natürlich zusteht, und wem er es aus Gnaden will gönnen; das andere creatürlich und irdisch, in welches Wesen sich auch Christus, der Sohn Gottes, seiner Exanition nach eine Zeitlang um unseres Heiles willen begeben, da er Knechtsgestalt an sich hat genommen." But such a vacillation, quite exceptional in any event, is after all more apparent than real: the distinction between man as to his essence and man as to his origin may even here be made. It was the only logical position for Schwenckfeld to take, if he really meant to attach any importance to his singular idea of the deification of the flesh of Christ.

† For Schwenckfeld's peculiar conception of faith, see below. For the present the remark must suffice, that the effects attributed to the faith of the Virgin Mary have a striking analogue in the application of the same principle in the sacraments: faith is the nexus between God and the human personality receiving the supernatural grace. It is precisely here, as we shall find, that Schwenckfeld's "mysticism" reveals its distinctive features most plainly.

‡ *Geschichte der prot. Theologie*, p. 181.

§ Cf. Baur, *Theol. Jahrb.*, 1848, p. 520: "Da er seinem Ursprung und Wesen nach etwas ganz anders ist als alle andern Menschen, so ist, was er Menschliches an sich hat, nur ein verschwindendes Accidens, das ihm auch nur den Schein eines wahren und wirklichen Menschen giebt. Eine wahre Homousie des Menschen Christus mit andern Menschen konnte Schwenckfeld nicht behaupten."

Schwenckfeld's "mystic" phraseology, ours may become after "faith" has borne its perfect fruit—an essentially supernatural and spiritualized flesh. There are, in fact, two kinds of flesh in the sphere of human life: that of sin, inherited from Adam, and that, resembling the former but dominated by grace, that is by the principle of the divine essence itself, which is a supernatural generation. The former in the case of every believer is "re-created" into the latter. In Christ alone, since the fall of Adam, has there been a true humanity free from the principle of sin.*

The difficulty is only increased by the attempt to bring the unique character of the Saviour's humanity into causal connection with his mediatorial work in behalf of the race. For it is specifically in the flesh of Christ that we must find his basal qualification to be our Redeemer: the entire scheme of salvation is built upon the principle of the once progressive, but now completely accomplished deification of the flesh of Christ.

It is difficult to present this peculiarity of Schwenckfeld's system in any other than his own words. His language places in boldest juxtaposition the elements of what in reality is an irreconcilable dualism. The Saviour is truly God and truly man, and yet his humanity has become in the strictest sense of the term divine. This is the burden of countless christological utterances; the author's language remains rigidly consistent in the assertion of this absolute inconsistency. We must be content to let his thinking rest in a formula which by every reasonable interpretation simply presents a *contradictio in adjecto*. The practical bearings of this peculiar theory upon the two questions with which we still have to deal, the mode of Christ's presence in the Supper, and the benefits which faith derives from this sacrament, are so important that we cannot forbear bringing the matter somewhat more sharply to view. The following deliverance is typical: "When I say that Christ's flesh is deified, that his flesh or the man Jesus of Nazareth by his glorification, ascension and *primogenitura* from the dead has become God and a Lord of heaven and earth, I mean nothing else than that the human nature in Christ has become altogether similar to the divine nature in glory. I do not mean

* It is obvious that Schwenckfeld's fantastic distinction between the essence and the accidental or creaturely origin of our nature is due simply to his erroneous conception of sin as something inherent in our very constitution as creatures. Cf. D, p. 107: "Ja ob auch Adam nie gefallen wäre, so wären dennoch seine Nachkömmlingen von Natur, und alles was aus ihm den Ursprung hat, ohne Christum und seine Gnade nichts denn Creaturen und natürliche Menschen geblieben."

that the humanity in Christ is destroyed nor made into the Godhead (*noch zur Gottheit worden*), but that the man in Christ can now do all that God can, and that he in Christ's person, united with the Word, is to be invoked, worshiped, and divinely honored as much as God—one Christ, one Son of God, who is our Lord and God absolutely.* In another passage, in discussing the words *Gottwerdung* and *Vergottung*, he cites the fathers in his support: "Thus the fathers mean by the deification of the flesh of Christ, that it is poured through, shot through, irradiated and glorified † with God and the Holy Spirit in all divine fulness—*spiritu repleta divina*, says Ambrose, that it is completely filled with the Holy Spirit and the divine essence and life; and as Cyril writes concerning the sixth chapter of John, that not only the divine nature in Christ but also the human regenerates, that the flesh of Christ has now assumed the whole reality of the Word and attained unto the power of the divine essence; indeed, that his whole body has been filled with the vivifying power of the Spirit; *haec ille*. This we also call deification and becoming God, that God in Christ, albeit in undiminished human nature, is all in all, just as he will finally become all in all in every Christian."‡ From this point of view he compares the Lutheran preachers with the Arians: as the latter denied the deity of Christ according to the nature of the Word, so the former deny his divine glory according to the nature of his flesh.§

The above citations clearly reveal an apologetic interest in behalf of the perfect humanity of the Redeemer. All, therefore, who represent Schwenckfeld as teaching a conversion or transmutation of the flesh of Jesus into the substance of the Godhead compromise his eccentricities with their own conceptions of what logic would have required him to say.|| Rather are we to think of this change

* D 514d. The subject is discussed with wearisome prolixity in the tripartite *Confession und Erklärung von der Erkenntnis Christi und seiner göttlichen Herrlichkeit*, in D, pp. 91–319, as well as in many of the lesser treatises of that volume, and in numberless letters in the other folios. No other point in the whole range of controversial discussion elicited from Schwenckfeld so many apologetic and polemic writings; even his peculiar views of the Supper could not be explained without extensive references to this underlying doctrine.

† The German compounds are scarcely translatable: "mit Gott und dem heiligen Geiste in aller göttlichen Fülle ist durchgossen, durchgeuert, durchglanzet und verkläret."

‡ C 787c.

§ C 1008a.

|| Thus Klee, *Dogmengeschichte*, II, p. 41, says: "die menschliche Natur sei in die göttliche umgewandelt worden." Kurtz, *l.c.*, p. 150, is ambiguous: "so dass im Stande der Erhöhung seine göttliche und menschliche Natur vollkommen in eins verschmolzen sind." Schwenckfeld is careful never to use the verbs "umwandeln" or "verwandeln" or their derivatives, but only "wandeln" or

as a gradual process, as the organic development of the essentially divine principle implanted in his humanity from the moment he was conceived by the Holy Ghost. The author is fond of presenting this *Gottwerdung* of Jesus as the counterpart of the *Menschwerdung* of God.*

In this progressive deification of the humanity of Christ there are, moreover, two clearly marked stages: much is made of the differences existing between the estate of the Saviour's humiliation and that of his exaltation.† By pressing this distinction and yet strongly holding to the unity of Christ's person, Schwenckfeld seeks to break the force of the objection that his view of the origin of Christ's flesh does injustice to the Redeemer's humanity, and that his view of Christ's passion does injustice to the Redeemer's divinity. For it must be remembered that no one was more concerned than he was to maintain the unity of Christ's person. Even Luther's scholastic makeshift of the *communicatio idiomatum* did not secure a sufficiently intimate union of the two natures. Schwenckfeld wished to have every redemptive act referred to the single divine-human personality and never to either of the two distinct natures.‡ But how can the prime necessity underlying Schwenckfeld's desire to have a real and essential union of God and

an equivalent; and in spite of all emphasis upon the oneness of Christ's person there is no fusion of the two natures. To be sure, some of the figurative terms employed might fairly be interpreted in that way, but such descriptions must be read in the light of such explicit negations as the following (D 125d): "Ich sage nochmals, dass ich's nicht also halte als ob die Menschheit Christi sei zur Gottheit worden, oder in die Gottheit sei verwandelt, wie mir etliche unbillig zulegen . . . (Ich) glaube und bekenne . . . es ist seine Menschheit geändert oder gewandelt nicht verkehret, noch verzehret, sondern gewandelt spreche ich, durch die himmlische Gloria gebessert und mit göttlichem Reichtum gemehret."

* See the treatise, *Dass Christus auch nach seinem Menschen der natürliche wahre Sohn Gottes sei*, p. F iiiii; cf. B, pp. 132 sqq., *Sendbrief XIII, Von der Menschwerdung des Worts und Gottwerdung des Menschen in Christo*.

† Sometimes three stages are enumerated. Cf. e.g., A 712a, where—quite in the style of his allegorical exegesis—the forecourt, the holy place, and the holy of holies in the Jewish tabernacle are made to symbolize respectively (1) the incarnation, passion and death of Christ, (2) his resurrection, and (3) his ascension to heaven and session at the right hand of God. Usually, however, the last two constitute a single idea, the second and final stage in the glorification. Cf. also D, pp. 523–531, *Summarium von zweierlei Stande, Amt und Erkennung Christi*.

‡ Cf. D, p. 486 sqq., *Von der göttlichen Kindschaft und Herrlichkeit des ganzen Sohnes Gottes*; *ibid.*, 531–551, *Drei christliche Sendbriefe von der Erkenntnis Christi beide im Leiden und in seiner göttlichen Herrlichkeit*; and the treatise, not in the folios, *Von der Ganzheit Christi beide im Leiden und in seiner Herrlichkeit*. Hence the insistence that Christ should be worshiped even according to his human nature. See the treatise, *Von der Anbetung Christi*.

man in the Redeemer be fulfilled? If the unity of Christ's person is to be preserved—and it was from this point of view and not from the duality of natures that Schwenckfeld viewed the problem—the only possible solution was one which could emphasize the closeness of the union between the two natures only in proportion as time was gained for this progressive development by magnifying the difference between the first and the final stages in the union between the Word and the flesh; that is, in proportion as the incarnation is conceived merely as the initial stage in a process that increasingly deprives the human nature of Christ, in spite of Schwenckfeld's protest, of what in the judgment of the historic Church constitutes its characteristic attributes, till in the last stage the very flesh of Christ has a glory indistinguishable from that of the Godhead itself. After all, therefore, it is not real and essential divinity that becomes incarnate in the historic Christ: it is rather, in the first instance, only the germinal principle of divinity implanted in a human (but non-creaturely) nature.* Nor, on the other hand, can the deification of the entire God-man, including his humanity, be taken strictly; for in reality it presupposes that the flesh of Christ loses its distinctive properties and becomes essentially spiritual.†

It is, therefore, only by the sacrifice of some of the content of the terms "flesh" and "divinity" that Schwenckfeld can vindicate his peculiar doctrine of the "glory" assumed by the humanity of the Redeemer after his resurrection and ascension. A single passage may serve to give the tenor of many. "I repeat, the Word became flesh in order that it might conform and render similar to itself the flesh which it received into a union with itself, in all divine glory, power, might, and capacity. But this did not happen suddenly, all at once, at the moment of the physical and temporal union, which afterward was destroyed by death, to be followed, however, by a much more glorious and better union: namely, an entirely new, enduring, and altogether divine union and glorification which is to last to all eternity. Only then will the flesh, as Jerome writes in connection with Phil. 2, be completely united and deified, anointed through and through (*durchsalbet*), and glorified by its union with God the Word in the heavenly essence and its transfer (*Versetzung*) into the glory and nature of the fulness of the Godhead; only then indeed will the flesh be perfectly glorious, divine, and spiritual, that is equal to God in honor,

* See Schultz, *Die Gottheit Christi*, p. 280 sq., for a brief statement of the striking similarity between Schwenckfeld's Christology and that of the later Kenotists.

† Cf. Baur, *Die Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit*, p. 242 sq.

power, and might; this I call the deification of the man Christ or his becoming like unto God, or his perfect glorification."* There can be no doubt, moreover, that the reformer's zeal in this matter led him to put the centre of gravity of his whole system in the work not of the earthly but of the heavenly Christ.† The *summum bonum*, the indispensable condition of salvation, is the spiritual knowledge of the God-man, the "King of grace," first in his estate of humiliation and then, and chiefly, in his estate of exaltation.‡

The suggestiveness and worth of some of these christological principles it would be idle to deny.§ The strong insistence upon the oneness of the Redeemer's person, against the Nestorianizing tendencies of the Zwinglians on the one hand, and the unsatisfactory unity based upon a community of attributes taught by the Lutherans on the other, is the dictate of a sound and safe instinct. But his own construction of the biblical data was too much the product of a mind which, in spite of its speculative acuteness and its marked taste for systematic thinking, lacked both the logical vigor and the ethical insight necessary to trace his dualistic principles to their last consequences. Governed primarily by the practical considerations of religious reform, rather than by the speculative interests of the scientific theologian; at times naïvely faithful to the letter of Scripture, but more frequently yielding to the charms of a spiritualistic interpretation, he was capable of the boldest conceivable antagonisms of thought and language: Christ

* D 513, 514. Cf. the whole Sendbrief, *Von seinen zwei Naturen, vornehmlich von der Glorie des Fleisches Christi*. In this doctrine of the "Verklärung" and "Vergöttung" of the Saviour's humanity lies the reason for the designation so often applied to the Schwenckfelders, in accordance with their founder's wish, "the Confessors of the Glory of Christ."

† But it is a mistake to suppose, as is often done, that he denied the fact or the need of an objective atonement. Nor is such an extreme statement as that of Hodge justified: "With him, as with mystics generally, the ideas of guilt and expiation were ignored" (*Syst. Theol.*, I, 83). In view of the many special treatises written by him on the passion and death of Christ, the most that can be said—and this must not be overlooked, for it is a characteristic defect—is that "guilt and expiation," regardless of the amount of space devoted to them, have no logical relation to his peculiar conception of the atonement. The ideas were not ignored; they were misapprehended. They were biblical ideas and were as such discussed; but they were, as will presently appear, really foreign to the nature of his conception of salvation.

‡ C 475d: "Wer Christum *in priori statu* nicht kennt, wie kann er *ad posteriorem* so bald aspiriren?"

§ Baur, Dorner, Erbkam, Schenkel, and especially Hahn have made it plain that his speculations about the person of Christ by no means merit the summary condemnation visited upon them by such a writer as Planck.

retains his true humanity, yet his very flesh is deified. "Christ Jesus, I say again, with the testimony of Scripture, has indeed two natures: he is indivisibly God and man. But these two natures exist in a divine, eternal life and essence, so that the life and essence of this man, now, after his glorification, ascension to heaven and elevation over all the heavens, is not to be viewed and judged as the life and essence of a man with a natural soul*—as human reason judges and can never come to a higher knowledge—but it is to be regarded as the divine life and essence, that of God, existing in and like unto God."†

But our purpose in thus setting forth the salient features of Schwenckfeld's doctrine of the person of Christ was none other, it will be remembered, than that of securing a knowledge of the principles that underlay the reformer's answer to the question concerning the mode of the Lord's presence in the Holy Supper. To this problem we now return.

There is much in the Christology of Schwenckfeld which logically would have brought him into closest sympathy with Luther's doctrine of the ubiquity of Christ's body.‡ For however sharply the thought is emphasized that the flesh of Christ has been deified, it is to be remembered that an equal stress is laid upon the confessedly scriptural fact that the Redeemer retains his true humanity after his resurrection and exaltation.§ The apparent approximation to Luther's peculiar view becomes even more deceptive when we consider how Schwenckfeld interprets the term "the

* "eines seelhaftigen natürlichen Menschen."

† D 844 sq. From the brief account we have here given of Schwenckfeld's Christology it is easy to understand how he has been charged with such diverse heresies as Docetism and Ebionitism, Nestorianism and Eutychianism, and, by modern writers, with Apollinarianism and Kenosis. The verdict depends upon what class of passages the critic is pleased to lay chief emphasis. Thus the question of his Eutychianism has been variously answered. Hahn (p. 76) and Erbkam (*Geschichte d. prot. Sekten*, p. 467) deny the charge. It must be remembered, too, that Schwenckfeld in numberless places repudiated the heresy. But this is not conclusive. Dorner and Baur, accordingly, take mediating views, denying that his teaching is to be placed on one and the same level with historic Eutychianism, yet admitting the presence of the essential features of this error. It is Baur who (*Theol. Jahrb.*, 1848, pp. 527f.) calls attention to the similarity between Schwenckfeld and Apollinaris. Dorner, in both of the works cited, seeks to do justice to the disparate and indeed irreconcilable elements of the problem as stated by Schwenckfeld, and gives on the whole the most penetrating and just criticism.

‡ Cf. Döllinger, *Die Reformation*, I, 241 sq.

§ The passages already cited will have made this abundantly clear.

right hand of God'' as signifying Christ himself.* For if we bear in mind how strongly the reformer insisted upon preserving the unity of the Redeemer's person and the glorification of his humanity, we might naturally expect to find the strictly divine attribute of omnipresence ascribed to the very flesh of the Saviour. And indeed precisely this step is taken. The logical consequence of this fact, however, is explicitly denied. Christ in his undivided and inseparable divine-human personality is everywhere present as the "right hand of God"; but for that very reason he is above all considerations of place.† Heaven, therefore, the abode of Christ, is no locality—no "*räumlicher Ort*," no "*locus corporalis*." Christ is in heaven, but is not circumscribed. "Therefore we cannot by the aforesaid text [Matt. xiv. 26] detract in any way from the glory of the flesh of Christ and his spiritual nature and essence, nor for that reason confine Christ to a spatial place, who to-day reigns in all divine majesty, and needs no spatial place at all but is exalted over all temporal places and conditions into God and glorified, just as in the resurrection he easily penetrated every place with his body.'''‡

In spite, therefore, of the deification of Christ's flesh and the intimacy of the union existing between his two natures, Schwenckfeld was bound to differ radically from Luther in his conception of the mode of Christ's presence in the sacrament. The precise points here at issue will become more evident if, in setting forth Schwenckfeld's answer to this decisive question, we reproduce the polemic coloring that characterized his whole system of thought. For after all Luther's doctrine of the ubiquity of Christ's body was

* It is an interesting analogy that Schwenckfeld employs to body forth his idea of the relation of the three persons of the Trinity. "Daher wird auch Christus die rechte Hand Gottes des Vaters genannt, dass Gott der Vater durch Christum im heiligen Geiste alles hat geschaffen; dass Christus der Sohn, das Wort, ja die rechte Hand Gottes ist vom Vater als dem Haupte ins Fleisch ausgegangen und hat darin und dadurch Erlösung gewirkt im Finger, das ist im heiligen Geiste" (C 104). Cf. in this letter the section entitled "Wie Christus sitzt zu der Rechten Gottes und was es sei" (pp. 106-110), and in the tract *Apologia und Erklärung der Schlesier, etc.*, section 17, pp. G, Gi, Gii.

† "Esse ubique est esse in toto, non in parte; est omnia continere, a nullo contineri," D 257d, in margin. Cf. the section in the *Confession* (Part III) entitled *Vom Wesen des Leibes Christi in der Glorien und ob Christus nach seinen beiden Naturen allenthalben sei, und was allenthalben sein heisse*, and the tract *Verantwortung und Defension für C. Schwenckfeld der Punkte und Irrthümer damit ihn Doctor Joachim von Wat unrecht beschuldigt*, especially paragraph 5: *Dass Christus nicht im Himmel als an einem leiblichen oder räumlichen Orte sitze oder umschrieben*.

‡ B 238b.

only one of many causes that prevented the Silesian reformer from identifying himself, in the eucharistic controversy, with any of the recognized church parties or leaders.

We shall not need to dwell upon his absolute rejection of the Romish theory of the Redeemer's presence in the sacrament. The mass was to him an abominable idolatry.* For him, as for every other representative of a genuinely Protestant view of the Supper, the bread remained bread and the wine wine.† Transubstantiation is regarded as the figment of an unsanctified mind incapable of discerning the spiritual content of the letter of Scripture.‡ The Church may indeed present offerings to God, but they are the sacrifices of praise and self-denial and service, not of the body of Christ.§ The all-comprehending objection to Rome's answer of the question concerning the mode of the Lord's presence in this rite is that the mass detracts from the glory of "the ruling King of grace."|| Christ is not in any such sense in the Supper that his presence calls for a worship of the sacramental elements.¶ No one can change the bread into his body; he is no longer under the power of sinners.**

From what has been said of Schwenckfeld's objection to the doctrine of the ubiquity of Christ's human nature we are prepared to see him oppose, in the second place, the Lutheran answer to the question concerning the mode of the Lord's presence in the Supper.

We need not enlarge upon the data already given that showed

* See especially the four prefatory *Sendbriefe* in B and the immediately following epistles.

† Cf. Baur, *Tertullians Lehre vom Abendmahl . . . nebst einer Übersicht über die Hauptmomente der Geschichte der Lehre vom Abendmahl*, in *Tübinger Zeits. für Theol.*, 1839, H. 1, pp. 107ff.

‡ Cf. B, Part I, pp. 8, 100, and B, p. 442c, C 77a, 969b.

§ B, pp. 11, 19f. Cf. the tract *Von dreierlei Leben der Menschen*, especially cap. XX, *Von dreierlei guten Werken des Glaubens und christlichen Lebens* (D 673 sqq.).

|| See B, p. 9, where this general consideration is resolved into fifteen specific arguments against the mass, as follows:

1. *Sophistica illa transsubstantio panis in corpus Christi gloriosum.* 2. *Oblatio corporis Christi sub specie panis pro vivis et defunctis.* 3. *Trina corporis Christi fractio et improbabilis applicatio.* 4. *Actionis Christi ipsissima perversio.* 5. *Peccatorum ficta per opus operatum remissio.* 6. *Hostiæ consecratæ tanquam idoli adoratio.* 7. *Christi regis infinitæ gloriæ localis inclusio.* 8. *Pœnitentiæ per missam extinctio.* 9. *Cœnæ dominicæ abolitio.* 10. *Christi regnantis e dextera Patris super altare eorum detractio.* 11. *Regis e regno suo characteristica expulsio.* 12. *Verborum de corpore et sanguine Christi falsa ad panem relatio.* 13. *Sanctorum contra sacerdotium et mediationem Christi invocatio.* 14. *Symoniaca missarum nundinatio et gratiæ venditio.* 15. *Precatio cœca et inhibita.*

¶ A 105a.

** *Ibid.*

how Luther in his doctrine of the sacraments, in trying to hold a middle course between the Romanists and the fanatics,* was compelled to approximate the former by the logic of his sharp attack upon the latter. He not merely emphasized anew the real objective content of the sacrament, but identified this content with the material or corporeal presence of the Redeemer in a manner that made it possible that the body of Christ might be "distributed, eaten, and masticated by the teeth" even of an ungodly and unbelieving man.† Schwenckfeld therefore rejects the Lutheran as much as the Roman Catholic idea of the consecratory act in the eucharist. "Therefore *consecrare* does not mean to convert the earthly into the heavenly, or to transubstantiate. Nor does it mean to unite one thing with another, as the Lutherans imagine, a *sacramentalem unionem panis cum Christi corpore*, nor an *impanationem, eine Einbrötung, vi verborum, . . .* but it signifies to separate, to accept, by prayer to bless or consecrate something, to give thanks unto God, to remember the benefits of Christ, as also *apud panem vel in pane eucharistico* to celebrate the death of Christ, to represent the heavenly reality, to praise and thank Christ for his spiritual food unto eternal life. It does not mean to seek the divine and heavenly in *pane eucharistico*, much less to regard the bread itself as such."‡ As this passage indicates, Schwenckfeld represents the Lutheran doctrine as teaching impanation.§ The sense in which the term is used, however, does no injustice to the peculiar views of this class of his opponents. For while he fails to grasp the full significance of the active principle of faith in their system, he clearly apprehends the inadequacies of their "sacra-

* Cf. *Wider die himmlischen Propheten*, St. Louis edition, Vol. XX, p. 251: "Darum gehen wir zwischen beiden hin und machen nichts weder geistlich noch leiblich, sondern halten geistlich was Gott geistlich und leiblich was er leiblich macht."¶

† See his "Bedenken" concerning union with the Zwinglians, dated December 17, 1534, in the St. Louis edition, XVII, col. 2052. Of course the *Formula Concordiæ* (*Epitome*, Art. VII, *Negativa* 21; Schaff, *The Creeds of Christendom*, III, p. 146) utterly rejects and condemns "Capernaiticam manducationem corporis Christi quam nobis Sacramentarii contra suæ conscientiae testimonium, post tot nostras protestationes, malitiose affingunt," etc. But it was precisely with the crass literalism of Luther that Schwenckfeld had to deal. Cf. C 236c. Particularly objectionable was the statement in Luther's last *Short Confession on the Holy Sacrament* that the bread in the Supper is the Lord's body, which the godless man or Judas receives orally just as much as do St. Peter and all the saints (St. Louis edition, XX, col. 1778). Schwenckfeld wrote a special treatise on the subject: *Ob Judas und die ungläubigen, falschen Christen den Leib und das Blut Jesu Christi im Nachtmahl des Herrn empfangen*.

‡ A 856c. Cf. C 148, B 53d, 61c, 143b.

§ Cf. also A 415b, B, Part I, 101a, B 38d, C 75c, 97c, 178ff.

mental union'' between the bread and the body of Christ. With whatever name he chooses to label the Lutheran doctrine,* he reveals in his refutations a clear understanding of the precise issues, as appears from his sixfold argument against the theory: It is contrary (1) to the content of all Scripture; (2) to the nature of the (eternal) Word; (3) to the character of genuine faith; (4) to the kingdom, New Testament, and high priesthood of Christ; (5) to the honor and glory of God; and (6) to the institution of the Supper and the usage of the early Church.† The Lutheran formula "in, with, and under" is condemned as an artificial interpretation of the words of institution.‡ The Lutheran view is after all a prop for the papacy. "For although Luther out of God's gracious revelation pointed out many errors of the papacy"—in this sentence we have Schwenckfeld's attitude to the conservatives on the right wing accurately pictured—"it was not given him of God to reform the sacraments, nor to establish a united, blessed Christian Church; he failed even to this extent, that in the article concerning the sacrament, upon which the whole papacy and anti-Christian kingdom with its foundations, masses and other characteristics is dedicated, he only confirmed this Church, inasmuch as he fought so violently in behalf of the papists, that every priest, no matter what sort of man he is, might *per verba consecrationis* bring down Christ from heaven upon the altar into the bread or under its form."§

It is plain, therefore, that, apart from all the christological difficulties involved, Luther's theory of the substantial presence of the Redeemer's body was too gross and massive a literalism to suit the spiritualistic presuppositions of a man like Schwenckfeld.||

* It is well known how the Lutherans object also to the term consubstantiation. See, e.g., Krauth, *The Conservative Reformation and its Theology*, pp. 130, 339 sq., et passim. But so far at least as Luther, Schwenckfeld's protagonist, is concerned, there can be no valid objection to the use of the term consubstantiation, or even its partial equivalent impanation, provided only the idea of a local or physical inclusion of the material body of Christ be eliminated.

† See B, Part I, p. 18, and the whole of the first letter, *Vom Grund und von der Ursache des Irrthums beim Sacrament des Herrn Nachtmahls*.

‡ "Etliche sagen er sei im Brot, Etliche unterm Brot, Etliche sagen er sei das materiale Brot selbst, da man bald ihre Ungewissheit mag finden. Denn was in, mit, oder unter einem Ding ist, kann ja das Ding nicht selbst sein, wie ihr wisset. Es werden auch solche mit ihren 'in, mit, oder unter' durch die Worte 'Das ist mein Leib' (auf welche sie dennoch fest trotzen) selbst überwunden" (A 415bc).

§ C 519d.

|| It is not necessary to make special reference to Melancthon. Melancthon expressed a no doubt common judgment upon the Silesian when in a letter to Frecht, of October, 1535, he called him "stultum magis quam improbum" (*Corpus Reformatorum*, ed. Bretschneider, II, 955); and in 1556 his chief objection

But if the Romanists and Lutherans, according to Schwenckfeld, practiced idolatry in the eucharist, Zwingli and the Anabaptists made too little of this sacrament. Before setting forth his own views, therefore, it may be advantageous to consider his objections to the Swiss doctrine concerning the mode of Christ's presence in the Supper.

The key to Zwingli's position is found, of course, in his symbolic interpretation of the verb in the words of institution: *est* is equivalent to *significat*. The Supper is, therefore, primarily a memorial of the Saviour's death, a symbolic act picturing this redemptive fact; while at the same time stress is laid upon the character of this rite as a badge of Christian faith and as a communion with Christ and with the fellow-believers.* The Supper is a sign and seal of a grace already bestowed, rather than a means by which to secure the grace itself. It must be added, however, that Zwingli at times unequivocally asserted the spiritual presence of Christ in the sacrament. To be sure his polemic attitude led him rather to emphasize the absence of the Saviour's body, but the other positive factor is not to be forgotten.†

was to the marvelous literary activity of the "hundred-handed" "Stenckfeldius" and his "milites, qui ipsius nomine non solum scripta spargunt sed etiam seditiones movent, jactitant adflatus, et abducunt homines a publico ministerio et a lectione et cogitatione doctrinæ" (*ibid.*, VIII, p. 740). Schwenckfeld in turn simply identified Melancthon with the Lutheran movement, and made no allowance for the mediating tendencies on the eucharistic question revealed by the author of the Augsburg Confession in the edition of 1540. Nor indeed could Schwenckfeld consistently have adopted even the latest concessions of Melancthon. For in proportion as the latter receded from his Romanizing position of 1530 and admitted the figurative interpretation of the words of institution, he was simply transferring himself from one to another of the extreme parties between which Schwenckfeld tried to maintain himself. For the condemnation of Schwenckfeld by the Schmalcald theologians, including Justas Jonas, Bugenhagen, Melancthon and Amsdorf, and for Schwenckfeld's reply to their "misunderstanding" of his views, see C 691ff.

* Zwingli's eucharistic views are fully discussed by August Baur, *Zwingli's Theologie: Ihr Werden und ihr System*. See especially I, 357ff., 427ff.; II, 298ff., 500ff.

† "Adserimus igitur non sic carnaliter et crasse manducari corpus Christi in cœna, ut isti perhibent, sed verum Christi corpus credimus in cœna sacramentaliter et spiritualiter edi a religiosa, fidei et sancta mente, quomodo et divus Chrysostomus sentit. Et hæc est brevis summa nostræ, immo non nostræ, sed ipsius veritatis, sententiæ de hac controversia" (*Confessio ad Franciscum Francorum Regem*, in Niemeyer's *Collectio Confessionum*, p. 72). Adamson, *The Christian Doctrine of the Lord's Supper*, p. 61, in his account of Zwingli's views, is incomplete and even misleading; but he has done well to emphasize anew the higher factors in this type of doctrine. Cf. also Ebrard, *Das Dogma vom hl. Abendmahl und seine Geschichte*, II, 220 sqq.

From what has already been said we are prepared to find Schwenckfeld objecting to Zwingli's conception of heaven as a locality,* to his strong insistence that the body of Christ, spoken of in Matt. xxvi. 26, is that consigned to death and not the risen body,† and to the rhetorical device, called *allæsis*,‡ whereby a statement made concerning one of the two natures in Christ is to be referred to the other without prejudicing either the unity of his person or the distinction of his natures. But the chief objection was that against the symbolic interpretation of the words of institution. Schwenckfeld here clearly discerned that the Zwinglian view embodied a rationalistic tendency.§ He complained that it reduced the Supper to a meal that was nothing more than the manna or paschal lamb of the Jews.|| In his judgment no symbolic construction of the verb could do justice to the blessed but mysterious reality of the sacrament, for which faith is the indispensable condition. In spite, then, of the points of contact between his view and that of the Swiss ¶—the points, namely, in which both opposed the Lutheran and Roman Catholic doctrines—Schwenckfeld never could rest satisfied with the primary consideration of Zwinglianism, that the elements after all only symbolize the body and blood of Christ. By the ardor of his deep piety rather than by the logic of his system, he magnified the reality of the sacramental grace with a zeal that appeared all the more impressive because his philosophic presuppositions seemed to annihilate the external ordinance itself.

We need not adduce the scattered references to Oecolampad, Capito and Bucer.** The first, indeed, emphasized the idea of a sacramental nourishment, very much as Schwenckfeld did, and considerably enriched Zwingli's refutation of the doctrine of the corporeal presence in the Supper.†† But the solution offered by

* C 597d, 795b.

† *Zwinglii Opera*, Schuler et Schulthess, III, p. 523. Cf. Schwenckfeld's *Bekennnis von der göttlichen Herrlichkeit des Leibes, Fleisches und Bluts Christi*, in D, pp. 263ff.

‡ A 597bc.

§ Cf. A 727b, B 240a.

|| A 667d.

¶ Zwingli himself (*Opera*, II, Abt. 3, p. 23), in his *Vorrede* of 1528 to Schwenckfeld's *Anweisung*, declares that the latter's views are not opposed to his own, but rather included in them. He here tries to endorse Schwenckfeld's exegesis by citing a Hebrew analogue. Cf. A 673.

** See especially A 673ff.

†† Goetz, *l.c.*, p. 72; cf. Kahnis, *l.c.*, pp. 332 *sqq.* Schwenckfeld even fancied that his own view of the difference between the inner and the outer Word was shared by Oecolampad. See C 336, where he approvingly quotes the Swiss reformer's comment on Ezek. iii.

Oecolampad, that of interpreting the term *corpus* in the words of institution as the equivalent of *figura corporis*, was not a whit more attractive to the Silesian than was Zwingli's. In his judgment both deprived the sacrament of its deepest essence. Capito had, to be sure, thoroughly approved of Schwenckfeld's doctrine as early as 1529.* The same is true of Bucer, who was displeased with Luther's harsh treatment of the Silesian.† But later under Bucer's influence Capito likewise became a bitter opponent of Schwenckfeld's eucharistic (and ecclesiological) views.‡

It is time, however, to let Schwenckfeld present his own positive view of the mode of Christ's presence in the Supper.

He himself tells us at some length the facts concerning the origin and growth of his peculiar doctrine.§ Unable to believe, as the Romanists and Lutherans taught, that even a Judas Iscariot could eat the body of Christ, and unable to accept the positive elements of Zwingli's teaching as sufficient, Schwenckfeld felt himself moved to an independent study of the question which the Carlstadt-Luther controversy had already made the most prominent issue in the field of religious discussion. Being unfamiliar with Greek at that time—it was the year 1525—he submitted his views to his friend Val. Krautwald, of Liegnitz. Krautwald at first sharply opposed him, whereupon Schwenckfeld sent him some *duodecim quæstiones* or *argumenta contra impanationem*.|| Krautwald himself now passed through an experience very similar to that of his correspondent: there was a season of profound intellectual and spiritual anxiety concerning the meaning of the eucharist, when suddenly, after three days' meditation and prayer, he received a divine revelation,¶ teaching him a new and more satisfactory interpretation of

* See the preface, by Capito, to the *Apologia und Erklärung der Schlesier dass sie den Leib und das Blut, etc., . . . nicht verleugnen*; cf. A 673ff.

† Schneider, *l.c.*, Abt. I, p. 9, and n. 15, p. 28f.

‡ Gerbert, *l.c.*, pp. 188–193.

§ The leading passages are contained in C p. 24ff., *C. Schwenckfelds Handlung und Gespräch mit den Gelehrten zu Wittenberg . . . vom rechten Verstande der Worte "Das ist mein Leib,"* and C p. 20 sqq., *Von der Offenbarung des rechten Verstandes beim Nachtmahl und Essen seines Leibes* (anno 1540). Erbkam, *Geschichte*, etc., p. 370f., gives the gist of the narrative. Cf. Hampe, p. 11ff., Planck, V, 1, Buch IV, cap. 7, and Arnold, *Kirchen- und Ketzler Hist.*, I, Th. II, Buch XVI, cap. XX, p. 838.

|| C 22.

¶ We need not by this term understand anything more, in the case of either Schwenckfeld or Krautwald, than the sudden enlightenment of the mind earnestly seeking the true sense of Scripture. For Krautwald's experience see the letters written by him to Schwenckfeld and incorporated in C as *Sendbriefe* I and II and with this compare Schwenckfeld's story, C 22ff.

the much discussed words. Thus encouraged Schwenckfeld went to Wittenberg,* to submit his views to Luther. The interview was, on the whole, encouraging to the inquirer. But "about two months later" Luther is said to have written him a sharp letter, closing with the words: "In short, either you or we must be the devil's bondsmen, because we both claim the Word of God in our behalf."† Nothing daunted, however, the two friends confirmed each other in their singular view and soon the break with Luther was complete.

We may come to the heart of the matter by following the exegetical arguments with which Schwenckfeld sought to buttress his theory.‡ He inverted the words of institution and made the pronoun a "spiritual demonstrative," yielding the sense: "My body is this, namely, bread or true nourishment for the soul; my blood is this, namely, drink or true refreshment for the soul." In support of this exegetical device reference was made to countless alleged analogous texts, as, for example, Gen. xvii. 10, "This is my covenant," etc.; Exod. xii. 27, "It is the sacrifice of the Lord's passover"; Ezek. v. 5, "This is Jerusalem."§ Köstlin is doubtless correct in attributing the opposition of the Silesian to the figurative interpretation to the influence of Luther himself,|| since he had insisted that even in such passages as 1 Cor. x. 4, "and the rock was Christ," the verb is to be taken literally so that the sense would be, Christ

* This was at least his second trip thither. The first had occurred toward the end of 1521. Cf. Schneider, *Über den geschichtlichen Verlauf*, etc., Abt. I, p. 4. This does not, however, conflict with the more usual statement that the visit occurred in 1522; for he stayed there at least long enough to attend the official investigation on January 1, 1522, by Melancthon, into the doings of the Zwickau prophets.

† C p. 22c. Erbkam, *l.c.*, p. 371 n., insists—following the Erlangen edition of Luther's works (Vol. 53, p. 383)—that the date of Luther's reply was August 11, 1526, and that therefore the "two months" here named were in reality nearly ten, inasmuch as the interview was held, according to C 24, early in December, 1525. (Goetz, *l.c.*, p. 77, n. 2, wrongly represents Köstlin, *Martin Luther*, II², p. 82, as saying that the interview itself occurred in December of the year 1526). Enders, however (*Briefwechsel Luthers*, V, 338), and following him the editors of the St. Louis edition (Vol. XXIa, p. 851), put the date of the letter in question at April 14, 1526. Even so the term "two months" must be taken as a round expression for four months. Moreover, the concluding sentence, quoted above, is not to be found in that form in the epistle. Schwenckfeld must be understood as giving merely the spirit of Luther's reply.

‡ The "credit" of the discovery belongs to Schwenckfeld; for its scientific vindication, however, he was largely—at least until he became master of the Greek language—indebted to Krautwald. Cf. Hampe, p. 11.

§ Cf. A 704.

|| *Martin Luther*, II², p. 83.

was really and truly the rock, namely that spiritual rock.* In the same manner Schwenckfeld now and ever after insisted upon the literal interpretation of the verb and the "spiritual" interpretation of the (predicate) pronoun "this."†

The rationale of this singular view must be found in the fundamental dualism of Schwenckfeld's system of thought. There are in short two kinds of bread in the Supper: the physical and the spiritual; the bread of the Lord and the bread which is the Lord. Each has its purpose: "There are therefore two kinds of bread and drink to be considered in the complete sacramental transaction of the Lord's Supper, where it is celebrated with the right understanding, faith, and knowledge, in the due course of grace: one for the inner, the other for the outer man that believes. The inner or spiritual bread or food, that feeds the soul, no one can give, as has been said, save only Christ in the Holy Spirit; and this must under all circumstances precede. . . . Thereupon follows the sacramental, external eating to proclaim the death of the Lord and to give thanks for his salvation and nourishment."‡ For this reason the pronoun (*hoc*) is no *corporalis demonstratio ad oculum*, but a *spiritualis demonstratio ad intellectum*.§ To these two sacra-

* The mere inversion of the words of institution ought not, of course, to be regarded as an insuperable objection to the theory. Cf. Rückert, *Das Abendmahl, sein Wesen und seine Geschichte in der alten Kirche*, who, though controverting Schwenckfeld's interpretation, yet admits (p. 66f.): "Das griechische Prädikat geht seinem Subjekt voran, so lange kein Grund zum Gegenteil ist. In so fern hätte Schwenckfeld mit seiner Auffassung recht." And cf. Goetz, who declares, *l.c.*, p. 77, that "die griechische Wortstellung in der Brotformel des Mt. und Mk., nur für sich und rein grammatisch betrachtet, eigentlich die Deutung Schwenckfelds mehr begünstigt als die Luthers, bzw. als die gewöhnliche." In any event the essence of his exegesis is found not in the changed order of the words, but in his interpretation of the *τοῦτο*.

† He was thoroughly familiar with the fantastic view of Carlstadt, who, emphasizing the difference in gender between the *τοῦτο* and the *ἄρα*, declared that the former must refer to the Lord's body (*σῶμα*), and that the Saviour when instituting the Supper pointed to his body as if to say: "This (body of mine) is my body (about to be) broken for you; this (blood) is my blood (about to be) shed for you." See the excellent account of Carlstadt's theory by Göbel, in *Theol. Studien und Kritiken*, 1842, pp. 329-354. For Schwenckfeld's brief but adequate criticism of Carlstadt, see C 61b, C 175d (anno 1526), and C 566.

‡ B 72d. This is the burden of countless passages in the folios and the separate treatises. Cf. B 564b on the *Zweierlei Ordnung aller Dinge*. In D 18 the distinction between the inner spiritual and the outer physical eating is connected with Augustin's distinction between the *sacramentum* and the *res sacramenti*. Cf. also D, p. 897, *Von den zweierlei Brod und Trank in des Herrn Nachtmahl*. The necessity of appropriating the spiritual before the material food in order to partake worthily of the sacrament is emphasized in A 739a. The error of his opponents is ascribed, as usual, to a lack of spiritual discernment in the reading of the Word (A 657d, 670a). § C 134f.

mental realities, the spiritual content and the sensuous sign, moreover, the two declarations in the words of institution closely correspond: "This is my body," and "this do in remembrance of me." "We thus write and maintain, that in the complete Supper of the Lord two things are to be found: one is that which the Lord did and accompanied with appropriate remarks, when he took the bread, gave thanks, and broke it and gave it to the disciples and said: 'Take, eat; this is my body which is given for you'; and likewise the cup. The other thing is that which Christ afterward commanded his disciples to do when he said: 'Do this in remembrance of me.' "*

As implied in this passage and frequently stated elsewhere, the presence of the true and spiritual bread of life is the logical prius in the whole sacramental transaction. And there ought to be no question about Schwenckfeld's wish to emphasize, with all the enthusiasm of his mystic piety, the real presence of the Redeemer at his table. For although this has been often denied,† the arguments adduced only show that the reformer did not teach the corporeal or bodily presence in the Roman or Lutheran sense. The Saviour is truly or "really" present, though his body is not there either under the "accidents of the bread and wine" or "in, with, or under" those elements. "That the presence of Christ in the Lord's Supper is not on this account denied" was a favorite thesis.‡ He expresses his delight in the conviction of a correspondent, "that in the Lord's Supper his body, flesh and blood, indeed the Lord Christ himself, is truly (*wahrhaftiglich*) and essentially (*wesentlich*) received."§

The following passage will serve to show conclusively that he held to what must in all fairness be called a true or actual or "real" presence: "[I believe] that the true body and blood of Christ is *vere* present to faith in the mystery of the holy sacrament (if it is observed and understood according to his institution). For that reason, too, it is called by the Church '*mysterium fidei*,' inasmuch

* A 761d.

† *E.g.*, Goetz, *l.c.*, p. 75: "Auch Schwenckfeld verwarf, wie die Schweizer, die wirkliche Gegenwart." So also Walch, *Einleitung in die Religionsstreitigkeiten*, 4. und 5. Theil, 1736, p. 1012: "In der Lehre vom Abendmahl läugnete er die wesentliche Gegenwart des Leibes und Bluts Christi." Even Hahn, *l.c.*, p. 14, declares: "Apparet ex his, cur ne divinam quidem Christi naturam Schwenckfeldius in pane atque vino eucharistico vere præsentem cogitare potuerit, non ex alia nempe causa, nisi quod sint elementa creata, a quibus divina essentia absolute sit separata."

‡ B 74a.

§ B 119c.

as it is only by the light of faith that one can rightly understand and celebrate the ordinance, and thus in the spirit of faith eat the body of Christ and enjoy participation in him. . . . [I believe] that in the Lord's Supper, or in the mystery of the sacrament (as the fathers call it), believers eat the body of Christ, not as a sign or only figuratively, in thought, but *vere*, truly (*wahrhaftig*), essentially (*wesentlich*), and in a sensible manner (*empfindlich*) for the nourishment of their souls, and truly drink his blood in and out of the living Word of God."*

These citations will have served to point out both the similarities and the divergencies between Schwenckfeld's view and the views of his various classes of opponents concerning the mode of Christ's presence in the sacrament. On the one hand, the opposition to the literalism of the Romish and the Lutheran doctrines must be said to exclude every possibility of a corporeal presence.† On the other hand, the points of contact with the Swiss or Reformed doctrine are equally obvious. At first sight, indeed, it would appear that Schwenckfeld's conception of the words of institution is virtually the same as that of Zwingli or Oecolampad; that whereas Zwingli introduced the symbolic principle into the verb (*est*), and Oecolampad into the noun (*corpus*), Schwenckfeld did precisely the same thing by his "spiritual," or let us rather say his spiritualistic, interpretation of the pronoun (*hoc*). It must be admitted, of course, that Schwenckfeld regarded the sacramental elements primarily as signs or vehicles of representation.‡ But while accepting in the main Zwingli's anti-Romish and anti-Lutheran interpretation of the words of institution, Schwenckfeld cannot be said to have been satisfied with the rationalistic spirit of the Swiss reformer's general conception of the sacrament. Schwenckfeld's positive and most

* D 50 sq.

† "Wenn euch aber jemand sagte C.[aspar] S.[chwenckfeld] untersteht sich zu hindern dass viele Menschen nun nach erkannter Wahrheit das irdische, gebackene Brot mit dem M.[artin] L.[uther] nicht für Gott halten und abgöttischerweise anbeten, die Seligkeit dabei suchen, einen bröthern Christum haben, dass man die Menschen drauf weist, da möchte ich gerne hören was ihr dazu würdet sagen."

‡ Schenkel, *Das Wesen*, etc., I, p. 558, even goes so far as to say: "Dass Brod und Wein für Schwenckfeld keine andere Bedeutung als diejenige eines Darstellungsmittels hat, bezeugt er schon damit, dass er sich gegen den von Luther und auch den Vermittlern gebrauchten Ausdruck 'sacramentliche Einigung' (zwischen Christi Leib und Blut und den äussern Zeichen) entschieden erklärt." But this would hold equally against the Reformed view. Moreover, the assertion in this extreme form fails to do justice to the many passages, only a few of which have been cited, that insist upon the true or real presence of Christ, not indeed in a "sacramental union" with the physical elements, but in or at the Supper.

characteristic elements, therefore, such as his emphasis upon the real presence and upon the profound mystery of the inner sacramental transaction, his idea of the nature of the blessings bestowed upon the worthy communicant—in other words of the reality and worth of the strictly objective content of the sacred ordinance when rightly employed—suggest a comparison with the Calvinistic rather than with the Zwinglian or early Swiss view.*

For Schwenckfeld, like Calvin, taught an essentially figurative interpretation of the words of institution, the difference being that the latter made the verb and the former the pronoun bear a spiritual meaning. Both insisted that the sacrament makes a real offer to the communicant not merely of the body and blood of Christ but also of his whole person and work, including therefore all the blessings of his redemption.† For both faith was of such cardinal importance that, whereas the Lutheran and the Roman views taught a real presence of the body of Christ in such terms as made it possible even for the unworthy and the unbelieving to “eat the flesh of the Son of man and drink his blood,” they insisted that without faith the participants received only the signs and that to their condemnation. Again, Schwenckfeld, like Calvin, not only avoided this too intimate association between the sacramental substance and the sacramental signs, but sought rather to lay all emphasis upon the immediacy of the effect produced upon the believer by the entrance, not into his mouth but into his soul, of the spiritual substance of the Redeemer’s body. Above all, Schwenckfeld made much of the glorified humanity of the Saviour, of his dynamic presence in the

* Cf. Hampe, *l.c.*, p. 12: “so viel ist aber aus den kurzen Andeutungen wohl klar geworden, dass Schwenckfeld ungefähr dasselbe lehrte, was etwa 15 Jahre später als Calvinische Lehre weite Verbreitung fand.” Niedner, *Geschichte der christlichen Kirche*, 1846, p. 676, n. 1, declares: “Es ist wesentlich das calvinische Sich-erheben-lassen des gläubigen Geistes zu der vergotteten [this last word is not, of course, to be understood as referring also to Calvin’s christology] Menschheit Christi, durch die Allgegenwärtigkeit seines heiligen Geistes; also ohne eine örtliche Selbstversetzung entweder des Menschengestes in den Himmel oder des Christusleibes auf die Erde.” It must be remembered, however, that Schwenckfeld objected as much to Calvin’s as to Zwingli’s figurative interpretation of the verb *est*. Cf. C 524, where the two are placed together for criticism. Logically, however, his protest against the figurative interpretation is not warranted: we find here another illustration of the discrepancy between his negations and his affirmations.

† Schwenckfeld’s doctrine of the true bread of life has made this clear. The point will be more fully discussed in connection with the question of the benefits to be derived from a right use of the sacrament. For Calvin’s views, see his *Institutio*, Lib. IV especially c. XVII. sections 10–18.

Supper, of that divine energy that emanated from the body of the exalted Lord of life.*

In this virtually Calvinistic sense, therefore, Schwenckfeld taught a true or real presence of Christ in the eucharist. A number of further similarities between his view and that of the Reformed leaders will emerge when we now consider his response to the second specific question which engaged the minds of the sacramentarian controversialists of that day, namely, What are the benefits to be derived from the right use of the sacred institution? The answer has already been given by way of necessary implication. But a more adequate discussion of this point will reveal additional characteristic elements of Schwenckfeld's system of thought.

We have seen how his fundamental dualism affected his conception of the nature of the sacraments in general and, in particular, of the mode of Christ's presence in the Supper. There is an outer and there is an inner transaction; a physical or earthly bread and wine, and a spiritual or heavenly bread and wine: and corresponding to these there is a carnal eating and drinking, and there is a spiritual eating and drinking. And it is obviously with these subjective acts, these assimilative processes that we must now concern ourselves, if we would ascertain the benefits imparted to the worthy or believing communicant.

Here, as elsewhere, we find Schwenckfeld not only acquainted with the theological battle-cries of the day but thoroughly dominated by their influence; but here, as elsewhere, his use of them is peculiar to himself. In harmony with his view of the eucharist as a double reality he distinguishes between two generic kinds of benefits, those derived from the outer ceremony and those derived from the inner mystery. The external act or the *commemoratio*, whereby

* The mystical features of Calvin's doctrine of the eucharist are as difficult to understand as are Schwenckfeld's peculiarities. Ebrard, *Das Dogma vom hl. Abendmahl*, II, 458 *sqq.*, gives what must doubtless be regarded as the fittest solution of the problem, when he shows how the *substantia* of Christ's presence in the Supper denotes, according to Calvin, not the material substance of his body, but that "essence of the glorified Christ" which is to be conceived primarily as a power, an energy, an "actus in actu non extensum in extenso." The similarity on this point between Calvin and Schwenckfeld is most striking. But there is a difference. Calvin never allows, as Schwenckfeld does, the glorification of the Redeemer's human nature to amount to a "deification." Moreover, closely connected with this is the fact that Calvin represents the Holy Spirit as the mediator of the spiritual blessings, whereas Schwenckfeld, with a consistent regard for his mystical, physico-spiritual presuppositions, was rather inclined to ascribe this office to the deified God-man in his own person. On the mystical elements of Calvin's doctrine of the Supper, compare also André Duran, *Le Mysticisme de Calvin*, pp. 62ff.

the Saviour's death is proclaimed, is at the same time a symbol of that internal act, the *manducatio*, by which faith appropriates the blessings of salvation. "These two (namely *manducatio* and *commemoratio*) must be well distinguished in a divine transaction and not be confounded. The eating takes place internally and, as has been said, out of the living Word of God. . . . The commemoration takes place outwardly in the breaking of the bread of the Lord. The eating precedes; the commemoration and thanksgiving follow. He who has not eaten and had enough cannot truly give thanks."*

The external rite, then, has primarily a didactic or demonstrative value.† "The broken bread teaches, explains, and represents the nature of the body of Christ that was given and broken for us."‡ Thus the external rite, though clearly subordinated to the inner mystery, nevertheless performs an important service.§

Obviously, therefore, the real question concerns the nature of this act of manducation|| typified in the outward ordinance. And here the significant fact is to be noted that, contrary to the prevailing views of the time, Schwenckfeld not only took his point of departure for the interpretation of the words of institution from the sixth chapter of the Gospel according to John, but made this discourse refer directly to the Lord's Supper as the fourth evangelist's contribution to our knowledge of the eucharist.¶ To him it was no accident that the most mystical of the New Testament writings contained the key to the solution of the problem of the festal "mysterium."** There is indeed a corporeal or carnal eating of the physical bread itself; but there are no two ways—as Luther claimed

* B 131a. Cf. the oft-repeated remark: " 'Das ist' gehet vor; 'das thut' folget."

† Schwenckfeld did not reject Zwingli's idea that the sacraments are badges of the Christian man's faith. But he had too little interest in the external significance of the rites to emphasize this merely professional value.

‡ A 399d, in the margin. Cf. Schenkel, *l.c.*, I, 560, n. 1, for the remarkably similar view of Servetus.

§ Cf. A 857b: "Es bringt gemeldete *Rememoratio* oder Wiedergedächtnis mit *Ruminationem et repetitionem omnium beneficiorum Christi. Ita saturatur fidelis anima et manducat corpus Christi pro se traditum et bibit sanguinem pro se effusum.*"

|| The term is also used synecdochically to include the "drinking of the blood" of Christ.

¶ Zwingli of course had insisted upon using this chapter as a guide; especially v. 63, "the flesh profiteth nothing"; but he did not suppose that the passage had a primary reference to the Supper. Cf. Baur, *Zwingli's Theologie*, II, pp. 296 *sqq.*, 318, 592 *et passim*.

** See the treatise, *Eine schöne und herrliche Auslegung über das ganze sechste Capitel Johannis von der Speise des ewigen Lebens*, especially pp. 126ff. (ed. 1595).

there are—in which the body of Christ can be eaten, a “spiritual” and a “sacramental” manducation. For, according to Schwenckfeld, the body of Christ is a purely spiritual food, and hence whether it be eaten in the sacrament or, as was possible, apart from these elements, the process must be a spiritual one.* Wherever, then, the communicant by faith appropriates the spiritual realities present to the believers at the Lord’s table and typified by the sensible signs, he is eating the true bread of life, which is the flesh and blood of the Son of God. In effect, therefore, Schwenckfeld here concedes, with Zwingli and the Reformed theologians, that eating is a tropical expression for “believing.”† The larger question accordingly becomes the more precise one: What are the redemptive benefits which faith receives in the Gospel, whether with or without the use of the sacraments?

The answers are given in various terms. In the following passage, *e.g.*, the language approximates that commonly used to set forth the evangelical conception of the work of Christ: “Therein,” *i.e.*, in the body and blood of Christ, the Christian “receives nothing other than divine righteousness, grace, the Holy Ghost, forgiveness of sins, peace of conscience, and much spiritual joy continually in his heart. . . . He who receives the body of Christ through faith, receives also the Spirit of Christ who keeps urging him unto all good.”‡ At other times, however, we have the peculiar indefiniteness of his mystical or physico-naturalistic conception: “He who eats the flesh of Christ partakes of the divine nature, flesh of flesh, bone of bone. He who eats the flesh of Christ eats life, that eternal life which begins in man here and preserves the soul from eternal death, so that this food will again produce the flesh of man, in a glory equal to that of the soul, at the final resurrection, and rescue and keep body and soul from eternal death.”§

* Cf. B 140 *sq.* There is therefore no unique or special way of feeding upon Christ in the sacrament. The term “sacramental eating” must be equated either with the merely physical act of partaking of the eucharistic elements, or else—it is after all only a question of the absence or presence of faith—with that spiritual manducation which is, according to Schwenckfeld, the only possible way of feeding upon Christ’s “flesh.”

† Of course Calvin (*Institutio*, IV, c. XVII, 5; Allen’s translation, II, p. 529) regarded the eating rather as a “fruit and effect” or “consequence” of faith, though he admitted that the manducation can be by faith only. But the difference between Calvin’s personal views and those of the Reformed symbols on this point is a negligible quantity.

‡ A 331.

§ *Auslegung des sechsten Capitels Joh.*, p. 175. Luther himself had taught that a physical or magical benefit might be derived from the eucharistic meal to insure

It is possible, however, to obtain more specific answers than either of these to the question concerning the blessings received by faith, whether in the use of the Supper or not. Our limits forbid a full discussion of Schwenckfeld's soteriology, but it is necessary to set forth at least the general principles of the subject as they bear upon the point in controversy.

We must revert to the basal fact of the two so diverse estates in which the Saviour performs his mediatorial services; in other words, the central importance of the resurrection of Christ must be clearly apprehended.* The earthly work of Jesus is to be regarded as the basis and the preparation for his heavenly work. The former is to be designated as the work of acquiring, and the latter as the work of distributing, the redemptive blessings.† All grace is therefore now to be found in the risen and glorified Christ. Sometimes, indeed, this thought is presented in a way which apparently robs the objective atonement of its intrinsic value, or which, to speak more positively and at the same time to relate the fact to his philosophic presuppositions, apparently transmutes the physical reality of the Redeemer's body into a spiritual substance to be mediated to the believer by the Holy Spirit.‡ Ordinarily, however, the work of Jesus on earth is regarded rather as a preparation for his more important service in heaven as "the ruling King of grace." The centre of Schwenckfeld's system of thought must unquestionably be found in the mediatorial work of the exalted, *i.e.*, the completely deified God-man.§ From this point of view the Gospel message

the bodily resurrection at the last day. Cf. Thimme, *Neue Kirchliche Zeitschrift*, 1901, p. 890. But in his later treatises this consideration was not dwelt upon, a point which Müller emphasizes in his endeavor to approximate the teachings of Luther on this question to those of Calvin (see his *Dogmatische Abhandlungen*, p. 417).

* On this general subject, see D 239 *sqq.*, 465 *sq.*, 507, 527, 825 *sq.*

† For the proofs we may refer to the admirable section, "De opere Christi," in Hahn, *l.c.*, pp. 52ff. Besides the passages there cited, see D 103, A 694, 861, and B 591. Luther had early developed the same mode of representation. See his *Wider die himmlischen Propheten*, St. Louis edition, XX, col. 275: "Von der Vergebung der Sünden handeln wir auf zwo Weisen: einmal wie sie erlangt und erworben ist, das andermal wie sie ausgetheilt und geschenkt wird."

‡ Cf. A 696c, C 943d.

§ Schwenckfeld's emphasis upon the post-resurrection activities of the Lord contained many a corrective suggestion for the one-sided treatment that Luther, in the interests of his forensic justification, was prone to accord to the earthly life of the Saviour. Schwenckfeld made much of the two texts: "Jesus our Lord . . . who was delivered up for our trespasses and was raised for our justification" (Rom. iv. 25), and "Wherefore we henceforth know no man after the flesh: even though we have known Christ after the flesh, yet now we know him so no more" (2 Cor. v. 16). On the common perversion of this last text by mystical interpreters, see Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, p. 69 *sq.*

is represented as being composed of two unequal but vitally connected portions. There is the milk for babes and the strong meat for adults; there is the word of the cross, and there is the word of life. "The sum of the Gospel is in the Word of the cross and the Word of life. By the Word of the cross is understood the entire mystery of the crucified Christ and the entire transaction of all that which Christ the eternal Son of God became for our sakes, that he accomplished, earned, and effected by the bitter death of the cross, namely, his salvation, reconciliation, self-sacrifice, and satisfaction for sin and the forgiveness of the same; while the Word of life denotes the whole mystery of the glorified Christ and eternal life, the whole work of our justification and salvation, and all that Christ after his ascension to heaven and entrance into the kingdom of God effects in believers through the Holy Ghost, and how he after accomplishing our salvation upon the cross now brings us to his heavenly kingdom unto eternal salvation."*

It is obvious from the passage just cited that Schwenckfeld infused a new meaning into some of the formulas employed to designate the blessings of the Gospel. The peculiarities of his system, from this point of view, may be briefly indicated by referring to his statements concerning the three specific terms, redemption (*Erlösung*), regeneration (*Wiedergeburt*), and justification (*Gerechtmachung*).†

Redemption is primarily, as in the early patristic conception, a deliverance from the power of Satan. By his death on the cross Christ overcame the archfiend of the human race,‡ and by his resurrection he made it possible that man, having been freed from the dominion of the devil, should become positively capable of triumphing over his foes by virtue of a gradual deliverance from the estate of creaturehood itself.§

This last phase of redemption, however, belongs rather to the specific doctrine of regeneration. And here, even more than in the case of the somewhat negative consideration of our being "bought off" from Satan by the ransom of the divine King's life,

* D 348 *sqq.* Concerning the terms "milk" and "strong food," and concerning the insufficiency of the former, which signified only a historical knowledge of Christ, and the absolutely indispensable character of the latter for the truly "spiritual knowledge" of Christ, see C 898, D 286 *sq.*, 587 *sqq.*, 895 *sqq.*, A 471-476.

† In what immediately follows we are drawing from Hahn, *op. cit.*, 51 *sqq.*, who has with admirable clearness, brevity and accuracy reproduced Schwenckfeld's soteriological principles.

‡ A 716c, D 435, 463, 742f. Cf. Baur, *Lehre von der Versöhnung*, p. 462n.

§ D 467 *sq.*

the emphasis must be placed upon the distributing, as distinguished from the acquiring, activity of the Redeemer, *i.e.*, upon his heavenly as distinguished from his earthly work. The act of regeneration or "re-creation," whereby the believer receives the divine principle of the spiritual life, is the beginning of the saving process on its subjective side. It would be easy, of course, to cite passages which, taken apart from their contexts and from the philosophic presuppositions upon which they are based, would appear to be in fair harmony with the general evangelical or Protestant view of his opponents concerning the initial act in the salvation of man. The following is a typical deliverance of this sort: "Thus regeneration is an incipient work of God, which he of his pure grace and mercy performs without any merit on our part in dead, corrupt man for his quickening, righteousness, and salvation; in which work God the merciful awakens man from spiritual death through his living Word, Jesus Christ, changes the old nature with a heavenly newness, converts the sinner, begets for himself children and heirs of his kingdom; in which he also grants ears to hear, eyes to see, and an open heart to understand, and through Jesus Christ in the Holy Spirit makes the evil and unrighteous man pious, holy, and righteous."* But the rationale of this regenerative process clearly evinces the extent to which Schwenckfeld compromised his biblical formulas with his spiritualistic principles. This will become the more evident when we interrogate him on the question which, as we have seen, was for him, no less than for Luther, central in the practical religious life of that day—the question of "justification by faith." For it was precisely in his conception of both "justification" and "faith" that Schwenckfeld developed to their logical consequences the essentially "mystical" principles of his system.

To be sure, he sought here as elsewhere to defend himself against the logic of his novel assertions. Therefore, on the one hand, he rejected altogether the Romish idea of meritorious works,† and, on the other, he sought to concede as much as possible to Luther's doctrine of forensic justification. He made much of the passion and death of Christ as the only ground of our reconciliation with God. Such language as the following is by no means exceptional: "This indeed is the joy of our hearts, that if we in faith think of his satisfaction, our consciences are quieted and put at ease. And to

* D 606a. Cf. the whole section, *Was ist denn eigentlich die Wiedergeburt? und wobei soll sie erkannt werden?*

† See, *e.g.*, D 653, 657.

celebrate the Lord's Supper, to eat and drink his blood, signifies the awakening of the believing hearts by the Spirit, so that they perceive the benefits of Christ, remember, inwardly experience, and consider them, and with hearty thanks put his wounds upon their wounded souls and consciences as a salutary plaster.''* The blood of Christ is the pledge of our redemption.† The Saviour died, the just for the unjust, having become a curse for us.‡ It is therefore an erroneous representation which declares that Schwenckfeld absolutely denied the imputed righteousness of Christ.§ The following citation may serve to show how freely Schwenckfeld could use the orthodox phrases: "The righteousness of God is nothing but the perceiving, grasping, and appropriating of such grace in Christ through faith. . . . Only that grace purifies by which our sins are not imputed to us.'''||

But if Schwenckfeld did not in practice deny imputed righteousness to the believing sinner, yet in theory, that is by the logic of his system, he was compelled to do so. The historical situation had here, too, done its part to force him into an extreme position where, in spite of his good intentions, he could not maintain himself in harmony with the Protestant leaders.¶ In his eagerness to

* A 379b; cf. A 243, 269.

† A 301b, D 460. To be quite accurate, however, it must be added that the historic bloodshedding is always to be followed by the "spiritual" effusion of the Saviour's blood in his heavenly activities. Cf. D 102 *sqq.*, 287, and C 943.

‡ A 44b, 301a, 289d.

§ Baur, *e.g.* (*Lehre von der Versöhnung*, p. 462), says Schwenckfeld substituted essential for imputed righteousness. Ritschl (*Rechtfertigung u. Versöhnung*, I³, p. 319) likewise asserts, "dass Schwenckfeld von einer angerechneten Gerechtigkeit nichts wissen wollte." But Hahn, *l.c.*, pp. 61ff., gives a more accurate statement. In strict consistency Schwenckfeld *ought* to have denied all imputed righteousness; but all attempts thus to measure him by the test of other fixed systems of theological opinion are sure to do the reformer injustice by failing to take account of some minor yet most highly characteristic and therefore important details. Consider, *e.g.*, the following statement, quoted by Hahn from A 283: "Siehe Röm. 14; was unsere Gerechtigkeit sei, und dass der allein gerecht ist, welchem um des Glaubens Christi willen seine Sünden nicht werden zugerechnet. Christo wurden unsere Sünden zugerechnet, da er für uns am Kreuz eine Maledieung ward, des geniessen wir noch heute." Dorner (*Geschichte d. prot. Theologie*, p. 178) gives a characteristically fair judgment: "Ebenso will er zwar Christi Leiden ganz und gar mit der Kirche seine versöhnende Bedeutung lassen; aber erinnert, dass man nicht scheiden dürfe zwischen Christi Person und Verdienst."

|| A 8. Cf. Schenkel, *Das Wesen*, etc., II, 287.

¶ Cf. Erbkam, *Geschichte d. prot. Sekten*, pp. 437 *sqq.*, for a criticism of the popular Lutheran conception of justification by faith. There can be no doubt that much occasion for offense was given by the new "indulgences" to be obtained from unworthy Lutheran pastors in connection with the administration of the Lord's Supper. Cf. A 411b, and Döllinger, *Die Reformation*, I, 257ff.

magnify the grace of Christ as against all religious externalities, and especially because of his zeal for the fruits of faith in holy living, he not only widened the idea of justification so as to make it include sanctification, but also, as we shall have occasion presently to observe, deepened the conception of faith so as to make it a substantial, we may even say a physico-spiritual, bond between the righteous God and the sinful soul. We read: "In fine, we are assured by Holy Scripture, thanks be to God, that *justificatio* in Paul denotes a making righteous; *justificare*, to make righteous; and *justitia Dei*, the righteousness of God, that is, the goodness and godliness of the faithful God, which he here imparts to his elect by faith through Christ in the Holy Spirit."* Once more all stress is laid upon the mediatorial reign of Christ in his exaltation and glory. In fact the primary difference between his and the orthodox view of justification concerns the basis or ground, rather than the mere extent, of this act, or, as he would prefer to say, this work. "And in short we must not seek our becoming righteous and our righteousness in Christ according to his (earthly) estate in a purely historical manner, but according to his other estate, wherein he has now been glorified and eternally equipped and appointed by God the Father to be the dispenser of the heavenly blessings and the head of the Church."† Schwenckfeld at times bravely endeavored to preserve the truth of the forensic conception and its correlate, the doctrine of an imputed righteousness, yet the logic of his system, the consequence of his central idea of the deification of Christ's flesh as the indispensable bond of union between the creature and the holy Creator, compelled him to admit: "God considers no one righteous in whom there is nothing at all of his essential righteousness."‡ While, therefore, he had a profoundly ethical view of sin and of the need of its expiation, he was yet more concerned for the subjective appropriation of divine grace than for the merely objective and forensic act whereby, according to his opponents, guilt is remitted and a title to eternal life is granted to the believer.§

* D 484f. For Schwenckfeld's conception of faith, see below.

† D 485. Cf. Hahn, *l.c.*, p. 64: "Itaque solum glorificatum Christum putavit justificationis nostrae fundamentum." On the similarity in this and other respects between Schwenckfeld and Osiander, as well as for the differences between the two, see Hahn, *ibid.*, pp. 63-70; Erbkam, *l.c.*, p. 443; Baur, *Lehre von der Versöhnung*, pp. 326ff., 340ff.; and Schwenckfeld, C 942 sq. ‡ A 812c.

§ It is perfectly in accord with the facts, therefore, when Hahn (*l.c.*, p. 55, n. 3) and Ritschl (*Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, I³, p. 318) declare that the idea of expiation is one that does not harmonize with Schwenckfeld's mystical principles. He retained the current biblical formulas, but infused into them a characteristic physico-spiritual content.

It is not necessary for our purpose to dwell upon the subsidiary features of Schwenckfeld's conception of the nature of justification. He has often been accused of reverting to Catholicism in his discussion of the need and importance of good works. But the charge is ill founded. He was neither a legalist nor a perfectionist. Such was his conviction of the estrangement between the creature and the Creator that even the regenerated soul can do nothing to merit the divine favor, nor can it ever in this life reach a point where it is absolutely free from the defilement and bondage of sin. In these matters, indeed, Schwenckfeld may be said to have equaled any of his contemporaries in sobriety of judgment and keenness of insight into the biblical data concerning the relations of faith and works.* He therefore did not purpose to deny the orthodox doctrines of the imputed righteousness and the vicariousness of Christ's death, nor had he any desire, with his emphasis on the need of holy living, to countenance the Romish idea of the meritorious character of good works. The fact is that he simply used the term justification, as Luther himself had done,† in the double sense of declaring and making righteous; but that, in accordance with his spiritualistic tendency, he laid primary stress upon the latter factor. In short, he widened the application of the word to the whole process of salvation, including that which to him was the basal consideration, the redemption from creaturehood itself. Sanctification is only another name for the same gradual transformation.‡

* Cf. the verdict of Schenkel, *Das Wesen des Prot.*, II, 520. It is true that Schwenckfeld speaks much of the rewards of Christian service, but, on the other hand, no reformer recognized more clearly than he did the all-sufficiency and the absolutely exclusive merit of the Redeemer's work. Even our own good deeds are in reality nothing but the manifestations of the life of God within the soul. Christ is himself the merit of our good works. See *The Threefold Life of Man*, Anspach's Translation, Ch. XXX, p. 111, "How the Word, the Reward and Merit of Good Works are to be properly adjudged and understood." The *Formula Concordiæ* (*Epitome*, Art. XII; in Schaff, *Creeds*, etc., III, p. 178) clearly reveals the influence of Schwenckfeld's antagonists, Andrea and Flacius, when it represents him as saying: "Quod homo pius, vere per Spiritum Dei regeneratus, legem Dei in hac vita perfecte servare et implere valeat." Kurtz, *l.c.*, p. 150, repeats the unjust charge. It is true that Schwenckfeld made much of the text, "Whoso abideth in him sinneth not" (1 John iii. 5), and delighted in the paradox, "Christians have sin, yet sin not" (*e.g.*, A 209a); but the context always explains such declarations in harmony with the constantly recurring principle: "We never live without sin before God" (A 379a). Even Planck, accordingly, charges the Lutheran divines with chicanery and falsehood in this matter (*Geschichte der Entstehung*, etc., Vol. V, 1, p. 221).

† Cf. Loofs, *Dogmengeschichte*², p. 351 sqq., and Otto, *Anschauung vom heiligen Geiste bei Luther*, p. 27f.

‡ Cf. D 725c, in margin: "Die Justificatio ist nicht allein Vergebung der Sünden, sondern auch die Heiligung und Erneuerung des innerlichen Menschen."

Indeed, even the more restricted term "pardon" is likewise stretched far beyond its usual limits,* and made to designate the actual removal of the sins and even the totality of redemptive blessings.

It is plain, then, that the characteristic features of Schwenckfeld's conception of the mode of salvation, and therefore also of the nature of the benefits to be derived from a right use of the sacramental Supper, must be sought, not so much in his polemic statements against his opponents—for he largely used their own and the biblical formulas—as in the elaboration of his positive views concerning the very essence of Christianity. We do not come to the heart of the matter, therefore, until, regardless of his frequent attempts to harmonize his speculations with the more usual interpretations of Scripture then in vogue, we fully apprehend the essentially mystical or magical mode in which he conceived the process of salvation. Along the periphery of his theologizing, to be sure, he ever took pains to avoid the extremes of the more radical subjectivism of that day, and even at the expense of self-consistency he strove, as we have seen, to take more thoroughly conservative views of the Word, of the Church, and of the Sacraments than his philosophic presuppositions strictly warranted. But at the centre and core of his system of thought, and in the very heart of his practical piety, he reveals the characteristics of a genuine Protestant mysticism. It is necessary, in conclusion, therefore, to ascertain the precise nature of the causes that made him take, so far as the question of the sacred Supper is concerned, the mediating and unstable, because not strictly logical, position he assumed. We have still to learn the deepest meaning of the correlative terms "justification" and "faith."

It cannot be too sharply emphasized, then, that however diligently Schwenckfeld strove to get scriptural warrant for his views and to accommodate himself to the new formulas of the Protestant theology, he taught an essentially physico-spiritual salvation, in which the communication of the divine life as a substantive principle must be magically effected.

* D 921d, 922: "Was ist aber Vergebung der Sünden für ein Ding? Antwort: es ist nich allein ein Nichtzurechnung der Sünden . . . nicht allein eine gnädige, barmherzige Nachlassung der Strafe Gottes, so wir durch die Sünde und Ungehorsam vor Gott wohl verschuldet haben; sondern es ist auch ein Töten, Abtilgen, und Hinnehmen der Sünden vom Herzen und Gewissen . . . Da ist die Sünde mit ihrer Klage tod, ja vor Gott hinweg und abgetilgt, das Herz ist gereinigt, und zur Einwohnung der heiligen Dreifaltigkeit zubereitet, dass auch der Mensch, der in Christo bleibet, alsdann weder den ewigen Tod, der Sünden Sold ist, noch das höllische Feuer, welches ihre Strafe ist, nicht mehr darf fürchten."

In spite of all that has been said, therefore, to show that he in explicit terms admitted the traditional views concerning the vicarious atonement as a basis for the imputation of Christ's righteousness, we must be prepared to find a disturbing stress laid upon the inward subjective appropriation of the divine-human essence of the Redeemer himself. The Word must become "spirit-flesh" in every believer. "It is therefore not enough that we believe that the Word has become flesh, but we must also believe that it still for Christ's sake becomes flesh. I repeat, we must know not only that Jesus Christ then came into the flesh, but that even to-day he by reason of his holy and glorified flesh comes into all other flesh which receives him in faith, and that he regenerates this, leads it by the Spirit, and makes it a child of God."* Christ, then, is to be born and fashioned anew in every soul that is to be redeemed. But this language is for Schwenckfeld no mere metaphor. Such is his conception of salvation, that the whole process appears as a realistic transformation of the natural man, body and soul, into an ever-increasing likeness to the deified humanity of Christ, the goal being such a participation in the divine essence that the sinner himself is divinized.†

The details of the process are worked out with more or less ingenuity in the adaptation of the theory to the biblical data. The

* A 517b. Cf. the marginal caption, "Wie das Wort noch heute in den Gläubigen geistliches Fleisch werde."

† Such at least is the obvious import of the strong language sometimes employed. Cf. D 142: "So könnten sie [his Lutheran opponents] aus der Gnaden Gottes, auch mit der Schrift Zeugnis, den allerteuersten Wechsel bald finden, dass Gott drum sei Mensch worden, auf das der Mensch wiederum Gott würde in Christo unserm Herrn." Cf. the phrase in D 856c, "je länger je mehr vergottet." It must immediately be added, however, that Schwenckfeld did not purpose to be a pantheist. His conception of God is too personal, too ethical, to permit such an interpretation. He reveals even in the immediate contexts of such passages as we have just referred to his fundamentally practical and moral aim: "vergottet," after all, means only "geistlich und heil gemacht zur völligen Gesundheit." We have here another illustration of the danger of magnifying the speculative at the expense of the religious and ethical element in Schwenckfeld. Philosophically, indeed, he may be said to overcome his dualism by pantheistically transcending it. But in the adjustment of his basal principles to his biblical exegesis he resolutely avoids the unethical conclusions to which his speculations would lead. He made much of St. Peter's phrase concerning our becoming "partakers of the divine nature" (2 Peter i. 4), but he had just as little intention as the apostle had of countenancing pantheism. The most that can be said against him, from this point of view, is that he at times used forms of speech which, if not construed in the light of his considerations for the practical religious life, would inevitably lead to pantheism. Cf. A 286d, where he explicitly attacks Sebastian Franck's genuinely pantheistic utterances concerning the indwelling of the Word of God, the divine seed, in all men.

first stage of the development is that whereby "Christ is conceived and born in us by faith."* This is the beginning of the Christian experience, the dawn in the heart of the spiritual light necessary to apprehend the Redeemer in his true worth. This he also designates the "regeneration" of the sinner, which, it will be remembered, he made to consist of a supernatural or creative act, whereby the principle of sonship is implanted in the creature in order, by a process of inner transformation, to bring him completely into the estate of grace. The second stage is that of conformity to Christ, "which the Holy Spirit by faith effects in the members of his body, and it is the whole life of Christ in the flesh, with his doctrine, miracles, and benefits, . . . so that Christ becomes strong in us, and we more and more faithfully follow him in his walk and life by means of the proffered grace." The third stage pertains to the "crucifixion of Christ in us," which is to be understood both of the trials and hardships imposed upon the Christians by the world and of the never-ceasing warfare between the flesh and the Spirit. The fourth stage, "that Christ is buried in us," constitutes the victory of the Spirit over the world and the flesh and the devil.† The fifth stage is the resurrection of Christ within us, when he fully triumphs in our lives and renders it impossible for us to be permanently estranged from the Lord.‡ The sixth stage, that of the "ascension of Christ within us," denotes the continual upward drawing of the heart to the affairs of its heavenly citizenship. The final or seventh stage is "that Christ in us sits at the right hand of his heavenly Father." Here "man often learns more in one hour, when he is drawn rapturously to this point, than otherwise in much time; here we only begin to know the glory, honor, might and power of the man, yea of the flesh of Jesus Christ according to the Spirit, through which merit and glory all these gifts are granted to our poor flesh."

It may be supposed that this is but pictorial language, to set forth with realistic force the sinner's need of apprehending the whole objective work of Christ, from its first inception in the incarnation itself to its unending activity in the mediatorial reign in the kingdom of heaven. And doubtless in many passages that speak of the indwelling and informing Christ the writer meant no more

* In what immediately follows we draw from the chief passage on the subject, B 522-532, *Vom Geheimnis der ganzen Ausführung Christi, wie unser Fleisch aus Gnaden mit ihm in eine Gemeinschaft komme.*

† The more accurate designation, "our being buried in Christ," is also used.

‡ In this connection the fact is emphasized that, so far as the time element is concerned, the various stages may follow one another in quick succession or after long intervals.

than Christians have ever understood by those terms, which identify the life-process itself in the redeemed soul with Christ, its author, its object, and its end. But, as a rule, there is something deeper, something more substantial, something genuinely mystical embodied in these fanciful formulas. More and more the Christian is dominated by the life which, emanating in a concrete manner from the deified flesh of the Redeemer, implants its essential principle in the sinner. The substance of God himself is communicated from the glorified humanity of Christ.*

The practical question for us in this connection, therefore, is that concerning the mode in which these physico-spiritual blessings are conferred upon the Christian in the Supper. The answer is the thoroughly conventional one, that the bestowal and reception of grace, whether in the sacraments or apart from them, is all a matter of faith. Manifestly, then, Schwenckfeld ought to give a scientific vindication of faith as the instrument whereby the soul receives her spiritual gifts. But this is precisely where he utterly fails to bring his philosophic presuppositions into harmony with the practical exigencies of his religious teaching. Faith is to serve, as we have seen, as the nexus between the outer ceremonial rite and the inward or truly sacramental transaction. But what dialectic connection is effected by the use of this pre-eminently scriptural term? How does faith, coming to the Lord's table, receive from the consecrated elements a spiritual gift? Or, once more to reduce the matter to the largest common denominator, how does faith ever appropriate Christ?

The problem, by reason of its practical importance, often pressed itself upon the reformer's attention. But his laborious efforts toward its solution amount in effect only to an ingenious *petitio principii*. The central significance of this Christian virtue of faith is, indeed, clearly apprehended; but there is no satisfactory explanation of the function which, according to the logic of his system, faith must needs perform. Never having fully grasped that profoundly religious and ethical conception of the term which

* Cf. A 627d, where the "göttlich, geistlich Wesen" acquired by Christ after his resurrection is represented as being imparted to the believer at the beginning of his life of faith. A 831b even speaks of Christians becoming gods by virtue of the fullness of the divine life implanted in them. In D 379a, Schwenckfeld speaks of the virtues of the Christian character as being, "in a measure and in part, by grace, that which God is naturally, and in the totality, and in perfect fullness." The biblical "indwelling of the Spirit" is made to signify a deification of the human soul or its participation in the divine essence (*ibid.*).

his spiritual father Luther had acquired in the course of an extraordinary experience of the grace of God, Schwenckfeld, in his zeal to refute what was after all only a caricature of the evangelical view of faith, succumbed to the temptation of going to the opposite extreme of fairly annihilating the ethical and religious factors in the process of salvation. Nothing indeed was farther from his deliberate intention: his conceptions of God and man, of holiness and sin, reveal a sufficiently clear apprehension of the moral quality pertaining to freedom of choice. But his theory of the nature and function of the concrete, physico-spiritual substance of the deified flesh of Christ had such a determining influence upon his speculations that, in spite of his efforts to cast his thought into biblical moulds, and in spite of his meritorious services in criticising the ethical shortcomings of misunderstood and misapplied evangelicalism, he himself could not, except by occasionally departing from his own premises in the interests of his ardent piety, vindicate for personal faith a genuinely religious and ethical significance. His "spiritual" knowledge of Christ is after all no real knowledge: it is at best a consciousness, a feeling; it cannot, or at least it does not, establish its claims by any dialectic addressed to reason. In his own case, indeed, his "faith" worked beautifully by love; it filled the heart of the persecuted man with the holy confidence and gladness that inspired the noble motto, "*Nil triste, Christo recepto.*" Above all ascetic weakness, he took a serious yet thoroughly sane view of the things of time and sense; free likewise from the ecstatic elations of the professed mystic, he yet hoped intently for the blessed consummation of the heavenly kingdom. But his faith, real, ardent, mighty as it must have been in his own experience, could not give any rational account of the high prerogatives it claimed for itself. It was somehow to serve as the means whereby the soul must come into the possession of her spiritual treasures; but in the confessedly difficult subject of the psychology of faith he found it impossible, in spite of his numerous biblical citations, to remove or conceal his dialectic embarrassment. A few passages from his works will show the magnitude of his difficulty.

He never wearies of imputing to his opponents a purely "historic" or rationalistic, as distinguished from a "true" or "spiritual," faith. "The Lutherans," we are told, have a historical Christ whom they know according to the letter, according to the events of his life, his teachings, miracles, and deeds, not as he to-day lives and works; just as they have a historical rationalistic faith (*Ver-nunftglauben*) and a historical justification, which they base upon

the promises, no matter to whom they belong.* He insists that his critics make too marked a separation between their creed and their conduct.† They have only the faith that may come from a knowledge of the letter of Scripture, not the faith that comes only from the hearing of the inner Word.‡ They fail to realize the difference between a dead faith and a vitalizing knowledge of the Redeemer. They look too much to mere ceremonial rites, and not enough to Christ the "ruling King of grace."§

But if it is only just to make some concessions to Schwenckfeld so far as his general criticism of his opponents is concerned, his own positive or constructive views of faith are altogether unsatisfactory. For we must not permit ourselves to be deceived by the apparent scripturalness of his statements that faith is a gift, and that as such it is mediated to the sinful soul directly by the divine-human Redeemer. Schwenckfeld gives these assertions a far different significance from that ordinarily connected with them. To him faith is a real, substantive principle. It is, in a word, a portion of the very being of God. "Now therefore true faith is a gift of God, a present of the Holy Spirit. It is fundamentally (*im Grunde*) one essence with him who gives and presents it; a co-partner (*Mitgenosse*) with him who does and works all things; a beam of the eternal sun. It is a little spark of that burning fire which is God himself."|| It is a part of that which in its fullness exists in God only.¶ "It is a scion or plant of the divine righteousness, essentially implanted and established in the heart of man."** "It is,"

* A 812.

† *Ibid.*

‡ See, e.g., D 637 *sqq.*, C 462, A 421-4.

§ B 638 *sq.*

|| A 814cd. Cf. the equally striking statement in A 420: "Daher kommt der wahre gerechtmachende christliche Glaube aus Gottes Natur, Selbstand und Wesen, wie er denn vor Anfang der Welt samt andern geistlichen Gaben in Gott verborgen."

¶ Cf. D 379. The analogy of the sun shedding its beams without diminishing itself is here repeated. The margin, to be sure, would guard against our speaking of a *particula solis* in case of the radiating beams. But the illustration itself, and the other statements on the subject, make it plain that faith must, as the logic of his system requires, be conceived as a substantive, a physico-spiritual principle. How closely Luther approximated such statements may be seen in Hering, *Luthers Mystik*, pp. 97 *sqq.*, 170 *sq.*; and cf. Dorner, *Lehre von der Person Christi*, p. 631, n. 1. Schenkel, *l.c.*, II, p. 440, compares Schwenckfeld in this respect with Servetus and Osiander.

** D 380d.

to revert to the favorite mode of representation, "a stream and radiance of the heavenly light and fire which is God himself."*

These passages will abundantly have shown how impersonal is Schwenckfeld's conception of faith. It seems at times to be nothing but an ethereal substance emanating from the spirit-flesh of the glorified Christ. It is produced in an altogether one-sided and magical manner by a divine causality, there being logically no place left for the free act of a moral agent. Man indeed, strictly speaking, cannot believe. He is to wait in a state of passivity until the implanting of the divine life has been effected; faith in its first stage is identified with regeneration. The strong emphasis laid upon the uselessness of "means of grace"—it will be remembered, however, that here too the practice did not quite keep pace with the theory—only made the whole process of salvation appear altogether suprarational.† To be sure, the theory admirably served the one purpose the author had in mind: the presence of such a faith fills the heart with unmistakable signs of its presence; the beam reveals itself by its own light and warms by its own ardor. Himself not given to ecstatic excesses, he at least left the door wide open for the vagaries of a genuinely mystical subjectivism. If he himself was saved from a more radical spiritualism by his vigorous and well-controlled religious life which expressed itself in the normal channels of service, his theory of the mode of salvation cannot fairly be said to do justice to the ethical needs of men. With all his objections, therefore, to the Lutheran and Reformed doctrine of pre-

* D 634d. Cf. also A 517, C 280d, D 145a. It was such mystical language that led Mat. Flacius to say of Schwenckfeld (see the *Verlegung der kurzen Antwort des Schwenckfeldt*, 1554, p. Ciii): "Was ist er aber für ein toller Heiliger, dem das Wort Gottes das Wesen Gottes selbst ist, das Evangelium ist ihm das Wesen Gottes, der Glaube ist ihm das Wesen Gottes, unsere Erneuerung ist ihm das Wesen Gottes, unsere Gerechtigkeit vor Gott ist ihm das Wesen Gottes. Alle Gaben des heiligen Geistes sind ihm das Wesen Gottes." We are prepared to realize how much in this representation is true and how much is a caricature of the truth. It would be easy to treat many another doctrine of Schwenckfeld in this fashion. At the same time it must be admitted that there is no other point so openly vulnerable in his system as his conception of the office of faith. Here the practical religious interests that ordinarily held him back from the logical extremity of his principles did not, and could not, preserve for his mysticism a truly ethical significance.

† Cf. the passage C 372: "Wer von aussen ein und durch das Äussere in das Innere will kommen, der versteht nicht den Gnadenlauf. . . . Der Mensch muss alles vergessen und fallen lassen und zu dem Einsprechen der Gnaden und aller Dinge ledig gelassen und allen Creaturen genommen sein, gänzlich Gott ergeben. . . . Deswegen ist der Gnaden und des heiligen Geistes einiger Schlitt und Mittel, darauf er in die stille Seele rutscht, sein allmächtiges ewiges Wort, so ohne Mittel von dem Mund Gottes ausgeht."

destination,* he can do no more for the sinner than to point him to a faith which is essentially an implanting of the divine substance, an altogether impersonal and unintelligible act so far as the beneficiary is concerned. Here, then, the two extremes meet—that which he regarded as the one-sided externalism of the Lutheran movement and that to which, with the protest of his mystical piety against all religious deadness and all mechanical ecclesiasticism, he himself went when he made faith a concrete ingrafting into the heart of the substantive principle of divinity. In the one case, as in the other, the ethical needs of the believer were jeopardized; but whereas in Lutheranism it was the practice that failed to maintain itself on the high level of the evangelical theory, in Schwenckfeld the defective theory of faith was wisely overruled in practice by a consideration for the religious welfare of the believer. And just as Luther, in his doctrine concerning the mode in which sacramental blessings are conferred, made the physical organ of the mouth the channel for the transmission of a spiritual benefit, so Schwenckfeld converted faith, a strictly spiritual act, into a vehicle for the transmission of a hyperphysical substance which none the less must somehow influence the body as well as the soul.

A practical illustration of the difficulty in which Schwenckfeld's theory of faith involved his whole system may be found in his views on the subject of the salvation of the Old Testament saints.

From all that has been said it would appear that no person living before the time of the incarnation, *i.e.*, before this mystical or hyperphysical flesh of Christ came into existence, could feed his soul upon the true bread of life, which, as we have seen, is nothing other than the flesh and blood of the Son of man. And this is precisely how some of the interpreters have represented the matter. Planck, for example, declares that Schwenckfeld explicitly taught that under the old economy no one was or could be saved.†

There can be no doubt that Schwenckfeld refused to place the ceremonial rites of the Old upon the same plane with the sacraments of the New Testament. The latter not only signify or symbolize the spiritual blessings, but they actually convey them.‡ The two dispensations are generically different in that the Old consists in “ex-

* See, *e.g.*, D 398ff., 412ff., 420ff.

† *Geschichte d. Entstehung*, etc., V, B. IV, pp. 119, 189, 192 *sq.* Dr. Hodge, *System. Theol.*, II, 587, was probably following Planck in declaring: “In a Send-brief written in 1532, in which he treats of the difference between the Old and New Testament economies, he says that under the former there was no saving faith and no justification, and that all the patriarchs had therefore perished forever.”

‡ A 510.

ternal divine service, promises, carnal justifications and external holiness, and is a shadow of the heavenly blessings''; whereas the New consists in the ''spiritual, true justification through the blood of Jesus Christ.'' * Baptism is therefore not a Jewish cleansing. † He finds fault with Calvin, Bullinger and others for not making a sufficiently broad distinction between the two covenants. ‡

The fact is, however, that Schwenckfeld unequivocally taught the salvation of all Old Testament worthies, and that too according to the same principles that obtain in the new dispensation, that is by ''faith'' in the divine-human Mediator. To be sure, one loose-jointed sentence in the chief letter on the subject seems to militate against this assertion: ''That in short no person before Christ entered heaven, or was able to receive salvation; that all holy fathers, patriarchs and prophets hoped in and waited for Christ, and by faith in the promises were preserved in Abraham's bosom.'' But not only does the margin rightly give the gist of the passage, ''that no person has been able to enter the divine glory without the suffering of Christ,'' but the letter repeatedly states, what is likewise the uniform representation elsewhere, that the patriarchs became participants in the merits of Christ's saving work. §

But of course the real question, again, is not whether Schwenckfeld at times taught the salvation of the Old Testament saints, but whether he could with logical consistency take this view of the problem. Must we not in this case also find his explicit statements conflicting with the basal principles of his philosophy and theology?

* B 593b.

† B, Part I, p. 112ff. Cf. the entire third letter: ''Darin bewiesen wird dass die Sacramente Christi nicht aus dem Gesetz Mosi genommen noch den Ceremonien oder Sacramenten des alten Testaments mögen verglichen werden.''

‡ C 521d. Cf. Kohn, *Die Lehre vom Abendmahl*, p. 462.

§ A p. 57 speaks of faith's bringing Christ into the heart and effecting ''one sort of forgiveness of sins, grace and salvation in all saints,'' ''whether at the beginning, middle or end of the world.'' Cf. also p. 58b: ''Denn so ist deshalb kein Unterschied zwischen den gläubigen Vätern im alten Testament und zwischen uns die wir glauben.'' The difference, therefore, to which attention is called in the text, does not concern the fate of true believers under the two covenants, but rather the institutions, the sacraments and, in a word, the genius of the two covenants themselves. In the former, no less than in the latter, there was true ''feeding upon Christ.'' ''Also haben nun die Jünger Christi''—he means the disciples at the time of the institution of the Supper, *i.e.*, before the glorification of the Redeemer's body—''ja, auch alle Väter den Leib und Blut Christi gegessen durch den Glauben, sowohl als ihn noch heute alle Gläubigen in des Herrn Nacht-mal essen und damit gespeiset und zum ewigen Leben genährt und gesättigt werden.'' Cf. the treatise, *Auslegung des Evang. Luce XIV, Vom Abendmahl des Herrn*, pp. H iii sqq.: ''Dass der Herr Christus auch mit allen Gläubigen von Anbeginn der Welt sein Abendmahl hat gehalten.''

The solution is attempted from two opposite sides: either faith is rationalized so that it is no longer a hyperphysical substance identical with the divine essence, or else the conception of salvation is modified so that the Old Testament believers were the subjects of a generically different redemption during their sojourn on earth. Sometimes, indeed, the difficulty is simply evaded, when, *e.g.*, the term "faith" is given the further capacity of having no necessary temporal or earthly relationship whatsoever. "The nourishing," that is of the faithful before Christ's birth, "is before God beyond all time (*aus aller Zeit*) and consists in *coelestibus*, in the heavenly divine essence, and takes place in this world only through a true living faith."* Schwenckfeld made much in this connection of such formulas as "the Lamb that hath been slain from the foundation of the world" (Rev. xiii. 8). But there is here no real grappling with the problem as to how spiritual blessings were mediated in the Old economy. It is, moreover, a characteristic of genuine mysticism thus to unite God and the soul without any dialectic means. Regardless of the assertion, therefore, that the faith is the same in both dispensations, save that in the former it was secret and concealed, whereas in the latter it is revealed and open,† it was natural for Schwenckfeld to have recourse to the familiar view of his opponents, that faith in the case of the patriarchs was "the assurance of things hoped for"—that is to say a strictly personal act, a voluntary trust in divinely promised blessings.‡ It could, therefore, "make all future things present," just as was the case in the common evangelical conception of the term. On the other hand, where he adhered strictly to his usual definition of faith, he was bound to secure the salvation of the Old Testament saints by the only other available expedient—the saving process must be idealized. The patriarchs must be represented as waiting in the "vestibule of Hades," "as in a prison,"§ for the infusion of that peculiar physico-spiritual principle from the flesh of the risen and deified Jesus which, as we have seen, was Schwenckfeld's normal conception of redemption. Either therefore faith becomes for the time a strictly personal act, and the whole mystical theory breaks down at the point of its contact with the individual moral agent, or else, the logic of the system being preserved, the fathers under the old

* A 655.

† A 58b.

‡ Cf. Heb. xi. 1. It was precisely this word, *ὑπόστασις*, in the definition of faith, however, that led Schwenckfeld to conceive of this divine gift as a substantive and non-personal principle.

§ A 61a.

covenant could not really partake of this hyperphysical and unethical salvation.

With this exposition of Schwenckfeld's view of faith we may conclude, having thus traced the entire circle of his speculations so far as they bear upon his participation in the eucharistic controversy of his age.* We have sought to interpret the man in the light of the historical situation in which he found so much to oppose, and then in the light of his own positive contribution to the solution of the problem that perplexed him and his contemporaries. It will have appeared, no doubt, that, like most of the extremists of that day, he had in the facts themselves an ample justification for the exercise of his protesting spirit; but that he likewise failed to grasp the essence of the evangelical reformation in the full depth of its meaning, and therefore failed also to meet the necessities of the case with a superior message. His negations were more timely and valuable than his affirmations. His diagnosis did him more credit than the treatment he prescribed. An ardent champion of the claims of subjective piety and the exemplification of the religious graces in daily conduct, his practice not seldom revealed, by its felicitous inconsistency with his theorizing, the truly Protestant secret of the adjustment between faith and works, between the inner activities of the redeemed soul and its outward manifestations in the sphere of all communal life. A strong and beautiful character, he often succeeded in transcending the limitations of his one basal error, the deification of the flesh of Christ, and overcame the mystical indefiniteness of his speculations; and where he could not do this to the satisfaction of

* Such minor facts as his peculiar emphasis upon the necessity of strict ecclesiastical discipline and sincere piety on the part of the pastors administering the Supper may be passed over in silence. They simply afford another illustration of what, we hope, has become thoroughly clear from the discussion, that this radical reformer was governed on all practical questions by such deeply religious interests that time and again he laid stress upon considerations which must be regarded as logically incompatible with his basal principles. For if God needs no means of grace and never confers gifts through creaturely instrumentalities, why should such rigorous Donatistic standards be applied to preacher or communicants? If faith operates magically, apart from all external and sensible realities, if in essence it is an emanation from God, what need is there of regarding either the person or the office of the celebrant? Here, too, the devout man was much better than his ill-phrased creed. Equally unnecessary is the inquiry concerning the effects of the Supper upon unbelievers. Not having the "spiritual discernment of faith," they cannot receive the inner sacramental gift; they cannot take part in the feast without being condemned, even though the act of communing may symbolize to their own or other minds the significance of the redemptive fact of the Saviour's death. Cf. B 78a and A 800a.

his opponents, he yet succeeded by the sheer force of his piety in winning to himself a band of devoted followers who might indeed in years to come forget some of his theological vagaries, but who would ever sacredly cherish the heritage of his prayers and labors in behalf of a pure evangelical faith, a truly spiritual Christianity.

But the ultimate test must take account chiefly of the positive rather than of the merely negative contribution which Schwenckfeld tried to make toward the solution of the great problem, the central question of human existence, the clear positing of which was the genesis of the Reformation—that of the soul's relation to God. We have seen how largely Schwenckfeld seems to have answered the question in the very terms of the Protestant theology, in the very language of the Bible. It is hoped, however, that the exhibition of the apparent affinities and similarities between Schwenckfeld and his evangelical opponents will have served by contrast to sharpen and deepen the impression which we believe his works must make upon every candid reader—that of the radical and irreconcilable difference between his and the traditional conception of the essence of Christianity. With the fondness of a genuine mystic to express his thoughts and feelings in the hallowed texts of Scripture, he failed to see how illogical and impossible it was to make these words bear the strain of a system of speculation which might indeed preserve the supernatural and Christocentric character of the divine revelation, but which could not do justice to the fundamentally ethical and personal needs of the religious subject. In his polemic against the external ecclesiasticism of his age, he was justified in coming forward as a spokesman for the rights of that inward religious freedom which could discard all priestly mediation and emphasize the great truth, that the soul can and may enjoy direct communion with the Infinite Spirit. But after all allowances are made on the score of the harsh angularities of his diverse opponents, his manifold inconsistencies in attempting to give his practical reform endeavors a speculative basis must likewise be freely acknowledged. That he was a mystic was his strength and glory; it was precisely his mysticism that gave him kinship with the master-minds of his age, above all with Luther and Calvin, and enabled him, albeit in a one-sided and criticisable manner, to express many an evangelical principle with an unsurpassed clearness and force. But that in his polemic zeal he permitted himself to sacrifice the biblical basis of a genuinely Christian mysticism, this was the speculative error that exposed his whole system to attack and detracted from its many practical

excellencies.* For this cardinal theory of the deification of the flesh or humanity of Christ, and the necessity of identifying redemption with a substantive ingrafting into the soul of the very essence of the divine-human nature of Christ, continually interfered with his attempt to vindicate a place for the concrete realities of the historical Church. The Bible was, to be sure, the book of books; but so sharp was the separation between the inner and outer Word, and so one-sided was the emphasis upon the absolute necessity and the all-sufficiency of the former to the verge of a possible exclusion of the latter, that in spite of his reverence for the Scriptures and his willingness in practice to make them the norm of his faith and conduct, he really had no logical warrant for his religious devotion to the sacred text: there was no adequate nexus between the letter and the spirit, between the "historical" and the "spiritual" understanding of the Word. Much less can his doctrine of the sacraments commend itself to the reason. The inner transaction has no necessary, not even a dialectic, connection with the outward rite. Yet again we are counseled to study the true purpose of the eucharist, and to console ourselves with the assurance that "in the use of the sacrament by faith" grace is communicated. But when this middle term "faith" is investigated, we are once more forced to conclude that however strongly Schwenckfeld wished to remain loyal to the confessedly divine institutions of the Church, he had no logical ground for regarding the sacraments as anything more than symbolic and didactic ceremonies. The right use of them, like the right interpretation of the Scriptures, demands faith; but faith itself is a gift of God that

* The application of the term "mystical" to those mysterious elements in Christianity which pertain to the direct contact and union between the finite and the Infinite Spirit is too common and convenient to be ruthlessly set aside. Schwenckfeld, it is true, reared his mysticism upon a faulty doctrinal basis, and therefore he also exceeded the bounds of propriety even in his negative attitude toward the importance of the historical Church and her means of grace. But nothing is gained by simply branding him as a mystic. The best elements of his "mysticism" simply reflect the deepest verities of the Christian religion as set forth by John and Paul, by Athanasius and Augustine, by Luther and Calvin. It would be easy to find in all of these writers precisely the same "mystical indefiniteness" that appears in the unfathomable words of the Saviour to his disciples: "Abide in me, and I in you," words which have never either by inspired or uninspired dialectics been resolved into any simpler or more fully comprehensible terms. On the general subject of the relation of mysticism to Christianity, see Ullmann, *Das Wesen des Christentums*, 4th ed., 1854, and his article, "Das Wesen des Christentums und die Mystik," in the *Theolog. Studien und Kritiken*, 1852, H. 3, pp. 535-614; compare especially the passages cited on page 600 from Calvin's *Institutes* to show the truly mystical vein in this great theologian.

neither requires nor admits any external mediation—a possession, therefore, which can be neither increased nor diminished by using or not using the appointed ordinance of worship. The Lord is indeed truly present at his table; not in, with, or under the elements, nor under their accidents, but to the faith of the worthy communicant. The question, however, recurs: How can the presence be a real one, in the spiritual sense of the term, when faith itself is reduced to a finely corporeal, a hyperphysical yet mechanically acting effluence from God through the deified flesh of the Redeemer? The benefits to be received in the sacrament may, it will be remembered, be presented almost in the language of the Reformed theologians. Yet how different in Schwenckfeld is the significance of such terms as redemption, regeneration, justification, eating and drinking the flesh and blood of the Son of man! With all his insistence upon the true humanity of Christ, he could not logically avoid the evil consequences of his theory that redemption necessitated a deliverance from the very estate of creaturehood; his system has a profoundly anti-natural as well as anti-personal tendency, and both his conception of human nature had to be modified in order to permit a real incarnation of the Son of God, and his notion of personality had to be conformed to the requirements of the strictly magical and unethical operation by which God makes the soul a “partaker of the divine nature.” His fundamental irrationality, that the human nature of Christ became essentially divine and yet remained truly human, presented alike to reason and to faith an impossible basis upon which to rest. A spiritualist dominated by the formulas of the new-found evangelicalism, he had no proper place in his system of speculations for the person and work of the Holy Spirit. Herein lies the difference between him and, so far as the eucharistic controversy is concerned, his nearest spiritual kinsmen, the leaders of the Reformed Church. Both he and they sought to find in faith the psychological nexus between the divine blessing and the sinful soul; but whereas they rose to a clear apprehension of the specific function of the Spirit in the application of grace, whether through the sacraments or apart from all such means, Schwenckfeld was compelled by the logic of his primary error to transform those genuinely mystical passages of Scripture that teach the gracious but mysterious operations of the Spirit directly upon the heart into a highly speculative but false mysticism. He labored to have the façades of his structure present the familiar characteristics of evangelical orthodoxy, and he succeeded in making the edifice serve as a delightful sanctuary

for many a deeply pious nature; but he could not with all his wealth of architectural ornamentation conceal the weakness of that imposing pretension that was everywhere made to serve as the foundation for the building, the unscriptural and irrational dictum that the humanity of Jesus Christ is divinitized yet remains essentially the same.

But if in spite of this basal speculative error Schwenckfeld could nevertheless achieve so large a measure of real success, we must be prepared to estimate at their true worth those elements of his system of thought and those factors in his personal influence that impressed so many of his contemporaries with the excellence of his life and work. His noble birth, the graces of his person and the charm of his manner, his eloquent pleas for religious toleration and concord, the warmth and beauty of his piety doubtless served to disarm criticism and inspire confidence. Moreover, the almost feminine receptivity of his nature had led him to try to approximate, as best he could, the distinctive peculiarities of the new evangelical message: in many a noble paragraph he shows how deeply he had grasped the inmost essence of Protestantism. Indeed, the skill and, where skill availed not, the unthinking boldness with which he sought to fuse heterogeneous and really incompatible elements into a unitary system of theological speculation easily conveyed to congenial spirits, to minds of a contemplative rather than a logical cast, the impression that his conception of Christianity offered not only the practical advantages of the common understanding of the rediscovered Gospel but also the superior claims of a deeper, because more mystical and less one-sided, interpretation of the facts of our religious experience. With all his exegetical shortcomings, moreover, he not seldom enjoyed a spiritual vision that revealed with the clearness and certainty of intuitive knowledge the manifold deficiencies of his opponents. Like all spiritualists he was a stubborn protestant against the existing order of things, and therein, no doubt, is to be found his noblest service to the cause of truth. On the fundamental questions concerning the relation of the Spirit to the Word, the bearing of religious belief upon life, and the nature of the Church and her sacraments,—the three points that engaged the chief attention of all the leading dissenters,*—he uttered judgments and forged arguments which historical Christianity has ever showed its need of having impressed upon its inmost consciousness. He was neither a creative religious genius nor even a talented ecclesiastical organizer; but his criticism of the theology and the

* Cf. Hegler, *Geist und Schrift bei Sebastian Franck*, p. 16.

religion of his day was a valuable positive contribution to the purity and strength of the evangelical movement as a whole. His best ideas are those of a genuinely Christian, a specifically Protestant mysticism, and these truths need emphatic republication in every age that is oppressed with an external ecclesiasticism or a lifeless orthodoxy. His mysticism had its ample justification, as a critical and protesting force, both in the facts of the divine revelation and in the events of contemporary history. If he failed of thorough success in his own time, and if the Church since then has found little use for some of the fantastic elements of his mysticism, it is only because, like the more radical dissenters, though not to the same extent, he failed to appreciate the best that his contemporaries had already achieved, and to realize the historic necessities of the case with which he was called upon to deal—the necessity of a truly rational faith, a genuinely scientific theology, that must serve as the guide to ethical conduct; the necessity of the objectively fixed Word that must repress the excesses of mere subjectivism; and the necessity of the divinely established Church that must after some sort have real means of grace. His mysticism, indeed, bravely sought to cope with these stern necessities of the situation. By the nature of the case, however, only a partial success could be achieved. But the measure of this success is a noble historic monument to the amount of spiritual truth which, despite the errors with which it was combined in his heterogeneous system, exerted so beneficent an influence upon his diverse opponents as well as upon the generations of his noble followers.

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III.

THEODORE BEZA.*

THE Protestant world is celebrating the tercentenary of the death of Theodore Beza, the successor of Calvin. It may be timely to ask who he was, what manner of man and what he did accomplish. Let us see. Theodore Beza or, as the name was originally spelled, de Bèze or de Bèzne, was born on the 24th of July, 1519, in the Castle of Bezelay, of an old and honored Burgundian noble stock. His father was Peter de Bèze, governor of the province; his mother, Marie Bourdelot. He was one of thirteen children, his father being married twice, and he was the seventh or last born of the first marriage. A puny, weakly babe, he was the pet of his mother and her heart was wrung with bitter pangs when, at the command of his father, he was handed over to his uncle, Nicholas de Bèze, who adopted him. The distracted mother accompanied her three-year-old darling to Paris and paid for it with her life, a fall from her horse, with the breaking of a leg and subsequent fever, making an end of her career. The lonely child was devoured with homesickness, and when a violent form of eczema, contracted from a careless servant, was added to his miseries, he suffered such agonies that, young as he was, he would fain have destroyed himself. As it was he remained in the cradle till he was five years old, and no one looking at the stately, strong frame of the Reformer of later years would have credited him with such a childhood.

At the age of nine his uncle entrusted him to the fostering care of the celebrated Melchior Wolmar, under whose roof he dwelt from 1528 to 1535, during the most plastic period of his life, both at Orleans and at Bourges. Beza always kept the date of his entrance into this charming and godly home as his second birthday. And how well Wolmar acquitted himself of the task of training the mind of his charge is attested by all the later life of Beza.

But hear what Beza himself has to add: "The greatest benefit is this, that thou hast brought me, through the word of God, as its

* An address to the students of the Presbyterian Theological Seminary of Kentucky.

purest fountain, to the recognition of true piety, so that I would be the most thankless of men should I not call thee father.'"

During the sharp Catholic reaction Wolmar was driven back to his native Germany, and Beza's father, who was a bitter Catholic sectary, refused his son to accompany him. On the day of their parting, therefore, Beza went to Orleans, where he devoted himself to the study of law; but thirty years later, when he had passed through many heartrending experiences, Beza confessed that "he knew no sadder day, in all his life, than that."

YOUTH.—With his removal to Orleans begins the critical period in the life of Beza. He hated the study of law with a perfect hatred, although the wish of his father kept him at the uncongenial task; but he loved belles lettres with all his heart, and when he was tired by his conscientious efforts to master the one he found rest and solace in the other. In these student days, as is common in the lives of nearly all students, he had his first serious affair of the heart: he fell deeply in love with a beautiful young maid, Marie de l'Etoile, who died in early youth and left Beza disconsolate for a while. Soon after, at the early age of twenty, he took his degree as licentiate of law in 1539. His father's house not belonging to the wealthy noble class, he was liberally provided for by his ecclesiastical relatives, who even before he left Orleans had obtained for him two substantial benefices, the income of which amounted to more than 700 crowns, for that time a very considerable income. Thus Beza, like Calvin, tasted of the bitterly humiliating cup of nepotism.

From Orleans Beza returned to Paris. Well provided for, a member of the privileged class, handsome, cultured, witty, the heir apparent to all the wealth of his uncle, Claude the Abbot of Froimont, he plunged in the whirlpool of the recklessly gay Paris of the sixteenth century.

Beza was no saint, but the closest investigation fails to prove the slanders of his Roman Catholic biographers, that he was ever guilty of grave immorality. And yet this slander is echoed in such encyclopedias as Aschbach's, Wetzer's, Welte's and others; nay, we find it even reflected in Protestant works, like the Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia. Rich ecclesiastical positions were offered to him, on condition that he should devote himself to the study of Canon law; but Beza hated the study of law, as we have seen. In all his temptations, as he himself tells us, the lessons received from Wolmar were ever present to his mind; and even then his eyes were turned to the future, with a hope of ultimate deliverance. This consciousness of Wolmar's influence over him was immeasurably strengthened by a short visit from his "second father" in 1539.

There was apparently considerable friction between him and his relatives in this Parisian period of his life. By a final arrangement he lived with his oldest brother, without any expense to himself, and he was to devote himself entirely to the study of letters.

His *Juvenilia* nearly all belong to this period and prove him to have been the first classic poet of his day, although the contents of some of them filled him with regret at a later period. He moved in the gayest circles, every door was open to him, he was fast becoming a popular idol, but under it all his poor heart cried out for higher and better things. In these hours of reaction and spiritual revolt he began to study Hebrew and to turn his attention to the writings of the Reformers, and slowly the hopeless condition of the Church of the fathers began to dawn upon him. His heart-hunger grew apace. About this time, in 1544, he contracted the secret marriage which forms the basis of the vile charges of immorality which his enemies have made against him. The explanation? Hear what he tells Wolmar: "In order that I might not be overcome by lust, I have engaged myself to a wife, Claude Desnoz. Secretly it is true, yet so that two of my friends were in the secret, that I might not give offense to others, in part because I could not yet rid myself of the devilish money which I drew from the above-mentioned spiritual benefices. I gave her, however, at the betrothal the express promise that in the near future, when all obstacles were removed, I would take her into the Church of God and openly marry her, and that meanwhile I would not take any papal consecration or orders, both of which promises I have faithfully kept." He then tells us of his struggles and temptations, especially from the side of his relatives, and continues thus: "Under all these cares I knew scarcely where was the way out or where was the way in. And behold God visited me with a severe illness, which laid hold of me in such a way that I despaired of ever getting well. After endless pains of body and soul God had mercy on His fugitive servant and comforted me, so that I no longer doubted His forgiving mercy." As soon as his health was sufficiently restored he broke all the old ties, tore himself away from his old friends and associates, deliberately renounced all his worldly prospects and, with his wife, went into self-imposed exile, not knowing what the future might have in store for him.

There was something in this self-sacrifice of Beza which reminds us of the old anchorites, notably of Antony the Great. It was heroic, an act of sublime faith. And we should never forget that none of the other Reformers made as great a sacrifice or renounced such brilliant worldly prospects as did Beza.

IN EXILE.—Where should he go but to Geneva and to John Calvin, the friend and protector of all the French exiles? In October, 1548, he arrived in Geneva. Calvin was there engaged in the last desperate death struggle with the Libertines. Beza was received with open arms, but the great Reformer dissuaded him from entering on a mercantile career. Did the eagle eye of Calvin even then discern the possibilities for the Church of God which lay hidden under this knightly exterior? Beza's first work in Geneva was the redemption of his promise of betrothal, in the public marriage of his wife. But what to do he knew not, for every path seemed to close before him. In vain he traveled to Wolmar for counsel; the ready wit of his "second father" seemed unequal to the task of guiding him; but God was leading him all the time toward his true destiny. On his return journey to Geneva he passed through Lausanne. There Viret had labored since his departure from Geneva; there, simultaneously with the introduction of the Reformation, a school had been established, and for that school, as Professor of Greek, Viret sought to engage Beza. Thus, in 1549, he began his illustrious career as teacher, but not before he had publicly expressed his sorrow for the publication of his *Juvenilia*, which were in the hands of the world and which, as Beza foresaw, might seriously jeopardize his position as professor in a Protestant academy. But his brethren were royal-hearted and clear-headed enough to see and to say that what lay before his conversion could not affect his standing after it.

LAUSANNE, 1549-1559.—With all his might Beza henceforth devoted himself to the task of building up the institution that had honored him with a call, and being a born teacher, the Academy of Lausanne soon began to feel the influence of his presence. Students from all Switzerland began to flock together, and especially the French refugees were drawn to Lausanne. Beza was tireless in his labors, and when the arduous task of his regular school work was over he gathered his fellow-exiles about himself and began to read with them the New Testament, in his beloved mellifluous mother-tongue. Thus he first explained the Epistle to the Romans and later the two Epistles of Peter. By means of these self-imposed tasks three things were achieved: (1) He became fixed in his theological principles, by obtaining a solid exegetical and Scriptural basis for them; (2) he became intimately acquainted with New Testament Greek and its peculiar idiom; (3) he laid the foundation for his critical and exegetical work on the New Testament, which in later years was to become one of the main pillars of his undying

fame. At Lausanne the poetic vein of Beza also began to show new and vigorous life. In the second year of his stay there he wrote his celebrated drama, *The Sacrifice of Abraham*, which was produced by the studentry of the academy in one of the ancient episcopal halls of the city. With subtle wit and sarcasm it laid bare the fundamental differences between Rome and Protestantism. It proved a complete success and was placed on the stage at Geneva and in various French cities, and was honored with a Latin and a German translation.

But suddenly the sky became dark with lowering clouds. The deadly plague appeared in Lausanne and Beza fell a victim to it. He was given up for dead, for no one dared to hope for his recovery. In this extremity Calvin voiced the deep-seated affection he had aroused in the hearts of his brethren in Switzerland. He tells us, in a letter to a friend at Paris, "I love him as a son," at the same time expressing his deep sorrow at the great loss about to be suffered by the Church.

Beza was the calmest of them all, wholly resigned to the divine will. On his apparent deathbed he wrote two of his finest hymns, indicating the complete victory he had achieved over death and all its terrors. But God willed differently; the work of Beza was not yet done, and to the amazement of all men he arose as from the dead.

New consecration marked the new life, and with usury did he repay the love of Calvin and of the other brethren. Was Calvin slandered, Beza defended him; did his enemies openly attack him, Beza took his part, notably against Bolzec and the Libertines. His poetic vein flowed freely. When five young Frenchmen returned to France to preach the Gospel and were burned at the stake at Lyons, Beza wrote a touching elegy. Best of all, he turned his attention to a metrical rendering of the Psalms, which was destined to form the basis of the Dutch and Scotch Psalmody. Marot had translated thirty of the Psalms, as early as 1536; later on he had added twenty more, and these Psalms had met with a royal welcome in France. It was Calvin who urged Beza to complete the task. He followed this advice and had finished the work in 1552, which, strange to say, proved acceptable to Roman Catholics and Protestants alike.

In the very next year, 1553, the awful tragedy took place in Geneva which, more than anything else, has been used by Calvin's enemies to cloud his fair name—the execution of Servetus. This erratic scholar, with strong anti-trinitarian proclivities, had been

condemned to death by the Catholics at Vienna. He escaped, came to Geneva against express warnings, identified himself with the party of the opposition, was accused, apprehended, tried, condemned to death and executed by the Council of Geneva, with the express consent of all the Reformed leaders, Melanchthon included.

But the agitation about this matter became so intense that Calvin saw himself compelled, in 1554, to write an apology for the action of the Council of Geneva, and thus was opened a bitter controversy about the right of the State to punish heretics with death, in which Castellio, Socinus and Curio Secundus took part on the one side, and Calvin and Beza on the other. The voluminous tract of the latter on this subject was translated into French in 1560. As we judge to-day, Calvin and Beza and all the other Reformers, following the lead of Augustinus, erred. God's cause does not need the hangman's ax, for He "does not delight in the death of the wicked." It was the surviving spirit of Romanism in the hearts of the Reformers, a remnant of the old imperial *jus circa sacra*, for which the Church has paid so dear a price. It was not the spirit of Christ, and we lament the execution of Servetus. But we are not yet ready to aid in erecting atoning monuments to the name of Servetus, as has recently been done in Geneva. Calvin and the other Reformers did the right as they saw the right; and men who attack and slander them for it now are guilty of an anachronism. No men can be separated from their environment, and only a false idealism can demand of them a view of Christian (aye, and of anti-Christian) liberty which, in the nature of the case, must be foreign to the horizon of the men of the sixteenth century.

In this period the relatives of Beza made one of their periodical strenuous endeavors to lead him back into the bosom of the old Church. The most dazzling promises of ecclesiastical preferment were held up before him; but both his brother and, later on, his aged father traveled to Switzerland in vain. The temptation glanced off from the armor of the iron determination of the royal-hearted Reformer and Beza remained at Lausanne. In this period of his life also we find him determinedly at work to heal the rupture between the Swiss and the Lutheran parties, as also earnestly endeavoring to succor his persecuted brethren in France. The first attempt had well-nigh resulted disastrously. With Farel he had traveled over all the Swiss Cantons and had succeeded in bringing them to unanimity of action in regard to the French martyrs. From Switzerland they went to Germany, and there, in obedience to the unionistic impulse, Beza wrote an outline of a Confession for

Otto Heinrich, Elector of the Palatinate, in the name of the Swiss Churches, but without their ken, which leaned over so far towards Lutheranism, on the doctrine of the Supper, that a wild storm of indignation was aroused all over Switzerland. The influence of Beza appeared to be hopelessly impaired and many of his best friends turned away from him in disgust. But he weathered the storm, chiefly perhaps because Calvin, who himself, as is known, had a strong penchant for the union of all Protestants, quietly and with telling effect turned the swordpoints away from the bosom of his friend.

GENEVA.—We now come to the final chapter in the life of Beza. In 1558 the celebrated Academy of Geneva had been organized, from which Calvin expected everything for his cause. There was trouble in Lausanne. Viret and his fellow-Frenchmen, ardent followers all of Calvin, were in a state of continuous friction with the government of the Bernese Canton. They insisted on the doctrine of predestination in its strictest form, on strict discipline, etc. Beza supported the opposition, but in a half-hearted way, as Calvin himself tells us. He could not fully side with either party. His wife had died in 1558 and he had married Catherina del Piano, an Italian woman, which in itself would tend to some estrangement from the French colony. Calvin availed himself of this opportunity to secure him for his school. He was called to Geneva, accepted the call, was honorably dismissed by Lausanne and joined Calvin. For the latter he cherished an almost filial affection, which was repaid with usury by the great Reformer. Beza proved himself a sturdy oak, around which the dying vine of Calvin's life entwined itself. He was destined to be his successor at Geneva and to shoulder the heavy burdens which crushed the life out of Calvin. Besides teaching Greek in the Gymnasium, Beza was originally asked also to deliver theological lectures in the Academy. The whole plan of the institution was, however, reorganized and Beza became its head, in addition to which he was elected as one of the regular pastors of the city. The institution was opened June 5, 1559, and forthwith became a tower of strength for all the Calvinistic Churches of the Continent and of England. As rector, Beza opened its scholastic career with an oration on "The Origin, Value, Necessity and Uses of the Schools." Two centuries before, Charles IV had offered Geneva a university, on condition that the Duke of Savoy should become its protector. But Geneva, mindful of the words, *timeo Danaos ac dona ferentes*, had refused the treacherous gift. When Calvin had first asked for it, immediately after his

return from his Strassburg exile, the Council found itself financially unable to shoulder the burden. In 1552, seven years before the school was opened, the ground for it was secured, for 10,000 florins, mostly freely contributed. The first great benefactor of higher education, in the history of the Reformed Churches, was Mons. Bonnevard, who consecrated his entire considerable fortune to the purpose. Thus the end hoped for was finally achieved. The building stands practically as it was opened in 1559. Below is the library, which still contains practically all the works of Calvin. Above the steps, leading to the upper classrooms, the words are written: "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom." Alas that Geneva has so completely forsaken the maxims of the fathers which have made her great!

The Faculty consisted of Anton Chevalier, in the chair of Hebrew; Francis Berauld, in that of Greek; John Tagart, in that of the free arts and philosophy; whilst Calvin and Beza were the theological instructors. The men were few but choice; as for the work they accomplished they appeared legion, and all Europe sounded their praises. There it was proven for all time that a great school does not necessarily need a great equipment.

Supported by Calvin, Beza now made a final effort to unite the broken ranks of the Protestants, but in vain. The bitterness of Westphal and Hesshusius caused him, irenic as he was in disposition, to defend the doctrine of the Reformed Church against its calumniators. He attacked the former in a moderately written tract, *De Cæna Domini, plana et perspicua tractatio*, Ao. 1559. But at Hesshusius, later so unpleasantly prominent in the bitter Palatinate controversy, he launched two satirical diatribes which cut deeper than he intended, since they identified Hesshusius with Lutheranism, and thus caused great heartburnings and a deeper schism between the two branches of the Protestant Church. A clearer and better tone was struck by his celebrated *Confession*, which appeared a year later. It was primarily intended for his father, but was destined to be of the greatest moment for the Reformed Churches. Simple, brief and pungent, it took with many the place of Calvin's *Institutes*, and with many more it formed an introduction for them. Beza had now become the central figure in Reformed circles. Calvin's strength was fast ebbing, and the eyes of all were directed to the stately figure of the coming man. He was now in the zenith of the maturity of his physical and intellectual powers, forty-one years old, courageous, as behooved his noble blood, devoted, eloquent, extremely virile, a man of note everywhere. Suddenly the far cry of his father-

land drew him. Events in France were fast reaching a critical stage. The queen-mother, Catherine de Medicis, was playing out the Guises, bitter foes of the Reformation and plotters against the royal house of Valois, against the Bourbon princes, led by Condé, who were in favor of the Reformation.

Could the king of Navarre be won over? It was certainly worth trying and would be of incalculable moment to the development of events in France. Calvin, in a moment of optimistic enthusiasm, urged his friend Beza to undertake a mission to the court of King Anton, whose wife, Johanna of Albret, as well as Renata de Ferrara, daughter of King Louis XII, was an open adherent of the Reformation. The mission failed, but how deep was the impression on Anton's mind, produced by this visit of Beza, his deathbed at Rouen has witnessed.

When, a year later, the Reformed looked for a man to represent them at the great conference of Poissy, it was again Beza who was selected for the mission. It is true he was but one of twelve, but like the proud king he might well say, *La conference c'est moi*. It was he who labored and toiled, early and late, though in vain, for the complete vindication of the cause of Protestantism in France. It was he who thrilled the assembly, the court entourage included, by his impassionate eloquence. No other man could have done what he did at Poissy. He was a Frenchman, a noble with all the native and acquired graces of his privileged position, a man undaunted in the presence of majesty, familiar with all the intricacies of court life, and with all that wise and cautious. And yet Poissy proved a hopeless failure, as the Catholics had intended it should be. The Protestants were banished from city and town, and were permitted only in the open country to worship God according to the dictates of their hearts. When all the other Protestant leaders who had attended the conference had left, Catherine de Medicis called for Beza and said, "You are a Frenchman; you must stay till these difficulties are settled."

With a pang in his heart and a look at Geneva, where Calvin toiled alone, and with the express advice of the latter, Beza remained in France, to pass through the most exciting and perilous experiences of his whole life. The thunderclap of the massacre of Vassy, in 1562, shook the entire country, and in the twinkling of an eye France was embroiled in the long series of Huguenot wars, which were to devastate the whole country and to pour out its best blood like water. Beza bore, with his brethren, the burden of the first campaign. The long past of his noble blood was surging in his

veins, and as field-preacher he accompanied the Huguenot army in the field. He was present at the ill-starred battle of Dreux, December 19, 1562, where an almost assured Protestant victory was changed into defeat by the frenzy of the Swiss troops, the faithful retainers of Rome, from the Catholic Cantons. And when the meaningless peace of Amboise, March 19, 1563, had temporarily ended the carnage, Beza returned to Geneva, tired in body and sick at heart.

And none too soon, for the sun of Geneva was fast declining toward the horizon—Calvin was dying. The bond between these two grew ever closer in these last days, and Beza's tribute of love to the great master is touchingly laid down in the vivid biography of Calvin, written under the immediate impression of his death, which we possess from his hand and which constitutes one of the great sources of our knowledge of the life of the man.

When death claimed Calvin at last, May 27, 1564, after a most heroic endurance of the greatest imaginable physical suffering and weakness, triumphed over till the very end by the indomitable spirit of the man, it was Beza who closed his eyes. It was Beza who tells us that "on that day, at the same time with the setting of the sun, the glorious light of life went out of the man who was especially destined in this world to labor for the restoration of the kingdom of God." It was Beza who, like Melancthon at Luther's death, exclaimed, "My father, my father, the chariot of Israel and the horsemen thereof!"

And now came the most laborious period in the life of Beza, for he was destined by Calvin and elected by the Council of Geneva to be the successor of the master. Nor did he spare himself to fill the place worthily and, as in Elijah's case, the mantle of the dead prophet seemed to have fallen on him. Increasingly he proved to be the very life of the Academy. Till 1588 he remained, without a break, the president of the great consistory, which, founded by Calvin, had transformed Geneva from the foulest into the cleanest city on the Continent.

A year after Calvin's death he issued the work which, more than any other, has made him famous—his edition of the New Testament, translated from the original. It passed through several editions, and in the second edition of 1582 (called the third on the title-page) was greatly improved by the use of two uncial MSS. (Codex D, Gospel and Acts), the so-called "Codex Bezae," now in the Cambridge library, to which Beza presented it in 1581. The last edition of this work became the basis of our "King James" translation of the Bible and also of the celebrated Dutch version, at least in part.

During the last eighteen years of his life the strong frame and practically unshaken health of Beza were steadily breaking down. Beside the burdens of the Genevese Church, the care of all the Reformed Churches was laid upon him. The French Protestants looked to him as their father and natural protector. On the Huguenot Synods of La Rochelle, 1571, and Nismes, 1573, he exerted a tremendous influence. Their decisions were practically his own.

He has been accused of countenancing the apostasy of Henry IV, whose celebrated cynicism, "Paris is well worth a mass," was said to be condoned by Beza on utilitarian grounds. Fortunately a letter of the Reformer, comparatively recently discovered, has given the lie to these slanders. From this letter it appears that Beza expressly warned the king to look to God alone and to His commands, and not to consider the less important question of mere human preferment, reminding him of his own words: "When God will that I shall reign it will happen, although men should try to prevent me; if God wills it not, neither do I." In the hour of gravest peril, when Geneva was about to be seized by the Duke of Savoy, in 1587, Beza proved a rock of defense to the republic by proving the futility of his claims. It was he again who voiced the jubilant joy of the whole city when in 1602 Geneva was saved, as by a miracle.

In his last days the Roman Catholic Church made a last desperate attempt to corrupt him once more by the most flattering offers of wealth and position, if only he would turn back to the old faith. It was one of the finely spun webs of the Jesuits, who, with great discrimination, had chosen as their agent the widely beloved mystic or quietist, Francis de Sales, now a "saint" of the Catholic calendar. When making the alluring proposition to Beza, he smilingly told him that "he did not make these tempting offers to corrupt him, but only to make the decision easy." But the old lion roared in defiance, the old spirit of satire blazed up once more, as Beza bitterly gibbeted the insane and futile attempts of his old enemies, who now would become false friends. The ire of the old Reformer had been doubly stirred, for, distrusting the outcome of the project, the Jesuits had spread the rumor that Beza had suddenly died, after making his peace with the Church.

Beza finally fell asleep in Christ, on the 13th of October, 1605, full of years and labors and honors and weary of strife. He was the predestined co-laborer of Calvin, as Melanchthon was of Luther, and the close student of the lives of both will find several points of contact between them.

As there was less of rigidity and more of elasticity in the system of Melanchthon than in that of Luther, so also in the relative dogmatic positions of Beza and Calvin. Both were more irenic than their masters and friends, with this difference, that Beza made fewer changes in the original system than Melanchthon; not, as I see it, because he would not have dared to do it, but because the environment and the history of the two men were totally different. But, as we have seen in many events of Beza's life, like Melanchthon, he was yielding almost to a fault—the same spirit animated both men. And great as they were, they appear only less great than they were because both were overshadowed by the gigantic proportions of the men whom they supported in love.

In determination Beza was less immovable than Calvin, more a man of opportunity, if occasion demanded. Less original and less profound than Calvin, he reflected the system of the master rather, though with some variations, than building up his own. Calvin possessed what Beza lacked, and lacked what Beza possessed. Both were great in their own sphere. Calvin was the theologian, the exegete, the logician *par excellence*. Beza had all of this, albeit in a lesser degree, but besides in him were stirring, all his life long, the impulses of the humanist, the poet, the devotee of belles lettres.

More ornate and polished perhaps than Calvin, less original, it was his task to polish the great blocks of marble which the master had quarried. That Beza should seem great at all, coming as he did after the king, succeeding John Calvin, is the most indisputable proof of his true greatness. He was the man for the hour and for the Church when Calvin died, great in that he was privileged to complete the great work of the greatest Reformer; and thus we reach out over the intervening ages and reverently lay a garland of immortelles on the grave of Theodore Beza.

Requiescat in pace.

Louisville, Kentucky.

HENRY E. DOSKER.

IV.

WHAT WAS THE PRIMITIVE CONDITION OF MAN?

MATERIALISTIC evolutionists are continually affirming that the Biblical account of man's earliest state is utterly and hopelessly contradicted by the discoveries of modern science.

They declare that the Bible affirms that man was originally in a civilized condition, and that he was perfect, intellectually and morally, at his beginning; that from this perfect state man fell, that for ages his progress was downward, and that he is even now painfully endeavoring to work upwards to the state from which he fell.*

On the other hand, they affirm that science has revealed something entirely different concerning the earliest state of man. Science, they proclaim, has unanswerably proved that man was at the beginning in a state of utter barbarism. Man began his existence on the earth in a condition of bestial savagery and utter mental and moral degradation. He was lower than the most wretched savage now living,† little removed from a brute. He used sticks and stones for weapons,‡ so that his earliest age was called the Stone Age, and his earliest social condition was that of a hunter. By and by he improved. He became a shepherd, then an agriculturist, and, passing through the Bronze Age, at last rose into the Iron Age.§ Civilization was slowly developed; religion was invented; and man continued to develop, improve and advance. Thus, it is declared, science shows that man's progress has always been upwards from the beginning, so that the Biblical account of man's fall cannot possibly be held. In the words of a popular writer: "As regards Adam's fall, the discovery of Palæolithic man is that which has given the greatest shock to received theological opinions; for this discovery, which is an entirely new one of the last half century, though now confirmed by innumerable instances,

* See the discussion on Lord Avebury's paper in the British Association meeting for 1867.

† Fisk's *Man's Destiny*, pp. 77, 78.

‡ *The Ascent of Man*, by Prof. H. Drummond, p. 139.

§ *Prehistoric Times*, by Lord Avebury, pp. 2, 3 (first edition).

not only flatly contradicts the narratives of recent descent from Adam and Noah, but it assails in its most vital point the whole dogma of Pauline Christianity. The two statements cannot be true: one, that man has fallen, the other, that he has risen; one, that he was created in God's image, with high moral and religious faculties, and placed in a garden in a state of innocence and happiness, from which he fell by an act of disobedience, entailing a curse on his descendants, and partially redeemed by the Atonement; the other, that he is the product of an evolution tending ever upwards, over immense geological periods, from savages who chipped their rude flints on the banks of frozen rivers, chased the mammoth and the reindeer on the plains of Southern France, and held their cannibal feasts in caves excavated by small streams which ran one hundred feet above their present level.' '*

We shall examine these bold statements in the light of prehistoric archæology and geology, and we shall show that there is nothing whatever in modern science which contradicts the Biblical narrative.

Before doing so, however, we must consider at length and set forth in all its particulars the Biblical account of Primitive Man.

THE BIBLICAL ACCOUNT OF PRIMITIVE MAN.

It will be observed that the Bible does not say that man was created and was at first in a civilized state. Civilization consists in a knowledge of the arts and sciences, and in the existence of communities under settled governments with complicated laws. In this state the Bible does not place the earliest men. It says, however, that man's first state was one of innocence and happiness, in which man was like a pure and innocent child, but naturally ignorant of science, art and literature. Man was at first, according to the Bible, in the Stone Age; for Tubal Cain, a long time after the Fall, was the discoverer of metals.† The agricultural implements, therefore, which Adam used in Eden must have been of stone, and this reminds us also that man's first state, according to Genesis, was not that of a hunter, but of an agriculturist. The habit of a shepherd was assumed afterwards. We must also remember that, although the earliest men might have been ignorant of many of the mechanical arts, they might have been morally upright, and this ignorance does not imply that they were degraded savages.

The Duke of Argyll well says: "There is no necessary connection between a state of mere childhood, in respect to knowledge, and

* *Modern Science and Modern Thought*, by Samuel Laing, pp. 342, 343.

† Gen. iv. 22.

a state of 'utter barbarism'—words which, if they have any definite meaning at all, imply the lowest moral as well as the lowest intellectual condition. Consequently, no proof—if proof there be—that primeval man was ignorant of the industrial arts can afford the smallest presumption that he was also ignorant of duty or ignorant of God."*

Let it be observed also that the Bible clearly shows the gradual development of the industrial arts. In the end of the fourth chapter of Genesis we read of the invention of an elaborate system of music and of the discovery of metals; so that, according to the Bible, the Stone Age must have lasted a long time. Here, therefore, in the slow progress of the perfection of the arts and sciences, the Bible is in perfect harmony with the revelations of science.†

The building of Noah's Ark shows also how far the mechanical arts had progressed. It implies the existence of sea-going vessels, and of an extensive system of maritime trade. The men who put windows, doors, roofs and floors into the Ark were in the habit of also putting them into houses, and naval architecture proves the presence of architecture in buildings on land of all character. This implies that at the time of the Flood civilization was of a quite elaborate character.

We must mention, also, that the Biblical account of man's primitive innocence is in perfect harmony and agreement with the earliest traditions of all the oldest nations relating to man's first condition. On this remarkable fact the brilliant French scientist, Prof. Lenormant, says: "The idea of the Edenic happiness of the first human beings constitutes one of the universal traditions. Among the Egyptians the terrestrial reign of the god Ra, who inaugurated the existence of the world and of human life, was a golden age to which they continually looked back with regret and envy. This belief in an age of happiness and of innocence in the infancy of mankind may likewise be found among all peoples of the Aryan or Japhetic race. It was among the beliefs held by them anterior to their dispersion, and it has been long since remarked by all scholars that this is one of the points where their traditions find themselves most evidently on common ground with the Semitic stories which we find in Genesis."‡

The theory of man's primitive innocence is thus in agree-

* *Primeval Man*, pp. 132, 133.

† Let it be carefully noted that the Fall concerned man's moral nature, and was only indirectly connected with his intellectual abilities.

‡ *The Beginnings of History*, p. 67, first edition, 1883 (not dated).

ment with the earliest traditions of the oldest nations. The idea that the first men were utterly degraded, both mentally and morally, is not in agreement with them. Let this fact be pondered.

WHERE WAS THE PRIMITIVE HOME OF MAN?

In what region of the world did man begin his existence? The reader will be amazed to learn that the primitive home of man has been placed by evolutionists in every region of the Old World between the Equator and the Arctic Ocean. Mr. Gerald Massey* holds that Central Africa was the primitive home of man, and Profs. Haeckel† and Keane‡ maintain that man first saw the light in a continent which formerly stretched from Central Africa to Australia. Mr. Darwin decides in favor of North-western Africa,§ and Mr. Laing is inclined to follow Darwin, and also to favor Western Europe.|| The peninsulas of Southern Europe, that is, Spain, Italy and Turkey, are considered by Mr. W. S. Duncan¶ to have been the countries in which man first dwelt.

Asia also has its advocates. Lenormant** decides in favor of Persia; and the great plateau of Central Asia between the Altai, Himalaya and the Persian tableland is chosen by Prof. Wallace†† and M. de Quatrefages.‡‡ Sir John Evans looks to India and Southern Asia,§§ and M. de Mortillet declares that Southeastern Asia was the region in which man's first home was situated.|||| The strangest of all opinions is that of Mr. Waddington, who actually maintains that it was in Siberia and the region of Mongolia immediately south of the Siberian border.¶¶ This opinion is remarkable enough, but it is surpassed in strangeness by a theory which Mr. Laing declares to be "very plausible,"*** and which actually affirms that man originated somewhere within the Arctic Circle in former times, when the climate of that region was much milder than it is now.

* *A Book of Beginnings* (2 vols.) and *The Natural Genesis*.

† *The Natural History of Man*.

‡ *Ethnology*.

§ *Descent of Man*, vol. i, p. 199.

|| *Human Origins*, p. 415.

¶ *Anthropological Journal*, 1883.

** *Manual of Ancient History of the East*, vol. i, p. 22.

†† *Darwinism*, p. 460.

‡‡ *The Human Species*, p. 175.

§§ *Address to the British Association*, 1897.

|||| *Formation de la Nation Française*, p. 227.

¶¶ *Nineteenth Century*, November, 1900.

*** *Human Origins*, p. 417.

In amazement we ask, what possible value can be assigned to prehistoric archæology when its testimony is so hopelessly confused and inconsistent? Where is the much-vaunted value of the recent investigations relating to primitive man? And how can we give serious attention to the statement of those who speak of the clearness and correctness of the conclusions of modern science about the early state of mankind?

How have these scientists come to such utterly contradictory conclusions, and how have they fallen into such extraordinary mistakes? The answer is easy to discover.

They have looked at the question only from the standpoint of biology and geology, and they have entirely overlooked the testimony of other sciences. They have forgotten that history and tradition are sciences also, and that they have important testimony to offer. Is there not, then, another plan that we can follow in deciding upon the region in which man had his earliest home? Certainly there is, and it can easily be applied. The primitive home of man is that region where man has lived longest, and where he has developed the oldest civilizations. In this part of the world must necessarily be found all the oldest kingdoms and empires, and in proceeding from it in any direction we must find civilizations becoming younger and younger as we journey onward.

Can such a spot be found on the earth's surface? Certainly it can; there is one region in the world, and one only, which meets all these requirements. This region is the basins of the Euphrates and Tigris, in Chaldæa and Mesopotamia. In this district, and around it, lie all the oldest civilizations. In this region is the civilization of ancient Chaldæa, now admitted to be the oldest in the world.* On the south of it lies the Mincean or ancient Arabian civilization, lately discovered,† and thought to be almost equal in antiquity. To the west lies ancient Egypt; to the northwest the Hittite civilization, supposed to be nearly five thousand years old, and on the direct north is Assyria. To the east of Chaldæa lie the civilizations of Elam, Persia and of ancient India, which go back at least as far as B.C. 3000. As we leave Chaldæa behind and journey in any direction, we find that the antiquity of civilization becomes less and less as we proceed. European civilization does not begin until long afterwards; Central Africa has no ancient civilization; China cannot claim any civilization beyond B.C. 2500; Polynesia boasts of

* Thought to go back to B.C. 5000-6000.

† Stone temples like Stonehenge were found in Central Arabia by Mr. F. T. Palgrave.

no ancient empires; and America has no civilizations (*i.e.*, Peru and Mexico) which are a thousand years old.

Let the reader take a map and try to find any region in the world, except ancient Babylonia, which fulfills these tests, and he will soon give up the search in despair.

The primitive home of man, therefore, lay somewhere within the basins of the Euphrates and Tigris, in ancient Chaldæa or Mesopotamia. Two important considerations follow from this conclusion.

First. We cannot determine the primitive state of man from discoveries in Northern and Western Europe. These regions only lay on the fringe of the habitable world in primeval days, and were inhabited by the lowest and most barbarous men, the highest being in ancient Chaldæa. Even in the palmy days of the Roman Empire the shores of the Baltic were inhabited by savages, and in the present day Red Indians and Eskimo inhabit the northern portions of the Dominion of Canada.

Secondly. Whatever intellectual power or incipient civilization existed in primeval days in Western Europe must have been far surpassed by the men who in those times lived on the banks of the Euphrates and Tigris.* The former were mere wanderers; the latter were cultured settlers, who were so much stronger that they drove out the weaker tribes, who wandered northwards into wilder regions. We must always keep these two important considerations carefully before us.

IMAGINARY ANCESTORS OF MAN.

If man has been developed from an ape, then between the highest ape and the lowest man there must have been an enormous number of intermediate forms, "graduating insensibly" (in Mr. Darwin's words†) from man to ape. Thus it is not a question of the missing links, but of many which must all have existed for ages. Where are the remains of these missing links? Not one has ever been discovered in any geological formation in any part of the world. This difficulty, which was urged against Mr. Darwin's theory‡ when it was first started thirty years ago, exists to-day in undiminished power.

Strenuous efforts have been made by materialistic evolutionists to meet this difficulty, and some of their attempts are interesting and

* This follows from the conclusion above, and has been admitted by the Duke of Argyll in his *Primeval Man*, p. 184.

† *Descent of Man*, vol. i, p. 235.

‡ *I.e.*, of the origin of man.

even amusing. At Thenay, near Tours, in France, some small fragments of flint have been found in deposits of Miocene Age. Similar fragments have been brought to light, in deposits of the same age, at Puy-Courny, near Aurillac, in Central France. At Otta, on the Tagus, near Lisbon, some small pieces of flint have also been found in Miocene formations. Now M. Mortillet, an ardent evolutionist, declares* that these fragments of flint were made intentionally. They cannot have been made by man, for he did not exist in the Miocene Period. They are artificially formed; therefore their makers could not be apes. It follows, according to Mortillet, that these flints were formed by a creature intermediate between man and apes which he names *Anthropopithecus*.

This childish and grotesque supposition is not only made without any evidence, but against all evidence, and is brought forward only because the theory of evolution requires that some such theory should be formed. Not the slightest evidence can be produced to show that these Miocene flints were formed by any intelligent agent, for they are so small and so rude that it is certain that they are formed by natural causes. M. Arcelin† has shown that exactly similar flints are found in the still earlier Eocene deposits; and when these deposits were formed, neither man, nor apes, nor any ape-like creatures lived anywhere in the world. M. Boule‡ shows that the Puy-Courny flints have been formed by mere natural concussions, and many of them owe their special state to having been rolled along in the bed of a torrent. Most geologists in England and France§ now look upon these Tertiary flints as fragments formed by simple natural causes, and, in the interest of genuine science, such reckless theories as those of M. Mortillet should be most strongly condemned.

But a far more important discovery has lately been made, which has caused many materialistic evolutionists to declare that the "missing link" has been found at last.

In 1891 and 1892, Dr. Eugene Dubois was exploring certain Pleistocene(?)|| deposits at Trinil, on the banks of the Bengawan, in Java. These beds are full of animals' bones, and in the midst of them he found a part of a skull, two teeth and a femur (leg-bone) of a peculiar character. These relics seemed to be human, but were of

* *Le Préhistorique Antiquité de l'Homme*, pp. 104, 105.

† *Matériaux pour l'Histoire de l'Homme*, 1885.

‡ *Revue d'Anthropologie*, tome iv, p. 217 (third series).

§ *I.e.*, Sir John Evans, Sir Joseph Prestwich, MM. Cotteau, Carthailac, etc.

|| *I.e.*, late Tertiary.

a strange nature. They were not found lying together, but were in different parts of the deposit, some distance from each other. The skull-cap found showed that the skull had a cranial capacity of 1000 cubic centimetres, which is nearly double that of the highest ape, and only three-fourths of that of the average European. It is, however, equal to the capacity of the skulls of many native Australians. The brain, then, of the possessor of the Trinil skull must have been double the size of that of an ape, equal in size to that of a native Australian, and much smaller than the brain of a European. The leg-bone (femur) of the Trinil specimen is perfectly human, but the teeth are stated to be larger than and shaped differently from human teeth. Dr. Dubois named the creature to which the Trinil remains belong *Pithecanthropus erectus*. Evolutionists such as M. Mortillet,* Prof. Keane,† and others, maintain that the Trinil relics belong to a creature intermediate between man and the apes; so that it is declared that the "missing link" has been found at last! The reader is probably not aware that a perfectly bewildering maze of doubt surrounds this remarkable discovery.

For, first, the remains were not all found together; they were lying separated from each other by long distances, the leg-bone being nearly fifty feet from the skull, and the teeth also were not near each other. Nor were the relics all found at the same time. Thus it is impossible to prove that all the remains belong to the same individual. M. Mortillet himself admits this,‡ and with this admission the theory that the Trinil relics belong to the missing link instantly collapses. Secondly, the age of the deposit in which the bones were found is doubtful. It may be Pliocene, but it may also be Pleistocene.§ If the relics are of Pleistocene Age, then the link comes in too late. For in the Pleistocene Period men existed who were as truly human as are the men of the present day. If it be replied that *Pithecanthropus* is a survival of a pre-existent form, the answer is, Why do not such survivals also exist now; and why have no more been discovered? To these questions no reply can be returned. Thirdly, the relics themselves are truly human. (1) The skull-cap indicates that the skull possessed a capacity of 1000 cubic centimetres. Sir William Turner has said|| that he has measured human skulls with capacities even smaller; and other

* *Formation de la Nation Française*, pp. 226, 227.

† *Ethnology and Man, Past and Present*.

‡ *Formation de la Nation Française*, p. 221.

§ This is the opinion of Sir John Evans. See his *Address to the British Association* in 1897, p. 9.

anthropological Journal, 1896.

anatomists agree with him. A skull (the Albany skull) belonging to one of the clever semi-civilized mound-builders of North America has a capacity of only 976 cubic centimetres;* another from the stone graves of Tennessee measured 1084 cubic centimetres;† and others—which belonged to women—from California had a capacity of 1048 cubic centimetres.‡ As it is possible that the Trinil skull belonged to a woman, it is clearly truly human; and it cannot have been an ape's, for the largest skull of an ape ever measured had a capacity of but 600 cubic centimetres. The brain of the Trinil skull must therefore have belonged to a genuine human being. (2) The teeth of Trinil are somewhat abnormal in size and form; but both Prof. Thomson and Dr. Garson have stated§ that they have seen teeth from native Australians which are even larger. (3) The leg-bone of Trinil is admitted by all to be perfectly human. Thus, if the Trinil relics belonged to the same individual (which cannot be proved), there is no reason why that individual may not have been a man. Mr. Bland Sutton and Dr. Garson do not admit that the relics all belong to the same individual,|| and Prof. Boyd Dawkins¶ does not think that the Trinil deposit is of Pliocene Age. Thus it appears that the idea that the Trinil remains belong to a missing link between man and the apes vanishes completely when we thoroughly examine it.

EARLIEST TRACES OF MAN, AND EARLIEST HUMAN RACES.

When did man appear on the earth, and when do we find the first certain traces of man? It is generally admitted now that the first certain traces of man are to be found in what is called the Post-Glacial Age.** When the Glacial Period had passed, there followed a mild and genial time in Western Europe, in which England, France and Germany abounded with great beasts, such as the elephant, the lion, the hyena, the rhinoceros and the hippopotamus. Man lived during this time, and as he used only rough stone implements,†† the epoch is called the Palæolithic Age, to distinguish it from the later Stone Age, or Neolithic Period, when the great beasts above named had all disappeared. We are only concerned with the Palæo-

* *Prehistoric America*, by the Marquis de Nadaillac, p. 491.

† *Ibid.*, p. 490.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 490.

§ *Anthropological Journal*, 1896.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 38.

¶ *Nature*, vol. liv, p. 610.

** This is the view of Sir C. Lyell, Sir John Evans, Sir Henry Howorth, Sir Joseph Prestwich, Sir W. Dawson, etc., etc.

†† Some polished stone weapons have been found in the beds of the Palæolithic Age, but they are rare. Polished bone tools are, however, abundant.

lithic Age in this article, as it is the oldest epoch in the history of man. We shall refer in succession to the physical, intellectual and social state of the men of the Palæolithic Age, as they are the oldest members of the human race that science has revealed to us.

There are nearly one hundred skulls, skeletons and fragments of the human frame which are found in deposits of the Palæolithic Age, and from a study of these remains anatomists have divided the Palæolithic men into three distinct races. First the Canstadt race, the members of which were of medium height, savage and brutal, and dolichocephalic * as to the form of the skull. Secondly, the Cro-Magnon race; tall, graceful and accomplished, and also dolichocephalic. Thirdly, the Truchere race; of medium height, intellectual and brachycephalic.† These three Palæolithic races are now generally accepted,‡ although some ethnologists, such as M. de Mortillet,§ alter the names, calling the first the Neanderthaloid race, and the second the race of Laugerie.

It is often maintained that the Canstadt race (wild and brutal) was the earliest to appear in Europe.|| The statement is, however, entirely erroneous. The oldest skulls of this race are those discovered at Spy, in Belgium, in 1886. The Engis skull (Belgium), belonging to the Cro-Magnon race, is, however, quite as old, if not older, and the skull of La Seille, which represents the Truchere race, has an antiquity quite as great. The animals found with the remains of the three races are also always the same. The reader is, therefore, warned against accepting any statements which declare that the Canstadt (*i.e.*, Neanderthaloid) race is the oldest of the three. Such statements are made without any evidence, and have not the slightest value.

MENTAL CAPACITY OF PRIMITIVE MAN.

The brain is the organ of the mind, and, as a rule, the larger the brain the greater is the intelligence of its possessor. There are exceptions to this law, but, as a rule, it holds good. As many skulls of primitive (Palæolithic) man have been found, we can calculate their cranial capacity, and discover the size of the brains of the earliest men who lived in Europe with the lion, the elephant and the

* *I.e.*, long-headed.

† *I.e.*, round-headed.

‡ See *Crania Ethnica*, by MM. Quatrefages and Hamy.

§ In his works, *Le Préhistorique* and *Formation de la Nation Française*.

|| See *The Human Species*, by M. de Quatrefages, chap. xxvi; also Broca's *Address to the French Association for the Advancement of Science*, 1877, and *Le Préhistorique*, by M. Mortillet, chap. viii.

rhinoceros; and we can compare the size of the brains of the earliest men with the brains of the men of the present day. The following table gives the cranial capacity of some of the skulls of some of the Palæolithic men in cubic centimetres:

Skull of La Truchere.....	cranial capacity, 1925 c.c.*	
“ Chancelade	“ “	1710 “
“ Cro-Magnon	“ “	1590 “
“ Solutré.....	“ “	1560 “
“ Cro-Magnon (woman)	“ “	1550 “
“ average modern Parisians.....	“ “	1558 “
“ “ modern Germans	“ “	1521 “

Hence, it appears that the oldest men, as represented by the skulls of La Truchere, Chancelade and Cro-Magnon, had brains even larger than those of the average modern Frenchmen and Germans. The oldest skull in America, that of Calaveras, tells the same tale, as it must have contained a brain larger than that of many North American Indians now living.† No wonder that Prof. Virchow has said of the earliest men, “They have heads so large, that many a living person would be only too happy to possess such.”‡ As far as brains were concerned, therefore, the earliest men were even further removed from apes than are many civilized men of the present day.

In reply to this it is stated that some skulls of the Palæolithic Age are small in capacity and brutal in form. We will examine the statement. Here are two well-known small-capacity skulls of the Palæolithic Period:

Skull of Lagoa Santa.....	1388 cubic centimetres.
“ Neanderthal	1225 “ “

The first of these skulls may be quickly dismissed, since its capacity is greater than that of the average North American Indian, the cranial capacity of whose skulls averages only 1359 cubic centimetres.§ The Neanderthal skull requires a longer notice, since it is often described, and is said to be very ape-like. It must be observed first that the Neanderthal skull is not so old as some of the Palæolithic skulls of large capacity.|| It is Palæolithic, but late Palæolithic. The Neanderthal skull was found in the Loess,

* References for these measurements: *Hommes Fossiles et Hommes Sauvages*, by A. Quatrefages, p. 77; *Formation de la Nation Française*, by M. Mortillet, p. 311; *Reliquiæ Aquitanicæ*, p. 311; *Fossil Man*, by Sir J. W. Dawson, p. 341.

† *Fossil Man*, by Sir J. W. Dawson, p. 184.

‡ *The Freedom of Science in the Modern State*, p. 60.

§ *Prehistoric America*, by the Marquis de Nadaillac, p. 492.

|| Such as the skulls of Engis and Cro-Magnon.

which is the latest and most recent of all the Palæolithic deposits. Its great antiquity has been denied by some German scientists. Von Meyer actually maintaining that it is the skull of a Cossack who was killed in the war of 1814. As to the cranial capacity of the Neanderthal skull, it is actually superior to that of Hindoos of small stature.* The average cranial capacity of the ancient Peruvians is only 1212 cubic centimetres,† and many skulls of the clever, semi-civilized mound-builders of North America show a cranial capacity of only from 1000 to 1200 cubic centimetres.‡ As to the strange form of the Neanderthal skull, De Quatrefages has shown§ that the same form, even more brutal, was possessed by a French bishop of the fourth century and a clever Danish politician who lived in the seventeenth century. It is plain, therefore, that the Neanderthal skull is perfectly human, and may have belonged to an intellectual man. Regarding the Engis skull, which is not only of Palæolithic Age, but is older than the Neanderthal skull, Prof. Huxley says, || “It might have belonged to a philosopher.”

It must be remembered, also, that the high-class skulls of the Palæolithic Age were very many, while the low-class skulls are very few. Also the high-class skulls are very widely distributed, being found not only in France, Belgium and England, but also in America. On the other hand, low-class Palæolithic skulls are only found in France, Belgium and Germany, and do not occur either in America or England. It is clear, therefore, that the typical Palæolithic skull was of a high class and contained a large brain, while the low-class skulls were merely exceptions and abnormal forms. The oldest men, therefore, so far as brains were concerned, were even further removed from apes than are many civilized men of the present day.

PRIMITIVE MAN'S WEAPONS.

The weapons of primitive (or Palæolithic) man were of stone and bone, and the stone weapons were almost exclusively of flint. These flint weapons were of the following types, and were only chipped, being never (except in rare cases) polished: (1) Axes. These are found in immense numbers in the gravel-beds, and were often fitted to a handle, but sometimes merely held in the hand. (2) Spear-

* *The Human Species*, by M. Quatrefages, p. 295.

† *Prehistoric America*, p. 502.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 490.

§ *The Human Species*, pp. 310, 311.

|| *Man's Place in Nature*, p. 156.

heads, of medium size, some of which doubtless belonged to small javelins for throwing or stabbing. (3) Knives, formed of thin blades of flint. (4) Arrows, of all sizes, but without barbs, and generally cut in the shape of lozenges. (5) Scrapers, for preparing skins and for domestic work. In addition to these, there are many implements of strange form which might have been used in agriculture. No chronological division of these flint tools is possible, for the same fauna is associated with them all. In some rare instances polished flint axes are found in Palæolithic deposits, as at Maldon, in Yorkshire, in a gravel-pit,* and in some of the bone caves in Central France.† This proves that polished stone weapons were in use during the Palæolithic Period, and that the art of polishing stone was known during that era. The bone implements are chiefly harpoons, finely cut, beautifully polished, and barbed sometimes on one side, and often on both sides. The beauty and symmetry of these harpoons have never been surpassed. It is singular that many bone arrow-heads of this era are grooved in such a manner that it has been suggested that they were poisoned.‡ There were also used daggers of flint, bone and horn, the handles of which were often curiously carved. It has been thought that the throwing-stick was used, but of course this is doubtful.

Primitive man was, therefore, well provided with weapons, many of which, particularly those of bone, were fashioned with the greatest skill, and beautifully polished.

DRESS OF PRIMITIVE MAN.

It has been stated that the earliest of the Palæolithic men in Europe were naked;§ but the statement is absurd. Man adapts his dress to the climate, and in Palæolithic days the climate of Europe was only slightly warmer than it is now. Had the Palæolithic man not worn clothing he would have perished for the lack of it. The reason for this statement is, that though two drawings have been found|| which were executed in the Palæolithic Age, and in both of which men are represented naked, it is well known that modern savages, who are well clothed, draw pictures in which

* See *Ancient Stone Implements*, by Sir J. Evans, p. 135.

† *Memoires sur les Restes d'Industrie Appartenant aux temps Primodiaux de la Race Humaine recueillis dans le Department de la Charente*, par A. T. Rochebrune, pp. 42, 47, 49.

‡ *Les Invasions Palæolithiques*, par M. Girod, pp. 55, 57.

§ *Le Préhistorique*, by M. Mortillet, p. 250.

|| Both these carvings are given in *Reliquiæ Aquitanicæ*.

they represent themselves naked. The Chutchis of Northern Siberia are well and warmly clothed, but they draw themselves naked,* and so do the Eskimos.†

The large numbers of polished bone needles which have been found in caves of the Palæolithic Age show that the earliest men practiced sewing, which implies that they were at least clothed in skins. A curious carving found in the Duruthy cave in France also proves that the earliest men wore long gloves with gauntlets.‡ More than this, recent researches in the cave at Brassempouy in Western France, by MM. Piette and Laporterie, show that many of the earliest of the Palæolithic men wore elaborate dresses of cloth.§ In this cavern carvings have been found portraying the earliest men clothed in tippets, and drawers confined with girdles, and wearing cloth caps on their heads after the manner of the ancient Egyptians. Primitive man in Europe, therefore, was well clothed. He was not a naked savage. Elaborate ornaments also were worn. These were strings of beads of pierced shells and striking minerals, while the great chiefs wore as trophies, necklaces of animals' teeth|| with which they also adorned their girdles. A robe of skin was perhaps often worn by warriors, and in the skeleton found at Mentone it seemed that the body had been buried wrapped in the bearskin worn by the deceased.¶ The hair was often drawn up in the form of a helmet and adorned with strings of shells.** The faces were often painted red, and the body was often colored for burial. The great abundance of flint "scrapers" which are found in the Palæolithic caves and gravels, and which to-day are used by many savages for preparing skins, show that many of the earliest men employed the skins of animals for their clothing. That many men in the Palæolithic Age wore cloth garments is proved by the discoveries at Brassempouy before mentioned. Spindle whorls of baked clay have been found in the Palæolithic caverns in Poland.†† The earliest men in Europe were, therefore, well dressed either in cloth

* Nordenskiöld's *Voyage of the Vega*, vol. ii, pp. 132, 133.

† *Cave Hunting*, by W. B. Dawkins, p. 257.

‡ One of these gloves is figured in *Early Man in Britain*, by Prof. W. B. Dawkins, p. 211.

§ *Bulletins de la Société d'Anthropologie de Paris*, Novembre-Décembre, 1894.

|| One of these necklaces, formed of the teeth of the lion and bear, was found in the Duruthy cave.

¶ See *La France Préhistorique*, by E. Carthailhac, p. 116.

** This is proved by a carving found in one of the Dordogne caves. See *Les Invasions Paléolithiques*, by M. Girod, Plate XIX.

†† *The Bone Caves of Ojcow*, by Prof. F. Romer, p. 42.

garments or in carefully prepared skins; and ornaments, such as bracelets and necklaces, adorned their clothing or hung in their hair.

AGRICULTURE AND DOMESTIC ANIMALS.

We are always told that primitive man was merely a hunter and knew nothing of agriculture; but it is impossible to prove the statement. The ancient Indians of Hochelaga were agriculturists, but in the ruins of their town traces of agriculture* could be found only with the microscope. Many of the Palæolithic tools also are exactly like the stone hoes which were formerly used by North American Indians,† and from this Sir J. W. Dawson concludes that agriculture was practiced by the earliest men in Palæolithic times.‡ Primitive man also may, like the Hochelagans, have used wooden hoes,§ or, like the old inhabitants of the Canary Islands, known as the Guanches, he may have dug his fields with hoes formed of bullocks' horns.|| Corn-crushers (hollow stones for grinding corn) have been found in the Palæolithic caves in Poland,¶ and in the Palæolithic gravels in California stone mortars occur, which may have been used in primæval times for grinding grain.** It is very possible, therefore, that the earliest men had some knowledge of agriculture.

It is constantly asserted in popular works and in cheap textbooks that primitive man of the Palæolithic Period had no domestic animals. The assertion, however, is a pure guess, unsupported by any evidence. Moreover, it is directly contradicted by facts. In the Palæolithic burial-place of Solutr , in France, the bones of at least 100,000 horses, which had been eaten by man, have been discovered.†† These horses must have been kept in herds and eaten when necessary, exactly as the Tartars do at the present day. Representations of horses carved on bones by primitive man are often found in the caves in France and England,‡‡ and these horses are carved with the manes artificially clipped and cut, showing that they were domesticated. On the batons of the chiefs of the Pal o-

* *Fossil Man*, by Sir J. W. Dawson, p. 158.

† See "Man," in *Smithsonian Report*, 1868.

‡ *Fossil Man*, p. 129. These flint hoes are very numerous.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 154.

|| *Savage Africa*, by W. Winwoode Reade, p. 10.

¶ *The Bone Caves of Ojcow*, Plate V, fig. 12.

** Southall's *Epoch of the Mammoth*, pp. 391, 392.

†† *L'Homme Pr historique*, by Zabrowski, p. 74.

‡‡ In the caves of Cresswell Crag, in England, and of the Dordogne, in France.

lithic Age such horses are frequently carved, and these were evidently the chiefs' favorite horses. The bones of the dog have been found in the Palæolithic deposit in the Cattedown cave in Devonshire, where they lie side by side with the bones of man, the lion and the rhinoceros.* The goat's bones also were found in the same place,† and in the Palæolithic deposit in the cave of Kesslerloch, in Switzerland, was found a carving of a pig.‡ M. Piette has also declared that he has found in a cave in France a drawing which depicts a reindeer with a halter round its neck, proving its domestication. The bones of the dog were found also in the Cattedown fissure at Plymouth§ close by the skeletons of Palæolithic men, and mingled with the bones of the lion and the rhinoceros. The earliest men, therefore, were possessed of domestic animals.

BURIAL OF THE DEAD, AND RELIGION.

There are many who assert that primitive man in Palæolithic days did not bury his dead, but the statement is an extraordinarily mistaken one. Even if we had found no sepulchres of the Palæolithic Period, we could not conclude that burial was not practiced in those days, since the bodies might have been dressed and exposed on raised platforms, which is the custom of the North American Indians and native Australians at present. But sepulchres of the Palæolithic Period have been discovered in different countries,|| and so numerous are they that M. Cartailhac, in a recent work on primitive man,¶ writes a whole chapter on the way in which Palæolithic man buried his dead. Prof. Dupont discovered a burial-place of Palæolithic man in the cave of Frontal, in the valley of the Lesse, in Belgium.** Sixteen bodies had been buried in a sepulchral chamber, and the door closed by a limestone slab; a Palæolithic deposit overlaid the sepulchre. At Mentone, in a cavern, other Palæolithic skeletons had been buried, and similar interments had taken place in the caves of Bruniquel and Laugerie, in France.

The wonderful burial-place of Solutré, in Eastern France, has been alluded to.†† Here the Palæolithic bodies had been buried,

* *Transactions of the Devonshire Association*, 1887.

† *Ibid.*, p. 437.

‡ See *Excavations at the Kesslerloch*, by Conrad Merk, p. 46, Plate XI, fig. 67.

§ *Transactions of the Devonshire Association*, 1887.

|| In France, Belgium and Italy.

¶ *La France Préhistorique*, chap. vi.

** Dupont, *L'Homme pendant les Ages de la Pierre*, chap. iii.

†† This burial-place is fully described by M. Ferry, in the *Report of the Archaeological Congress at Norwich*, in 1868.

lying on their backs, and surrounded by a ring of stones. It was the custom, when a great chief died in those days, to wrap the body in a funeral robe, after it had been painted and adorned with necklaces and bracelets of beads and shells. All kinds of trinkets and weapons were also buried with the deceased for use in another world, and an urn containing food was sometimes hung in the sepulchral chamber.*

The body was buried in three different ways in Palæolithic times. It was either laid at full length on its back, or it was placed on its side with the knees tucked up to the chin, or the bodies were heaped one upon the others in a sepulchral chamber.

The reader will see, therefore, the extraordinary error of the statement that the earliest men did not bury their dead.

This leads us to speak of the religious ideas of the earliest men; but of these we know nothing. It is easy to say that the earliest men had no religion; but this is a mere guess, and is absolutely incapable of proof. That Palæolithic man believed in the immortality of the soul is probable, and this is the opinion of Sir J. W. Dawson† and Prof. Dupont. The evidence for this opinion is found in the weapons and useful articles buried with the deceased, implying that the departed man would use his weapons in another world. The great care taken to dress and adorn the body for burial is another proof that the earliest men held the doctrine of immortality. The relics of funeral feasts, constantly discovered, have also been regarded as evidence of the same belief. The carving of animal figures on the weapons of Palæolithic man is perhaps a sign of totemism, and these engravings may represent (as in the case of the American Indians) guardian spirits in the form of animals.‡

CARVING AND SCULPTURE.

One of the most astonishing characteristics of primitive (Palæolithic man) was his remarkable artistic ability. He carved pictures on his bone implements, and representations of animals on slabs and fragments of ivory with extraordinary fidelity. The carvings sometimes represent figures of animals cut in ivory with astonishing fidelity. These are the elephant,§ the reindeer,|| the horse,¶ and even the human form, in small statuettes. Then come

* This was the case in the cave of Frontal.

† In his works, *Fossil Man* and *The Meeting-place of Geology and History*.

‡ This is the opinion of Sir J. W. Dawson in his *Fossil Man*, chap. ix.

§ At Bruniquel. See *Les Cavernes, etc.*, by J. Fraipont, p. 159.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 160.

¶ *La France Préhistorique*, by E. Cartailhac, p. 71.

splendid carvings on bone, representing hunting scenes, such as the chase of the wild bull, and the moving of habitations. The baton of Montgaudier is carved with two great serpents, and also ornamented with fishes and plants.* This wonderful work of primitive art shows at a glance the high intellectual capacity of the earliest men. The chief's batons also were ornamented with carvings of horses and reindeer, which no doubt belonged to him in large herds. On another baton found at Veyrier (Switzerland) the leaves and branch of a shrub are beautifully sculptured.† Carvings of plants and trees have also been found in France. On slabs of slate and bits of iron figures of animals were engraved with astonishing fidelity. The outlines of these animals were reproduced on these slabs with such artistic perfection that we are filled with amazement, and Prof. Boyd Dawkins says of the work of these earliest engravers: "The most clever sculptor of modern times would probably not succeed very much better if his graver was a splinter of flint, and stone and bone were the materials to be engraved."‡ How these primitive men must have admired the sublime and beautiful in nature! how they must have delighted in its splendid landscapes! and how skillfully must they have reproduced its marvels! To call such men savages is the wildest absurdity imaginable.

These carvings also are often shown on the handles of daggers used by these ancient warriors. The handle of one dagger is carved in the form of a kneeling reindeer, and the batons and heads of wands sometimes represent the head of the horse, and sometimes that of the bison. Even the teeth of animals, which were pierced with a hole and hung as necklaces round the necks of the chiefs, were often elaborately ornamented with the carved figures of animals. So skillful were the earliest men in carving and sculpture, that in their artistic ability they far surpassed their successors who lived in the Later Stone Age or Neolithic Period. The wonderful art of the earliest men died out with them, and it is a remarkable testimony to the high intellectual capacity of the earliest human inhabitants of Western Europe. The gulf between man and apes was as broad and as deep in the very earliest ages of the human race as it is in the present day.

POTTERY, ARTS AND TRIBAL ORGANIZATION, TRADE.

One of the strangest of all mistakes made in connection with primitive man is the statement that he was ignorant of pottery.

* *Ibid.*, p. 82.

† Figured in *Early Man in Britain*, by Prof. Boyd Dawkins, p. 238.

‡ *Cave Hunting*, p. 344.

No error can possibly be greater. Pottery has been found in many Palæolithic caverns, such as those of France, Belgium and Germany. M. Fraas said, at the Congress of Prehistoric Archæology in 1872, that pottery was frequently found in the Palæolithic beds in the German bone-caves,* and it was also found in the cave of Nabrigas in France, in 1885, by MM. Martel and De Launay. M. Dupont found pottery in the Palæolithic beds of the Belgium caverns in the valley of the Lesse, such as the caves of Frontal, Praule and Goyet. Later on, MM. Fraipont and Tinon have announced the discovery of pottery in the Palæolithic beds of the caves of Engis, Spy and Petit Moldave, in Belgium.† The list increases every year, and the pottery of the Palæolithic Age can be distinguished from that of the Neolithic Period, in many caves, by its difference in character. No pottery has been discovered in any Palæolithic cave in England.

Palæolithic man is said to have had no tribal organization, and is said to have wandered about in herds, like the Bushmen in South Africa. Like many other statements, however, this is a mere guess, entirely unsupported by any proof. It seems also to be very unlikely, and the necessity for defense would lead to some combination under acknowledged leaders. The numerous "batons of command" found in the caves of the Dordogne seem also to have been sceptres of the chiefs, and were probably carried in procession before the chiefs, as is the custom among the Indians of the Mackenzie River.‡ On the state batons or sceptres figures of the chief's horses were constantly engraved, and sometimes, as in the case of the baton of Montgaudier found in France, serpents, fish and plants are sculptured on them.§ Similar ornamented batons have been discovered in Switzerland, in the cave of Kesslerloch, by M. Merk,|| and in Belgium in the cave of Goyet, by M. E. Dupont.¶ Palæolithic man, therefore, was organized in communities, governed by chiefs, over large areas in France, Switzerland and Belgium. We must also remember that the Maoris of New Zealand when discovered were under the government of chiefs, who carried "staffs of distinction."** The Maoris also tilled the land and were agriculturists, but the only implement they used in doing so was a long sharpened stick.

* *Congres Int. d'Anthro.*, 1872, p. 255. The cave of Hohlefels, near Ulm, was specially mentioned.

† See *Les Cavernes et leur Habitants*, by M. Fraipont, pp. 102-104.

‡ *Reliquiæ Aquitanicæ*, pp. 30, 50.

§ *La France Préhistorique*, by E. Carthailac, p. 82.

|| *Excavations at Kesslerloch*, by C. Merk, Plates X, XII.

¶ *L'Homme pendant les Ages de la Pierre*, p. 117.

** *Prehistoric Times*, by Lord Avebury, 1st edit., p. 368.

The lowest savages have no idea of trade and commerce. When Mr. Petherick entered the country of the Niam-Niams in Central Africa, he found that commerce was utterly unknown among them.* Captain Cook also found that the natives of New Holland had no notion whatever of trade. The earliest men, however, in the Palæolithic Period were traders, so that in this respect they were far ahead of many modern savages. The proof of this statement is found in the many shells, trinkets and various other objects brought from a great distance. Thus in the caves of Ojcow in Poland there are shells which are now only found in the Indian Ocean.† In the caves of the Dordogne there are many shells which have been brought, some from the shores of the Atlantic and others from the coasts of the Mediterranean.‡ Some fossil shells, used for ornament, must have been brought from the Isle of Wight. Hence primitive man must have had a knowledge of navigation. Dupont also thinks that he navigated the rivers by means of rafts in Belgium,§ and that the Palæolithic men who lived in that country traded as far as Champagne in France for their flints.|| As traders and navigators, therefore, the earliest men were far in advance of many savages of the present day.

What kind of dwellings had the earliest men? There are some who affirm that primitive man was exclusively a cave-dweller, and that there was a time when only cave-dwellers lived on earth. The statement is childish, and it would be equally true to say that all the natives of South Africa are cave-dwellers, because at the present day the wretched Bushmen inhabit caverns in the Drakensberg Mountains in Natal. But the ancient Palæolithic settlement at Solutré, on the side of a hill, with its fires, tombs and animal remains, contradicts emphatically the idea that Palæolithic man was exclusively a cave-dweller. Solutré was a Palæolithic encampment, composed of wigwams like those built by the North American Indians, and probably surrounded by a stockade. Other open-air Palæolithic settlements have been discovered.

SUMMARY AND OBJECTIONS.

And now we may ask the reader to sum up all that we have said concerning the earliest men who lived in the Palæolithic Period.

* *Travels in Central Africa*, p. 465.

† See *The Bone Caves of Ojcow*, by F. Romer, Plate V.

‡ *Reliquiæ Aquilanica*.

§ *L'Ethnographie de l'Homme de l'Age du Reune*, p. 71.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 72.

What does this summary teach us? It shows us that man in the earliest times was as much man, physically, socially and mentally, as he is now. This is also the oldest picture of the human race that science presents to us; so that we cannot say that more ape-like men existed in the past, for their remains have nowhere been found in any country of the world. If man developed from an ape-like creature, that development must have taken place millions of years before the Palæolithic Period; and then where are the remains of the creatures intermediate between the apes and the Palæolithic men? They do not exist anywhere in any geological deposit in any country in the world. If, in going back to the Palæolithic Age, we find man no nearer to the ape than he is now, it is plain that we must go back many millions of years in geological history to reach the time when man developed from an ape. Those millions of years would have contained millions of intermediate creatures and millions of missing links; but not one of these intermediate forms has been found in any country of the world!

Many materialistic evolutionists try to avoid these conclusions by dividing the Palæolithic Period into subdivisions, and making the oldest era the rudest. They pick out the rudest flint weapons and place them in the earliest era, and they arrange the other relics of man in an ascending series, with the most perfect last of all. The classification generally followed is that of M. de Mortillet,* who divides the Palæolithic Age into the following subdivisions, from the oldest era to the latest epoch, thus:

- (1) The Chelleen Period, in which man was the lowest and rudest of all, and used only the roughest flint tools.
- (2) The Mousterien Period. In this era man still used rough flints, but of different make.
- (3) The Solutréen Period, in which man's flint tools were more finely fashioned.
- (4) The Magdalenien Period. In this last era of the Palæolithic Period man first used bone harpoons and arrows; he became a most beautiful carver and artist, and was also a trader.

This classification, which places the roughest tools first as the oldest, and considers the most perfect specimens the latest, because they are the best formed, has not the least scientific value. When it was first proposed by its author, at the Congress of Prehistoric Archæology at Brussels, in 1872, it was violently opposed. M. Fraas, on behalf of Germany, pointed out that it was contradicted

* *Le Préhistorique Antiquité de l'Homme.*

completely by all German discoveries; for in Germany there was but one period in the Palæolithic age, that of the mammoth, and it ought to be so in other countries also. Mr. Franks, on behalf of England, also could not accept M. de Mortillet's classification. The periods of M. de Mortillet have all the same animals, which in itself is enough to upset the classification; and Prof. Boyd Dawkins has said* that the animals which M. de Mortillet declares characterize his different eras may all be found lying side by side in the same beds of gravel. Rudeness of form in flint implements is not the slightest test of relative age, and Sir Henry Howorth has shown† that the different flint implements of M. de Mortillet's eras are constantly mingled together at the same place and in the same deposit. The reader, therefore, is warned against attaching the slightest value to M. de Mortillet's eras, since it is absolutely impossible to divide the Palæolithic Period into divisions, as its fauna and flora were the same from its beginning to its end.

Thus we see that those persistent attempts often made to degrade man receive no support from science. Science shows that even the earliest men had a noble nature and a mental power which, placing them in a totally different position from the brutes, bore witness to the fact that man was made in the image of God. That image was as visible from the first as it is now, in man's reason, speech and conscience, and, however degraded he may be, he has the mark of royalty within him. His moral nature has been corrupted by sin, and his degradation is the effect of his disobedience to the command of God. But he can be recovered and made a new creature through the Incarnation of the Son of God, and brought back ultimately to a state of purity and happiness far exceeding that from which he fell by his primæval transgression.

D. GATH WHITLEY.

* *Nature*, August 13, 1896.

† *The Mammoth and the Flood*, pp. 238-242

V.

REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE.

I.—APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. A Critical and Speculative Treatise of Man's Religious Experience and Development in the Light of Modern Science and Reflective Thinking. By GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD, LL.D, formerly Professor of Philosophy in Yale University. Two vols. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1905.

The reviewer who sets himself to do justice to these two large volumes (nearly 600 pp. each) of Dr. Ladd's work on *The Philosophy of Religion* soon discovers that he has no easy task. This arises in part from the extent and complexity of the subject itself, and from the thoroughness with which every aspect of it is treated. It must be owned that it arises also in part from the author's plan, which necessitates a good deal of overlapping in the discussion, and from a tendency, springing from his very painstakingness and constant sense of the intricacy and manifoldness of the factors involved in the phenomena under review, to undue expansion and diffusiveness in exposition. The work would probably have been more helpful—it certainly would have been easier to grasp, without anything essential being lost—had it been more concentrated. We take it, however, with much gratitude, as it is, gladly acknowledging the remarkable breadth of knowledge, the mature reflection, the genuine philosophic insight, and, in the main, the caution and sanity in the treatment of current theories which it displays. On the general doctrine of religion, on the character and place of the historical religions, on theistic problems, we find it nearly always informative and stimulating. Where we must take leave to differ is in the tendency to sink Christianity too much in the general stream of the developing religious consciousness of mankind, with inadequate regard to those features which constitute this religion, in a sense true of no other, *the religion of revelation and redemption*.

To follow Dr. Ladd in detail through the fifty-seven chapters of the six parts of his work, and exhibit the slow unfolding of his argument in his own order, is impossible in our space; we shall not therefore attempt it. Enough that we try to seize his leading ideas, and show how these bear on the general conception of a philosophy of religion. Even in attempting this we are conscious that we may not be able always to present his thoughts without mistake. His exposition is progressive, and we have repeatedly found that what seemed gaps or one-sidednesses in his presentation were removed or modified in later statements, even if the harmony of the different sides was not always then made perfectly clear. If we err in any degree in our summary, or in the remarks based on it, we may plead at least that the mistake is not intentional.

The philosophy of religion, briefly put, is the reflective study of religion, with a view to showing its ground in the essential nature of man, and the value which

is to be attached to its conceptions in its less perfect and more perfect stages of development. Philosophy, Dr. Ladd tells us, deals with religion so far as it is an "abiding and universal"—a "permanent and universal"—element of man's life (I, pp. 5, 6). The philosophical method is somewhat vaguely defined as "a combination of the historical and comparative with the psychological method" (p. 18)—"the mixed psychological and historical method" (p. 22). A better definition follows: "In religion, as elsewhere, the philosophical method consists in the application of reflective thinking, with its searching critical analysis, and its cautious but free and bold speculative synthesis, to the material already prepared for it by the appropriate particular sciences" (p. 22). Again: "The philosophy of religion aims to give to the facts and laws of man's religious life and development that critical and reflective treatment which will discover, elucidate, and defend the fundamental Conceptions and universal Truths of Religion, and to unite them with other conceptions and truths in a harmonious and unitary theory of the World and of Man's total experience" (p. 27). We are rightly reminded that rationality does not exclude, but "rather comprehends and includes in its highest potency the psychological and historical evaluation" (p. 73). The attempt to reach an "absolute" philosophy of religion, such, e.g., as Hegel's aimed at being, is disavowed; but it will be felt, probably, that the task assigned to the philosophy of religion in the sentences above quoted is still sufficiently bold and difficult. The only remark we would venture to make at this point is, that the scheme of a perfectly rationalized theory of religion is difficult to harmonize with the admission later of an element of "revelation" as a chief factor in religious progress (see after); or, if it is held that "revelation" in this connection comes into view only so far as it yields a rationally construable and verifiable content, this would seem to fail to do justice to the positive character of Christianity as the discovery of a divine purpose and work for man's salvation, which, while meeting man's deepest need, yet could not be deduced from any general rational principles.

A valuable part of Dr. Ladd's book is the proof it affords of the universality of religion (pp. 88, 120ff.). Religion itself, reduced to its "lowest terms," he would define as "the belief in invisible, superhuman powers (or a Power) which are (is) conceived after the analogy of the human spirit; on which (whom) man regards himself as dependent for his well-being, and to which (whom) he is, at least in some sense, responsible for his conduct; together with the feelings and practices which naturally follow from such a belief" (p. 89). Dr. Ladd is quite aware, as he shows when dealing with the subject from other points of view (pp. 19, 110, 111, 151, etc.), that such a definition is of very little value as respects the main problem, viz., the ground of religion in the essential nature of man. As he truly says on p. 88: "It is true that by taking religion at its lowest terms, so to say, we shall by no means fully comprehend its profound significance and supreme value for the total life of man." The definition furnishes, in fact, only "an historical or matter-of-fact *minimum*," which is useful merely as a starting-point for deeper consideration. It is not, as later statements show, in the lowest, but in the highest religions that religion discloses its real essence (p. 111). The danger, further, has sedulously to be guarded against of confusing this vague common element of *all* religions—a mere product of logical generalization—with the "lowest form" of religion historically, and of thinking of it as the "primitive religion," from which higher types are to be evolved.

Dr. Ladd, happily, is well aware of the nests of fallacies which lurk in current speculations about "primitive man" and "primitive religion," and some of the most valuable portions of his book are those which deal with this subject. "Strictly speaking," he reminds us, "little or nothing is known of primitive man" (p. 14). "One must not be imposed on by an offhand transference of the char-

acteristics of savages or uncivilized tribes as now existing to the case of primitive man. To quote from the highest authority in anthropology [Waitz], the 'primitive man' is a pure fiction, however convenient a fiction he may be" (p. 135). We gather that Dr. Ladd recognizes a real distinction in "kind," not merely in degree, between human consciousness and animal consciousness (pp. 138-39), and is not to be held as acquiescing in evolutionary theories which do away with this distinction (pp. 139-40; II, pp. 290ff.). Similarly, in several chapters of his book—often recurring to the theme—he trenchantly criticises the tendency to set up some particular low type of religion, as fetishism, totemism, ancestor-worship, as the "primitive" form of religion, and abundantly shows from anthropological data how baseless such assumptions are (e.g., pp. 96-99, 106, 142ff., 148, 170, etc.). "Neither Fetishism, nor Totemism, nor Shamanism, nor Theriolatry, nor the other lower forms of nature-worship can be regarded as the earliest form of religion; no one of these so-called religions can be the original from which all the other religions have been derived" (p. 142). In this connection Prof. Frazer's fantastic theories in his *Golden Bough* come in for a good deal of severe handling (pp. 34, 103, 144, etc.). We are not clear, however, that Dr. Ladd does not in part fall into the same error in his evident inclination to regard what he calls "a vague and unreflective Spiritism"—"A child of nature, he [man] views all nature as moved and influenced by soul-life, similar and yet superior to his own" (pp. 90, 93)—as, if not absolutely the primitive religion, yet the nearest approach to it attainable by us (pp. 89, 96, 137, etc.). Obviously, if religion had no deeper root than this animistic tendency its conceptions would have no more rational value than the nursery beliefs in gnomes, sprites and fairies; from it no rational development of monotheistic faith would be possible. Dr. Ladd himself in many places shows later how much deeper the root of religion lies, viz., in man's essential nature as rational spirit (pp. 302ff.). It should be observed also that every conception of "soul-life" in nature is not yet the conception of "gods." The predicate "divine" when analyzed is found to contain a higher element which needs special explanation (cf. p. 148). It was Max Müller's special merit to insist on this.

We have not space to follow Dr. Ladd in his elaborate chapters on the Differentiation and Development of Religions, the Religious Consciousness, etc., all of which turn out to have a good deal to say also on the Origin of Religion, previously discussed. Notice need only be taken in these chapters of his reasoning against the idea of a "primitive revelation" and a "primitive monotheism" (pp. 152, 204, 223, etc.), and his endorsement as "undoubtedly" correct of the words of Zeller: "What humanity possesses of religious truth and religious life it must win for itself . . . religion, like any human work, could only climb upward gradually, out of crude and imperfect beginnings, to a nobler and more pure form" (p. 150). This, in our view, is as *à priori* as anything could be; and is not, besides, we venture to think, in accordance with facts, which show, in many instances, a descent in religions from relatively purer to infinitely grosser and growingly polytheistic and idolatrous forms. On the question of a "primitive revelation" we cannot but think that there is a good deal of misapprehension. No one seriously contends that religion "originated" in a primitive divine revelation (p. 152); such a view is on the face of it untenable. But it is not untenable to suppose that man had from the first, with his inherent religious endowment, a measure of divine revelation granted to him, sufficient at least to ground, in an elementary form, a pure worship of God, and keep him right in his relations with God. The fact of such revelation may, as Dr. Ladd says, be beyond the conditions of "historical" (extra-Scriptural) proof; but there is no warrant for denying its possibility or probability (p. 204). Then, as respects "monotheism," this also

is an ambiguous word; for it is not supposed by any that man set out with a reasoned conception of the unity of God, or the opposition of the idea of that unity to false gods or many gods. Even with the help of revelation it was enough to realize that the soul was in the presence of its Maker and Lord. But confining ourselves to the natural religious sense of man, it seems to us every whit as reasonable to believe that originally an undifferentiated sense of the divine in nature lay at the root of the religious consciousness—a sense of the divine afterwards refracted or broken up into the polytheisms and idolatries we know (cf. Rom. I. 19ff.)—as that religious consciousness began with an imaginative spiritualizing of natural objects, from which monotheistic conceptions were afterwards developed. Even on Dr. Ladd's view, if we understand him aright, a dim or more definite impression of the unity in origin and character of all living things—a "vague conception of the unity of all life"—is "the earliest result in religion of any exercise of man's reflective powers upon his experience" of the universe (pp. 111-12, 157). But may we not say that this is rather something primal, which antecedes even reflection? Dr. Ladd believes, we are aware, in a natural development of monotheism from the lowest stage of Spiritism even to the point where religion reaches its ideal in "the belief in the Being of the World as perfect Ethical Spirit" (p. 113); but we doubt very much whether facts bear him out in this view. On the one hand, his own pages show a wonderful amount of monotheistic thought in the world, going back, as far as we can judge, to earliest times, as well as a widespread monotheistic substratum even in the lowest religions (cf. pp. 224-25). On the other hand, we have significant admissions of the fact of "devolution" (degeneracy) in the historical religions (p. 152), and of the limitation of the law of evolution in its application to those religions, as Judaism and Christianity, and on a lower plane Islam, which practically alone have attained to the rank of pure monotheistic religions (pp. 160-61, 169, 203ff.).

We must pass briefly over the author's various remarks on the religions of ancient Egypt, Babylonia and Assyria, China, etc., though, along with much that is instructive, these contain some things we are disposed to question. We do not know, *e.g.*, what facts are relied on to show that in Egypt "a popular Totemism" was older than the monotheistic conception expressed in the hymns (pp. 220, 224); or that, "with the advance of civilization" in that country, "religion assumed constantly more and more simple forms" (p. 181). The very contrary seems to us to be the fact (cf. p. 224). In China the antiquity of the higher conception is conceded (p. 148). Surely, again, philology points to a purer and simpler conception of God in the primitive Aryan religion than is to be found in the developed religions of the several branches; and it is hardly satisfactory, after declaring "that the paucity of either literary or archæological traces of the deification of stones, trees, animals, and other natural objects, as compared with other contemporaneous nations, is the most remarkable thing in the religious history of the Greeks," to lay down "that their earliest historical development of the religious consciousness was free from fetish-worship, ancestor-worship, and worship of natural objects of both a lower and higher grade, is not a credible *à priori* assumption" (p. 183). The *à priori* assumption seems to us in the assertion of the contrary. Dr. Ladd does well to point out the remarkable extent to which ethical ideas have at all times coexisted with religion in the higher religions; but he surely goes far beyond the evidence when he seeks to find an ethical element in *all* religions, and buttresses his view by such an illustration as the following: "The worship of the *lingam* in India to-day and the worship of Ishtar in the ancient world, together with prostitution in honor of the divinity, or as an act of submission to the priest, are signs of the intensely ethical nature of their religion. For in neither case is the attitude of the worshiper toward the object of worship merely that of the unethical following of a natural impulse," etc. (p. 162).

In reality, however, as we early discover, Dr. Ladd does not rely on a simple evolutionary process to help on the religious progress of humanity, but brings in as a chief co-operating element the factor of "revelation"—though this, again, it is to be acknowledged, with a breadth of signification and a virtual identification of revelation with psychological development (p. 356) which resolves it once more into a phase of spiritual evolution. The author's thesis is that progress in religion in all ages has been mainly due to "the inspirations, convictions and thoughts" of exceptional individuals, who are variously described as "geniuses in religion," "great religious geniuses," "the good few," "men of revelation," "prophets," etc. (pp. 223-25, 229, etc.). "It is the few—the thinkers and prophets, who have had special insight into the truth about the Divine Being and about his dealings with men—that have chiefly succeeded in leading upward the religious life of the multitude. It is to 'the good few,' the small number of 'men of revelation,' that mankind chiefly owes its religious progress" (pp. 223, 228, 230). Thus are explained the higher religious ideas among savages ("the old-time prophets and sages of the tribe thought out the conception of a Creator-God," p. 225, etc.); the monotheistic ideas in Egypt, Babylonia, China, etc. (p. 224), and particularly the loftier conceptions of God in Judaism and Christianity. "Only among the Hebrews," we read, "and here only because of the work of inspired men of revelation, does the King-like character of the Supreme God attain the excellence of righteous and spiritual Personality" (p. 220). "Especially, though not exclusively, this must be said of the spiritual forces which have contributed to the development of the religious life of humanity, as they have flowed from the person of the founder of Christianity" (p. 230). It is granted that in these "religious geniuses" there is something which the principle of historical continuity fails wholly to explain; that in a certain sense of the word *supernatural*, "we may say that the perfect Ethical Spirit, in whom monotheistic religion believes and whom it worships as God, has contributed something new of his own Spirit to these sons of men" (p. 230). It will be very generally felt, we think, that, while much is done to preserve the elevation and uniqueness of the ideas of God in Judaism and Christianity, the notion of revelation is here so generalized that these religions are really merged with the rest in the general stream of development (p. 129), are viewed as products of essentially the same causes as operate in the other religions, and so have their *distinctive* character as the outcome of a special, continuous, and authoritative revelation in large measure weakened or effaced. This, we believe, is not Dr. Ladd's aim, but it is difficult to see that it is not the effect of his treatment.

Further light is naturally sought for on this point in the various references in the volumes to the Old and New Testament religions, and especially in the chapters in Vol. II which deal directly with the doctrinal ideas of Christianity, and with the subject of Revelation and Inspiration. One observes first that, in accordance with the new school of Old Testament critics, whose positions apparently Dr. Ladd now accepts, he takes a decidedly low view of the original form of Israel's religion, and of the conception of Yahweh in Israel prior to the time of the prophets. Yahweh, it is suggested, had his origin in "amalgamations" (I, p. 128; cf. pp. 205, 220); the opinion is even endorsed that "the Black Man of some shivering communistic savages is nearer the morality of our Lord than the Jehovah of Judges" (p. 226). To the prophets is due the purifying and spiritualizing of this conception (pp. 206, etc.). The obvious objection to this is that it parts with the idea of Jehovah as a real Being revealing himself to Israel altogether, while his reality seems again assumed when we come to the prophets; or rather we are transposed from the standpoint of an objective revelation to that of man's own weak and wavering, though possibly in some sense divinely prompted, efforts to attain a conception of God worthier of his own advancing

moral ideal. This, we are well assured, is a way of conceiving of Old Testament revelation which will not finally commend itself as adequate. On the other hand, it is to be recognized that in many places, if not with entire consistency, Dr. Ladd argues for the elevation of view and relative freedom from defect of the Old Testament (*e.g.*, I, pp. 63, 145, etc.; II, p. 431, etc.). He puts in a word in defense even of its "miracles," acknowledging their "commendable moderateness" (II, p. 441), though, on the theory of the miraculous which he expounds, there is left no room for any real intervention in the order of nature, but only "relative" miracles; that is, interpositions really natural in character, but providentially serving "as a sign or reminder of some divine thought or purpose" (II, p. 436). In this "relative sense miracles are defended against scientific and other objections" (pp. 436, 441, etc.). But here again, alike in respect of revelation and miracle, there is a constant generalizing of conceptions which takes away the edge of most that is admitted. "The revelations and inspirations of the Almighty have been too democratic to be confined to the select few," and "such names as Isaiah, Pythagoras, Zoroaster, Buddha, Confucius and Lao-tse" are brought together as examples (p. 443). Especially does one feel this defect in the case of Jesus. If Jesus stands at the apex of this world-wide upward movement in religion, as in Dr. Ladd's conception he undoubtedly does, one realizes that the absoluteness of his person and work is still being parted with. His religion is one of the many, though by far the noblest, which have their origin in religious reformers or geniuses (pp. 192-93); which aim at providing for man a way of salvation—"of reconciliation and union with the Divine Being" (pp. 130, 548, etc.); and its life is continued through "constant metabolism" (p. 131). The impression produced is that, though absoluteness is predicated of it, Christianity is rather a stage in the advance of the self-revelation of God than itself the absolute religion (p. 131). The general result of the doctrine of revelation is thus given: "Religion, which is itself an historical development, is also a progressive self-revelation—through a Spiritual Presence immanent in all humanity, but especially energetic in certain individual spirits—of the perfect Ethical Spirit of God" (II, pp. 445-46).

The real spring of the religious development of humanity, when we get to the philosophical ground of it, is found to be man's rational, spiritual nature, using reason in a wide sense to include ideals of value. On this subject Dr. Ladd has much to say that is profoundly true, though, in our view, he attributes too much throughout to man's power of self-development, and ignores almost entirely, what is so prominent in Scripture, the fact of a bent in man's nature away from God, rendering him averse from God and prone naturally to sin, with the result at once of a clouding of his intellectual conceptions and of a corruption of his affections. Man, it is dwelt on, has everywhere made God in his own image—a fact which is religiously interpreted to mean that God has first made man in *his* image (I, Ch. XIV). This, it is declared, is the mode of God's self-revelation, *viz.*, through the purifying of man's intellectual and moral conceptions, which impels to a corresponding exalting and purifying of the idea of God. We have accordingly, in one place, the somewhat daring proposition: "God himself, as at first the Ideal of power and majesty, and afterwards of justice, truth and spiritual perfection, is the construct of the quenchless desire and growing aptitude for the realization of the Ideal" (I, p. 146; cf. p. 323). It is strenuously argued that the Ideal carries the conviction of its reality with it; that there is an "ontological consciousness" in religion (pp. 274, 308, 332, etc.), which is the real basis of the ontological "proof" in theistic argument (II, pp. 48, 49, etc.). It is contended justly that the only conception of God which can satisfy the human spirit, as adequate to its own nature, is that of "personal and perfectly Ethical Spirit" (II, p. 69), and Judaism and Christianity are held to find their justification

as the highest forms of religion in the fact of their presenting God under this aspect.

Space compels us reluctantly to forego any discussion of Dr. Ladd's very full and acute examination of the rational basis of the idea of God, of God's attributes, of his relation to the world, of his Providence, and other questions which occupy the greater part of his second volume; but the reader may rely on finding much in these chapters to interest and instruct him. The treatment of the dark problems of evil and of human destiny has also many valuable elements, though we confess we fail to see how the admission of a "doctrine of salvation," especially when salvation is construed in the very general terms which alone Dr. Ladd employs, furnishes the "solution" of the initial mystery of evil as that which, *ex hypothesi*, ought not to be (II, p. 167). The problem of evil is difficult even with the fullest acknowledgment of man's freedom and responsibility; it baffles thought altogether, it seems to us, when the Creator himself is conceived of as placing man under a law of development which makes sin a necessity of his progress. Perhaps, however, we are wrong in crediting Dr. Ladd with this latter notion.

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JAMES ORR.

PHILOSOPHIA ULTIMA, or Science of the Sciences. Vol. III: The Scientific Problems of Religion and the Christian Evidences of the Physical and Psychological Sciences. By the late CHARLES WOODRUFF SHIELDS, D.D., LL.D., Professor in Princeton University. With a Biographical Sketch by William Milligan Sloane. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1905. 8vo; pp. lxxvii, 227: portrait.

In this posthumous volume is at length completed Dr. Shields' *magnum opus*, on which he was, in one form or another, engaged during a large portion of his working life, and the first two volumes of which, in their final form, have been before the public for fifteen years or more. It is not necessary here to enter into any detailed account, much less criticism, either of Dr. Shields' philosophical system, given its completed expression in this great work, or of the special contents of this final volume. Of the former Dr. Patton has already said for us all that needs be said, in the way whether of general appreciation or special caveat: and it would be improper to make the appearance of this third volume the occasion for a general review of the whole work, the more significant portions of which have been before the public for many years. This is the more true that there is little contained in the present volume which has not been put before the public before: it is here republished not as a fresh contribution to knowledge, but in order formally to complete the great treatise as part of which it was prepared and for the completion of which it was destined from the beginning. The larger and the more important portion of the volume has already appeared as the Bishop Paddock Lectures for 1900, under the title of "Scientific Evidences of Revealed Religion," and has already been reviewed for us by Dr. H. C. Minton in *The Presbyterian and Reformed Review* for July, 1901 (pp. 453-54). To that review it will be enough that we refer our readers. Suffice it to say for ourselves only that the completion, by the publication of this volume, of Dr. Shields' great work, as from the beginning laid down in outline, erects a worthy monument to a life of careful and wide study, persistent and profound thought, and successful accomplishment. The range of Dr. Shields' reading, as evidenced in these volumes, was immense: the care and exactness of his reports of others' opinions command constant admiration: the conscientiousness of his thought on the great themes which engaged his attention was always notable: and the courage and yet courtesy with which he enunciated and defended the conclusions at which he

arrived are a model for all controversialists. The work as it now stands completed is a storehouse of information, an inspiring example of serious argumentation, and a powerful defense of the fundamental elements of the Christian religion against now fashionable assailants.

Prefixed to the volume is a brief memoir of the author from the pen of Prof. Sloane. This is written with sympathy and knowledge, and brings vividly before us the figure of the scholar and gentleman whom we all admired and loved. Every biographer has his individual view of his subject, and we miss therefore something in Dr. Sloane's account of Dr. Shields' life which we would fain have seen adverted to; and the emphasis is not always thrown precisely as we should have thrown it. The shading of the figure, thus, is not exactly the shading with which it presents itself to our own memory. But it is the same gracious figure which we ourselves knew which is here presented to us—the eager scholar, the keen disputant, the firm witness to truth as he saw it, the ever-courteous gentleman who always spoke with conviction indeed not easy to gainsay, but also always with deference for the opinions of others. Exact knowledge, wide culture, profound conviction, clear expression, firm assertion, deferential manner—these were the outstanding characteristics of the man as we met him in daily converse: and they were compacted into a man whom to meet was to admire and whom to know was to love. The volume is adorned by an admirable portrait of Dr. Shields taken near the end of his life.

Of two things in the volume we cannot speak with praise: the Bibliography and the Index. The Bibliography is mechanically made, follows no consistent system, is not complete, and is arranged not chronologically but alphabetically. We defy any one to obtain from it any adequate notion of Dr. Shields' literary activity. And think of an Index which makes two men, each, of Wolff and Christian Wolf; of Archibald and Alexander Hodge; and even of Augustine and St. Augustine!

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD

THE LIFE OF REASON; OR, THE PHASES OF HUMAN PROGRESS. By GEORGE SANTAYANA. REASON IN RELIGION. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1905. 8vo; pp. ix, 279.

This volume is a member of a series, the series bearing the first of the above titles and this volume bearing the second. The volumes in the publisher's announcement of the series are five in number, being named in this order: Introduction and Reason in Common Sense; Reason in Society; Reason in Religion; Reason in Art; Reason in Science. We have not seen any of the other volumes, and any judgment of this must be based upon the impression which it alone creates. It is often true that if we can get a writer's point of view we can pretty accurately infer the drift and substance of his teachings. The writer of this book is often bold and sometimes brilliant; but his brilliancy is rather in a striking sentence than in the strength of his sustained thought. Many single sentences are striking—sometimes strikingly untrue; but when we reach the end of a chapter, the detached scintillation has been obscured in the misty character of the whole—we cannot see the trees for the forest; we cannot see the houses for the city.

Religion has the imagination for its peculiar faculty. While its objects coincide with those of the Reason, it proceeds by intuition and unchecked poetical conceits. These conceits are refined or vulgarized as may be; they come to pass for objective truths and constitute Religion's world of faith. Religion is merely symbolic and abounds in inconsistency, partialities and contradictions. These are not defects but inherent qualities, and with the franchise of the poetic imagination which Religion must be accorded, they constitute its richness and many-

sided adaptedness to human wants. A religion serves a purpose; if it serve that purpose well it is a good religion, otherwise it is not. We must not speak of a religion as being true or false, but as better or worse. "When religion appears to us in this light its controversies and contradictions lose all their bitterness. Each doctrine will simply represent the moral plane on which they live who have denied or adopted it. Religions will thus be better or worse, never true or false. We shall be able to lend ourselves to each in turn, and seek to draw from it the secret of its inspiration" (p. 14).

The two ingredients of religion are superstition and moral truth, each as legitimate and necessary as the other. Naturalism, Materialism, Utilitarianism, these are all at different angles predicable of this book. Like religion itself, according to its own view, it seems to have inconsistencies and contradictions as its inherent qualities.

We have the author's point of view, and we can safely guess the rest. We are only left to wonder why this volume has been written. It serves only as an echo of what has certainly been as well said, again and again. It is not the Naturalism of Religion so much as the Religion of Naturalism. "True religion is entirely human and political, as was that of the ancient Hebrews, Romans and Greeks. Supernatural machinery is either symbolic of natural conditions and moral aims or else is worthless" (p. 276). This is not far from the zero point in the scale of naturalistic interpretation of Religion in the name of Reason.

Trenton.

HENRY COLLIN MINTON.

ONGELOOF EN REVOLUTIE. Eene Reeks van Historische Voorlezingen door MR. G. GROEN VAN PRINSTERER. Derde Uitgaaf. Met eene Voorrede van Dr. H. BAVINCK. Kampen: J. H. Bos. 1904. Cloth. Price, \$2.00.

This book of the great statesman Groen van Prinsterer appeared for the first time in 1854. Twenty years later a new edition was published, and two years ago the enterprising bookseller J. H. Bos ventured to reissue it. It is an old book, but not antiquated. The principles advocated by the author are perhaps better understood now than during his lifetime. Conditions have changed and new political constellations have made their appearance, yet the principles of the great leader are more vigorously advocated by his followers than ever before.

Groen van Prinsterer is not as well known outside of the Netherlands as he ought to be. He was a noble Christian gentleman and the father of the anti-revolutionary or Christian-historical party, which in our days under the leadership of Dr. A. Kuyper has been surprisingly successful. When Groen van Prinsterer entered the States General as representative of the newly born party, he stood literally alone. It is said that Thorbecke, the liberal premier of those days, came up to him, saying, "What are you doing here? Your party has no future." Van Prinsterer is said to have replied, "The nearer future belongs to you; the further future is ours." He did not know at the time that these words were a prophecy, sooner to be fulfilled than he could divine. Since the death of Van Prinsterer the reins of government have been twice in the hands of the despised party. Baron MacKay was the first and Dr. Kuyper the second head of an anti-revolutionary government.

Nippold, one of the greatest German historians of our day, who is not at all in harmony with the principles of the anti-revolutionary party, and who on this account hated the German representative of this tendency, Dr. Stahl, with a perfect hatred, esteemed Van Prinsterer very highly. Had he grown up in Great Britain he might have been the peer of a Gladstone. If I am allowed to compare these two statesmen, I would say of Gladstone, he was an eminent statesman and a Christian, while Groen van Prinsterer was an eminent Christian statesman.

The book which we bring to the notice of the readers of the *PRINCETON REVIEW*

is one of the best publications of the author. In fifteen historical lectures he develops the principles of his political position. He endeavors to prove—and in my estimation he has succeeded in doing so—that unbelief is the cause of the French Revolution of 1789, which to him is the revolution *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, Revolutions, as *e.g.*, the rising of the Hollanders against the tyranny of the Spanish king, the dethronement of James II of England by his Parliament and the American insurrection against the arbitrary government of Great Britain, find favor in his sight; but the revolution, as embodied in the events which began to convulse France in 1789 and successively led to regicide, terrorism and military despotism—different forms of the same evil—causes him to shudder and to raise his voice against its pernicious influences, which were still alive after the French Revolution had ran its course.

THE revolution is a continuation of the desire to be God, which Satan put before man in Paradise. *Eritis sicut Deus*. Van Prinsterer charges the revolution with robbing God of His authority and giving it to man. "No God, no master," the motto of Social Democracy of our times, was indeed the root principle of THE revolution. Groen van Prinsterer's book is worthy to be studied in our times. History repeats itself. THE revolutionary spirit, as manifested in the French Revolution, is an object lesson which we ought to view with the deepest interest. The development in Russia teaches us that the revolutionary spirit, *mutatis mutandis*, produces everywhere the same bitter fruits.

Groen van Prinsterer does not whitewash the powers that be. The political conditions were the occasion, but unbelief was the cause of THE revolution, and ever will be. And according to the author even the governments of Europe, with the exception of Great Britain, were tainted with the revolutionary spirit in the beginning of the nineteenth century.

I recommend the study of this timely book with all my heart. Let every one who knows the Holland language take cognizance of the contents of this able presentation of the anti-revolutionary principles. He will find that Van Prinsterer and his followers were neither clericals nor conservatives, but a party *sui generis* which ought to come to the front in all the countries of the earth.

Holland, Mich.

NICHOLAS M. STEFFENS.

II.—EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY.

JAMES THE LORD'S BROTHER. By WILLIAM PATRICK, D.D. (Glas.), Principal Manitoba College, Winnipeg. Pp. xii, 369. Price, \$2.00 net. New York: Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons. 1906.

It is a wide field of which Dr. Patrick has made himself master before he has undertaken to write a monograph on *James the Lord's Brother*. The title at first may suggest an essay rather than a volume, but when we consider the number and importance of the problems to be treated we realize that the book is none too large. The author claims that there is no other work which covers the same ground, and while most of the topics here treated are discussed in Lightfoot's *Galatians and Philippians* and Mayor's *St. James*, it is convenient to have all that we know about James gathered together in a single volume. The material for anything like a biography of James is exceedingly scanty. His Epistle gives us an insight into his character, but as compared with Paul's Epistles is singularly impersonal. The result is that, even with Dr. Patrick's aid, we have difficulty in picturing to ourselves what manner of man he was. Most of the details supplied by tradition are rejected by our author as unhistorical, and he is at pains to

show that the James of Hegesippus, who is "an ascetic, probably a Nazirite, perhaps even an Essene," cannot be the James of the Epistle and the Acts. His skepticism (here we believe excessive) leads him even to doubt whether James was called the Just by his contemporaries (p. 275). The account of his death given by Hegesippus (Euseb. H. E., ii. 23) is traced to the lost Ebionitic work, the so-called *Ascents of James*, and is rejected in favor of Josephus' account that he was put to death by the younger Annas, probably in the year 62. In his treatment of the Scriptural material the author belongs to the school of Lightfoot and Hort rather than to that of Weizsäcker and Harnack, but he frequently differs from all of these writers. He takes issue with Lightfoot on the meaning of brother, and defends the Helvidian view that James was the son of Joseph and Mary.

Dr. Patrick's longest and most elaborate chapters deal with the Congress at Jerusalem—a subject, he says, which has been before his mind for thirty years—and the ecclesiastical position of James. He holds, that Paul's visit of Acts XV is the same as that described in Galatians ii; that the four prohibitions proposed by James were the fruit of mature discussion between Peter and James and Paul and Barnabas before the public meeting; that it is at least debatable whether James presided at the Congress; that James' speech is inconsistent with the common opinion that he was a zealot for the Jewish Law; and that the four decrees were not taken from the Levitical legislation as to strangers, nor from the so-called Noachian rules governing all dwellers in the Holy Land, but were suggested by the circumstances of the case. The object was "to secure the union in social fellowship of the two branches of the Church in mixed communities." It is held that James could not have been the Bishop of Jerusalem, in an official sense of that term. As to the Epistle, Dr. Patrick thinks the evidence for its genuineness, "alike internal and external, is enough to convince any reasonable man." With the exception of an excursus on Spitta's view of the Epistle, there is no detailed treatment of recent critical views, but all the important points are touched upon. There is no literary relation, it is held, between James and Paul; their views of Christianity were essentially identical, and the puzzle as to justification is resolved by holding that James refers to the justification of the righteous and Paul to that of the unrighteous.

In his chapter on "Certain who came from James," it may be doubted whether Dr. Patrick is successful in his attempt to relieve James from all responsibility for the defection of Peter at Antioch. He thinks it unreasonable to believe that the emissaries "expressed the mind of James," because such an attitude on the part of James would be inconsistent with the other representations of his views and character. But the action of Peter and Barnabas is still more inconsistent with their usual conduct. Dr. Patrick thinks it improbable that any news, or at least any complaint, of Peter's conduct in associating with the Gentiles reached James. "Who would complain at Antioch of Peter's conduct? The Gentile section of the Church? This is out of the question. The Jewish branch? This seems contradicted by the narrative in Galatians." But—to adopt the interrogative method which Dr. Patrick uses effectively but perhaps at times too freely—is it improbable that reports of Peter's conduct reached Jerusalem, and caused dissatisfaction in the Church there? Is it improbable that James, more solicitous for the peace of the Church at Jerusalem than for the cause of Gentile liberty, should send to Peter and caution him as to his conduct? And can we understand how Peter, after his experience with Cornelius and his attitude at the Council, should have withdrawn from the Gentiles and incurred the just rebuke of Paul, unless the strongest possible influence had been brought to bear upon him? Our author is right in defending James from what he believes is an unjust accusation; but we must balance the historical probabilities, and from Paul's mode of ex-

pression it is not unnatural to infer that he attributed Peter's conduct, at least in part, to the influence of James. The fact is that it is very difficult for us to imagine the state of mind of a Jewish-Christian of the primitive Church who was loyal at the same time to Moses and to Christ. It is hard to see how James could have been a Christian leader and apostle (so the expression Gal. i. 19 is interpreted) and yet at the same time have himself observed the Law, as it is admitted that it is "quite possible" that he did, and should even have advised Paul to pay the expense of offering a sacrifice in the Temple. That Judaism and Christianity were incompatible, Jesus declared in His words about the old wine and the new bottles; Paul saw clearly, although to those under the Law he became as under the Law; and the logic of events decisively proved. But men are not always governed by logic (p. 204), and it is apparent that the early Christians at Jerusalem saw no antagonism between the Law and Christianity. It is possible that, in attempting to draw a consistent picture of James the Christian, Dr. Patrick has not emphasized as he might the Jewish features in the historical portrait of James the Jewish-Christian.

Every reader of the book will be grateful to the author for the light which his patient thought and research have shed upon some exceedingly difficult problems of the apostolic age. He has read not only through but around his subject, his positions are in the main well chosen, and the argument is conducted skillfully and in good temper and withal with a candor which wins the confidence of the reader. It is a book which must be reckoned with in future by all who would be well-informed upon the topics of which it treats.

Lincoln University, Pa.

WM. HALLOCK JOHNSON.

THE PRESENT PROBLEMS OF NEW TESTAMENT STUDY. By WILLIAM BANCROFT HILL, Professor of Biblical Literature in Vassar College. Pp. 68. Price, 50 cents, net. New York: Edwin S. Gorham, Publisher, Fourth Avenue and Twenty-second Street. 1903.

This little volume fulfills the modest purpose announced in its Preface, and will be found useful as a "first step" in New Testament study. The problems both of Textual Criticism and of New Testament Introduction are stated concisely but with admirable clearness, and the author concludes that critical study does not destroy confidence in the trustworthiness of the New Testament.

Lincoln University, Pa.

WM. HALLOCK JOHNSON.

III.—HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.

THE EXPANSION OF CHRISTIANITY in the First Three Centuries. By ADOLF HARNACK, Professor of Church History in the University of Berlin and Member of the Royal Prussian Academy. Translated and Edited by James Moffatt, B.D., D.D. (St. Andrews). 8vo; Vol. I, xv, 494; Vol. II, ix, 488. London: Williams & Norgate; New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1904-05.

Prof. Harnack's treatise on the expansion of Christianity during the first three centuries has been before the public in its original form some four years (since 1902) and has already taken its place in the literature of the subject. In its English shape it appeals to a broader audience; and it has been adapted to a wider use by, for example, the translation into English of the excerpts from the Greek and Latin documents included in it. The translation has been well done and uniformly conveys the sense of the original plainly and straightforwardly.

It is deformed, however, by certain unnecessary provincialisms or individualisms of speech, and now and then is a little mechanical. On the whole, however, the English form of the treatise is worthy of its contents.

Everything that Prof. Harnack writes is informing in the highest degree; most of it is brilliant; a large part of it is epoch-making. That these latter adjectives cannot be applied to the present work is due in large measure to its composition. It does not present a body of new generalizations founded on fresh investigation of sources, and involving a revised interpretation of history. Apart from the careful collection of the materials for an estimate of the actual extension of Christianity before 325, which fills a large portion of the second volume, little of the contents of the present work will be new to those familiar with Prof. Harnack's previous publications. Some of his earlier essays are incorporated bodily or almost bodily into its fabric: the results attained by others are presented here anew in summary form. It would seem that, having collected a mass of statistical material illustrating the diffusion of Christianity during the ante-Nicene age, Prof. Harnack determined to prefix to it, out of the rich treasury of his previous discussions, whatever seemed necessary in order to account for this diffusion, and thus to compact a general treatise on the expansion of Christianity in the first three centuries. In this manner the work has become not a mere statistical collection, but a philosophical inquiry.

Its object, accordingly, is not simply to determine how widely Christianity had spread and how important a factor in intellectual, social and political life it had grown to be before Constantine came upon the scene, but to investigate the sources of its influence and the causes of its growth. It begins, therefore, at the beginning. We have chapters on Judaism and the vigor and methods of its propaganda in the ancient world; on the external conditions which favored the diffusion of Christianity, and the internal characteristics of that religion which gave it favor in the world; and on Jesus' own career and message and its transformation in the hands of His followers, by means of which it was adapted to its mission. Then we have chapters on the various elements which, in Prof. Harnack's view, entered into the substance of "the mission-preaching in word and deed"—the preaching of God the Father Almighty, of His Son the Lord Jesus Christ, and of the resurrection; the proclamation of the Gospel of the Saviour and of salvation and of the Gospel of love and charity; the manifestation in life of moral earnestness and holiness; the twin announcement of an indefeasible authority in religion and yet of the rights of reason and enlightened understanding, though not without "mysteries"; the proclamation of the advent of a new people into the world, who were nevertheless in principle as old as the world; and, perhaps above all, the gradual assimilation and utilization of everything in the old-world which formed separately the allurements of each of its religious movements, by serving itself with which Christianity offered itself as fulfilling the needs of every type of religious aspiration. After this, we are given an account of the organization of the Church for its missionary work and the methods by which this work was prosecuted; in the progress of which we have, of course, Prof. Harnack's views of the early organization of the Church repeated to us, but also much additional matter of the highest interest. Finally, in the latter half or two-thirds of the second volume, we have the actual statistics of the spread of Christianity in the first three centuries.

Prof. Harnack does not venture upon a numerical estimate of Christians in the Empire at the advent of Constantine; or indeed at any previous epoch. He contents himself with a general statement of their relative strength in the several sections of the Empire. Asia Minor was their centre, along with countries like Armenia and Edessa: these at the end of the third century were practically Christian countries. Christianity was dominant then also in Antioch and

Coele-Syria, Alexandria and Egypt, Rome and Lower Italy, Carthage and Africa, Lyons and Southern Gaul. Elsewhere it was less powerful. But it was already the ruling force in the ruling provinces; and thus we see that it was not Constantine which gave it its dominance in the world, but its dominance which gave the world Constantine. How had it attained to this position of dominance in the dominating regions of the world? This it is Prof. Harnack's especial task to depict. But we confess to a feeling of disappointment as we read his painstaking analysis. All the subordinate elements that entered into the expansion of Christianity are carefully estimated: all the instrumentalities employed to bring about the result are minutely studied. But there seems to be little appreciation of the real source of the power by which the marvel was wrought.

"The facts of the case do justify the impression of the church-fathers in the fourth century, of men like Arnobius and Eusebius and Augustine—the impression that their faith had spread from generation to generation with inconceivable rapidity. Seventy years after the foundation of the very first Gentile Christian church in Syrian Antioch, Pliny wrote in the strongest terms about the spread of Christianity throughout remote Bythinia, a spread which in his view already threatened the stability of other cults throughout the province. Seventy years later still the Paschal controversy reveals the existence of a Christian federation of churches, stretching from Lyons to Edessa, with its headquarters situated at Rome. Seventy years later again the Emperor Decius declared he would sooner have a rival Emperor in Rome than a Christian bishop. And ere another seventy years had passed the cross was seen upon the Roman standard" (II, 466-67).

That a marvel was wrought is freely recognized. But there is no adequate account of the marvel. It is as if one should stand by some mighty locomotive and, inquiring how it makes its way across a continent, absorb himself with a study of its great driving wheel, its cogs, its piston and escape: and never once think of its steam.

Why did Christianity become a world-religion and Mithraism fail? Prof. Harnack can only say, because Christianity took hold upon the influential races, enlisted Hellenism in its service: and Mithraism could not do this. But why could Christianity thus take hold of the culture of the world and absorb it into itself, while other religions fell back before the advance of culture? Prof. Harnack's analysis of "reasons" is powerless so much as to suggest the true reason. Here is a religion which, according to him, originated in the preaching of a Galileean peasant, whose vision was bounded by His land and people, and who had no thought of founding a universal religion, though, without knowing what He was doing or understanding what would result, He did preach a religion universal in its nature. This religion was taken up and preached everywhere; and everywhere it won its way, marvelously supplying all the needs of all men, and assimilating to itself all that was good in all other cults. Where culture was dominant there the way was most open to it, and yet it propagated itself primarily among the lowly, outcasts and slaves. What was the secret of its power? Prof. Harnack, if we do not misunderstand him, says practically this: that "it drew to itself every outside element that was of any value"—until in fact it even outdid polytheism itself in its polytheism and magic itself in its magic, and thus supplied to each just what each wished to have. "By this sign," he says, "it conquered: for on all human things, on what was eternal and on what was transient alike, Christianity had set the cross" (II, 468). This explanation is too superficial to be an explanation. Enumerate all the subordinate elements in the progress of Christianity you may—and they all, of course, had their part to play in its progress—and the progress itself is not accounted for. It would be far more rational, in full view of them all, to say with Augustine that Christianity must have reproduced itself by means of miracles, for its miraculous expansion apart from miracles would have been the greatest miracle of all. After all said and

done, the conquest of the ancient world by Christianity remains a miracle and can find its account in nothing short of the hand of God.

Meanwhile the careful study of the phenomenology of this conquest, such as Prof. Harnack gives us in these volumes, is full of instruction for us: and the effect of the story the volumes have to bring us, despite the naturalistic undertone, is a tonic to faith. We can testify for ourselves that, as we have read it, we have been more and more impressed with the miracle of Christianity in the world: and have arisen from the perusal of this new presentation of it with a profound conviction that no stronger testimony to the Deity of the Founder of Christianity could be desired than just Christianity itself. Its origin; its career; its early conquest of the world; its persistence in the world—reconquering its way to the helm of things afresh in every generation; its present position in the world, purifying itself anew every generation from the corruptions brought upon it by its advocates—a task far more difficult than the protection of itself from the assaults of its foes; the deathless hopes with which it inspires its adherents, its undying enthusiasm and its confident outreaching to that ever-receding future when it shall cover the world as the waters cover the sea: after two thousand years Christianity remains the marvel of history and evinces itself afresh every day as a phenomenon in time which assuredly has its source and its issue in what lies beyond time.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

KERKELIJK HANDBOEKJE BEVATTENDE DE BEPALINGEN DER NEDERLANDSCHE SYNODEN EN ANDERE STUKKEN VAN BETEKENIS VOOR DE REGEERING DER KERKEN. Uitgegeven door P. BIESTERVELD en Dr. H. H. KUYPER, Hoogleraren aan de Vrije Universiteit te Amsterdam. Kampen: J. H. Bos. 1905. Cloth. Price, \$1.80.

This book has, practically considered, only limited value. It is a compilation of the constitutions, as we would say, of the successive conventions and General Synods, offered to the Churches. It begins with the articles of the Convent of Wesel of 1568, and ends with the "kerkenorde" of the General Synod of Dordrecht of 1618-19. It is a known fact that this renowned Synod was the last of the General Assemblies of the Reformed Churches of the Netherlands. Provincial or particular Synods were convened occasionally, but a General Synod was never called. The bureaucratic organization of the State Church made it unnecessary to hear the voice of the Churches convened as a General Assembly.

The present publication is the best of all that have appeared and has a critical value. The editors have prefaced their publication with an essay on Church Polity. Added are some rules and regulations made by the "christelijke Synodus van Gelderland" and by "C. Synodus van Delft" and some questions of a moral character, which "de Synode von Middelburg" formulated and which were answered by Danacus, well known as the theologian who separated Dogmatics and Ethics, and the so-called *Walchersche Artikelen*, which were of a dogmatical nature.

Practically considered, it is of value to those who belong to the Reformed Church of the Netherlands. But any one who takes interest in questions of Church polity and desires to understand the development of the simple rules and regulations in the Churches on the Continent in the times of their normal growth, and the arrest of this growth in later days, will find in this book a wealth of information. He also will learn to understand and to appreciate why it is that the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands in their new organization return to the "kerkenorde" of Dordrecht instead of laying a new foundation.

Holland, Mich.

NICHOLAS M. STEFFENS.

IV.—SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF SALVATION. By GEORGE BARKER STEVENS. Ph D., D.D., LL.D., Dwight Professor of Systematic Theology in Yale University. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1905. 8vo; pp. xi, 546.

Dr. Stevens,* although since 1895 Professor of Systematic Theology in Yale Divinity School, has hitherto been known to the wider public chiefly as a writer upon themes of Biblical Theology, the fruit, doubtless, of his studies while he was Professor of New Testament Criticism and Interpretation in the same University (*The Pauline Theology*, 1892; *The Johannine Theology*, 1894; *The Theology of the New Testament*, 1899; *The Teaching of Jesus*, 1901). There was no doubt a little volume of not very great significance called *Doctrine and Life* published in 1895. And more to the point, there was always a strong dogmatic tone in the professed Biblical studies, and there were always intruded into them not merely a dogmatic method, but large elements of purely dogmatic discussion. And as Prof. Stevens has been very much of a dogmatist from the beginning, so he has from the beginning been very much the dogmatist he exhibits himself in the present volume. From his earliest publication the same tendencies of thought which meet us here in their full flower were already present. Already in the volume on *The Pauline Theology* (1892), for example, the divine righteousness is resolved into the divine love, and the doctrines of "original sin" and "satisfaction" are rejected. Even the same methods of argumentation and the same insufficiency in the statement of opposing views which characterize the present volume are already noticeable in that. We must confess to some surprise, therefore, at the chorus of astonishment which has greeted the appearance of this volume. Doubtless, Prof. Stevens' theological conceptions have somewhat ripened during the interval which separates it from its predecessors, and in the process of his special studies for it, but this is very much the kind of book on "the Atonement" which any reader of his former works should have expected to receive from Prof. Stevens.

We shall not profess to have found the volume pleasant reading. The polemic tone in which it is cast from beginning to end, strident from the commencement, finishes by becoming rasping. It is not obvious that the opinions thus endlessly controverted have been sympathetically appreciated. It is not even obvious that the trouble has been taken thoroughly to understand them. Certainly they are not always stated in their completeness; and they are not seldom refuted in mere caricature. The reader acquires an unpleasant feeling as he proceeds in the volume that the language of scorn, rising even to vituperation, is now and again depended upon to do the work of argument. Dr. Stevens does not like the doctrine of "penal satisfaction." Not liking it, he is entitled to argue against it, and (if he can) to refute it. It may be questioned, however, whether its refutation is advanced by declaring that it makes God a Shylock (p. 410) whose most distinguishing characteristic is "his appetite for revenge" (p. 331 *et seq.*). And it seems more than questionable whether this procedure is justified by the open declaration that the advocates of such a doctrine are past arguing with. Take, for example, this sentence: "It seems to me that one who can adopt the principle which underlies the penal theory of our Lord's sufferings—that God is so just that He cannot forgive the guilty until He has first punished the innocent—

*It goes without saying that this notice was written before the death of Dr. Stevens. It has not seemed necessary, however, to make any alteration in it on account of that sad event. The book remains the same, and requires the same treatment; and it is better that the verdict passed on it should remain unaffected by any personal considerations whatsoever.

thereby renders himself inaccessible to all considerations of equity and morality" (p. 383). In Dr. Stevens' view sin itself, in its most complete development, does not reduce man to so hopeless a condition (p. 316): he remains always accessible to appeal and open to conviction. It is inconceivable that he really considers his Christian opponents in worse case than the worst of sinners. His language is the language of simple vituperation.

The book is laid out, on lines usual in such treatises, in three parts. These parts would commonly be described as occupied successively with laying the Biblical foundation, tracing the historical development, erecting the dogmatic construction. These descriptions appear, however, to apply to Dr. Stevens' three parts only in a somewhat modified sense.

The discussion of the First Part (pp. 1-135), for example, seems devoted less to laying firmly a Biblical basis for a doctrine of Atonement than to removing all Biblical basis for such a doctrine. In Dr. Stevens' view there are almost as many Biblical doctrines of Atonement as there are Biblical writers: which is as much as to say that there is no Biblical doctrine at all. He does not deny that the "theory of penal satisfaction" is taught in the Bible. He intimates rather that it is taught by Paul; although when he expounds Paul's teaching for us, it takes in his hands much more of the appearance of the governmental theory (p. 60). He seems not very averse to allowing even that it may be implied in certain sayings attributed to our Lord in even the Synoptic narrative. But on that very account he doubts the authenticity of these sayings. And he does not feel bound to believe all that Paul taught. He is a modern man, and can no more "think in terms of late Jewish theology" (as Paul did) "than he can think in terms of pre-Socratic philosophy" (p. 74). "He claims the right, then, to distinguish between the specifically Christian and the characteristically Jewish or Rabbinic in Paul" (p. 75). Making this distinction, he ascribes Paul's doctrine of a substitutive atonement, of a "propitiation of God" (p. 61, note), to his Jewish inheritance; and rejects it from the possibilities of thought. "The men of to-day can no more appropriate the outward forms of Paul's Jewish thought respecting expiation, than they can adopt the cosmology or demonology which he derived from the same source" (p. 74). "What is Pauline? What is Scriptural? Is every conception of which Paul made use a necessary part of his religion and of ours—physical death due to sin, our sin due to Adam's, Christ's speedy return to earth? As I have frequently intimated, it seems to me that no fruitful investigation of the beginnings of Christian theology can be made without recognizing the distinction between the contingent thought-forms of the first Christian thinkers and the essential religious life and fundamental Christian certainties concerning God and the experience of salvation which they were seeking to expound and to philosophize" (p. 131). The upshot of his discussion of "the Biblical basis of the doctrine," therefore, is to free himself from the trammels of much of the Biblical teaching. Only the teaching of Jesus, it seems, is to be implicitly trusted: and that, not the entire teaching attributed to Jesus, but only the Synoptic tradition of His teaching: and not even that in its completeness, but only so much of it as Dr. Stevens' criticism spares.

In the historical section of his treatise (pp. 131-261) Dr. Stevens does not attempt "to write the history of the doctrine of salvation in the Church"; but quite properly confines himself to outlining "the principal types of theory which have obtained in Christian thought regarding the specific problem of atonement." These types of theory he conceives to be fundamentally three, which may be roughly designated by the names of the doctrine of "Satisfaction" and the "Governmental" and "Moral Influence" theories. The first two of these he discusses in their founders, Anselm and Grotius, and in their modern representatives of various kinds, under the names of "modern penal satisfaction theories"

and "modern ethical satisfaction theories." He devotes no separate chapter to the founders or early representatives of the Moral Influence theory, but, adverting to Abelard and the Socinians only incidentally in the chapters devoted respectively to Anselm and Grotius, reserves what he has to say of this third type of theory to a final chapter on "modern 'subjective' theories." It cannot be said that the several theories which come up for discussion in this series are dealt with dispassionately. The tone is severely critical throughout; and the object seems to be not so much to estimate the elements of truth discoverable in each as to clear the way for a passionate advocacy of the moral influence theory. The instability of the compromising Grotian theories is recognized (see especially p. 531), and the real opponent of the "'subjective' theories" is perceived to be the doctrine of Satisfaction. To discredit this doctrine becomes, thus, the chief purpose of these chapters. So engrossed is Dr. Stevens with this task that he does not stop to state the doctrine in its completeness before he refutes it; and thus falls into a carping habit which expends its criticisms upon isolated and, we must add, often misconceived elements of the doctrine. He is aware that although Anselm struck out the fundamental statement of the doctrine, it did not come to its rights until it received restatement at the hands of the post-Reformation divines. This has not led him, however, to any careful exposition of the doctrine as taught by the post-Reformation divines. He prefers to close the matter with a scornful allusion to "that period of Protestant scholasticism and hyperorthodoxy," and its "provincial extravagances," which "have no right to the name of orthodoxy, in the comprehensive use of that term" (p. 252). The result is that his polemic is vitiated by its lack of comprehension. The most astonishing oversights are committed; the doctrine attacked is scored for lacking elements which really lie at its very core; and the whole polemic misses its mark and degenerates into an amusing, perhaps, but certainly most ineffectual criticism of detached modes of expression. Though the doctrine of Satisfaction is rooted in the infinite love of God, Dr. Stevens, in criticism of it, elaborately argues out in opposition to it the necessary origin of the saving work of God in His love (p. 246), and ostentatiously compliments an advocate of it here and there as "damagingly admitting" this common proclamation of the whole body of its adherents. Though Christ's "active obedience" enters as an essential element into the doctrine—as even F. A. B. Nitzsch (*Evang. Dog.*, pp. 468, 484), to whom he defers much, would have told him—he blames the doctrine for a total neglect of the whole side of Christ's work which consists in His sinless and holy life in the world. Though it is of the very essence of the doctrine that Christ purchased by His Satisfaction both release from the dominion of sin and a title to holiness, together with the only prevalent instrument of sanctification, the Holy Spirit, he reproaches it with not correlating justification and sanctification in a vital and adequate way. Though the peculiarity of the doctrine of Satisfaction among attempts to explain the nature of the work of Christ lies in its conception of the reconciliation wrought by Him as mutual, he assaults it as making nothing of the attractive power of the manifestation of the love of God in Christ, the force of the demonstration of God's righteousness made on the cross, the moving influence of the perfect example of our Lord's holy life. In a word, Dr. Stevens is in such haste to thrust the doctrine of the Satisfaction of Christ out of the way, that he does not stay to grasp the doctrine itself, but is ever hastily thrusting aside something else which his hands have seized. The consequence is that naturally he is never satisfied that he has thrust it aside. He tells us over and over again that it is all over with the doctrine of Satisfaction; and yet he is ever returning to slay afresh the slain. He cannot get done with it. And finally he seeks his comfort in the assertion that it never needed any slaying anyhow; it long since died of itself. "It has been at no period entirely unchallenged; it has had its

rivals and its critics, until now, at last, there is scarcely a reputable theologian anywhere who ventures to come forward in its defense" (p. 251). He calls F. A. B. Nitzsch and private letters from Kaftan and Ménégoz to witness that it has disappeared from the European Continent, and adds his own assurance that it has equally disappeared from Britain and America—at least in "noteworthy" publications (p. 187). He declares that, "for better or for worse, this theory is moribund" (p. 187), is "obsolescent" (p. 260), and finds practically no place "in the literature of investigation, in the theological monographs and doctrinal systems which are attracting attention and exercising widespread influence to-day" (p. 261). In short, he is continually assuring his readers that the doctrine of Satisfaction is already out of the way, and yet he is perpetually returning to the charge and elaborately refuting it. Is it not unseemly thus to hack a corpse? And is it not strange that as the book comes to its close (p. 531) this poor dead theory—and by this time, one would think, not merely safely dead but sufficiently mangled—is still set forth as living, between which and the Moral Influence theory alone "lies the choice" ("forever irreconcilable theories"); and the reader is recommended—if he is not convinced by this volume that the Moral Influence theory is the truest and most satisfactory—to go on and read Dr. W. N. Clark's *Outline of Christian Theology* and Dr. T. W. Tymms' *The Christian Idea of Atonement*? It sounds very much as if the weary combatant would say, "I have done my best to kill this thing; but it won't stay killed: now I lay down my sword" (shall we say "my hacked sword?") "and leave the task to my fellow-combatants: perhaps they may succeed where I have failed."

Throughout the whole Third Part of the volume (pp. 262-536)—which is entitled "Constructive Development of the Doctrine"—the polemic element continues to occupy a large space. But in the fourteen chapters which constitute this part an attempt is made to elaborate and commend the special form of the Moral Influence theory to which the work is consecrated. This task involves a survey of a great number of the topics of theology; and they are expounded—if we may be permitted to use a general term in a general sense—in what must be spoken of generally as the Socinian sense. The doctrines of historical Christianity are, in other words, reduced, here, at least "to their lowest terms." We thankfully recognize that there are many expressions scattered through the discussion which show that this is not Dr. Stevens' inheritance, and that he has not adjusted himself perfectly to the lowered views of the doctrines which he is, nevertheless, in the main, commending. He can even criticise a treatise on the Atonement on the ground of its want of "scripturalness" (p. 243). If he objects to Anselm's phrase which ascribes to God "outraged dignity," he can himself speak of His "affronted love" (p. 275). If he scouts the analysis which distinguishes between justification and sanctification, he yet claims its benefit in distinguishing between the forgiveness of sin and the removal of its moral consequences (pp. 355-356): "Forgiveness is but one factor in salvation"; "the pardon of sin is never conceived in Scripture in separation from the cleansing, life-bestowing action of the divine spirit"; "forgiveness is a name for the beginning or restoration of right personal relations," etc. If the conception of guilt is minimized almost to the vanishing point, it yet is explicitly retained (pp. 319, 337, 355)—although race-guilt is denied and no guilt is allowed to stand in the way of acceptance with God. Nevertheless it must be regretfully allowed that Dr. Stevens' theology is of a piece—as indeed all theologies must be, since, as Dr. Orr has tellingly pointed out afresh (*God's Image in Man*, pp. 7, 8, 12, 13, 23), it is impossible to hold the Socinian doctrine of Atonement and not hold along with it a Socinianizing doctrine of everything else—of God, of sin, of the person of Christ, of the application of salvation.

We are not asserting that Dr. Stevens "does not believe in the deity of Christ."

But we are constrained to admit that no reader of the chapter in this volume on "The Personality of the Saviour" could venture to affirm that it is taught in it. There seems to us in this chapter (we trust we are mistaken) a notable falling off from the position (already somewhat unsatisfactory) in his *Theology of the New Testament*. There, Dr. Stevens represented "the metaphysical Sonship," the "ontological deity" of Jesus, rather as an inference we draw from the ethical facts or the data of our Lord's manifestation than as an element of His own consciousness: but he at least expressed his own earnest conviction of its reality. Here, although we are told that "the divinity of Christ is presupposed in the Christian view of His Saviourhood" (p. 298), we are also bidden to magnify "the moral and religious significance of His person" and be careless what "its metaphysical background" may be. Men may have "tried to exalt Him by ascribing to Him all manner of metaphysical characteristics and powers," but "what the Gospels place in the forefront of their portraiture is just His moral completeness, His perfectly filial consciousness, His stainless, untainted holiness" (p. 290). Just how much or just how little this may mean the reader may be puzzled to determine. Nor will he feel sure that things can stand at this point. For he can scarcely fail to note with blanching countenance the attenuated grounds on which alone Dr. Stevens can rest an assertion of moral completeness, perfect filial consciousness, untainted holiness for Jesus. With the feeble hold he has on the trustworthiness of the Scripture records, as he partly perceives himself, there is no sufficient reason to be derived from them for so great a conclusion: and to say that "the divinity of Christ"—does that mean His "metaphysical deity"?—"is presupposed in the Christian view of His Saviourhood" may not suffice one who does not hold to "the Christian" but to "the Socinian" "view of His Saviourhood." This view of His Saviourhood has not been historically correlated with a clear and firm faith in the "metaphysical deity" of Jesus.

On another matter we feel less hesitancy in speaking decisively. Dr. Stevens exhibits a remarkable sensitivity to the "charge" that the "moral influence" theory of the Atonement implies a lowered view of sin (pp. 267-68, 390, 392, etc.). One does not wish to be offensive: but is not the truth of the "charge" not only inherent in the case, but also plain matter of fact and universally recognized? Is Dr. Orr bringing a railing accusation against his brethren when he says (*God's Image in Man*, p. 11): "It is a truism that, with defective and inadequate views of sin, there can never be an adequate doctrine of redemption: it is, in fact, precisely because so many superficial views of sin are abroad, that there is at the present time so general a recoil from the Biblical declarations on the need and reality of atonement." Certainly if we needed an *à posteriori* proof of the truth of this dictum, we should not need in order to supply it to go farther than Dr. Stevens' own chapter on "The Sin from which Christ Saves" in this volume. Of course, no one supposes that either Dr. Stevens or any other advocate of these lower views of "the Atonement" does not think sin a bad thing, a very bad thing: or that they cannot discourse eloquently about its badness. But no one who reads this chapter can doubt that Dr. Stevens does not think sin so bad a thing as it has been thought by the advocates of those "provincial extravagances" of the "era of Protestant polemic scholasticism," which included among them the doctrines of original guilt, total depravity, and inability. It is, in fact, part of the very purpose of this chapter to discard these "extravagances," "exaggerations": and in calling them "extravagances," "exaggerations," Dr. Stevens advertises his own view as, relatively to them, a "lowered" view. It surely cannot be offensive, then, to say that it is only because this "lowered" view of sin and its effects on man is Dr. Stevens' view, that his view of the Atonement seems to him adequate. If he held the "exaggerated" view "taught, for example, by Augus-

tine and Edwards, and embodied in the Westminster Confession," he would not be able to content himself with his view of the "Atonement."

It can scarcely be necessary to prolong this notice in order to explain in detail what Dr. Stevens' view of the Atonement is. He did not leave it to this point in his treatise first to avow it: and we have not been able to follow his treatise thus far without repeatedly suggesting it. Let it suffice to say it is simply a form of the very prevalent "Moral Influence theory," and like all forms of this theory finds the atoning fact, the actual thing which brings man into right relations to God, not in Christ or in anything which Christ was or taught or did, but in man's own act of repentance and return to God,—Christ's whole function consisting in inducing man to repent and return to God. It is only by a figure of speech therefore that it can be said that "Christ gives us repentance and so remission" (p. 354). For how does he "give" it? Only by "making us to feel and know our sin, and showing us the sure way to escape from it." There is nothing upon which Dr. Stevens waxes more passionate than upon man's inalienable power to repent, "to heed and respond to the Gospel invitation" (p. 316). On this view one may well ask, What then becomes of those who lived and died before Christ came? Only two views are possible. Either they are hopelessly lost, or else Christ's work is not necessary to salvation. The former alternative Dr. Stevens, of course, does not take; he even (absurdly enough) tries to fix it on the "Satisfaction theory" (p. 379). The latter is, then, inevitable to him: and he boldly embraces it in a theory of what he calls "Eternal Atonement" (Ch. X, pp. 433 *sq.*), in which he teaches that "the word 'atonement' represents a process and not a merely single event,—that it designates the operation in history of certain laws or forces of the divine life which are perpetually operative, an action of God in relation to sin and salvation which has been continuous throughout human history" (p. 433). Thus our Lord's "saving mission is a transactional expression of eternal atonement" (p. 440): "the earthly life and suffering of Christ are the historic form of an eternal reality, a perpetual process" (p. 442). All of which, being interpreted, means that it is not what Christ did on earth which grounds salvation, but "the dateless passion of God on account of sin"; and that "God is, by His very nature, a sin-bearer." Why, then, the mission of Christ? Why His sufferings and death? There is a chapter (Ch. VIII) on this too. Its axiom is that "Christ came to realize in the world the ends of God's holy love" (p. 401). "Christ did not come to procure but to proclaim and bestow forgiveness" (p. 386). In any event that He did not come earlier, leaves it certain that what He did in the world was not necessary for the salvation of man—that nothing He did in the world was essential to salvation. If the world did not need His work for so many ages, it can have stood in no need of it at all. Search and look: it is inherent in the very nature of the Moral Influence theory to depreciate the importance of the mission of Christ. He becomes only one Saviour among many (Bushnell, Sabatier). His work is really unessential to salvation. Undeniably this is not the Biblical view. Undeniably it is not the view of the Christian centuries. Is it a view tolerable to the Christian heart? The plain fact is that the lowered views of the Atonement now becoming so prevalent are uncomfortable to all the presuppositions of the Christian faith, and involve a reconstruction which will ultimately transform it into a merely natural religion.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

GOD'S IMAGE IN MAN, AND ITS DEFAACEMENT, IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN DENIALS.

By JAMES ORR, D.D., Professor of Apologetics and Systematic Theology, United Free Church College, Glasgow. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1905. Crown 8vo; pp. xv, 325.

Dr. Orr's "Stone Lectures" were listened to in Princeton with great pleasure.

Their publication in this handsome volume will carry to a wider audience their fine exposition of the fundamentals of Christian anthropology and their vigorous protest against a tendency, apparently growing among us, "to wholesale surrender of vital aspects of Christian doctrine at the shrine of what is regarded as the modern view of the world." What renders this protest most valuable is that it is particularly directed against weak evasions of the issue raised by the conflict between the Christian view of the world and that "congeries of conflicting and often mutually irreconcilable views" which is commonly spoken of as the "modern view." Dr. Orr has the courage to recognize and assert the irreconcilableness of the two views and the impossibility of a compromise between them; and to undertake the task of showing that the Christian view in the forum of science itself is the only tenable one. This task he accomplishes with distinguished success: and this is the significance of the volume.

The material is divided into six lectures. In the first of these the issue is stated, and the actual irreconcilability of the two views demonstrated. The Biblical doctrine of God, man and sin is set sharply over against the "evolutionary" view of them, the exaggerations sometimes found on both sides are cleared away, and the residuary conflict made plain. The second lecture, proceeding to details, sets the Bible and the new views of the nature of man over against one another, and shows that no scientific facts really endanger the Bible doctrine that man differs in kind and not merely in degree from the lower creatures. In the third lecture it is shown that the extreme evolutionary theories have broken down before the advance of knowledge, and that, on the data of science itself, man stands forth as the product not of nature but of a Higher Cause intruded into nature. The fourth lecture extends this argument with especial reference to the mental nature of man. In the fifth lecture the great question of sin is grappled with, and the Biblical view of sin as a racial fact rooted in voluntary action on the part of the creature is powerfully commended. Finally, in the sixth lecture, the Biblical account of death as non-natural to man and the result of sin is defended: and the bearing of the whole discussion on the entirety of the Christian system explained. At the end a body of valuable material is collected in a series of Appendixes which support, and in some instances advance, the positions taken in the text of the lectures.

What impresses the reader of these admirable lectures most is their fine balance. In the statement neither of the Biblical doctrine nor of the "modern view," nor in their comparison, is there any exaggeration. The two are just calmly set over against one another and investigated in their bases and relations. Perhaps the most striking feature of the exposition of the Biblical doctrine is the just insistence upon the unity of man as "a being composed of body and soul in a unity not intended to be dissolved." A firm grasp upon this element of the Biblical doctrine notably clears the air. It not only puts in their right aspects death and the resurrection—the former as the product of sin and the latter as the necessary fruit of redemption from sin: but it throws the whole question of the origin of man into a new light. It perhaps may not be too much to say that the hinge of the Biblical anthropology lies here: and that the argument of Dr. Orr turns upon his clear appreciation of it. Next to this, we are struck perhaps by the searching analysis and account of sin given in the fifth lecture. The question arises, as we read, why sin cannot be characterized, in contradistinction to that "love" in which the fulfillment of the law consists, as just "lovelessness" or, in its positive manifestation, "hate." This would be only another way—whether a better way or not may be open to question—of reducing sin to the principle of selfishness.

Some striking minor points in Dr. Orr's arguments should also be mentioned. Among these is his suggestion (p. 152) of the impossibility of disparate development of mind and body, with the inference he draws from it that, therefore, it can

scarcely be credited that the body of man was formed by the accumulation of insensible variations from a brutish original, and the soul made all at once by a divine fiat for the completed man. Body and mind must go together: and a great brain with a little mind is just as unthinkable as a little brain with a great mind. The argument does not seem to be available, however, as against a theory of evolution *per saltum*. If under the directing hand of God a human body is formed at a leap by propagation from brutish parents, it would be quite consonant with the fitness of things that it should be provided by His creative energy with a truly human soul. And this leads us to say that the precise point in the question of evolution is, after all, not whether the new forms proceed from older ones, whether by or without the directing hand of God; but whether the forces concerned in the production of the new forms are all intrinsic in the evolving stuff. Man may "breed" many varieties of pigeons, fowls, sheep; and the varieties he "breeds" may often come *per saltum*. But they all find their account in the forces operating in the materials dealt with: his directing hand cannot be traced in the chain of efficient causes, all of which are discoverable in the evolving stuff. Accordingly, under man's hand we can have nothing but an "evolution," an un-rolling—a drawing out into new forms of what was potentially present in the evolving material from the beginning. If this were all that God does, there would be no "creation" in the case whatever. We do not quite understand, therefore, Dr. Orr's remark on p. 87 (explanatory note 1), to the effect that "evolution" and "special creation" are not mutually exclusive, whether as terms or as things. Surely "evolution" means just "modification"; and "creation" just "origination": and surely "modification" and "origination" are ultimate conceptions and mutually exclude one the other. You cannot "originate" by "modifying"; you cannot "modify" by "originating." Whatever comes by "evolution" that certainly cannot arise by "creation"; and whatever is "created" certainly is not "evolved." The old definition of "creation" as the making of something "*partim ex nihilo, partim ex materia naturaliter inhabili—ex materia inhabili supra maturæ vires aliquid producere*,"—is certainly the sound one. Unless the thing produced is above what the powers intrinsic in the evolving stuff are capable of producing (under whatever Divine guidance), the product is not a product of "creation" but of "Providence." And "Providence" can never do the work of "creation." Dr. Orr fully understands this and argues therefore that the apparition of man implies the intrusion of a new cause, that it is a creation, strictly so called: and this is what makes the note on p. 87 inexplicable. Let man have arisen through the Divine guidance of the evolutionary process, there is no creative act of God, but only a providential activity of God, concerned in his production, unless there has been intruded into the process the action of a cause not intrinsic in the evolving stuff, causing the complex product to be something more than can find its account in the intrinsic forces, however divinely manipulated. Evolution can never, under any circumstances, issue in a product which is specifically new: "modification" is the utmost that it can achieve,— "origination" is beyond its tether.

One of the most pregnant passages in the volume is that (p. 188) in which it is briefly demonstrated that for a moral being to exist in a non-moral condition is really for it to exist in an immoral condition. We may in the abstract distinguish actions into those that are right, wrong and indifferent. But there are no indifferent acts: in the concrete all acts are good or bad. So we may in the abstract speak of conditions which are moral, non-moral and immoral. But for a moral being, a state of non-morality is a state of immorality. Such a being is either good or bad; never neither good nor bad. This simple demonstration cuts up by the roots the whole Pelagian standpoint.

As we have already pointed out, Dr. Orr's whole treatment of sin is very sane

and satisfactory. Only, we demur to what seems to us the over-emphasis of the fact of "heredity," taken in the strict sense, in this connection. We hear indeed of "the representative principle" (p. 277), and the "inheritance" of death is apparently hung upon it. But the transmission of sin appears to be hung at least mainly upon the principle of "heredity" (e.g., 235, 242). This seems to us a mistake, and to involve us in many unnecessary difficulties, as e.g., the difficulty of accounting for our "inheritance" of specifically Adam's first sin (why not Eve's? and why not the sins of all our ancestors?) and the difficulty of accounting for our Lord's failure to "inherit" sin. We are burdened with the guilt of Adam's first sin and have received its penalty. Surely that is enough. We do not need to defend the theory of the "inheritance" of acquired qualities in order to account for it; the principle of representation is enough. And we do not need to insist that a son tends to inherit the moral character of his parents, which (on the broad question) certainly is not borne out by common experience: the children of the pious are not uniformly pious nor are those of the vicious uniformly vicious, and assuredly few would contend that the specific forms in which piety and vice are manifested are on the average transmitted. It seems much better, then, to follow what appears to us the simple Scriptural representation, and to say that we partake in Adam's sin because he was our representative, and that he was constituted our representative because he was our father and was naturally indicated as such for that office.

We have in these remarks, we think, noted everything with respect to which we should feel disposed to question even Dr. Orr's modes of developing his subject. Perhaps a query may be placed also against his remarks (pp. 153-54) on the difficulty created for a purely evolutionary theory by the necessity of the production of not a single instance, but of a pair of human beings. We do not feel this difficulty as strongly as Dr. Orr appears to feel it. Why should there be a pair? Nothing is more common in the experience of breeders than the origination of a new type through an individual sport. And what is the difficulty of obtaining a pair or more of the same fundamental type? *Ex hypothesi* the new variation is slight; and that implies the coexistence of many individuals of almost equal advantages. And nothing is commoner in the experience of breeding than the production from the same parentage of a succession of individuals of the same or nearly the same "sporting" characters. Perhaps also a query may be placed over against the strong statement (p. 257) to the effect that "there is not a word in Scripture to suggest that animals . . . came under the law of death for man's sin." The problem of the reign of death in that "creation" which was cursed for man's sake and which is to be with man delivered from the bondage of corruption, presses on some with a somewhat greater weight than seems here to be recognized. But these are matters of no importance to the march of the general argument of the book. The book is a distinct contribution to the settlement of the questions with which it deals, and to their settlement in a sane and stable manner. It will come as a boon to many who are oppressed by the persistent pressure upon them of the modern point of view. It cannot help producing in the mind of its readers a notable clearing of the air.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

A SUMMARY OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH. By HENRY EYSTER JACOBS, D.D., LL.D., Norton Professor of Systematic Theology, Lutheran Theological Seminary at Philadelphia. Philadelphia: General Council Publication House. 1905. 8vo; pp. xii, 637.

About a dozen years ago there came to us from Dr. Jacobs' hand a winningly written statement of the *Elements of Religion* (Philadelphia: G. W. Frederick, 1904; 12mo, pp. 298), designed for the instruction of the people. He now gives

us this somewhat more extended *Summary of the Christian Faith*, "adapted to the use of theological students, intelligent laymen and active pastors." In even this treatise he seeks, however, to state only the results he has arrived at in his theological studies. For the processes he has another work still in store for us, which will naturally be the most extensive of all.

The method of the present volume is that of question and answer—a method made familiar to the readers of this REVIEW by Dr. A. A. Hodge's standard *Outlines of Theology*. The endeavor has been to embody the elements of the faith in concise definitions, supported by condensed arguments, drawn largely from the Confessional Lutheran literature, from Luther himself and from the standard Lutheran divines, not to the neglect, however, of a wider reading. The statement seeks to be as untechnical as possible in form, while introducing the reader to all the important technical terms. The system of faith expounded is, of course, the Lutheran, of which Dr. Jacobs is a convinced adherent. But a manifest effort has been made to state the Lutheran system not only firmly but also genially, and to allow for whatever truth may be found in other systems. Time and again Dr. Jacobs is observed seeking so to express the traditional doctrines of his school of thought as by their very statement to avoid objections which have been brought against them, and to conciliate at least overstrained opposition. Above all, it is a distinctively evangelical Lutheranism which is here expounded, a Lutheranism which finds its heart in the great verities, and which is not afraid or ashamed to reassert them in the face of an unbelieving world.

That Dr. Jacobs has performed his task well will go without saying to all who know his previous work. What he is giving us is not mere momentary "views," but matured convictions turned over and over again in the mind for a lifetime. Of course, we are not in accord with his Lutheran standpoint. With a few particular opinions or points of view not necessarily dependent on his Lutheranism we find ourselves also not fully in accord. Indeed, we should part company with him on his very first page, and indeed in his very first sentence, which embodies his conception of the task of "Dogmatics." He calls it "the science of the Christian Faith"; that is, he makes the object of its investigation "the Christian Faith, with all its contents." We think of it as the scientific investigation and statement of the knowledge of God; that is to say, we conceive the object it studies as no other than God Himself as He has revealed Himself to man. In other words, Dr. Jacobs conceives the subject matter with which this science deals as a product of the human spirit. "Dogmatic theology," he says accordingly, "is the science of the definitions of the Scriptural faith made by the Church, or widely prevalent within the Church" (p. 6). We, on the other hand, conceive the subject-matter with which the science deals as a product of a divine revelation. If he took his definition strictly he would needs busy himself solely therefore with human things, and could never rise above what men have thought, that is, mere opinion; no matter how "widely prevalent within the Church" this opinion may have been, or may be, and no matter with what emphasis it may be defined by the Church as true. That he does not take his definition strictly is excellent for his book, but, one would think, bad for his definition. Theology will never come to its rights as a science among other sciences until it is universally understood that (in accordance with its very name) it has for its subject-matter not opinions, or definitions, or decrees of men, but a section of objective Reality, and that, the highest section of all, just God Himself.

We must confess to finding the language of Dr. Jacobs occasionally lacking in precision. Take for example Chap. XI, Q. 18 (p. 727). Here there is a most confusing use of the concrete "person" for the abstract "personality," and some other difficulties of expression. The subject under treatment is the Person of Christ. The question is, "Is the person related in the same way to each

nature?" We shall quote the answer and, as the shortest way of indicating what we have found confusing in the passage, interpose in square brackets remarks or amendments. "The person, with the divine nature, has existed from all eternity. [Why not say: The personal divine nature has existed from all eternity? or, the Divine nature, which is a person, existed from all eternity? Why speak of person as if it were a something additional to the 'divine nature'?] The human nature began in time. The person, therefore, was once without a human nature. But the human nature could not exist without a person [read 'without personality,' or better, 'impersonally']. The person [read, 'personality'] of the human nature, therefore [Is the illation justified? How can we infer from the fact that a human nature implies personality, that the personality of that human nature is derived from outside?], came not from that nature but from the divine. Since the human nature entered into the world [why not say, Came into being? Is there not danger of suggesting a preëxistence of the human nature by such phraseology?], i.e., was conceived and born and lived [is the grammatical construction clear?] by the divine person uniting Himself with our race [read, 'with a human nature.' Was the whole human race in the Virgin's womb?] in the womb of the Virgin Mary, we say that the human nature has no [add: separate, or distinct] personality of its own, but that the personality of the human nature is that which it has derived from the divine [read: but partakes of the personality of the Divine nature]. The Greek theologians called this [what is the antecedent of this 'this'?] the doctrine of the *anhypostasia* of the human nature, which [what is the antecedent of this 'which'?] our theologians accept, although stating [surely an awkward expression] that *anhypostasia* is preferable [a perfectly blind sentence, which is sure to confuse any reader not already acquainted with the facts]. The unity of the person requires that we must hold to the want of personality [really? read: 'want of separate, or distinct, personality'] on the part of the human nature." No doubt this is an extreme instance of inexactness of phraseology: but every now and again something approaching it is met with.

We are not referring to the confusions and ambiguities forced upon Dr. Jacobs by the peculiarities of the Lutheran construction of doctrine. For these he is not responsible: and it must be confessed that he makes a valiant effort to reduce them by carefully choosing his phrases. In the matter of the Lord's Supper, to be sure, he fairly confesses inability: and falls back on "the mystery"—"When faith must be content with knowing more clearly what the sacramental union is not, than with describing fully what it is." It seems a pity, nevertheless, to have to say, "We firmly believe something—we cannot just tell what." And, by the way, we wonder that Dr. Jacobs' usual acumen permits him, without some modification, to hang his chief argument for "the real presence" on "the words of institution"—"This is my body," "This is my blood": for, when taken with the crass literality that is demanded, they surely assert transubstantiation, or consubstantiation, at the least. The Lutheran doctrine takes the "is" no more literally than the Zwinglian. But, passing from this, a fair example of the unavailing nicety in phraseology in question is supplied by his dealing with predestination. Predestination is defined as resting on foresight,—the foresight of faith and of the persistence of faith unto the end of life (Ch. XLI, 5, p. 554). But Dr. Jacobs does not wish to rest under the imputation of synergism, and so explains that the relation of faith to predestination is "precisely the same as it has (*sic*) to Justification," and that the matter may be best understood by transferring the question to that less mysterious region. Now, "men are justified," he says, "not on account of faith, but through faith on account of the merits of Christ; or," he adds with fine candor, "on account of faith apprehending the merits of Christ." "The merits of Christ do not justify, unless apprehended by faith." It is difficult to believe that Dr. Jacobs fancies that by this nice employment of words he

escapes from the assertion that the reason why any given man is saved is not that Christ died, but that that man believes; and so the ground of the predestination of this man to be saved is not the merits of Christ, but just (as he has in his definition asserted) the foresight of his faith. Manipulate words as warily as we will, it is not possible to make anything else out of them. The merits of Christ may be the ground why it is to life that any man can be predestinated; but it is his own faith foreseen by God and his perseverance in that faith unto the end which is the proper ground, in this scheme of thought, why any particular man is predestinated to this life. As soon as you make predestination particular, as Dr. Jacobs does, it must rest on what is particular in the individual and not on what is common to all.

We can have no pleasure in fighting over again the old battles between the Lutheran and the Reformed on the basis of Dr. Jacobs' volume. And this the less that Dr. Jacobs' volume does not especially invite strife. Lutheranism is here expressed with firmness. But it is also expressed with dignity and grace. And it is Lutheranism of the better type that is expressed. We rejoice in the clear, strong and constant assertion and defense in this goodly volume of the fundamental elements of our common faith. And we wish, as we expect, for it a wide reading and a great influence among our Lutheran brethren.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

THE CHRISTIAN FAITH PERSONALLY GIVEN IN A SYSTEM OF DOCTRINE. BY OLIN ALFRED CURTIS. Professor of Systematic Theology in the Drew Theological Seminary. New York: Eaton & Mains; Cincinnati: Jennings & Graham. 1905. Pp. 531.

In this volume Prof. Curtis has set forth with considerable speculative ability a system of doctrine which may be classified broadly as Arminian. In the Preface we are told that the main clue to the understanding of the book is to be found in "the junction of the two ideas, personal responsibility and racial solidarity." Prof. Curtis tells us that, instead of being content with one of these ideas, he uses them both in junction, and it is in this junction that he sometimes hopes that there may be a "fair mediation" between Arminianism and Calvinism. We, however, do not regard a mediation between the two either possible or desirable, because in the specific points of difference between these two systems of doctrine, Arminianism is not only unalterably opposed to Calvinism, but represents, in our estimation, a departure from the teaching of Scripture and from the consistent working out of the true relation of man to God. Moreover, it should be remarked that Calvinism does full justice to both the ideas of personal responsibility and racial solidarity. And finally it will be seen that the author's idea of racial solidarity, being a solidarity not in sin but only in inherited tendencies and impulses to which no responsibility or guilt attaches, does not advance beyond the Arminian conception.

Part First is a speculative or philosophical anthropology, the design of which is to show the need of man for Christianity. Part Second, entitled "The Christian Religion," seeks to show how Christianity meets man's needs, and also discusses the questions of the grounds of Christian certitude and of the Scripture. The author then proceeds to set forth his system of doctrine, which is organized around his conception of man's need of redemption. This is discussed in the first doctrinal division. He then proceeds in the five following divisions to set forth the Person and Work of Christ and the *ordo salutis*, which is immediately followed by his discussion of eschatology. Then follows the discussion of "redemption realized in the new race," in which he sets forth his idea of the Church. The volume closes with a division on the "Triune God revealed in redemption." This includes a chapter on the attributes of God and a chapter on the Trinity.

It would require too much space to go into the details of Prof. Curtis' system. We can only notice some of its main features. One of the most important points in the book is its conception of the relation of Christianity to the ethical needs of man. This underlies the whole of Parts One and Two. At this point one of its fundamental difficulties also appears. It is by no means clear at first sight whether the need for Christianity lies in sin or in the nature of man conceived as a moral person. And still further, waiving this question, it is not clear in what way moral responsibility is grounded. The consideration of this latter question will lead naturally to the former. How, then, does Prof. Curtis ground moral responsibility? It is grounded in moral freedom. He says that "moral freedom and moral responsibility are so inextricably connected that neither is possible without the other." This leads us to inquire what is his idea of freedom. Omitting his analysis of what he calls "the process of freedom," which we think too mechanical and one that will not bear the test of psychological analysis and introspection, we come at once to his definition of freedom. "Freedom," he tells us, "inherently considered, is the power to use uncoerced any motive given in self-consciousness." Indeed, as can be seen from the author's discussion, freedom involves plenary ability to act from any motive—the power of contrary choice. And as this is personal freedom, so moral freedom is simply this freedom of the person regarded as moral. Man has first all those individual traits or the "entirety of his native characteristics." For this no man is responsible, "any more than a walrus is responsible for his tusks." Then, secondly, man has his character as a person or his personal moral character, which is made by his choices out of this raw material which characterizes him as an individual. Moral responsibility, therefore, is based on this idea of moral freedom. But from what has been said it will at once appear that freedom and personality are practically correlative terms; and this is asserted to be the case by Prof. Curtis. We are surprised, therefore, to be told that "man cannot become an organic moral person under the moral law," and that "he cannot organize himself about his main intention" (p. 69). This inability is explained by Prof. Curtis to be due to the fact that the motive from which man acts, apart from full Christian knowledge, is fear of the supernatural, and that fear is a disintegrating and not an organizing motive. We shall see presently in what way this leads from morality to the Christian religion. Just now we are concerned to notice that if man must act from the motive of fear, it would appear as if he had lost his moral freedom, according to the author's idea of freedom. And having no real moral freedom man can have no moral responsibility. It would seem, therefore, to follow, since Christianity is to enable man to choose freely between motives under the supreme persuasive influence of love, that man must become a Christian before he is truly free and therefore before he can be morally responsible. Consequently, he would have to become a Christian before he is really a sinner. Of course, Prof. Curtis does not mean to say that man under the moral law apart from Christianity is not a free moral person. Indeed, in the chapter on sin he asks why it is that the *free moral person* (italics are mine) "cannot organize his individual being under his moral ideal" (p. 201). But it should be observed that he has here changed his position somewhat. In the opening chapters, where his ideas of moral freedom and personality are set forth, it would not be permissible to speak of a "free moral person who cannot organize his individual being under his moral ideal," because the "cannot" lies in the compulsion of fear, and where fear is there can be no longer freedom and moral personality. The difficulty here, however, lies not merely in Prof. Curtis' conception, but in the Arminian principles with which he operates. He can only escape this dilemma by a more adequate idea of freedom which will guard man's moral responsibility and also leave room for his total inability. If one places the doctrine of the will at the centre of

his system, holding also that freedom consists in the plenary power of contrary choice, and at the same time tries to do justice to his true Christian feeling (which is borne out by Scripture teaching) that man is unable and is made able only by the power of God—he is bound to get into difficulties. This, however, is only to say that Calvinism is the only system which can be consistently evangelical. Before going on to consider the second of the above-mentioned questions, we may remark in passing that this conception of freedom, personality, and their relation to Christianity conditions also the author's idea of future punishment. He rejects any attempt to regard it as an annihilation or as a state in which men "are crushed into mere thinghood"; and yet it is, he says, "an involuntary service of God," in which men are "below the possibility of self-decision" and are "creatures of fear." It will be seen, therefore, to be a state in which they are no longer moral persons. This idea does not seem to us to accord with the Scripture statements on this subject.

We come to the second question, which is closely related to the one we have just been discussing. Does the need for Christianity lie in sin or in the nature of man as a moral person? We can now answer this briefly. Why is it that man cannot become a complete moral person apart from Christianity? The answer that it is due to inherited depravity, Prof. Curtis tells us, contains some truth, but "the truth only lies on the surface" and "does not expose the deep root of the failure." Neither does it lie in man's finitude. The "flaw" of moral personality, Prof. Curtis says, lies in "the accretion of imperfect motive"; i.e., our original motive may be pure, but we cannot keep it so because we cannot sustain a sufficiently keen realization of our moral selfhood and of all the issues involved. Hence, "man cannot organize himself about his main intention." But why can he not sustain his "self-grasp"? Prof. Curtis says it is because fear of the supernatural is man's dominant motive, and fear is a "disintegrating" and not an "organizing" motive. The only motive which is truly "organizing" is love, which comes in response to the Christian revelation of God and the influence of the Holy Spirit. When we ask, however, whether this condition of man is natural to man as created or due to sin, the author tells us that it is due to sin which has brought as its punishment banishment from God's presence, which in turn has resulted in a "disorganization" of the individual and the race. This "disorganization" is defined by Prof. Curtis to be a nonconformity to God's law, which nonconformity is inherited, and involves no responsibility or guilt either on the part of the individual or the race. Only when it results in deliberate acts does it involve moral responsibility. Thus there is no guilt resulting from any immediate imputation, nor does the inherited depravity in the individual and the race involve guilt. Moreover, as we have seen, according to the author's idea of freedom, it is difficult to see how any guilt can really attach to the individual. It would seem, therefore, that Christianity comes to help man out of a condition for which he is in no way responsible. Accordingly, it would seem to follow that God owed the world Christianity, and that it is no longer, as Paul said, by grace that we are saved. But here again the difficulty is not peculiar to Prof. Curtis' idea: it is involved in the underlying Arminian principles. Moreover, the idea that man is born depraved and not guilty is about as difficult to reconcile with Divine Justice as that of Placcæus, viz., that man is born depraved and therefore guilty, since this innate depravity, according to Prof. Curtis, though it involves no guilt, nevertheless, necessarily drives man to sinful acts which render him guilty. The unanswerable criticism directed mainly against the doctrine of Placcæus in the *Formula Consensus Helvetica* (vid. Karl Müller, *Die Bekenntnisschriften der reformirten Kirche*, p. 865) bears also against Prof. Curtis' doctrine.

We have already touched sufficiently upon the author's idea of sin in consider-

ing the general question of the relation of Christianity to man's ethical needs. We pass on to his conception of the redemptive work of Christ, or his doctrine of the Atonement. This point is of some special interest, since the reviewer of the book in the *Methodist Quarterly Review*, January, 1906, hails Prof. Curtis' doctrine as transcending the Governmental theory not only as represented by Grotius, but also as improved by Dr. Miley, and the author makes the same claim. Prof. Curtis tells us that the Satisfaction theory was wrong in conceiving the necessity for the Atonement as "automatic," by reason of its idea of penalty as an end in itself—i.e., in supposing that God because of His Justice must punish sin, and in holding that the work of Christ is a satisfaction of God's Justice, and not of His Holiness. The Governmental theory, he says, is mistaken in its underlying utilitarianism and in holding that the necessity for the Atonement lies merely in the requirements of God's moral government, and not ontologically in the Divine nature. Prof. Curtis claims to have transcended both these theories as well as the Moral Influence theory. He has purged the Governmental theory of its utilitarian ethical basis, and has made the moral law "reach into the structure of the Divine nature," and so has grounded an absolute instead of a relative necessity for the Atonement. He claims to have improved upon the Satisfaction theory in holding that the Atonement is not related to God's Justice but to His Holiness, and in showing that penalty is not an end in itself, but an element in God's "movement toward a goal," the goal of a redeemed race. Briefly put, what Prof. Curtis means is that the Divine Holiness, which he conceives of as holy love, leads God to determine upon a new race. But God is so holy that He cannot receive men again into fellowship with Himself without showing His intense hatred of sin. The death of Christ, therefore, does not relate to God's retributive righteousness, but expresses His "moral concern," and shows that "God cares tremendously about sin." This, of course, is just the language and ideas of the Governmental theory. It differs from the theory as originated by Grotius in holding that this exhibition of God's hatred of sin is not so much in order to deter men from sinning and so safeguard the interests of God's moral government, as it is just because God's Holiness makes it necessary for Him thus to express His "moral concern" about sin while He is saving the new race. But this does not transcend the main ideas of the Governmental theory, unless we are to limit it to its utilitarian form, which seems to us an arbitrary limitation. Its main features are its opposition to the idea that Christ actually bore the penalty of sin, and to the idea that He died to satisfy God's retributive righteousness, and its affirmation that in Christ's death the Divine hatred of sin is set forth. These ideas are shared by Prof. Curtis with the older Governmental theory. Neither is the theory of Prof. Curtis new. Thus, to take an example from a recent Arminian work, Dr. Henry Sheldon, in his *System of Christian Doctrine* (pp. 360–411, especially pp. 402ff.), in discussing the Atonement sets forth ideas not unlike those of our author. The theory of Prof. Curtis may be called, to borrow a phrase of the late Prof. Stevens in his *Christian Doctrine of Salvation* (p. 199), "Ethicised Governmentalism." The main question, however, is not where the theory belongs, but whether it is true. We have not space to discuss this question, but can only say that while like all theories of the Atonement it expresses some truth, it falls short of the full truth and the important truth as to the meaning of Christ's death, which we believe is expressed by the Satisfaction doctrine. Moreover, it has, we think, actually fallen into error in its assertion that the Atonement is related to God's holiness exclusively, and not to His righteousness; in its arbitrary rendering of *δικαιοσύνη* in the Epistle to the Romans as holiness, and not righteousness; in its arbitrary definition of the holiness of God; and in its neglect of the Scripture ideas of guilt and expiation. As regards his conception of the efficacy of the Atonement also, Prof. Curtis, in accordance with the principles of the Governmental theory, conceives it as simply removing obstacles in God's way to saving

men, rather than in actually saving those for whom it was made. In this point also we cannot but regard it as defective.

The limits of this notice will not permit us to go any further into the author's discussion of special doctrines. We should like to indicate how in the chapter on the Incarnation, while dissenting from the modern conception of kenosis and while asserting that "after He (Christ) had become man, He had every divine capacity, every divine power, every divine attribute," Prof. Curtis, nevertheless, continually drops into modes of statement which imply the kenotic theory. Thus, for example, he says that Christ did not have these divine attributes in His self-consciousness, and that He laid aside the "personal experience" of God. So again, he tells us that Jesus during His earthly life was omniscient, but that this does not mean that "the attribute of omniscience was a plunge in self-consciousness all through the period of humiliation." This is simply the language of kenoticism. Of course, there was but one self; but if we say that there was but one consciousness of that self, and that a limited one, then we are using precisely the language and ideas of the kenotic theory. We should like also to point out how, in his essentially Arminian conception of the "*ordo salutis*," Prof. Curtis seems to posit an ability of depraved man to go out to meet divine grace and begin the process of his salvation, when once he has been merely mentally informed of God's love, which ability scarcely is allowed to man in the opening chapters of the book. We should like to show how he denies a future probation in the case of adults, and affirms what practically amounts to the same thing in the case of infants dying in infancy, because he cannot hold with Wesleyan Arminianism that infants are born saved. Moreover, since this future probation of infants is sure to issue favorably, it will be seen that the author posits a divine partiality in favor of all dying in infancy, thus allowing a discrimination in the sphere of providence which he repudiates in the sphere of grace. All these difficulties, however, are simply the results of the Arminian principles and are inherent in the system. It is not at all to be inferred that Prof. Curtis' book is peculiarly inconsistent. It would also be interesting to see how his acceptance of Prof. Bowne's idea of nature and matter affects his idea of the supernatural and the identity of the resurrection body.

If, however, we were merely trying to enumerate our points of dissent from Prof. Curtis, we should have to mention his idea of Inspiration, and in fact very many other matters. We prefer, however, to close this notice by calling attention to what we conceive to be the chief merit of the volume. We refer to the statements which Prof. Curtis makes upon the value of Systematic Theology (pp. 183, 184). He says, first of all, that a systematic view of Christianity has apologetic value, and quotes with approval the statement of Dr. W. F. Warren that "an adequate system of doctrine is the only adequate Christian apologetics." Certainly, we should say, it is at least the most adequate Christian apologetics. But not only is this statement of Prof. Curtis of great importance; we wish still further to note with emphatic commendation the caution which he adds; viz., that "systematic theology should never be an intentional apology." "There ought not," continues Prof. Curtis, "to be in it even the tiniest trace of mediation tactics." This we regard as a message to systematic theologians very vital and very much needed. The attempt of too much of the current apologetics is to defend an apologetic minimum, and so we find also too many systematic theologians with their eyes continually upon the apologetes, and setting forth a system of doctrine with the purpose that it shall be easy to defend. We wish to give unstinted praise to Prof. Curtis, not only for stating this truth, but also because he has carried it out consistently throughout his book. He has not written with the fear of any man or school before his eyes, and it is largely because of this that his book is interesting and stimulating. And then once more he tells

us that systematic theology has a biblical value, and "is almost as necessary to any comprehensive biblical theology as biblical theology is necessary to any worthy systematic theology." Here is a word which the biblical theologians may well heed. We do not mean that exegesis should forsake the historico-grammatical method and become dogmatic. We do not mean that biblical theology is not strictly an exegetical discipline. We do not mean that systematic theology is not an inductive science, based chiefly upon the product of biblical theology. But we do mean that too much biblical theology apparently is chiefly concerned with pointing out the differences of view between the different Scripture writers, and often exaggerating these into contradictions, missing often the underlying unity, and all because they lack a unified and systematic grasp of all the parts of divine truth in their relation, and because they have inadequate views of the nature and progress of special revelation. To have a point of view, provided it be the Scriptural one, can only be of help to the biblical theologian. Finally, the author says that systematic theology has "a practical value in balancing and steadying the Christian life." He says that "a Christian experience which is nourished by isolated, unrelated doctrine is likely to lose all balance, and to become an exceedingly unwholesome thing." In days when men are proclaiming that theology is killing religion, we welcome these sane words of Prof. Curtis. His book is worthy of a place among the representative works of contemporary Arminianism.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

V.—PRACTICAL THEOLOGY.

THE BOOK OF COMMON WORSHIP. Published by Authority of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, for Voluntary Use in the Churches. Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath School Work. 1906. 263 pages. The Riverside Press.

This is an admirable achievement in liturgical composition. The volume is of convenient size, carefully printed and pleasing in its appearance. The change on the title-page, necessitated by the action of the General Assembly, is no reflection upon the excellent character of this Book of Forms. The Committee appointed by the Assembly was one of peculiar ability; its work was undertaken with the utmost faithfulness and devotion; and its accomplishment is quite worthy of the distinguished names by which the report was signed. The action of the Assembly was specifically this: To remove from the title-page of the Book of Forms the words, "Published by Authority of the General Assembly," and to substitute the words, "Prepared by a Committee of the General Assembly, for Voluntary Use in the Churches." This action was designed merely to emphasize the fact that the Book was intended for optional use, and not to be accepted as a compulsory liturgy adopted by the Presbyterian Church. This matter of absolute liberty in connection with this Book of Worship cannot be too strongly accentuated, nor can it be better expressed than in the words of the Committee in one of its previous reports: "Of course, the whole matter is optional, there is no compulsion or restriction; on the title-page of any book to be prepared there must stand (in our judgment) the words, 'For Voluntary Use in Presbyterian Churches'; but over and above this general rubric, we feel that there is need of considerable opportunity for variations, in different congregations and on particular occasions, in any form of service which is to be generally acceptable; and this liberty should be expressed, where it is possible, within the service itself. Unity in the broad outline of the common worship; agreement upon certain

simple and universal elements of the service, like the Psalter and the Lord's Prayer and the Creed, which are already part of the standards of our Church; liberty within the broad outline to vary the use of certain forms, the place of certain hymns, the time of the offering and so on; order without monotony, variety without confusion—these are the features that we have sought to bring into our work, in the hope of preparing a book which might really help the people to join in the services."

However this liberty may be exercised, or whatever use may be made of this "Book of Common Worship," there is no question that the Committee has performed most creditably the task which was assigned, namely, "To prepare a Book of Simple Forms of Service which shall be proper and helpful for voluntary use in the churches, which shall be in harmony with the Directory for Worship, which shall be drawn from the Holy Scriptures and the usage of the Reformed Churches, and which shall embody sound doctrine, and keep ever in mind the end of Presbyterian worship, which is, that all the people should join in the worship of God."

While the book is brief and its forms concise, the scope of the work and its possible usefulness are wider than many had expected. It includes not only "Orders of Morning and Evening Service" but also a "Brief Order of Worship," "intended for the use of any company of Christians gathered together to worship God, where there are no regular church ordinances or where a minister of the Gospel is not present." Then follows an arrangement of the Commandments, and another of the Beatitudes, each of which may be used as a separate service or introduced as part of the Morning or Evening Service. In addition to the Orders for the "Celebration of the Communion" and for the "Administration of Baptism," the "Solemnization of Marriage" and the "Burial of the Dead," there are also Orders for the "Confirmation of Baptismal Vows," the "Reception of Communicants from Other Churches," "The Licensing of Candidates to Preach the Gospel," "The Ordination of Ministers," the "Installation of a Pastor," the "Ordination and Installation of Elders and Deacons," "Laying the Cornerstone of a Church," "The Dedication of a Church." Then follows a "Treasury of Prayers," The Psalter—which corresponds to that printed in the Hymnal, with the addition of two sections for Good Friday—and, last of all, thirteen "ancient hymns and canticles." In the preparation of these Forms, the Committee evidently made a scholarly and discriminating review of an extended collection of liturgical matter. How wide the view and how varied the sources may be suggested, for instance, by the mention of a few names and liturgies which have lent their riches to the "Treasury of Prayers": "Thomas à Kempis," "Thomas Arnold," "Erasmus," "Matthew Henry," "John Calvin," "Jeremy Taylor," "St. Augustine," "Pusey," "Robert Louis Stevenson," "John Knox," "Dutch Reformed," "Dionysius," "Coptic," "Scottish Church, Common Order," "Old English," "Gregorian," "Dutch Reformed," "The Book of Common Prayer."

It is most evident therefore that only the uninformed could have passed the careless criticism upon this Book of Common Worship, that it is an emendation of some existing Prayer Book. Such a view has been suggested in reference to the "Order for the Solemnization of Marriage"; yet this is a special instance of the independent action of the Committee, which declared its method in this case to be, not an attempt to alter the marriage service of the "Protestant Episcopal Book of Common Prayer," but to combine and arrange the material offered by the "Westminster Directory" and our own "Directory for Worship" for a complete, dignified, beautiful and truthful marriage service.

It would be puerile and useless to repeat captious criticisms or to suggest personal preferences, in reviewing a book in which qualified experts have given

the conclusions which have been matured during years of careful research, comparison and emendation; yet it may be of interest to suggest some of the minor points upon which a difference of opinion appears to exist:

1. In the "Order of Morning Service," some would prefer to have a hymn follow the "General Prayer," and precede the "Announcements" and the "Offering." The published order evidently aims to emphasize the offering as an act of worship; but it is often found that the announcements follow the prayer with unpleasant abruptness, and it might possibly have been well had the Committee retained the rubric published in this connection in the report of 1905: "If it be more convenient in any church, this singing may precede the offering." Then, too, some consider it difficult to introduce the sentences, spoken by the minister and congregation responsively, before reading the Psalter in the Morning Service: "Now, bless the Lord our God" and "Praise His glorious Name," etc. The same has been suggested in reference to similar sentences in the Communion Service, after the Prayer of Consecration.

2. Some object to the too frequent introduction of the Lord's Prayer, and its use at the close of the Evening Service, as being a possible approach to formalism in the public service.

3. In the rubric for the "Communion Service," there are many who would prefer to designate this "The Order for the *Administration* of the Communion," instead of calling it "The Order for the *Celebration* of the Communion." It is true that the verb "celebrate" appears in the text of our "Directory for Worship," but it somewhat suggests a "celebrant" and other ritualistic implications, and it might possibly be well to use the word employed in connection with the two Orders for Baptism, and which appears in the rubric of The Book of Common Prayer; namely, "The Administration of the Lord's Supper."

4. In the "Order for the Administration of Baptism to Infants," there may be some force in the objection that it will be difficult to introduce the brief prayer which follows the questions to the parents, and is again followed by the additional question, "What is the name of this child?" It may be that this brief petition, the effect of which is contained in the closing prayer, might be incorporated with the latter.

5. "The Order for the Burial of the Dead" is criticised by some for its unnecessary cheerlessness and gloom, especially in its opening portion, where the Order of the Protestant Episcopal Church is followed in employing Psalms XXXIX and XC. The appropriateness of these Psalms, particularly of Psalm XC, will probably ever remain an open question. It is endeared to our hearts by its opening and closing verses, and by long familiarity at funeral services; yet little comfort is brought to the stricken heart by words like these: "We are consumed by Thine anger, and by Thy wrath we are troubled. All our days are passed away in Thy wrath. . . . Who knoweth the power of Thine anger? Even according to Thy fear, so is Thy wrath." To many this prayer of Moses reflects the experience of the generation of Israel which was doomed to die in the wilderness, but hardly seems to express the ideal experience of the followers of Christ. The use of these Psalms is conventional rather than Christian. It is thought that passages such as the following are a truer expression of a Christian view of death: "For me, to live is Christ, and to die is gain; for I am in a straight betwixt two, having a desire to depart and to be with Christ which is far better." "Though our outward man perish, yet the inward man is renewed day by day; our light affliction which is for a moment, worketh for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory; while we look not at the things which are seen but at the things which are not seen, for the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal. We are always confident knowing that while we are at home in the body we are absent from the Lord; we are confident and willing

rather to be absent from the body and to be present with the Lord." "I am ready now to be offered, and the time of my departure is at hand. I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith; henceforth there is laid up for me a crown of righteousness which the Lord, the righteous Judge, shall give me at that day; and not to me only, but unto all them that love His appearing."

These and other similar quotations find no place in this particular "Order," and some feel that they might be more comforting than the Psalms which are conventionally employed. Then, too, when we find in the "Order for the Dedication of a Church" that the entire hymn is introduced, "All People that on Earth do Dwell," the suggestion may be of value that it might be well to have bound up in this Book of Common Worship certain other favorite hymns of the Church, which could be used on special occasions, as, for instance, in this very "Order for the Burial of the Dead." It would be helpful to introduce, at the discretion of the minister, one or more of the following: "Abide with Me," "Asleep in Jesus," "Rock of Ages," "Lead, Kindly Light," "Crossing the Bar," etc.

Possibly all these suggestions may be sufficiently met by referring to what has already been stated in reference to the liberty which this book is understood to allow. The Committee expressly declares that the phrase "Voluntary Use" is to be applied, not only to the book as a whole, but to each "Order" and to its separate parts. This enables the officiating minister to omit whatever may seem less felicitous, and to introduce whatever may correspond more perfectly to his own taste.

In reference to the special "Orders" which have been introduced, it may be remarked that the brief "Order of Worship," intended for the use of any company of Christians, has met with a most cordial response, and will undoubtedly be of great service to the Church at large. The same can be said of the necessary and appropriate Orders for "The Licensing of Candidates," for the "Ordination and Installation of Pastors, Elders and Deacons." "The Treasury of Prayers," as the Preface of the book modestly suggests, will be "not only useful from time to time in the conduct of public services, but also profitable for reading and study, for use in private devotions, and in that revival of family worship which is greatly needed in all our churches."

The book as a whole exhibits the most painstaking carefulness and thoughtful workmanship. Its selections are well chosen, its suggestions practical; its language, sometimes lacking in vividness, is ever dignified and devotional; its doctrinal implications are in full accord with the standards of the Church, and the completed work is to be regarded as an accomplishment deserving the grateful recognition of our Communion and the respect of the Christian world.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

THE EVANGEL OF THE NEW THEOLOGY. By T. RHONDA WILLIAMS, Minister of Greenfield Congregational Church, Bradford. New York City: Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons. 266 pages. Price, \$1.50 net.

The author manifests evident sincerity, a deep moral earnestness, and a true yearning for better things, for the individual, for society and for the world. In his first sermon, "Seeking and Finding in Religion," he makes a plea for more generous treatment of those who have not "found" but are still "seekers"; and one feels inclined to afford the adherents of "The New Theology," as represented in this volume, the very widest sympathy; for, judged by the New Testament revelation, however sincerely they may be "seeking," they have evidently much to "find." The writer denies the authority of Scripture, repudiates the doctrine of the Atonement, with that of the deity of Christ, and assumes the familiar posi-

tions of the Universalist and the Unitarian. Yet a "Unitarian" he refuses to be called. Unitarianism suggests too much of conservatism and traditional orthodoxy. The "Old Unitarians" were too much inclined to believe the Bible.

It is to establish the independence of "The New Theology" that the author devotes the second and third sermons of his series. He entitles them "The New Theology and Unitarianism." He endeavors to show that "The New Theology" is "not a going over to Unitarianism," but rather that the true Unitarians of to-day have gone over to the position of "The New Theology." He insists that the Unitarians have not always denied "the inspiration of the Bible, miracles, the miraculous birth and resurrection of Jesus." By convincing citations, he makes it evident that the "Old Unitarianism" accepted the Bible as the authoritative Word of God. The difference between the Unitarians and the Trinitarians was simply as to what each believed the Scriptures taught; what the Scriptures taught each was willing to believe. "The New Theology," however, according to the writer, disclaims all obligation to believe the Scriptures; and to the honor of this advanced position the Unitarians have no rightful claim. It is "The New Theology" which has given to the world the true conception of religion. In its light the terms "Unitarian" and "Trinitarian" are both antiquated. How can there be any discussion as to the divinity of Jesus, when "divinity is of the very essence of humanity"? And this later discovery "is the gist of the New Theology," and is due, not to the influence of Unitarianism, but to philosophy, science and higher criticism. These latter have given us a new conception of the universe, from which we have reached a new theology. "The leading names in philosophy, in science and in criticism have not belonged to the Unitarians": why then should the "New Theology" be called "Unitarianism?"

To the average reader it may be of little concern what the "New Theology" is called. It is probably of more interest to know what the New Theology says of the Bible. This is clearly declared in the fourth sermon, "The Bible and Babylon." We are told that "the Bible is not a direct revelation of God." "The ethical and religious" value of the Book is quite the same, even when its historical character has been disproven. "The Bible is not revelation; *goodness is revelation*. The one reason for regarding Jesus as the Son of God is that He was so good. *Goodness is revelation*." The latter phrase, whatever it may mean, is repeated four times and emphasized in three varieties of type in this immediate connection, and seems to summarize the doctrine of holy Scripture as taught by the "New Theology."

The fifth sermon, entitled "The Christian Consciousness," seems to involve in its discussion a logical fallacy. The Trinitarian is asked to admit that "in the content of his own experience he cannot distinguish between the operation of God and of Jesus." From this admission the writer denies the possibility of "present communion with the living Christ"; but if he is meeting a Trinitarian on his own ground he must admit that the living Christ is divine, and that communion with the Father is also communion with His Son, Jesus Christ. The writer, however, concludes that the origin of "The Christian Movement" is to be largely traced to Jesus; and yet He is only one of many forces which have resulted in a "Christian consciousness," which is in reality the experience of believing that "God is our loving Father."

The sixth sermon is on "The Sense of Sin." It warns the pulpit against utterances which suggest that "the heart is desperately wicked." The preacher should remember "that many are very good, and that there is some goodness in all." It is a question in the minds of some whether the pulpit of the present day is to be charged with unduly emphasizing sin, either as a fact or a doctrine.

However, the writer is correct in stating that there is too much "urging of an

artificial doctrine of sin," he is also right in suggesting as a remedy that it is not so much "a general doctrine of sin we want as specific dealing with the specific sin." It is, however, a characteristic suggestion of the "New Theology" which urges upon all men the following rule: "Instead of trying to believe that you are a lost sinner, try to realize that you are a child of God."

"What is Christian Discipleship?" is the question with which we are next addressed; and we are brought face to face, by way of answer, with the familiar platitude that Christianity is not essentially a matter of outward confession, but of inner life. This can hardly be called a discovery of "The New Theology"; but the latter seems continually oblivious of the fact that life depends upon faith. The writer makes a plea for admission to the Church of all who hold the ideal of unselfishness and purity. "If you join, I do not ask you for the articles of your creed: I ask you whether you want to be good, and to do good." This may seem to some to be Christianity reduced to its simplest form, possibly to its vanishing point. "Christian Discipleship" is, however, declared to be much more than these words might suggest. It is understood to contain all that is implied in the following suggestive phrases: "Entering with Jesus into the consciousness of the divine Fatherhood," "Sharing with Jesus the assurance of divine help," "Working with Jesus for the salvation of man," "Taking sides with Jesus against selfishness and impurity," "Losing the life of personal aggrandizement and selfish personal advantage, the life of grasping all for self, in the larger life of world service," and so "finding salvation in love."

"Does Evolution account for Jesus?" Not altogether, according to the writer. He was in large measure a product of His times, yet as it is "a fact" "that we cannot give a full account of any man," is it any wonder that we cannot give a full account of great men? "If therefore Matthew Arnold cannot give a full account of Shakespeare, and if in pre-Christian times men could not give an account of Plato, or of Buddha, much less should we be expected to be able to give a full account of Jesus, who stands chief in goodness and in self-sacrifice." Such seems to be the argument of the author.

The Christian Mission which we need is declared, in the next sermon, to be one which will result first of all in an increasing sincerity among ministers, who should faithfully investigate the discoveries of modern science and criticism. "The next revival of religion in England must be born in ministers' studies"; but further, "If the Church is to mission the world it must include in its Gospel some message on what is known as social questions." The Church, and especially the ministers of the Church, are not to confine their efforts to individual conversion, but must realize the larger needs of society, and must treat "socialized evils."

"Is God in Hell?" The writer suggests that He is. "Sin does not separate Man from God; God is in the Hell which sin makes." The writer does not refer simply to a "mediaeval hell," but teaches that God lives everywhere, in the evil and in the good. "Hells, here and hereafter, serve the cause of redemption—work toward the restitution of all things until God is all in all." If the writer merely meant to suggest God's love for even the worst of sinners, he would probably carry more conviction, and one could accept in their true meaning the closing words of the sermon: "God loves us; keep yourselves in the love of God."

In "The Relation of Heresy to Progress" the writer assumes as a fundamental proposition that "the Bible gives no rule of faith; it kindles faith but does not rule it. The Bible gives faith food, but no final form." We must therefore be expecting continual changes in the substance of our belief. "Our advantage is not in finding only, but in seeking also; to reach the goal would be death, but to be forever reaching unto what never can be fully reached—that is eternal life."

"I would define Pentecost so: the consciousness of the divine invasion." Thus the writer declares in his sermon on "Fear in the real Pentecost." The

sermon suggests that when the inmost shrine is "lit by the sacred Presence," "the sense of the deeper mystery of existence," "the incoming of a new Spirit of life," the realization of new relations, the recognition of a new standard of life, all cause a sense of fear; yet fear will result in gladness, in power and in faith.

The sermon on "The Meaning and Use of the Apocalypse" is mainly an attempt to show that the Book of Daniel was a pious forgery, but is an example of many similar books, which have as their aim the encouragement of men by a prophecy of ideal and imaginary good. These writings are "not to be taken too seriously," according to this author. "The Apocalypse sketches the future; things will *not work out according to the sketch*; but the sketch was made from confidence in principles which are true, though with imperfect knowledge as to how the principles would work out. The proper function of Apocalypse is to give you ideals and inspirations." This principle is applied to the Book of Daniel and also to the Revelation of St. John.

"The Messages to the Churches" contain helpful and practical suggestions of abiding principles in present day life. They suggest the necessity of continual struggles against low ideals; but also the possibility of conquest. "Through the struggle in every case the soul may come to victory."

"The Unclean Man before God" is a familiar endeavor to secure peace of conscience and moral cleansing aside altogether from the Name and precious Blood and the power of Jesus Christ. The whole suggestion of the sermon is moral resolution and a dependence on the good nature of God, by whom "the saving processes will be effective somehow, somewhere, and some time."

In treating of "The Communion Service" the author declares that it was not established by Jesus. "He did not command the observance of this ordinance." To establish this proposition the author makes use of one of the more familiar problems of textual criticism in connection with the account in the Gospel narrative; and in treating of St. Paul's explicit words, that "he had received this ordinance of the Lord," the writer declares that "he probably meant that this was his conviction as to what was right to do, and all right thought we believe comes from God." The Communion, of course, in the mind of this writer, has no reference to sacrifice, nor atonement, nor the remission of sins, nor the death of Christ; it is used simply to denote Christian fellowship. "By discerning the Lord's Body" is meant "discerning the unity of the Church—the society. The Church is Christ's body."

"Doing all in the Name of the Lord Jesus" is a phrase which must be carefully guarded against the alleged false dogmas of the necessary intercession of Christ, and also against the propriety of ascribing to Christ all the glory for worthy deeds. Christ did win a place of pre-eminence in spiritual religion, yet many others hold a similar place and should not be denied the praise they deserve. "If we protest against slavery anywhere, we do so not only in the name of Jesus, but also of Lincoln and Wilberforce and others. On the throne of victory over the slave trade, Lincoln and Wilberforce and others are sitting with Jesus, and if we condemn slavery anywhere to-day, we do it in all their names."

"The Song of the Well" and "The Value of Trouble for a Door of Hope" both contain helpful, moral suggestions. The first in suggesting the need of personal activity, of reflective thought, and a heart of love if we would attain to the truest springs of life. The second suggests to us the good that is often brought out of evil, and the door of hope which can be found in many experiences of darkness.

The last of these sermons will strike most readers as the most surprising of all. It has as its title this question, "Can We Hope to Unify the Religious World?" By the "religious world" the writer does not refer to merely the Christian world, but also to Mohammedanism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Brahminism. "The

attempt to give Buddhists, Mohammedans and Confucians the dogmas of our Western Christianity is a hopeless one; unification will not come along these lines; Christian dogmas must be abandoned. We should not aim at getting the Hindoo to change his dogmas for our dogmas, but to feel the spiritual power of higher ideals of life." In accomplishing this desired aim, the writer declares that higher criticism is the indispensable condition; for it "shows us that the Bible is not an infallible authority, it will show the Mohammedan and the Hindoo the same regarding their Bibles, and then the field will be clearer for drawing together." It is evident to the reader how simple the matter of unifying the religious world becomes when higher criticism has abolished the Bible and all other barriers to the manifestation of a spirit of tolerance. This spirit the writer designates "The Jesus Spirit."

Such, in brief, is the substance of these twenty sermons. It is possible that the American adherents of "The New Theology" may not be willing to accept all that they contain, nor to allow their own positions to be thus interpreted; and these discourses may serve as a salutary warning to some of our younger theologians, who are not altogether conscious of the results which will inevitably be reached by those who accept the general postulates of the "New Theology." These sermons give little ground for the claim of "progress"; they seem rather to indicate a relapse into a form of pagan philosophy, with which is united something of the borrowed morality of Christianity. "Evangel" they have none.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

THE EMPHASIZED BIBLE. By JOSEPH BRYANT ROTHERHAM. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. Four volumes. 920 pages. Royal 8vo. Price per volume, \$2.00 net.

These four volumes form a unique and invaluable addition to our modern equipment for Bible study. It is impossible to imagine how more light could be thrown upon Scripture in a work of briefer compass. Each page is a striking example of *multum in parvo*. The simple devices of printing offer suggestions on a single page which it would require a commentary to express, while the translation enables those who are not acquainted with the Hebrew and the Greek to understand the force of the original text. It is those who are best acquainted with these languages who are loudest in their praise of this admirable work. All classes of Bible students and readers will find in these volumes a scholarly and helpful interpretation of the Scriptures.

It is fully thirty-four years since the appearance of Rotherham's *Emphasized New Testament*. It originally appeared in 1872, under the title, *The New Testament Newly Translated and Critically Emphasized*. It was revised in 1878, but in 1897 a third edition appeared which was practically a new work. The Greek text employed was that of Drs. Westcott and Hort, instead of the former text of Dr. Tregelles. The emphasis was indicated by a more agreeable and effective method. References were increased in number; quotations from the Old Testament were indicated by italics. The notes were enlarged and gathered into an appendix; while the translation was so printed as to assist in an immediate comprehension of the structure of sentences and paragraphs, and thus to a rapid and accurate understanding of the text.

The three volumes of the Old Testament have appeared more recently, and fully merit an appreciative mention and review. The aim of the work as thus completed is best indicated by the title-page of the volumes, which is as follows:

"*The Emphasized Bible*. A New Translation. Designed to set forth the exact meaning, the proper terminology and the graphic style of the sacred originals; arranged to show at a glance narrative, speech, parallelism and logical analysis, also to enable the student readily to distinguish the several divine

names; and emphasized throughout after the idioms of the Hebrew and Greek tongues, with expository introduction, select references and appendices of notes."

It seems inevitable that prejudice and antagonism should be aroused by every appearance of a "New Translation of the Bible." We are all familiar with the opposition which has in all the centuries been offered to even a "New Revision." In the case of this work, however, the author at once wins our favor and confidence by certain phrases in his Introduction, by which he suggests to us that he is not offering a competitive translation but a companion version, and that it is not specially designed for public or social use, but rather as an aid to the reader in his study or in his private devotions. Every intelligent student of the Bible recognizes at once the value of any faithful and scholarly translation. It always serves as an illuminating commentary upon the version with which one is most familiar. This translation has been characterized as being peculiarly "vivid," "accurate" and "forceful." It brings out clearly the meaning of many obscure and difficult passages, and often with remarkable suggestiveness and strength. It throws fresh light upon old and familiar phrases. Its doctrinal implications are thoroughly evangelical, and its language is always dignified and clear.

The first volume contains an Introduction which is peculiarly interesting and instructive, and explains at once the methods by which the writer carries out the design which the title-page sets forth. From this Introduction we take the following suggestions:

1. The size of the page ($6\frac{1}{2}$ x 10 inches) is intended to bring into one view connected portions of Scripture, the parts of which can be more easily grasped and remembered when seen in their relation to each other and to the whole, than when extended over several smaller pages.

2. The varying indentations of the lines have been employed to serve several important purposes:

a. They mark the transition, in the text, from *narrative* to *speech*, as well as the existence of speech within speech.

b. More important still, they call attention to the existence of *poetic parallelism*. With this feature of Hebrew poetry all are familiar. It is "the beautiful measured reduplication of thought whereby the same sentiment, or fact, or promise is doubly expressed, the second time with a difference, while still within the general scope of the first; the variation serving not only to cluster together beauties of speech, but to fix the general scope and outlook of the couplet, the one line hinting the limit to which the other may be assumed to submit, or defining the subject to which it also relates." This parallelism is suggested by the printers of the Revised Version; but the *Emphasized Bible* draws attention also to what may be described as "semi-parallelism," which is indicated by responding extra capitals as in the following:

"I am sated With ascending-offerings of rams
And the fat of fed beasts."

Or, when space requires it, by an extra line as in the following:

"And they shall call thee—
The city of Yahweh,
The Zion of the Holy One of Israel."

There is another form of parallelism which Dr. Moulton has called the "envelope" arrangement of lines. In it the first line is responded to by the fourth, and the second by the third, as in the following example:

"Let me see thy form,
 Let me hear thy voice,
 For thy voice is sweet
 And thy form comely."

A most interesting example is found in Isa. ix. 3, where the critical revision and correction which Dr. Ginsburg has given to the original text is strongly confirmed by the fact that thereby is produced this special and beautiful form of parallelism:

"Thou hast increased the exultation,
 Thou hast made great the joy,—
 They joy before thee according to the joy of harvest,
 As men exult when they distribute spoil."

c. The indentations of the lines also present the results of *logical analysis*. This is specially illustrated in the case of the Pauline Epistles. The parentheses and digressions which strikingly characterize the writings of the Apostle Paul are clearly indicated, and by the same method passages in the prophets are made peculiarly intelligible and clear. The principal statements are so printed that the lines begin with the margin on the left, but the subordinate statements are expressed in lines which are indented; thus by glancing down the margin one sees at a glance the leading thoughts and their logical sequence and connection.

3. Three varieties of type have been used, sparingly but effectively. In the original edition of the *Emphasized New Testament* the black letter type was used for emphasis, but its too frequent use was obviously objectionable. In this completed Bible emphasis is not thus indicated, but instead simple devices have been substituted to indicate the emphatic words and phrases. These devices are especially the double bar and the bracket; but *italic* type is used to indicate the refrains in the Old Testament, and also the quotations from the Old Testament which appear in the New. In the matter of these refrains, most readers are familiar with those which abound in the Psalms, and it is pleasing to find these refrains made so prominent in this favorite Book; but the presence of "refrains" in the early chapters of Isaiah will surprise some readers, while the existence of them in the prophecies of Jeremiah will astonish still more. The most beautiful of the latter may however be familiar, as it occurs four times in the course of the prophecy. It is this melodious couplet:

"The voice of joy and the voice of gladness;
 The voice of the Bridegroom and the voice of the Bride."

As to the *quotations* from the Old Testament, all readers have been pleased to find that they are clearly indicated by the printers of the Revised Version. In the *Emphasized New Testament* they are reproduced in *italics*, and it is interesting and surprising to see how numerous they are, and how large a part of the Book of Revelation, for instance, is constructed out of Old Testament language and imagery. The only other use of special type is in the case of the Divine names. The Hebrew "Elohim" is printed in ordinary type, but the Hebrew "El" is printed "God" (one capital and two small capitals), and the Hebrew "Eloah," which appears principally in the Book of Job, is indicated by the word "God," printed in *Old English* letters. These discriminations are not regarded as of supreme importance, but they are invested with interest to all Bible students, and by this difference of type are made evident to the eye.

4. Attention should be called to the *Analyses* of the Books of the Bible, which are inserted so as to break the text into frequent paragraphs. To this method there is always some objection, yet most readers realize that when such analysis is carefully done, it is of invaluable help in understanding the content of Scripture.

5. The *footnotes* are remarkable. They are surprisingly brief, but full of suggestion, and contain much information which has not appeared in any previous translation of the Bible. They comprise "alternative renderings," some of which are so admirable as to make one wish that they had been incorporated in the translation. They further contain references to other sections of Scripture which are intentionally few in number, and come from the author's personal study, and are believed to be specially trustworthy and useful. The footnotes also contain "various readings" which refer to the most important differences between the text of Dr. Ginsburg (which our author employs) and other Hebrew texts.

6. We should also refer to the *appendices*, which contain brief but helpful notes on the most important themes. Among these might be mentioned the following subjects: "Special Note on the Psalms," marking their external features and essential characteristics, "Special Note on the Apocrypha," "The Authorship of Deuteronomy," "The Escape Goat," "The Hardening of Pharaoh's Heart," "Sin Offering; Sin Bearer."

7. The "Introduction" further contains a most interesting discussion of the "incomparable Name." The author's use of the form "Yahweh" instead of the form "Jehovah," "which was unknown until 1520," is particularly strong and convincing, while his explanation of the Name is most suggestive, indicating the meaning to be "He who becometh," and implying "Whatsoever I will, may, or can become."

The explanations contained in this most lucid "Introduction" are all clearly understood by a single glance at a page of the printed text, and it may be of interest to conclude this brief review by the author's rendering of the Twenty-fourth Psalm:

PSALM 24.

David's. A Melody.

1. To <Yahweh> belongeth
The earth and the fullness thereof,
The world, and they who dwell therein;
2. For ||he|| <upon> the seas hath founded it,
And <upon the currents> doth make it firm.
3. Who shall ascend the mountain of Yahweh?
And who shall stand in his holy' place?
4. ||The clean of hands,
And pure of heart,—
Who hath not uplifted, to falsehood, his soul,
Nor sworn deceitfully||
5. Shall bear away a blessing from Yahweh,
And righteousness from his delivering God.
6. ||This|| is the generation of them who inquire of him,
Who seek thy face, O God of Jacob. (Selah.)
7. Lift up, O ye gates, your heads,
And lift yourselves up, ye age-abiding' doors
That the king of glory may come in.
8. Who' is the king of glory?
Yahweh, strong and mighty,
Yahweh, mighty in war.
9. Lift up, O ye gates, your heads,
Yea lift (them) up, ye age-abiding' doors,
That the king of glory may come in.
10. Who' then is' the king of glory?
| Yahweh of hosts |,
||He|| is the king of glory. (Selah).


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CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

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1. The first part of the document is a list of names and addresses of the members of the committee.

2. The second part of the document is a list of names and addresses of the members of the committee.



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